Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For more than 10 years, Land worked as a field service specialist for DISH Network. After a customer complaint in 2015, Land’s supervisor filled out an “Employee Consultation” form that stated it was a “Final written notice” issued “due to policy violation: Falsification of Company records.” On the day before Land signed the consultation form, Dish received another customer complaint. Land admitted, “going to the customer’s home off the clock and taking his daughters.” The second consultation form indicated that it was a termination notice. Land applied for unemployment benefitsAn ALJ determined Land was ineligible for benefits because he had been discharged for breaking “a reasonable employer rule.” Land maintained he was unaware of any Dish policy forbidding employees from giving out their personal contact information to customers and from performing work during off-hours. He claimed he had gone back to the customer’s house to prevent a trouble call and to save the company money. The Appeals Board adopted the ALJ’s findings.The court of appeal reversed the denial of Land’s petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. The Appeals Board prejudicially abused its discretion in refusing to consider additional evidence proffered by Land. While the Board has considerable discretion in allowing or refusing to consider new evidence, the evidence was a customer’s declaration that would have “effectively refuted” the chronology of events set forth by the ALJ and adopted by the Board. View "Land v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The court of appeal previously concluded that San Francisco’s procedural approach to punishing Morgado for misconduct violated the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act by not providing a valid avenue for administrative appeal of his 2011 termination from his police employment and affirmed a 2014 injunction directing the city to vacate Morgado’s termination and reinstate him pending administrative appeal. Morgado was reinstated but was suspended without pay retroactive to his 2011 termination. In 2018 he obtained an order holding San Francisco in contempt for failure to comply with the injunction and requiring the city to vacate “unconditionally” Morgado’s termination and suspension, compensate him with front pay and benefits lost, and “refrain from ... any other action” against Morgado.San Francisco offset the payment owed to him based on his post-termination earnings from side income as a mortgage broker, a deduction of $181,402. Morgado obtained a second order of contempt, directing the city to pay Morgado the amount deducted and to re-assign him to administrative duties. The court of appeal vacated that order as not resting upon a “clear, intentional violation of a specific, narrowly drawn order.” The trial court again found the deduction inapplicable and ordered the city to pay the amount deducted. The court of appeal reversed, citing precedent that entitles the city to deductions for Morgado’s side income, and remanded for recalculation of the amount. View "Morgado v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying the employer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the employee demonstrated his assent to the arbitration clause by signing the acknowledgment, and the employer had no duty to call the arbitration agreement to the employee's attention. The court found that provisions in the arbitration clause concerning arbitrator's fees and costs and attorney fees are unenforceable, but they may be severed, and the rest of the agreement is enforceable. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is directed to sever the offending provisions concerning arbitration fees and costs and attorney fees from the agreement and otherwise grant the motion to compel arbitration. View "Conyer v. Hula Media Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), an employee aggrieved by his or her employer's Labor Code violations may be authorized to act as an agent of the LWDA to recover such penalties in a civil action. In the cases underlying these consolidated appeals, Plaintiffs Starks and Herrera, each acting as the LWDA's agent, separately filed substantially identical PAGA actions against their former employer, Vortex. Starks eventually settled with Vortex and Herrera moved to vacate the judgment and intervene in the Starks action.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Herrera's motion to intervene in the Starks action was untimely. The court also held that, because the LWDA accepted the proceeds from the judgment in the Starks action, Herrera, as the LWDA's agent, cannot attack that judgment. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the Herrera action, because Herrera's PAGA claim, in substance, is encompassed within the Starks judgment, and thus its maintenance is barred by the LWDA's acceptance of the benefits of the Starks judgment. View "Starks v. Vortex Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Davis filed sued individual Red Bull executives for age and sexual harassment and hostile work environment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Davis was 56 years old, had been employed by Red Bull for 15 years, and was in a mid-level managerial sales position until he was terminated.Red Bull filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. The individual defendants moved to compel Davis to submit his claims to arbitration. Davis filed a separate lawsuit against Red Bull seeking a declaratory judgment that his claims were not subject to the arbitration agreement. That agreement specifies it is “intended to cover all civil claims which involve or relate in any way to [Davis’s] employment (or termination of employment) with Red Bull, including, but not limited to, claims of employment discrimination or harassment on the basis of . . . sex, age, . . . claims for wrongful discharge, [and] claims for emotional distress.”The trial court concluded and the court of appeal affirmed that the agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The court noted the "adhesion" nature of the agreement, which is not mutual and the arbitral discovery process does not guarantee adequate discovery. View "Davis v. Kozak" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner and operator of four massage parlors, received three citations from the Department for violations of California's wage and hour laws. The hearing officer issued findings and an order affirming all three citations, including a total of $198,576 in unpaid wages and liquidated damages for citation no. WA-102321. Plaintiff's subsequent petition for writ of mandate challenging the Commissioner's decision affirming the assessments in citation no. WA-102321 was dismissed by the superior court after his request that it waive the bond requirement under Labor Code section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3) was denied and he failed to post a bond.The Court of Appeal affirmed and explained that, although section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3), now requires employers to post a bond as a condition to filing a petition for writ of mandate challenging the Labor Commissioner's citations, employers' substantive, preenactment obligations toward their employees under the Labor Code have not changed. All that changed is the addition of the procedural requirement that plaintiff post a bond to secure payment of the assessed amounts. Therefore, application of that requirement to a proceeding that had not yet been initiated prior to the effective date of section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3), does not constitute a retroactive application of the statute. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request to waive the bond requirement. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the trial court's finding that he was not indigent was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Fushan Li v. Department of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

Jarboe was hired by DKD. Shortly after he began working, Jarboe was transferred to Leehan. Following his termination at Leehan, Jarboe brought this wage and hour action individually and on behalf of a putative class against the Hanlees Auto Group, its 12 affiliated dealerships (each us a separate corporate entity), including DKD and Leehan, and three individuals. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement between Jarboe and DKD. The trial court granted the motion as to 11 of the 12 causes of action against DKD but denied the motion as to the other defendants. The trial court allowed Jarboe’s claim under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Labor Code section 2698, to proceed in court against all defendants. The trial court refused to stay the litigation pending arbitration of Jarboe’s claims against DKD. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the other defendants are entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement between Jarboe and DKD as third party beneficiaries of Jarboe’s employment agreement or under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. View "Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Virginia Arnold appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, defendant-respondent Dignity Health (Dignity) and other individually named defendants. Arnold was employed as a medical assistant. She alleged defendants engaged in discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on her age and her association with her African-American coworkers, including by terminating her employment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). On summary judgment, the trial court concluded defendants provided evidence of legitimate reasons for plaintiff’s termination and, in rebuttal, plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that defendants’ actions were discriminatory, harassing, or retaliatory. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court's findings and affirmed summary judgment. View "Arnold v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Robinson worked as a truck driver for Southern in 2015-2017. In 2018, after filing a notice with the California Labor Workforce Development Agency, he filed suit under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code 2698), alleging that Southern denied Robinson and other employees meal and rest breaks, and, as a result, failed to pay timely wages, furnish complete and accurate wage statements, and pay all wages due upon termination.The San Diego County Superior Court subsequently approved a settlement in a class action that sought individual damages and civil penalties under PAGA for the same alleged Labor Code violations (Gutierrez), which covered all persons employed by Southern in certain jobs, 2013-2018. Robinson and three other employees opted out of the class settlement. Robinson amended the allegations of his complaint to represent Southern employees who opted out of the Gutierrez settlement and persons who were employed by Southern from January 27, 2018, to the present. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the case. Robinson is barred from bringing a PAGA action asserting the same claims that were settled in Gutierrez and lacks standing to bring a representative action on behalf of employees employed during the time period when he was no longer employed by Southern. View "Robinson v. Southern Counties Oil Co." on Justia Law

Daisy Arias suffered sustained, egregious sexual harassment for most of the time she was employed by defendant-petitioner, Blue Fountain Pools & Spas, Inc. The primary culprit was defendant-petitioner, Sean Lagrave, a salesman who worked in the same office as Arias. Arias says Lagrave did everything from repeatedly asking her for dates to grabbing her and describing "his own sexual prowess." Arias complained about Lagrave’s conduct repeatedly over the course of her employment, but things came to a head on April 21, 2017: Lagrave yelled at Arias in front of coworkers, used gender slurs, and then physically assaulted her, bumping her chest with his own. Arias called the police and later left work. Arias told the owner, defendant-petitioner, Farhad Farhadian, she wasn’t comfortable returning to work with Lagrave. Farhadian did nothing initially, refused to remove Lagrave, then terminated Arias’s health insurance, and finally told Arias to pick up her final paycheck. Though Farhadian claimed Arias had quit, she says she was fired. Arias filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing and received a right to sue letter on August 14, 2017. She then filed this lawsuit alleging, relevant to this appeal, hostile work environment sex discrimination and failure to prevent sexual harassment. Petitioners moved for summary judgment, seeking, among other things, to have the hostile work environment claim dismissed as time-barred and the failure to prevent harassment claim dismissed as having an insufficient basis after limiting the allegations to the conduct that wasn’t time-barred. The trial court concluded Arias had created a genuine issue of material fact as to all her causes of action and denied the motion. Petitioners brought a petition for writ of mandate, renewing their statute of limitations argument, claiming Arias could not establish a continuing violation because she admitted she had concluded further complaints were futile. The Court of Appeal concluded Arias has shown she could establish a continuing violation with respect to all the complained of conduct that occurred during Farhadian’s ownership of the company. Further, the Court determined there was a factual dispute over whether and when Arias’s employer made clear no action would be taken and whether a reasonable employee would have concluded complaining more was futile: "that question must be resolved by a jury." The Court denied petitioners' request for mandamus relief and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Blue Fountain Pools and Spas Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law