Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, while working as a narcotics detective, Riske reported two fellow officers for filing false reports and testified against them at an administrative hearing that ultimately resulted in their termination. Afterward, Riske’s colleagues refused to work with him. Riske retired in 2014. He sued the city, alleging retaliation based on his protected whistleblower activity by failing to assign or promote him to several positions. Riske filed a discovery motion, seeking to obtain records of the officers selected for the positions to which he had applied. Riske asserted the documents were necessary to show the city’s stated business reason for its promotions—the successful candidates were more qualified than Riske—was pretext for retaliation. The city claimed the officers’ personnel records were not subject to discovery because the officers were innocent third parties who had not witnessed or caused Riske’s injury. The superior court denied Riske’s motion. The court of appeal directed the superior court to vacate that order and to require the city to produce the reports for an in camera inspection and to then order production of all discoverable information. The statutory scheme is not limited to cases involving officers who either witnessed or committed misconduct. View "Riske v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Granitrock produces perishable concrete that cannot be stored; when concrete is in a mixer truck, the drum must rotate constantly to prevent hardening. Freshly batched concrete must be poured within 60-90 minutes to ensure structural integrity. Graniterock gave its mixer drivers the option of signing an on-duty meal period agreement pursuant to Industrial Wage Commission Wage Order 1, which applies “when the nature of the work prevents an employee from being relieved of all duty and when by written agreement between the parties an on-the-job paid meal period is agreed to.” The Granitrock Agreement allowed revocation upon one working day’s advance notice. If drivers did not sign an Agreement and were asked to work through a meal, they would receive one hour of special pay. Drivers filed a class action, seeking restitution under Business and Professions Code section 17200 and penalties under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512(a). After consideration of the evidence, including the testimony of numerous concrete mixer drivers and dispatchers, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not proven that Graniterock forced any driver to forgo an off-duty meal period. The court of appeal affirmed. There was substantial evidence to support a finding that Graniterock provided its drivers with an off-duty meal period as required by law. View "Driscoll v. Granite Rock Co." on Justia Law

The Palo Alto charter provided that impasses in negotiations regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment for the city’s police and firefighters would be submitted to binding interest arbitration. In 2011, the City Council voted to place on the ballot for the upcoming election a measure to repeal the binding interest arbitration provision. The firefighters’ union filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging the city placed the measure before voters without consulting in good faith, as required by the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (Gov. Code 3500). A PERB administrative law judge (ALJ) found in the city’s favor. The decision was later reversed by PERB, which ordered the city to rescind its resolution. By that time, the measure repealing the binding interest arbitration provision had already been passed by the voters. The court of appeal found PERB’s conclusion that the union sufficiently requested to meet and consult with the city supported by substantial evidence. Constitutional issues raised by the city were meritless, but PERB’s order directing the city to rescind its resolution violated the doctrine of separation of powers by ordering a legislative body to take legislative action. View "City of Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

This case presented two issues of first impression for the Court of Appeals’ review. The issues touched on the interaction between (a) hospital peer review proceedings against doctors governed by sections 805 to 809.7 of the Business and Professions Code, and (b) the hospital whistleblower statute, Health and Safety Code section 1278.5. The first question was left open by the California Supreme Court “Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospital,” (58 Cal.4th 655 (2014)). Fahlen held that a physician could prosecute a section 1278.5 action without first having to prevail in an administrative mandate proceeding attacking a peer review determination, but the court did not go so far as to excuse the physician from completing the internal peer review process before filing a section 1278.5 action. The second question was whether a physician bringing a section 1278.5 action could name as defendants individual physicians involved in the peer review process who allegedly instigated the process in retaliation for the physician’s whistleblowing. Based on the analysis of “Fahlen” and the text and legislative history of section 1278.5, the Court of Appeals held that a physician need not complete the internal peer review process prior to filing a section 1278.5 action. With respect to the second issue, the Court held that a physician may not name individual physicians in his/her 1278.5 complaint. A third issue involved the tripartite interaction of the anti-SLAPP stattue, the peer review process, and a physician’s religious discrimination claims against a hospital under FEHA. Specifically, the issue raised here was whether the fact the physician reiterated complaints of religious discrimination by the hospital in the context of protesting the initiation of peer review proceedings against him so intertwined his discrimination claims with the peer review proceedings as to subject his discrimination claims to an anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeals found that based on the facts of this case, the physician first voiced his complaints of religious discrimination prior to the initiation of the peer review proceedings. His discrimination claims were therefore not based on activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Armin v. Riverside Community Hospital" on Justia Law

The applicant and real party in interest, Robert Goana, claimed industrial injury and filed a workers' compensation claim. Capital Builders, Goana's employer, objected to the admissibility of a medical report and requested that it be stricken. The WCJ denied Capital Builders's motions without prejudice. Capital Builders appealed, but the appeals board dismissed and denied Capital Builders's petitions for removal and reconsideration. Capital Builders now seeks a writ review in the Court of Appeal. The court concluded that the appeals board's order is not reviewable because the order is not final. Accordingly, the court annulled the writ of review and remanded the case to the appeals board. View "Capital Builders Hardware v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Tanguilig, a Bloomingdale’s employee, filed a representative action on behalf of herself and fellow employees pursuant to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code 2698), alleging several Labor Code violations by the company. The trial court denied a motion by Bloomingdale’s to compel arbitration of Tanguilig’s “individual PAGA claim” and stay or dismiss the remainder of the complaint. The court of appeal affirmed. Under California Supreme Court precedent and consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. 1), a PAGA representative claim is nonwaivable by a plaintiff-employee by means a predispute arbitration agreement with an employer. A PAGA claim (whether individual or representative) acts as a proxy for the state, with the state’s acquiescence, and seeks civil penalties largely payable to the state; such a plaintiff cannot be ordered to arbitration without the state’s consent. View "Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale's, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent interest Kevyn Thaxton was employed as a corrections officer by appellant, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). After being dismissed from his position, Thaxton filed an appeal with the State Personnel Board (the SPB), along with three other colleagues who were also dismissed in relation to the same incident that led to Thaxton's dismissal. The SPB consolidated all four employees' appeals and scheduled a joint evidentiary hearing. Thaxton did not appear on the first day of the evidentiary hearing, and failed to appear on the second day, although his attorney was present to represent him on both days. On the second day of the hearing, CDCR proffered the testimony of a process server to the effect that Thaxton had informed the process server that Thaxton was purposely avoiding service of CDCR's subpoena. Thaxton's attorney indicated that he would not accept service of the subpoena on Thaxton's behalf. After Thaxton's attorney refused to accept service of the subpoena, the administrative law judge (ALJ) overseeing the hearing ordered that Thaxton appear that afternoon. When the hearing resumed, Thaxton's attorney indicated that he had informed Thaxton of the ALJ's order, but Thaxton neither appeared nor provided any justification or explanation for his continued absence from the proceeding. The ALJ then dismissed Thaxton's appeal. Thaxton petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate. The trial court granted the petition, and effectively ordered that Thaxton be reinstated to his former position at CDCR and receive back pay and interest. CDCR appealed, arguing the trial court erred in granting Thaxton's petition for a writ of mandate, and contended the ALJ properly dismissed Thaxton's appeal because Thaxton failed to personally appear at the hearing, which CDCR contended was required by SPB regulation, and/or because the ALJ acted within the scope of her authority in determining that Thaxton's conduct in failing to appear despite the ALJ's order that he appear constituted a failure to proceed with the hearing. The Court of Appeals agreed with the CDCR’s reasoning and reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "Thaxton v. California Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed by the district, filed suit against the district and four coemployees for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress after the coemployees staged a mock robbery with plaintiff as the victim. Plaintiff, who had not been informed of the planned mock robbery, handed over the money and subsequently was treated for psychiatric injury. The jury awarded her $360,000. The trial court denied defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict but granted their motion for a new trial. Here, the ruling was based on a determination of the correctness of the jury instructions, and this in turn was based on a determination of the legal effect of statements in the complaint. The court concluded that the de novo standard of review applies to both these determinations. The court explained that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule is the rule, embodied in Labor Code sections 3600, 3601 and 3602, that with certain exceptions, an injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his or her employment is compensable by way of a workers’ compensation insurance award only, not by a tort judgment. The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the new trial motion because the trial court was mistaken in its view that the complaint conceded the case was within the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act and the only issue was whether one of the exceptions in Labor Code sections 3601 and 3602 applied as well. The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to apply judicial estoppel; the prior workers’ compensation award does not by itself show the conditions of compensation were met; and the double recovery issue was not properly before this court. The court addressed the remaining issues and reversed the order granting a new trial, affirmed the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee v. West Kern Water Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former on-air radio personality for Univision, filed suit alleging disability discrimination, wrongful termination and related employment claims. The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., claim for discrimination where plaintiff was not entitled to raise a medical condition as an alleged basis for discrimination for the first time in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; trial issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff had a disability under FEHA; and trial issues of fact exist as to whether Univision acted with discriminatory intent. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodation; the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to engage in interactive process; the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA), Gov. Code 12945.1 et seq., claims; and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's common law claim for wrongful termination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1972, Dinslage was employed by the San Francisco Recreation and Parks Department. As part of a large-scale restructuring, Dinslage‘s employment classification was eliminated in 2010. He was one of many employees who were laid off. Although he applied to be rehired in a newly created classification, he was not offered a position. He then retired from city employment. Dinslage sued, alleging age discrimination, retaliation, and harassment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code 12940(a), (h), (j).) The defendants claimed, with supporting evidence, that their actions were taken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Dinslage had refused to cooperate in the implementation of a new Department policy, moving away from separate recreational events for the disabled and toward inclusion in general events. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed rejection of Dinslage‘s age discrimination and retaliation claims. Dinslage‘s opposition to Department policies and practices he viewed as discriminating against disabled members of the general public is not protected activity because his opposition was not directed at an unlawful employment practice. View "Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law