Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2022, Congress amended the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) by passing the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA), which renders arbitration agreements unenforceable at the plaintiff’s election in sexual assault and sexual harassment cases arising on or after March 3, 2022. Jane Doe filed a lawsuit in 2023 against her employer, Second Street Corporation, and two supervisors, alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, and wage-and-hour violations. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in the employee handbook. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the EFAA rendered the arbitration provision unenforceable for all of Doe’s claims and allowed her to file a first amended complaint adding additional claims, including constructive wrongful termination.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration, finding that Doe’s sexual harassment claims, which included conduct both before and after the EFAA’s effective date, were exempt from mandatory arbitration. The court also ruled that all of Doe’s other claims were exempt from arbitration under the EFAA because they were part of the same case. Additionally, the court permitted Doe to file a first amended complaint.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that under the EFAA’s plain language, Doe’s sexual harassment claims, which alleged continuing violations both before and after the EFAA’s effective date, were not subject to mandatory arbitration. The court also held that the EFAA invalidates an arbitration clause as to the entire case, not just the claims alleging sexual harassment. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion to compel arbitration and did not abuse its discretion by allowing Doe to file a first amended complaint. View "Doe v. Second Street Corp." on Justia Law

A former employee, Campbell, filed a putative class action lawsuit against her employer, Sunshine Behavioral Health, LLC, alleging wage and hour violations. Campbell claimed that employees were not paid proper overtime, were required to work through meal and rest breaks without compensation, were not paid minimum wage, and were not paid in a timely manner. Sunshine initially proceeded with litigation and agreed to participate in mediation. However, Sunshine later claimed to have discovered an arbitration agreement signed by Campbell, which included a class action waiver.The Superior Court of Orange County found that Sunshine had waived its right to compel arbitration. Despite allegedly discovering the arbitration agreement in November 2022, Sunshine continued to engage in mediation discussions and did not inform Campbell or the court of its intent to compel arbitration until March 2023. Sunshine's delay and conduct were deemed inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, leading the court to conclude that Sunshine had waived its right to arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found clear and convincing evidence that Sunshine had waived its right to arbitration. The court noted that Sunshine's actions, including agreeing to mediation on a class-wide basis and delaying the motion to compel arbitration, were inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The court emphasized that Sunshine's conduct demonstrated an intentional abandonment of the right to arbitrate, thus affirming the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Campbell v. Sunshine Behavioral Health" on Justia Law

Maria Miller, a correctional officer with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), was injured in 2016 while on a temporary assignment. After her worker’s compensation benefits were exhausted in 2018, CDCR placed her on unpaid leave. CDCR later offered her a medical demotion to an alternative position, which she did not accept, citing a newly disclosed mental disability. Miller has remained on unpaid leave since then. In 2020, she sued CDCR under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation.The Superior Court of Riverside County granted summary judgment in favor of CDCR, concluding that CDCR was entitled to summary adjudication on each cause of action. The court found that Miller could not perform the essential functions of her job as a correctional officer due to her disabilities and that CDCR had offered reasonable accommodations, which she either accepted or refused.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that CDCR had met its burden by showing that Miller could not perform the essential duties of her job and that reasonable accommodations were offered. The court also found that Miller failed to produce evidence of a material dispute of fact regarding her ability to perform her job or the reasonableness of the accommodations offered. The court concluded that CDCR was not liable for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to prevent discrimination, or retaliation. The judgment was affirmed. View "Miller v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured when struck by a car driven by Ralph Wilson, who had been driving for Uber earlier that evening. Wilson had turned his Uber driver app to "offline" about four minutes before the accident and more than a mile away from the accident site. Wilson testified that he had finished driving for Uber for the night and was on his way home from McDonald's when the accident occurred. The plaintiff argued that inconsistencies in Wilson's testimony and Uber's records created a triable issue of fact regarding whether Wilson was still operating as an Uber driver at the time of the accident.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of Uber Technologies, Inc. and related companies, finding that Wilson was acting in his personal capacity and not as an Uber driver at the time of the accident. The court deemed the plaintiff's arguments speculative and irrelevant to establishing whether Wilson was acting within the scope of his employment with Uber at the time of the incident.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the undisputed material facts demonstrated that Wilson was not acting as an Uber driver at the time of the accident. The court found no evidence to support the plaintiff's claim that Wilson intended to switch back to "available" status or that he was driving towards a surge area. The court concluded that the inconsistencies in Wilson's testimony were immaterial to the issue of his status at the time of the accident. Therefore, the judgment in favor of the Uber parties was affirmed. View "Kim v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Joseph Mayor, a petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to direct the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) to rescind its order granting Ross Valley Sanitation District’s (Ross Valley) petition for reconsideration of an award of permanent disability. Mayor had been awarded total permanent disability by a workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) due to an industrial injury. Ross Valley filed a petition for reconsideration, but the Board acted on it more than 60 days after it was filed, which Mayor argued exceeded the Board’s jurisdiction under former section 5909 of the Labor Code.The WCJ issued the award on March 2, 2023, and Ross Valley filed for reconsideration on March 23, 2023. The Board did not act within the 60-day period mandated by former section 5909, which stated that a petition is deemed denied if not acted upon within 60 days. On August 14, 2023, the Board granted the petition for reconsideration, citing administrative irregularities and delays in receiving the petition. Mayor then filed for a writ of mandate, arguing that the Board lost jurisdiction after the 60-day period lapsed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Mayor, referencing the recent decision in Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., which held that the Board’s action after 60 days exceeded its jurisdiction. The court noted that the Legislature had amended section 5909 to start the 60-day deadline from when the Board receives the case file, not when the petition is filed, but this amendment did not apply retroactively. The court granted Mayor’s petition, directing the Board to rescind its orders and confirming that the WCJ’s award of permanent disability was final. View "Mayor v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Sarah Anoke and other employees initiated arbitration proceedings against their employer, X (comprising Twitter, Inc., X Holdings I, Inc., X Holdings Corp., X Corp., and Elon Musk), for employment-related disputes. The arbitration provider issued an invoice for $27,200, which Anoke’s counsel mistakenly paid. The arbitration provider marked the invoice as paid and closed, then refunded the payment and issued a new invoice to X, which X paid within 30 days.Anoke petitioned the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco to compel X to pay her arbitration-related attorney fees and costs, arguing that X’s payment was untimely because it was not made within 30 days of the first invoice. The superior court denied the petition, reasoning that since the first invoice was nullified after Anoke’s attorney mistakenly paid it and X timely paid the second invoice, X met the statutory deadline.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory deadline for payment was tied to the due date set by the arbitration provider’s invoice. Since the first invoice was paid (albeit mistakenly) and the second invoice was paid within 30 days, there was no default. The court affirmed the superior court’s order, concluding that the arbitrator acted within its authority by issuing a second invoice and that the statute did not require the arbitrator to reinstate the first invoice after it had been paid and closed. The court also noted that the reasons for a timely payment are irrelevant under the statute. View "Anoke v. Twitter" on Justia Law

Dignity Health, operating as French Hospital Medical Center, filed a complaint against orthopedic surgeon Troy I. Mounts, M.D., and his corporation to recover an advance paid under their Physician Recruitment Agreement. Mounts filed a cross-complaint alleging retaliation for his complaints about patient care quality, interference with his economic opportunities, and unlawful business practices. Dignity responded with an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, which the trial court initially denied. The appellate court reversed this decision and remanded the case for further consideration.Upon remand, the trial court concluded that Mounts had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court found that Dignity's actions were protected by the litigation privilege, the common interest privilege, and were barred by the statute of limitations. Consequently, the court granted Dignity's motion to strike the cross-complaint and ordered Mounts to pay Dignity's attorney fees and costs.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that all of Mounts' claims were based on conduct protected by the litigation privilege (Civil Code § 47, subd. (b)) and the common interest privilege (Civil Code § 47, subd. (c)). The court also found that Dignity's actions were immune under federal law (42 U.S.C. § 11137) and that some claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The appellate court upheld the trial court's orders granting the motion to strike and awarding attorney fees to Dignity. View "Dignity Health v. Mounts" on Justia Law

American Building Innovation LP (ABI) was hired by Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (Balfour Beatty) as a subcontractor for a school construction project. ABI had a workers’ compensation insurance policy when it began work, but the policy was canceled due to ABI’s refusal to pay outstanding premiums from a previous policy. This cancellation led to the automatic suspension of ABI’s contractor’s license. Despite knowing it was unlicensed and uninsured, ABI continued working on the project.The Superior Court of Orange County found that ABI was not duly licensed at all times during the performance of its work, as required by California law. ABI’s license was suspended because it failed to maintain workers’ compensation insurance. ABI later settled its premium dispute and had the policy retroactively reinstated, but the court found this retroactive reinstatement meaningless because it occurred long after the statute of limitations for any workers’ compensation claims had expired. The court ruled that ABI could not maintain its action to recover compensation for its work due to its lack of proper licensure.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that ABI was not entitled to retroactive reinstatement of its license because the failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance was not due to circumstances beyond ABI’s control. ABI’s decision not to pay the premiums and its false representations to the Contractors’ State License Board were within its control. Consequently, ABI was barred from bringing or maintaining the action under section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to Balfour Beatty under the subcontract’s prevailing party attorney fee provision. View "American Building Innovations v. Balfour Beatty Construction" on Justia Law

Four former Tesla employees, Sharonda Taylor, Shaka Green, Tatianna Smith, and Zenobia Milligan, requested personnel records from Tesla under the California Labor Code. These individuals are also part of a class action lawsuit, Vaughn v. Tesla, which alleges racial discrimination and harassment at Tesla's Fremont plant. Despite the requests, Tesla did not provide the requested records, citing a stay in the Vaughn case due to an ongoing appeal. The plaintiffs then filed a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) action against Tesla for failing to comply with the Labor Code.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, denied Tesla's anti-SLAPP motion, which argued that the PAGA claims arose from protected petitioning activity related to the Vaughn case. The court found that the plaintiffs' requests for personnel records were independent of the Vaughn litigation and were merely an exercise of their statutory rights under the Labor Code.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Tesla's refusal to provide the requested records did not constitute protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court distinguished this case from Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., noting that the plaintiffs' PAGA claims did not rely on any "written or oral statement or writing" by Tesla. The court also found that Tesla's conduct did not meet the criteria for protection under the anti-SLAPP statute's "catchall" provision, as it did not contribute to any public issue or debate. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of Tesla's anti-SLAPP motion. View "Taylor v. Tesla, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a long-standing employment discrimination dispute between a well-known columnist, T.J. Simers, and his former employer, Los Angeles Times Communications LLC. Simers was demoted in 2013 and subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging constructive termination and age and disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The litigation spanned nine years and included three jury trials. The first trial resulted in a mixed verdict, with the jury awarding significant economic and noneconomic damages. However, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the constructive termination claim and ordered a new trial on noneconomic damages. Both parties appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders, necessitating a second trial.In the second trial, the jury awarded Simers $15.4 million in noneconomic damages, but the trial court granted a new trial due to misconduct by Simers's counsel during closing arguments and the excessive nature of the damages awarded. The third trial focused solely on the amount of noneconomic damages, resulting in a $1.25 million award, which matched a pre-trial settlement offer made by the defendant.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County awarded Simers $3,264,906 in attorney fees and $210,882.55 in costs, but excluded fees and costs incurred after the defendant's settlement offer. The defendant appealed, arguing that fees for the second trial and the unsuccessful appeal should not be awarded due to counsel's misconduct and the unrelated nature of the work. The plaintiff cross-appealed, seeking recovery of appellate fees despite the trial court's ruling.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in awarding fees for the second trial and the appeal, noting that the trial court had considered the misconduct and the overall reasonableness of the fees. The court also upheld the exclusion of post-offer fees and costs, in line with statutory requirements under section 998. View "Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC" on Justia Law