Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for class certification in an employee misclassification case against his former employer, and the trial court's order terminating depositions of class members. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion for class certification based on issues of predominance and superiority. In this case, the record contained evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding that variations between the hundreds of properties the 228 putative class members were responsible for would command individual inquiries. Similarly, the evidence to support the trial court's superiority determination was largely the same as evidence supporting the predominance determination. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated depositions of putative class members whose declarations the employer submitted in opposition to plaintiff's motion for class certification. View "Modaraei v. Action Property Management, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, SFSU hired Gupta, an American woman of Indian ancestry, as a tenure-track assistant professor. In 2009, Gupta and other women of color in the School of Social Work raised issues concerning “hostile work environment” and discrimination. Two months later, Gupta received a critical fourth-year review. Shortly thereafter, Gupta sent emails to a colleague complaining that her workplace was hostile towards women of color. Her supervisor told Gupta “I know about [the emails] ... I’m going to get even.” Another professor witnessed the exchange. After being denied early tenure Gupta filed an EEOC complaint and a federal lawsuit. An arbitrator ordered SFSU to review Gupta for tenure the following year. Despite excellent evaluations and recommendations, Gupta was denied tenure; her supervisor made threatening remarks to a colleague who questioned the decision. SFSU granted tenure to Dr. J.H., another School of Social Work professor, who had not filed a complaint. Gupta’s scores were better than J.H.’s scores and Gupta had more than double the minimum publication requirement, while J.H. had not met that requirement. SFSU terminated Gupta’s employment in 2014.A jury awarded Gupta $378,461 for retaliation; the court awarded $587,160.75 in attorney fees and costs. SFSU has reinstated Gupta as a tenured professor. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in: allowing Gupta to present evidence of a “comparator professor” without requiring her to show her qualifications were clearly superior; refusing to give a special jury instruction regarding comparator evidence; and intervening in the questioning of witnesses in a manner that favored Gupta. View "Gupta v. Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and a class of former and current employees filed suit against Spectrum, alleging meal break violations under Labor Code section 226.7, seeking premium wages, derivative remedies, itemized wage statement penalties, and attorney fees.The Court of Appeal held that at-will, on-call, hourly, nonexempt employees who are paid for on-duty meal periods are also entitled to premium wages if the employer does not have a written agreement that includes an on-duty meal period revocation clause; unpaid premium wages for meal break violations accrue prejudgment interest at seven percent; unpaid premium wages for meal break violations do not entitle employees to additional remedies pursuant to sections 203 and 226 if their pay or pay statements during the course of the violations include the wages earned for on-duty meal breaks, but not the unpaid premium wages; without section 226 penalties, attorney fees pursuant to section 226, subdivision (e) may not be awarded; and the trial court prejudicially erred in denying certification of a rest break class. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employers for unpaid wages as a live-in caretaker for her employers' children. In 2014, the Legislature passed the Domestic Workers Bill of Rights (DWBR) to provide personal attendants with overtime protection beginning January 1, 2014.The Court of Appeal held that, because personal attendants were exempt from overtime requirements before 2014, California law in effect at the time did not limit the number of hours a personal attendant's salary could cover, except to require that it pay at least the minimum wage of $8 per hour for each hour worked. In this case, the parties did not dispute the trial court's finding that they did not agree to an hourly rate, and nothing in the record demonstrates they agreed plaintiff would work a set number of hours per week. Therefore, the court held that the trial court erred when it presumed plaintiff's monthly salary compensated her for only 45 hours of work per week. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for recalculation of the unpaid wages plaintiff was owed for work she performed from April 2010 through December 2013 applying an $8 per hour rate of pay for each hour she worked. View "Liday v. Sim" on Justia Law

After the City filed suit against plaintiffs from their jobs as hearing examiners at the Department of Transportation, they filed suit alleging violations of the Bane Act and a claim for whistleblower retaliation. The jury found for plaintiffs and the trial court assessed a penalty under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), awarding them attorney fees.The court held that plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of retaliation; assumed that the City established legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for firing plaintiffs; and held that there was evidence to support the jury's finding that the City's proffered reasons for firing plaintiffs were pretextual. In this case, there was evidence plaintiffs were not fired because of how they conducted hearings or for behavioral problems. Rather, a jury could have reasonably inferred that the City was punishing plaintiffs for their prior complaints. The court rejected the City's contention that the penalty award must be reversed based on plaintiffs' failure to comply with prefiling notice requirements, and held that attorney fees were appropriately awarded under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Finally, the court held that it need not reach the Bane Act issues. View "Hawkins v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Wilfert Williams sued defendant Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, LLC in a common law tort action for failing to hire him due to his race. His complaint also alleged discrimination under the Unruh and Ralph Civil Rights Acts and that defendant engaged in unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200. From April 2014 through July 2015, plaintiff catered meals to the visiting and home team players at Raley Field, home of defendant’s minor league baseball team. He was hired by the visitor clubhouse manager, Wayne Brown, and the home clubhouse manager to do so. He also helped Brown with meal preparation during that time. While assisting Brown, the job of assistant visitor clubhouse manager became available and plaintiff applied for the job. Brown recommended plaintiff to both defendant’s human resources director and to the baseball operations and public relations coordinator, Daniel Emmons. Plaintiff was never interviewed for the position even though he was already performing some of the tasks of assistant clubhouse manager and had experience running his own catering business. Instead, defendant hired a Caucasian teenager who was still in high school and did not meet any of the qualifications for the job. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint after sustaining defendant’s demurrer. Plaintiff stipulated the dismissal be entered without leave to amend. Defendant contended as a threshold matter, that plaintiff lacked standing in this appeal given his stipulation in the trial court was tantamount to a nonappealable consent judgment and in any event, his causes of action failed on the merits. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s contention that plaintiff lacked standing to appeal but agreed the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s causes of action for discrimination under the Unruh and Ralph Civil Rights Acts and for unfair business practices. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court addressed plaintiff’s common law failure to hire claim. Central to that claim is the applicability of Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 (1980). While the Court agreed that failing to hire a prospective employee based on race violated public policy, specifically the Government Code as well as our state Constitution, that prospective employee’s remedies were grounded in the Fair Employment and Housing Act (the Act). Tameny on the other hand required “the prior existence of an employment relationship” between the parties upon which to predicate a tort duty of care. Because defendant did not owe plaintiff any duty, plaintiff could not bring a failure to hire claim against defendant in a common law tort action and must instead proceed under the Act. View "Williams v. Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, LLC" on Justia Law

In the context of a demurrer by defendant Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London Subscribing To Policy Number 11EPL-20208, the trial court interpreted the term “wage and hour or overtime law(s)” to encompass all provisions of the Labor Code. Plaintiff owned and operated over 250 Pizza Hut and Wing Street restaurants. Defendant provided to plaintiff Southern California Pizza Company, LLC, an employment practices liability insurance policy, which covered certain losses arising from specified employment-related claims brought against plaintiff. The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer, concluding all causes of action in the underlying employment lawsuit against plaintiff fell within the scope of the Policy exclusion. Using well-established insurance policy interpretation principles, the Court of Appeal found the wage and hour law language of the exclusion was more narrow in scope than stated by the trial court: it concerned laws regarding duration worked and/or remuneration received in exchange for work. Applying that interpretation, and taking into account the Policy’s general coverage, the Court concluded many of the disputed underlying lawsuit claims were potentially subject to coverage. Thus, the trial court erred in sustaining defendant’s demurrer. View "Southern Cal. Pizza Co., LLC v. Certain Underwriters, etc." on Justia Law

Skelton sustained an ankle injury in 2012, and a shoulder injury in 2014, while working for the DMV. In the latter incident, she also claimed to have sustained an injury to her neck. Skelton filed separate workers’ compensation benefits applications. Skelton sought to be reimbursed for her wage loss for time missed at work for medical treatment and for medical evaluations (temporary disability indemnity (TDI)). Skelton’s work hours were not flexible, and she could not visit her doctors on weekends. She initially used her sick and vacation leave but eventually, her paycheck was reduced for missed time. She was then “forced to miss doctors’ appointments.” Skelton’s shoulder injury was found permanent and stationary in November 2017. Her ankle injury was not yet permanent and stationary at the time of the hearing. DMV contended that Skelton was not entitled to TDI because she had returned to work, citing Labor Code section 4600(e)(1). The Appeals Board affirmed that Skelton was not entitled to TDI for wage loss to attend medical treatment appointments following her return to work but was entitled to TDI for wage loss to attend medical-legal evaluations. The court of appeal affirmed. DMV’s obligation to pay temporary disability benefits is tied to Skelton’s actual incapacity to perform the tasks usually encountered in her employment and the resulting wage loss. View "Skelton v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, the California State Lottery, alleging retaliation in violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act. The trial court denied the Lottery's anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint. The California Supreme Court subsequently decided Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871 (Wilson), where the court disapproved of the precedent on which the trial court here relied, and held that retaliation claims arise from the adverse actions allegedly taken – here, the investigation – notwithstanding the plaintiff's allegation that the actions were taken for an improper purpose. The Court of Appeal affirmed and held, consistent with Wilson, that plaintiff's complaint arose from protected activity. The court also held that plaintiff established a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim. View "Jeffra v. California State Lottery" on Justia Law

Rodriguez, a Gulf War veteran, served as a Santa Cruz police officer. 1995-2007. He applied for industrial disability retirement in 2011 with the California Public Employee’s Retirement System based on his PTSD diagnosis that was caused in part by his work for the city. After litigation, the city granted Rodriguez disability retirement but denied his claim of industrial causation. He began receiving benefits in December 2016. Rodriguez requested a finding that his disability was industrial from the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board in April 2017. The Board concluded that Rodriguez’s disability was industrial, but that he was barred from receiving industrial disability retirement benefits because his claim for a finding of industrial causation was untimely under the five-year time limitation in Government Code section 21171. The court of appeal reversed. Section 21171 applies only to rescind, alter or amend an earlier industrial determination. Section 21174 applies to initial determinations and states that a retiree claiming an industrial disability that is disputed will not receive the additional benefits “unless the application for that determination is filed with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board... within two years after the effective date of the member’s retirement.” If a claimant applies for a determination of industrial causation within two years of retirement but more than five years after the injury, the Board cannot modify its determination that an injury is industrial or not; nothing precludes the Board from making the initial determination of industrial causation. View "Rodriguez v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law