Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Sofia Barriga filed this lawsuit against 99 Cents Only Stores LLC, (99 Cents) individually, and on behalf of similarly situated current and former nonexempt employees of 99 Cents hired before October 1, 1999, pleading various Labor Code violations and violation of the unfair competition law. Plaintiff alleged 99 Cents had a zero-tolerance policy that required its stores to lock their doors at closing time, therefore, forcing nonexempt, nonmanagerial employees, who worked the graveyard shift and clock out for their meal break or at the end of their shift, to wait for as long as 15 minutes for a manager with a key to let them out of the store. According to plaintiff, 99 Cents did not pay its employees for the time they had to wait be let out, and the policy denied employees their full half-hour meal break. Plaintiff moved the trial court to certify two classes: (1) “Off the Clock Class,” and (2) “Meal Period Class.” 99 Cents opposed the certification motion, contending there was no community of interests among putative class members, and the lack of common issues among putative class members would render a class action unmanageable. Plaintiff moved to strike 174 declarations of employee declarants who were members of the proposed classes on the grounds the process by which they had been obtained was improper, and because they were substantively inconsistent with the subsequent deposition testimony of 12 of declarants. Concluding it lacked the statutory authority to strike the declarations, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to strike. And, based on all 174 declarations, the court concluded plaintiff had not demonstrated a community of interests or a commonality of issues among putative class members. Plaintiff appealed those orders. The Court of Appeal found the record demonstrated the trial court in this case was unaware of the need to scrutinize 99 Cents’ declarations carefully, and was either unaware of or misunderstood the scope of its discretion to either strike or discount the weight to be given the 174 declarations, including the declarations of employees who were not members of the putative classes, if it concluded they were obtained under coercive or abusive circumstances. The orders denying plaintiff’s motion to strike 99 Cents’ declarations and class certification motion were reversed, and the matter remanded for reconsideration. View "Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC" on Justia Law

The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) granted University Professional and Technical Employees' (UPTE's) petition for unit modification to add a new classification, systems administrators, into a preexisting bargaining unit. The University of California refused to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment for systems administrators. PERB granted UPTE's unfair practice charge against the University. The University appealed, arguing that the systems administrator classification did not share a community of interest with the existing bargaining unit as required under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (Gov. Code 3560) and that PERB erred in not requiring proof of majority support by the unrepresented systems administrators subject to the unit modification petition.The court of appeal denied the petition. PERB’s finding that a community of interest exists is supported by substantial evidence. The job descriptions reflect a similarity in “common skills” and “job duties” between systems administrators and employees in the unit. The University fails to cite any evidence suggesting a disparity between the job descriptions and the employees’ actual skill sets. PERB properly counted the number of systems administrators at the time the petition was filed; PERB’s holding that it lacked the discretion to require proof of majority support from UPTE was not clearly erroneous. View "Regents of the University of California v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Konica service technicians, were required to drive their personal vehicles, containing Konica’s tools and parts, to customer sites. Technicians did not report to an office but usually drove from home to the first customer of the day and, at the end of the day, from the last customer to home. Plaintiffs sought wages for time spent commuting to and from the first and last work locations and reimbursement for mileage incurred during those commutes. The court determined that the commute time was not compensable, citing wage order 4-2001 and Labor Code 2802. The court of appeal reversed. If carrying tools and parts in a technician’s personal vehicle during the commute was optional, then the technician was not “subject to the control of [defendant]” for purposes of determining “hours worked.” Even if a technician was required “as a practical matter” to carry tools and parts during the commute, the technician would not be “subject to the control of [defendant]” during the commute if the technician was able to use the time effectively for the technician’s own purposes. However, if a technician was required during the commute to carry a volume of tools and parts that did not allow the technician to use ‘the time effectively for his own purposes, the technician would be “subject to the control of [defendant]” for purposes of determining “hours worked” and entitlement to wages. There are triable issues of material fact regarding those issues. View "Oliver v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

The Private Attorney General Act (Labor Code 2698) allows an employee, as a proxy for state enforcement agencies, to sue an employer on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees for Labor Code violations. When the parties have an arbitration agreement, California law blocks the employer from enforcing that agreement with respect to representative PAGA claims for civil penalties; the agreement may be enforceable with respect to other claims, including claims for victim-specific relief (like unpaid wages). Lime rents electric scooters. Olabi entered into an agreement to locate, recharge, and redeploy Lime's scooters. The agreement required the parties to arbitrate “any and all disputes,” including Olabi’s classification as an independent contractor but contained an exception for PAGA representative actions.Olabi sued, alleging Lime intentionally misclassified him and others as independent contractors, resulting in Labor Code violations; he included claims under the Unfair Competition Law and PAGA. Lime petitioned to compel arbitration, arguing Olabi was required to arbitrate independent contractor classification disputes and that the PAGA exception did not cover the unfair competition claim or the PAGA claim to the extent that Olabi sought victim-specific relief. Olabi voluntarily dismissed his unfair competition claim and disavowed any claim for victim-specific relief. The trial court denied Lime’s petition and granted Olabi leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed. The language of the arbitration agreement broadly excludes PAGA actions View "Olabi v. Neutron Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Gutierrez, a former Brand employee, sued Brand in a proposed class action for nonpayment of pre-shift employer-mandated travel time, citing Labor Code and Business and Professions Code provisions. The trial court granted Brand summary judgment before class certification, finding that a complete defense existed under California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 16-2001, section 5(D). According to the court, the provision permitted union-represented employees and their employers to enter into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) that waived the right to all compensation for employer-mandated travel time. The court found that the applicable CBAs, as amended by a 2017 letter of understanding, confirmed a bargained-for practice wherein Brand compensated its employees for post-shift but not pre-shift mandatory travel time.The court of appeal reversed. Wage Order 16 does not state that union-represented employees and employers can avoid paying any compensation whatsoever for employer-mandated travel time. Section 5(A) identifies two rates of pay, the employee’s regular rate and, if applicable, the premium rate and provides that it applies to any employees covered by a valid CBA “unless the [CBA] expressly provides otherwise.” Section 5 does not mention, much less override, the separate requirement under section 4(B) that employees receive compensation “not less than the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked.” View "Gutierrez v. Brand Energy Services of California" on Justia Law

Defendant ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (ReadyLink) was a nurse staffing company that placed nurses in hospitals, typically on a short-term basis. Plaintiff State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF) was a public enterprise fund created by statute as a workers' compensation insurer. Premiums that SCIF charged were based in part on the employer's payroll for a particular insurance year. SCIF and ReadyLink disputed the final amount of premium ReadyLink owed to SCIF for the 2005 policy year (September 1, 2005 to September 1, 2006). ReadyLink considered certain payments made to its nurses as per diem payments; SCIF felt those should have been considered as payroll under the relevant workers' compensation regulations. The Insurance Commissioner concurred with SCIF's characterization of the payments. A trial court rejected ReadyLink's petition for a writ of administrative mandamus to prohibit the Insurance Commissioner from enforcing its decision, and an appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. SCIF subsequently filed the action underlying this appeal, later moving for a judgment on the pleadings, claiming the issue of the premium ReadyLink owed for the 2005 policy year had been previously determined in the administrative proceedings, which was then affirmed after judicial review. The trial court granted SCIF's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal, ReadyLink conceded it previously litigated and lost its challenge to SCIF's decision to include per diem amounts as payroll for the 2005 insurance year, but argued it never had the opportunity to challenge whether SCIF otherwise properly calculated the premium amount that it claims was due pursuant to the terms of the contract between the parties, or whether SCIF's past conduct, which ReadyLink alleged included SCIF's acceptance of ReadyLink's exclusions of its per diem payments from payroll in prior policy years and SCIF's exclusion of per diem amounts in paying out on workers' compensation claims filed by ReadyLink employees, might bar SCIF from being entitled to collect that premium amount under the contract. To this, the Court of Appeal concurred the trial court erred in granting SCIF's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "State Comp. Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

When the Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules 2.01 and 12.02(B) are read together, their plain meaning is that so long as the probationer is engaged in the duties of "a position or positions" she is not "absent from duty." Plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, challenges his employer's practice of extending probation while investigating the deputy's claimed misconduct as violating the rules.The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's issuance of a writ of mandate directing the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to reinstate the deputy as a permanent civil service employee. The court held that the plain language of the rules does not authorize the department's practice of extending probation by re-assigning deputies under investigation to administrative duty. In this case, plaintiff became a permanent civil service employee 12 months after his probation began. Furthermore, the County's arguments premised upon avoiding absurd and impractical interpretations are unpersuasive. The court also agreed that plaintiff did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Trejo v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Jarboe was hired by DKD of Davis, doing business as Hanlees Davis Toyota. Shortly after he began working, Jarboe was transferred to Leehan of Davis, doing business as Hanlees Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Kia. Following his termination at Leehan, Jarboe brought a wage and hour action against the Hanlees Auto Group, its 12 affiliated dealerships, including DKD and Leehan, and three individuals. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement between Jarboe and DKD. The trial court granted the motion as to 11 of the 12 causes of action against DKD of Davis but denied the motion as to the other defendants and allowed Jarboe’s claim under the Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code 2698. to proceed in court against all defendants. The court refused to stay the causes of action allowed to proceed in litigation pending arbitration of Jarboe’s claims against DKD. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument by Hanlees, its affiliated dealerships, and the individual defendants that they were entitled to enforce the agreement to arbitrate between Jarboe and DKD as third party beneficiaries of Jarboe’s employment agreement or under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The trial court did not err in failing to stay the litigation under Labor Code section 1281. View "Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group" on Justia Law

Justice, employed as a workers’ compensation claims adjuster since 1991, fell at work in 2011 and injured her left knee. She later developed problems in her right knee, which was found to be a compensable consequence of the first injury. In 2012-2013 Justice had total bilateral knee replacement. Dr. Anderson, an orthopedic surgeon, testified that there was significant preinjury degeneration in both knees, that knee replacement was not required because of the meniscus tear, and that the fall “hasten[ed]” the need for knee replacement by “lighting up the underlying pathology.” Anderson apportioned 50 percent of the bilateral knee disability to the nonindustrial, preexisting degeneration. The workers’ compensation judge determined that Justice had sustained permanent partial disability of 48 percent, worth $59,110.00, stating that “the need for these surgeries was at least partially non-industrial. … the surgeries appear to have significantly increased [Justice’s] ability to walk and engage in weight-bearing activities. The judge stated that before the 2017 Hikida decision, he would have awarded permanent disability with 50% apportionment but that Hikida precluded apportionment. The Appeals Board affirmed.The court of appeal annulled the decision. Justice's permanent disability should have been apportioned between industrial and nonindustrial causes. Hikida, in which a medical treatment resulted in a new compensable consequential injury, is distinguishable. Here, there was unrebutted substantial medical evidence that Justice’s permanent disability was caused, in part, by preexisting pathology. Apportionment was required. Whether or not the workplace injury “directly caused” the need for surgery, the apportionment statutes demand that the disability be sorted among direct and indirect causal factors. View "County of Santa Clara v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding any attorney fees to plaintiff. Labor Code section 218.5 mandates an attorney fee award in any action brought for the nonpayment of wages, if any party requests them at the initiation of the action. Furthermore, Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1255, held that a plaintiff cannot obtain attorney fees in an action for failure to provide rest breaks or meal periods. In this case, there was no basis for the trial court's award of fees where the only wage and hour claims alleged and litigated were for rest break and meal period violations.The court held that plaintiff's claim that it must affirm the judgment because defendants presented an inadequate record for judicial review is unfounded. The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that the predicate misconduct of her wage and hour claims was not rest period violations, but rather failure to pay earned wages. The court explained that this theory was reflected nowhere in the record of the attorney fee proceedings—until plaintiff filed her reply papers. In those reply papers, plaintiff cited no evidence of any work performed before the settlement that referred to or suggested the existence of a claim or cause of action for failure to pay earned wages. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment to the extent it awarded attorney fees to plaintiff, remanding for entry of a new and different judgment denying recovery of attorney fees. View "Betancourt v. OS Restaurant Services, LLC" on Justia Law