Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgments granting petitions for writ of mandate filed by plaintiffs, former LAPD sergeants. The trial court ordered the city to vacate plaintiffs' terminations and provide them with the opportunity for an administrative appeal.The court held that the city's provision of a hearing before the Board of Rights was the administrative appeal Government Code section 3304, subdivision (b) requires. In this case, plaintiffs' Board hearings were not optional but mandated, because the police chief's selected sanction was the ultimate penalty of removal and the City of Los Angeles Charter required automatic Board review. The court explained that the Charter's requirement of a Board hearing when the chief selects removal bakes into the standard procedure what the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) requires: an administrative appeal for the officer to establish a formal record of the circumstances surrounding his removal, and to attempt to convince LAPD to change the sanction. The court declined to require more than POBRA mandates. View "Gonzalez v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In separate incidents, claimants Miguel Velazquez and Servando Velazquez suffered injuries within the scope of their employment, and each required Spanish language interpreting services in connection with their medical care. Meadowbrook Insurance Company was the workers’ compensation carrier for the claimants’ employers and accepted both claims and administered benefits. DFS Interpreting (“DFS”), which provided interpreter services to each claimant, timely submitted invoices to Meadowbrook for the services provided. Meadowbrook refused to pay the invoices DFS submitted. DFS objected to the insurance company’s explanations of review, but did not request a second review pursuant to Labor Code section 4603.2 (e) or California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 9792.5.5. Meadowbrook petitioned for writ of review of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board’s (WCAB) decision on reconsideration that liens held by DFS Interpreting (DFS) against Meadowbrook regarding unpaid invoices for interpreter services DFS provided to Meadowbrook’s insureds were not foreclosed by DFS’s failure to follow procedural rules. The Court of Appeal issued the writ, and held that DFS’s failure to comply with required procedures resulted in DFS’s bills being deemed satisfied. This result meant Meadowbrook was not liable for further payment. The Court annulled the WCAB’s decision to the contrary and remanded for further proceedings. View "Meadowbrook Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

SEIU filed an unfair practice charge with the PERB, alleging that the county's refusal to process its petition to represent nonphysician employees of medical clinics violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA). The MMBA governs employer-employee relations between public agencies and public employees. The ALJ found in favor of the county, but the PERB reversed and found that the county was a single employer, or in the alternative, a joint employer. The county contended that PERB had no jurisdiction because the county was not an employer within the meaning of the MMBA.The Court of Appeal denied the county's petition for extraordinary relief from PERB's decision, holding that substantial evidence supported PERB's finding that the county was a joint-employer of clinic employees. Among other things, the county exercised control over compensation and staffing decisions, and had ultimate control over the clinics' financial resources that pay for compensation and staffing. View "County of Ventura v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

GPP employed Le, a scientist, and disclosed to Le the proprietary formula for its trade secret product (a film that preserves lettuce) and the identity of an organic acid used in the product. Le signed a confidentiality agreement. After leaving GPP, Le formed a company and competed with GPP. In 2006, GPP and Le agreed to a stipulated permanent injunction to “fully and finally resolve all existing and potential differences” arising from Le’s use of GPP’s trade secret. In 2016, Le moved to modify or dissolve the stipulated permanent injunction, arguing that newly discovered facts—that citric acid was the previously undisclosed organic acid—demonstrated that GPP’s trade secret did not possess a commercial advantage; that GPP’s trade secret was previously publicly disclosed in a patent; and that the injunction’s language was overly broad and failed to provide adequate notice of the specific actions that were enjoined. The court of appeal affirmed a denial of relief. Le did not meet the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 533. There is sufficient evidence to support an implied determination that GPP has a valid trade secret. The injunction did not identify the precise formula or ingredients used in GPP’s trade secret, but its failure to do so did not mean that GPP’s description of its trade secret was not sufficiently clear. View "Global Protein Products, Inc. v. Le" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that Allergan was not entitled to summary adjudication of plaintiff's first cause of action for disability discrimination. The court held that plaintiff provided direct evidence of disability discrimination where Allergan terminated him because the temporary corporate benefits staffer mistakenly believed he was totally disabled and unable to work.The court held that Allergan was not entitled to summary adjudication of plaintiff's fourth cause of action for retaliation where plaintiff's emails would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that he sufficiently communicated to Allergan that he believed the way he was treated (i.e. ignored and not accommodated for his disability) was discriminatory. Furthermore, Allergan failed to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. The court held that plaintiff's fifth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and seventh cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy should survive summary adjudication for the same reasons as his causes of action for discrimination and retaliation. Accordingly, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate vacating the trial court's order to the extent it granted summary adjudication on these causes of action. View "Glynn v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was 43 years old when she began working for Defendants. She worked for approximately 15 years before retiring at age 58 due to rheumatoid arthritis. In 2000, Plaintiff successfully applied for disability retirement. Years later, Plaintiff brought a putative class action lawsuit, alleging that Defendants discriminate on the basis of age in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, 12900) by providing reduced disability retirement benefits to older employees who took disability retirement after working for the City for less than 22.22 years. Plaintiff alleged that she became aware her retirement benefits were based on her age after seeing an advertisement on or about July 20, 2017, more than 17 years after her retirement. The court dismissed on the ground that Plaintiff did not file a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing within one year of the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. The court of appeal reversed. The disparate treatment and disparate impact claims were timely with respect to the allegedly discriminatory disability retirement payments that Plaintiff received within one year of the date on which she filed her DFEH complaint. View "Carroll v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

O’Grady, a banquet server and bartender at Defendant’s San Francisco ballroom, brought a putative class action, challenging Defendant’s practice of automatically imposing a 21 percent “service charge” to every food and beverage banquet bill. Plaintiff claims part of the money collected as service charges is kept by Defendant, with the rest distributed to “managers and other non-service employees.” Plaintiff alleged that the service charge constituted a gratuity and that Defendant “failed to distribute the total proceeds of [these] gratuities to non-managerial banquet service employees” as required by Labor Code section 351, enforceable under the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200. Plaintiff argued that It is typical in the hospitality industry that establishments impose gratuity charges in the range of 18- 22% of the food and beverage bill, so customers paying these charges reasonably believed they were gratuities to be paid to the service staff. The complaint also alleged “Intentional Interference with Advantageous Relations” and breach of implied contract. The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of the complaint. There is no categorical prohibition why what is called a service charge cannot also meet the statutory definition of a gratuity. Labor Code provisions concerning compensation and working conditions are to be liberally construed in favor of employees. View "O'Grady v. Merchant Exchange Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

TWC operated a Walnut Creek Toyota dealership. The Davises sought employment at TWC, to run its special finance department. The Davises are African-American, and Donald Davis is over the age of 40. The Davises were required to sign agreements providing that the Davises agreed to arbitration. The three agreements are all different. After the Davises became employed, TWC hired a new General Manager, Colon. The Davises claim that Colon “began to systematically undermine [the Davises’s] programs,” an effort “punctuated by shockingly inappropriate ageist and racist comments to and about them.” The Davises eventually resigned, filed complaints with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, and obtained right to sue letters. The defendants filed an unsuccessful petition to compel arbitration. The court found there was an agreement to arbitrate, but found both procedural and substantive unconscionability. The court of appeal affirmed, noting TWC’s “lack of candor” concerning the agreements. The court noted the “take it or leave it” pressure under which the agreements were signed, the inconsistency between the agreements, how hard it would be for a layman to read the agreements, and the inclusion of broad provisions in violation of public policy. View "Davis v. TWC Dealer Group, Inc." on Justia Law

School bus driver Colleen Knowles sought workers' compensation from her employer, Mountain Empire Unified School District (the District). The District was a self-insured employer under the workers' compensation scheme, and its workers' compensation claims were administered through the San Diego County Schools Risk Management Joint Powers Authority (JPA). JPA purchased excess workers' compensation insurance to cover claims exceeding a set retention. The District was an additional insured under those policies. When a dispute over compensation arose, Knowles and the District petitioned the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). An administrative law judge ultimately approved their stipulation that Knowles suffered a "specific" injury in 2003. The distinction between a "cumulative" and a "specific" injury was pertinent for determining which of JPA's excess insurance policies was triggered. As JPA's excess insurer during the stipulated injury date, Kemper Insurance Company (Kemper) indemnified JPA until it went insolvent. JPA then approached California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA), a statutorily created insolvency insurer of last resort, to make up what Kemper had failed to pay. CIGA was only obligated to pay "covered claims," defined to exclude claims for which other insurance was available. On this basis CIGA denied coverage, claiming Knowles suffered a cumulative injury, which meant that JPA might recover from a different excess insurer (other than Kemper). CIGA sued JPA and the District (collectively, defendants) for declaratory relief, asserting that because Knowles suffered a cumulative injury, JPA's claim was not a "covered claim." In their cross-complaint, defendants sought reimbursement from CIGA of benefit payments made to Knowles after Kemper went insolvent. The Court of Appeal concluded that based on the purpose of excess insurance, the superior court had jurisdiction to characterize Knowles's injury in this action differently than was reflected in the WCAB stipulation. The Court reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to enter a new order denying defendants' JPA and the District's motions for summary judgment. View "Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. San Diego County Schools etc." on Justia Law

McCormick, working as a Lake County appraiser, developed medical symptoms, including pain, fatigue, and dizziness, that seemed to be caused by her office environment. After her employer denied her request to work in a different location, she applied for disability retirement. Adopting the decision of an administrative law judge, the Board of Administration of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) denied her application on the basis that her condition did not prevent her from performing her job duties at a theoretical different location. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeal reversed. Employees are eligible for CalPERS disability retirement under Government Code section 21156 when, due to a disability, they can no longer perform their usual duties at the only location where their employer will allow them to work, even if they might be able to perform those duties at a theoretical different location. Her usual duties required McCormick to work in the Lakeport courthouse, and whether she could have performed her duties elsewhere is irrelevant to her eligibility for disability retirement under section 21156. View "McCormick v. California Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law