Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dominique Keeton, an employee of Tesla, Inc., filed a lawsuit against her employer alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The parties agreed to resolve the dispute through arbitration as per their employment agreement. However, when Tesla failed to pay its arbitration fees within the stipulated 30-day window, Keeton moved to vacate the order submitting the dispute to arbitration. The trial court granted Keeton's motion, ruling that Tesla had materially breached the arbitration agreement, thereby allowing Keeton to proceed with her claims in court.Tesla appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in granting Keeton's motion to vacate. Tesla's arguments were threefold: the arbitration agreement delegated issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator; the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts the relevant section of the California Code of Civil Procedure; and the same section of the California Code of Civil Procedure constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of the arbitration agreement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, disagreed with Tesla's arguments and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that the arbitration agreement did not clearly delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. It also held that the FAA did not preempt the relevant section of the California Code of Civil Procedure, and that this section did not unconstitutionally impair the arbitration agreement. The court concluded that Tesla had materially breached the arbitration agreement by failing to pay its arbitration fees within the stipulated time, and thus Keeton was entitled to proceed with her claims in court. View "Keeton v. Tesla" on Justia Law

The case involves Lusardi Construction Company (Lusardi), a prime contractor, and its subcontractor, Pro Works Contracting Inc. (Pro Works). Pro Works violated certain Labor Code provisions by failing to hire apprentices for a construction project. The Department of Industrial Relations and the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) cited Pro Works for these violations and ordered Lusardi to pay penalties. Lusardi's administrative appeal was unsuccessful, and it subsequently filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which the superior court denied. Lusardi argued that the superior court erroneously concluded that it knew of Pro Works's violations and that the joint and several liability provision applied.The Superior Court of San Diego County affirmed the DLSE's decision, concluding that Lusardi had knowledge of Pro Works's violations and was liable for the penalties. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the findings relating to the amount of the penalty assessment. The court rejected Lusardi's claim of due process violations, stating that Lusardi was put on notice of the potential for being held jointly and severally liable for Pro Works’s apprentice hiring violations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the superior court did not err in interpreting the statute, which provides two inclusive and alternative ways for imposing liability on a prime contractor for penalties resulting from the subcontractor’s violations. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the penalty imposed. The court concluded that Lusardi was not denied due process when it refused to enforce its subpoena or ask for a continuance to secure the witness’s attendance. View "Lusardi Construction Co. v. Dept. of Industrial Rel." on Justia Law

The case involves the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association (LACERA) and the County of Los Angeles. LACERA, a public employee retirement system, sued the County over the authority to set employment classifications and salaries for its employees. LACERA argued that under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (CERL) and the California Constitution, it had the authority to create employment classifications and set salaries for its employees. The County disagreed, asserting that it had the authority to set employment classifications and salaries for all county employees, including those of LACERA.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sided with the County, following a 2003 decision, Westly v. Board of Administration, which held that the broad authority granted to retirement boards was not broad enough to give them the power to establish employment classifications and set salaries for their employees.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the Westly decision was inconsistent with the language, purpose, and intent of Proposition 162, a 1992 voter initiative that gave governing boards of public employee retirement systems “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and administration of the system.” The court concluded that this plenary authority included the power to create employment classifications and set salaries for employees of the retirement system. The court also found that section 31522.1 of the CERL imposed a ministerial duty on a county board of supervisors to include in the county’s employment classifications and salary ordinance the classifications and salaries adopted by the board of a county public employee retirement system for employees of that system. The court reversed the judgment of the lower court. View "L.A. County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

The case involves Ryan Owen Frayo, a former employee of A&A Organic Farms Corporation (A&A), who was terminated for refusing to take a COVID-19 test. Frayo sued A&A and its owners, Andrew D. Martin and Aimee M. Raphael-Martin, alleging they violated the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA). Frayo claimed that his termination was a result of his refusal to provide a COVID-19 test result, which he argued was equivalent to refusing to sign an authorization for the release of his medical information under the CMIA. He also claimed that A&A used his description of his symptoms, which he considered as medical information, to terminate his employment.The trial court sustained A&A’s demurrer to Frayo’s first amended complaint, finding that Frayo failed to state a claim under the CMIA. The court concluded that Frayo failed to state a claim under section 56.20(b) of the CMIA because the statute prohibits employer discrimination based on an employee’s refusal to sign an authorization to release his medical information, not refusal to take a COVID-19 test. The court also sustained the demurrer to Frayo’s second cause of action under section 56.20(c) because Frayo failed to allege A&A had possession of his medical information, as defined by the statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that Frayo did not state a cognizable CMIA claim under either section 56.20(b) or (c). The court found that Frayo's refusal to take and provide the results of a COVID-19 test was not equivalent to an "employee’s refusal to sign an authorization" under the CMIA. Furthermore, the court concluded that Frayo failed to allege that A&A was in possession of his medical information as defined under the CMIA. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "Frayo v. Martin" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an employment dispute between Nelida Soltero and Precise Distribution, Inc. Soltero, who was placed at Precise Distribution by a temporary staffing agency, Real Time Staffing Services, filed a class action complaint against Precise Distribution for alleged failure to provide required meal periods and rest breaks to employees, among other claims. Precise Distribution sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement between Soltero and Real Time. However, Real Time was not a party to the lawsuit.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied Precise Distribution's motion to compel arbitration. Precise Distribution argued that it should be able to compel arbitration under the agreement between Soltero and Real Time, despite not being a party to it, based on theories of equitable estoppel, third-party beneficiary, or agency.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that Precise Distribution was not a party to the arbitration agreement between Soltero and Real Time and could not compel arbitration based on the theories it proposed. The court found that Soltero's claims against Precise Distribution were not dependent upon or founded in the underlying contractual obligations of the agreement containing the arbitration clause. Furthermore, Precise Distribution was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement, and there was no evidence of an agency relationship between Precise Distribution and Real Time. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying Precise Distribution's motion to compel arbitration. View "Soltero v. Precise Distribution" on Justia Law

The case involves Edelmira Ibarra, a nonexempt employee who worked for Chuy & Sons Labor, Inc., Infinite Herbs, LLC, Baby Root Farms, and G.J. Farms, Inc. (collectively Defendants) from January to July 2021. Ibarra alleged that the Defendants violated several provisions of the Labor Code, including failing to maintain adequate staffing levels, giving too much work to employees, resulting in missed meal and rest periods without premium pay, and failing to reimburse employees for safety gloves and protective masks. Ibarra sent a prelitigation notice to the Defendants and the Labor Workforce and Development Agency (LWDA) in September 2021, alleging these violations on behalf of herself and all other current and former non-exempt employees of the Defendants in the State of California during the last four years.The trial court granted the Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Ibarra's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) action for failure to comply with PAGA's prefiling notice requirements. The court found Ibarra's prelitigation notice deficient because it did not adequately describe "aggrieved employees."The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the prelitigation notice need not further define "aggrieved employees" as long as it includes "the facts and theories" to support the alleged Labor Code violations and nonfrivolous allegations that other aggrieved employees exist. The court found that Ibarra's prelitigation notice met these requirements and was therefore sufficient. The court concluded that the trial court erred in finding the prelitigation notice deficient and dismissed Ibarra's PAGA action. The judgment was reversed, and Ibarra was allowed to recover costs on appeal. View "Ibarra v. Chuy & Sons Labor, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Maria Chavez, the widow of Leodegario Chavez Alvarado, who was employed by Alco Harvesting, LLC as a foreman and bus driver. Alco provided housing for Alvarado and other workers at the Hotel Santa Maria, where a COVID-19 outbreak occurred. Chavez alleged that Alco was aware of the outbreak but failed to report it to the health department, notify its employees, or implement adequate safety measures. Alvarado contracted COVID-19 and died from complications related to the disease. Chavez claimed that Alco's concealment of the outbreak and the nature of Alvarado's illness resulted in the aggravation of his condition, leading to his death.The trial court sustained Alco's demurrer to Chavez's second amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to Chavez's appeal. The trial court found that Chavez failed to plead sufficient facts under the fraudulent concealment exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six reviewed the case. The court construed the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as a final judgment. The court found that Chavez's second amended complaint sufficiently pleaded all elements of the fraudulent concealment exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. The court held that Alco knew that Alvarado had contracted COVID-19 from his employment and concealed that knowledge from him, thereby aggravating his illness. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the order granting Alco's demurrer and enter a new order overruling that demurrer. View "Chavez v. Alco Harvesting, LLC" on Justia Law

Carlos Ramirez, an employee, filed a class action lawsuit against his former employer, Golden Queen Mining Company, alleging various violations of the Labor Code and unfair competition. The employer moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion, stating that the employer failed to demonstrate the existence of an executed arbitration agreement. The employer appealed, arguing that it had made a prima facie showing that a written arbitration agreement existed and that Ramirez’s statements that he did not recall being presented with or signing an arbitration agreement were insufficient to rebut its initial showing.The Superior Court of Kern County had initially denied the employer's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that the employer failed to demonstrate the existence of an executed arbitration agreement. The court found that the employer's evidence, which included an unsigned arbitration agreement and a handbook acknowledgement purportedly signed by Ramirez, was insufficient to establish the existence of an arbitration agreement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that Ramirez did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the employer’s initial showing that an arbitration agreement existed. The court found that Ramirez's failure to recall signing the document did not create a factual dispute about the signature’s authenticity. The court also noted that Ramirez’s declaration did not state whether he had reviewed the arbitration agreement or other documents purportedly signed by him, nor did it address whether he recalled signing the handbook acknowledgement, which included a statement that he agreed to the terms of the arbitration agreement. The court therefore reversed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings to address Ramirez’s unconscionability defense. View "Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Ververka, who was employed as an administrator at a veterans home operated by the California Department of Veterans Affairs (CalVet). Ververka alleged that CalVet terminated him in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, which prohibits retaliation against whistleblowing employees. He claimed that he was dismissed for reporting safety and health issues at the home and potential violations of federal law. The jury found that while Ververka made protected disclosures that were contributing factors in CalVet's decision to remove him, CalVet was not liable as it proved it would have made the same decision for non-retaliatory reasons.After the trial court entered judgment for CalVet, Ververka moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that he was entitled to declaratory relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the analysis in Harris v. City of Santa Monica, a Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) case, did not extend to section 1102.5 claims, which are evaluated under the procedures set forth in section 1102.6.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division One, Ververka contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the judgment. He argued that an employer’s “same decision” showing under section 1102.6 precludes only an award of damages and backpay and an order of reinstatement, and as a result, he was entitled to declaratory relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The court disagreed with Ververka's interpretation of section 1102.6 and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, dismissing CalVet’s cross-appeal as moot. The court held that if the employer satisfies its burden at the second step in making a same decision showing, the employer is not liable regardless of whether the employee made an initial showing that his or her protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” in the adverse employment action. View "Ververka v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the International Association of Firefighters, Local 1319, AFL-CIO (Local 1319) and the City of Palo Alto (the city). In 2011, the city, facing a budget crisis, proposed an amendment to its city charter to alter a provision requiring certain labor disputes with its public safety unions to be submitted to binding interest arbitration. The city council adopted a resolution proposing the amendment, which was subsequently approved by city voters as "Measure D". However, the city did not consult with Local 1319 before proposing the amendment, which both the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and the appellate court later determined was a violation of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA).The trial court in the quo warranto proceedings agreed that the city violated the MMBA by enacting the resolution and submitting Measure D to the voters without prior good faith consultation with Local 1319. However, the trial court did not declare Measure D invalid. Instead, it issued a multi-step order that suspended the operation of the charter’s current dispute resolution procedures, required good faith consultation between the city and the public safety unions, and retained jurisdiction with the possibility of a future finding of invalidity of Measure D.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reversed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by not invalidating Measure D after finding that the city's submission of Measure D to the voters violated the MMBA. The appellate court directed the trial court on remand to enter a new judgment ordering the city to restore the pre-amendment portion of the city charter's article V, invalidating Measure D, and providing any other appropriate relief consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "P. ex rel. Internat. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Palo Alto" on Justia Law