Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Adrian Camacho appealed after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Target Corporation (Target) on Camacho's causes of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation, harassment causing a hostile work environment, failure to prevent harassment and discrimination, retaliation, constructive termination in violation of public policy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, and a violation of the Bane Act (Civ. Code sec. 52.1). The trial court concluded that language included in an addendum to a preprinted compromise and release form utilized to settle Camacho's workers' compensation action against Target constituted a broad release of any and all potential claims that Camacho may have had against Target, including claims falling outside the workers' compensation system. After reviewing the relevant language in the addendum and considering that language in the context of the entire settlement agreement, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in determining that the language at issue contained in the addendum to the settlement agreement executed by the parties in Camacho's workers' compensation case constituted a general release of all of Camacho's civil claims. The Court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Camacho v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

This lawsuit alleged a Trinity County deputy sheriff phoned citizens James and Norma Gund (who did not work for the County) and asked them to go check on a neighbor who had called 911 for help likely related to inclement weather. The Gunds unwittingly walked into a murder scene and were savagely attacked by the man who apparently had just murdered the neighbor and her boyfriend. The Gunds sued the County of Trinity and Corporal Ron Whitman for negligence and misrepresentation, alleging defendants created a special relationship with the Gunds and owed them a duty of care, which defendants breached by representing that the 911 call was likely weather-related and “probably no big deal” and by withholding information known to defendants suggesting a crime in progress. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation, because Labor Code section 3366 provides that any person “engaged in the performance of active law enforcement service as part of the posse comitatus or power of the county, and each person . . . engaged in assisting any peace officer in active law enforcement service at the request of such peace officer, is deemed to be an employee of the public entity that he or she is serving or assisting in the enforcement of the law, and is entitled to receive compensation from the public entity in accordance with the provisions of this division [workers’ compensation]. . . .” Defendants’ motion did not acknowledge or address plaintiffs’ factual allegations that the deputy misled them about the nature of the activity, minimized the risk, lulled them into a false sense of security, and that plaintiffs relied on the deputy’s misrepresentations. Absent section 3366, these allegations potentially supported imposing tort liability against defendants. The Court of Appeal concluded section 3366 applied to this case, because responding to a 911 call for help of an uncertain nature is active law enforcement, regardless of the deputy’s misrepresentations. Since the Court concluded section 3366 barred plaintiffs’ lawsuit on the ground they were assisting in active law enforcement, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gund v. County of Trinity" on Justia Law

Rosa Jensen and Linda Kerr sued their former employer, The Home Depot, Inc., (Home Depot), and their former managers at Home Depot for disability discrimination, wrongful termination, and eight other related claims. Home Depot and the managers (collectively, defendants) demurred to the first amended complaint arguing misjoinder of Jensen and Kerr (collectively, plaintiffs). The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissed plaintiffs’ lawsuit with prejudice. Jensen contended on appeal the trial court erred by dismissing her lawsuit because the court could have ordered severance. “It is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action.” At trial court, the Court of Appeal found plaintiffs made no showing as to how they would amend their complaint to fix the misjoinder issue. Accordingly, the trial court acted reasonably in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden. However, leave to amend may be requested for the first time on appeal; plaintiffs fixed the misjoinder issue by dismissing Kerr. Because the misjoinder issue has been fixed, the Court of Appeal ruled the case may proceed. The judgment of dismissal, as it pertains to Jensen, was reversed. The trial court was directed to enter an order vacating its order denying leave to amend as to the first through seventh causes of action, and enter an order granting leave to amend. The trial court was also directed to deem the first amended complaint to have been amended due to the dismissal of Kerr. View "Jensen v. The Home Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

Former or current non-exempt employees of Wells Fargo filed suit alleging that their wage statements failed to include information required under Labor Code section 226. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's summary adjudication motion and granted Wells Fargo's motion. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that there was no violation for not providing an itemized statement at the time of an employee's termination. View "Canales v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Gerawan challenged the Board's findings of unfair labor practices, and the remedy imposed of setting aside an election to decide whether to decertify an incumbent union. The Court of Appeal held that the Board erred in several of its findings of unfair labor practices as well as in the legal standard applied in reaching its remedial conclusions. The court held that, instead of the taint-on-the-petition approach, the Board should have evaluated the purported misconduct under the established outcome-determinative standard for considering whether to set aside the election, which standard would require the Board to focus its scrutiny on whether the misconduct tended to interfere with employee free choice to such an extent that it affected the results of the election. View "Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's dismissal of a putative class action against Williams-Sonoma, alleging that the company failed to pay prospective class members reporting-time pay. The plaintiff in this case was a member of a previous wage and hour class action that had settled and he received a share of the settlement proceeds. In this case, the court held that Williams-Sonoma's demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend on grounds of res judicata because all the claims in this case were based on the same theory as the previous case. Therefore, the court did not reach the other remaining issues. View "Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc." on Justia Law

California’s Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), as opposed to the board that administers the system, filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief regarding the proper interpretation of the effect of Government Code section 7522.02 (a)(3) on the pension benefits of transit workers. The CalPERS executive office had announced its own interpretation, which resulted in over 400 pending administrative appeals. As representative parties, the CalPERS executive office named as defendants a transit agency (the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority (Santa Clara Transit)) and an employee representative for a different Bay Area transit agency (the Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1555), which had been supporting the arguments of their employees and members, and had filed administrative appeals of their own. Santa Clara Transit filed a demurrer, which the trial court sustained, entering judgment in its behalf. Local 1555 then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted, entering a separate judgment in its behalf. In each ruling, the trial court concluded that the CalPERS executive office was subject to the procedural prerequisite of the exhaustion of administrative remedies, as the issue was pending in the appeals before the CalPERS board, and the CalPERS executive office had not established any exception to exhaustion in its allegations. The CalPERS executive office separately appealed each judgment. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals. The CalPERS executive office asserted it could bypass the process in CalPERS regulations for administrative appeals to the CalPERS board and proceed directly to the trial court to obtain a declaratory judgment on its interpretation of section 7522.02(a)(3). It also contended that it was not subject to the general rule that an action for declaratory relief was not appropriate for the review of administrative decisions in lieu of a petition for a writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal found neither position was tenable and affirmed the judgments. View "CalPERS v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. etc." on Justia Law

Pursuant to Labor Code section 203, subd. (a), 1194, subd. (a), an employer that does not pay its employees the wage required by law when they quit or are fired is liable for both the underpayment of wages and, if the failure to pay is "willful," a "waiting time" penalty of up to 30 days' wages. The Court of Appeals held that an employer's failure to pay is "willful" when the employer (a) suspects the required wage has gone up but continues paying the old wage after halfheartedly investigating its suspicions, and (b) later makes an unreasonable argument that the wage law is unconstitutionally vague. The court also held that a trial court does not have the discretion, on equitable grounds, to relieve an employer from having to pay waiting time penalties. In this case, the court affirmed the trial court's order finding that Grill Concepts was liable for waiting time penalties. View "Diaz v. Grill Concepts Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Huff worked for Securitas, which hires employees to work as security guards, and contracts with clients to provide guards for a particular location. Securitas typically provides long-term placements. After Huff resigned, he sued Securitas, alleging a representative cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA, Lab. Code, 2698) and citing Labor Code sections 201 [requiring immediate payment of wages upon termination of employment]; 201.3(b) [requiring temporary services employers to pay wages weekly]; 202 [requiring payment of wages within 72 hours of resignation]; and 204 [failure to pay all wages due for work performed in a pay period]. The trial court held that Huff was not a temporary services employee under section 201.3(b)(1), and, therefore, could not show he was affected by a violation and had no standing to pursue penalties under PAGA on behalf of others. The court of appeal affirmed the subsequent grant of a new trial. Under PAGA an “aggrieved employee” can pursue penalties for Labor Code violations on behalf of others; the statute defines an aggrieved employee as having suffered “one or more of the alleged violations” of the Labor Code for which penalties are sought. Since Huff’s complaint alleged that another violation of the Labor Code (separate from the weekly pay requirement) affected him personally, the failure to establish a violation of the weekly pay requirement did not preclude his entire PAGA claim. View "Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Western Dental accepts dental assistant student externs. Externs who want to be considered for full-time employment must submit a written application, undergo a background check, and be interviewed. Western posted job openings both to advertise actual open positions and to create a pool of applicants for positions that might open in the future. In May 2015, a requisition for a dental assistant in the Napa office was approved, and a solicitation for applications was publicly posted. It is unclear whether this solicitation was posted to create a pool of applicants. Abed began her Napa office externship in May 2015. She was pregnant but did not inform Western. Abed’s supervisor completed three evaluations of Abed. Abed consistently received high marks. Eventually, her co-workers discovered that Abed was pregnant. According to Abed, Strickling stated, "if she’s pregnant, I don’t want to hire her.” Abed claims she was told there were no positions available at the Napa office. Abel sued under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code 12900). The trial court ruled in Western’s favor because Abed had not submitted an application. The court of appeal reversed. Even though Abed never applied for a job, she raised triable issues of material fact as to whether Western intentionally discriminated against her by falsely telling her that no position was available. View "Abed v. Western Dental Services, Inc." on Justia Law