Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ling's employment as a Monterey restaurant manager was terminated. Her position was classified as exempt under Industrial Wage Order 5-2001(1)(B)(1), from overtime compensation and mandated meal periods. Ling sued, seeking unpaid overtime wages, waiting time penalties, and premium pay for failure to provide meal and rest periods; she alleged unfair competition and sought attorney‘s fees and costs. An arbitrator rejected Ling’s claim that she was wrongly classified and her contention that chronic staffing shortages required her to spend time performing nonexempt hourly work. Based on nine weeks when she attended training, Ling was compensated $1,038 for missed meal periods and $7,668 in waiting time penalties. The arbitrator deemed employer the prevailing party on all but that minor issue, awarded employer $29,046 in costs and $212,685 in attorney‘s fees based on the dominant contention of erroneous classification.The court corrected and remanded. The court of appeal agreed that the arbitrator exceeded his power by awarding statutory attorney‘s fees to an employer for work performed in defeating inextricably intertwined claims, contrary to public policy embedded in the Labor Code‘s one-way fee shifting provision. The court upheld the trial court‘s remedy and subsequent order confirming an award to plaintiff of costs but not attorney‘s fees based on intervening California Supreme Court authority. View "Ling v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc." on Justia Law

Care West and Ullico, two insurers, were jointly and severally liable for claims arising from an employee’s workplace injury. In a compromise and release agreement, they settled the employee’s claims and apportioned between themselves roughly 50/50 liability for any remaining third party charges. When Ullico became insolvent and was liquidated, responsibility for third party claims against it was assumed by CIGA. The Appeals Board subsequently denied CIGA's motion to dismiss on the ground that the Care West/Ullico agreement limited Care West’s liability to roughly half of any third party claims, thereby rendering Care West’s insurance unavailable as to the remaining half. CIGA petitioned for a writ of review. The court denied the petition, but the Supreme Court granted review and remanded back to the court with directions to hear the matter on the merits. The court now concludes that the Care West/Ullico compromise and release agreement did not relieve Care West of its several liability for third party claims. Accordingly, the court annulled the Appeals Board's decision. View "CA Ins. Guarantee Assoc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The City appealed the trial court's issuance of a writ of mandate authorizing the Board to exercise its discretion, previously delegated to it by the City in an ordinance, to set the maximum subsidy contributed by the City to police and firefighter retirees‟ insurance premiums without regard to later City ordinances “freezing” the subsidy until review and increase by the City Council and requiring payment of a voluntary contribution to join an opt-in program. The court agreed with the City's contention that the trial court's grant of a writ of mandate was in error because the City Charter grants the City Council the authority to set the amount of the subsidy and, as a consequence, the Delegation Ordinance can neither restrict the Council's authority nor create a vested right to a Board-determined subsidy as such would conflict with the Charter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Fry v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant CWPSC, Inc. (CW Painting) appealed a trial court order denying its motion to compel its former employee, plaintiff-respondent Martha Carbajal, to arbitrate her wage and hour claims under the arbitration provision in her employment agreement. The trial court denied the motion because it found the arbitration provision was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. After review, the Court of Appeal found: (1) the arbitration provision was procedurally unconscionable because it was part of an adhesion contract CW Painting imposed on Carbajal as a term of her employment; (2) the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable because it allowed CW Painting to obtain injunctive relief in court while requiring Carbajal to seek relief through arbitration, it waives the statutory requirement that CW Painting post a bond or undertaking to obtain injunctive relief, and it effectively waives Carbajal’s statutory right to recover her attorney fees if she prevailed on her Labor Code claims; and (3) pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, the party asserting the FAA bore the burden to show it applied by presenting evidence establishing the contract with the arbitration provision has a substantial relationship to interstate commerce, and CW Painting failed to timely present such evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the County under Government Code section 12940, alleging disability discrimination based on the County’s removing him from his job as bailiff and placing him on an unpaid leave of absence because of its incorrect assessment that he could not safely perform his duties as a bailiff even with reasonable accommodation. Principally at issue on appeal is how to instruct a jury on the employer’s intent to discriminate against a disabled employee and, more specifically, what role “animus” plays in defining that intent. The court concluded that the instruction and special verdict form in this case contained error. Under Harris v. City of Santa Monica, plaintiff could prove the requisite discriminatory intent by showing his actual or perceived disability was a “substantial motivating factor/reason” for the County’s decision to place him on a leave of absence. The Legislature decided that the financial consequences of an employer’s mistaken belief that an employee is unable to safely perform a job’s essential functions should be borne by the employer, not the employee, even if the employer’s mistake was reasonable and made in good faith. The court further concluded that the instructional error was prejudicial and remanded plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim for a limited retrial. View "Wallace v. County of Stanislaus" on Justia Law

Two administrative rules set forth different overtime pay rates for agricultural workers who harvest fruit and for those who process fruit for market. Farmers and plaintiffs Jaswant Bains and Piara Gosal unsuccessfully sought a declaration that certain of their workers were not subject to the more generous of two wage orders issued by the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (Department or DLSE). Plaintiffs argued on appeal: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction because they themselves failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) the trial court erred in its conclusion on the merits. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Bains v. Dept. of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant El Dorado County created a new classification (sheriff’s security officer) for employees providing court perimeter security, and placed the new classification in a general bargaining unit rather than the County’s law-enforcement bargaining unit because the sheriff’s security officers would not have peace officer authority. At the same time, the County deleted several positions (all of which were vacant) from the law-enforcement bargaining unit. One year later, plaintiff El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff’s Association, the exclusive representative of the County’s law-enforcement bargaining unit, demanded to bargain over the decision to create the new classification, even though the Association had actual notice of the decision before it was implemented. The County denied the Association’s request to meet and confer. The Association filed a petition for writ of mandate, alleging that the County did not provide advance notice of the creation of the sheriff’s security officer classification and violated its duty to meet and confer. The petition sought restoration of the status quo existing before creation of the new classification, which would require the County to nullify its action more than a year after it was taken and presumably terminate the 11 sheriff’s security officers already hired, so that the Association could demand to bargain over the decision and its effects. The trial court found the County had no duty to bargain over the decision because the work assigned to sheriff’s security officers is not work belonging to the law- enforcement bargaining unit. The trial court also found that, while the County had a duty to bargain over the effects of the decision, which included loss of overtime opportunities for members of the Association, the Association waived its right to bargain over the effects of the decision because it had actual advance notice of the change before the change was made and did not make a demand to bargain. On appeal, the Association contended that the trial court erred by finding that the Association waived its bargaining rights. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the law did not require an employer to give advance notice of the reasonably foreseeable effects of the decision; instead, the employer must give advance notice only of the decision. The Court agreed that the County violated a local rule by failing to give notice to and consult with the Association before deleting the positions. Deletion of the law-enforcement bargaining unit positions must be invalidated so that the County can comply with the local rules. View "El Dorado Deputy etc. Assn. v. Co. of El Dorado" on Justia Law

The City of San Diego (City) sought to compel the San Diego City Employees Retirement System (SDCERS) to increase City employees' contributions to their retirement fund to share in covering an $800 million investment loss suffered by the fund. Four public employee labor unions ultimately intervened in the action on the employees' behalf, asserting the same or similar arguments as SDCERS to rebut the City's claims. After the case settled, the Unions moved to recover $1,785,147 in attorney fees. The court denied the motion, finding the Unions were not entitled to fees as their involvement in the lawsuit was unnecessary to the result that was achieved. The Unions appealed the court's ruling, contending: (1) they were entitled to recover their fees even if their attorneys' services were unnecessary to the result; and (2) the court abused its discretion in concluding those services were not necessary. The Court of Appeal rejected these contentions and affirmed the court's order. View "San Diego Municipal Employees Assoc. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Robert Hughes, a retired sheriff’s deputy, had his case dismissed when the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to his amended petition for writ of mandate and administrative mandate. Hughes sought to compel the County of San Bernadino to complete the administrative appeal process of a disciplinary action. Hughes initiated the administrative appeal under the County’s civil service rules, but missed the scheduled hearing after suffering a heart attack. Hughes retired for medical reasons before the hearing could be rescheduled. The County declined to reschedule after Hughes retired, arguing he was no longer an employee entitled to an administrative appeal. Defendant San Bernardino Civil Service Commission (the CSC), after requesting briefing from Hughes and the County, ruled that it had no jurisdiction to continue with the appeal. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Hughes was entitled to complete his administrative appeal as provided in the County's Personnel Rules. The trial court's order was reversed and the case remanded with directions to enter a new order overruling the County’s demurrer. View "Hughes v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

Case voluntarily enrolled in a three-year, employer-sponsored educational program, agreeing, in writing that if he quit his job within 30 months of completing the program, he would reimburse his employer, UPI, a prorated portion of program costs. Two months after completing the program, Case went to work for another employer. He refused to reimburse UPI, which sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Case cross-complained, asserting the reimbursement agreement was unenforceable and UPI violated the Labor Code and other statutory provisions in seeking reimbursement. The trial court granted UPI summary judgment on both its complaint and Case’s cross-complaint, and subsequently granted UPI’s motion for attorney fees for defeating Case’s wage claims. The court applied the version of Labor Code section 218.5 in effect at the time of the summary judgment proceedings, rather than the version in effect at the time it awarded fees, which permits fees to a prevailing employer only when the employee’s wage claims have been brought in “bad faith.” The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment, but reversed the attorney fees award. Under California Supreme Court precedent, statutory provisions that alter the recovery of attorney fees are deemed procedural in nature and apply to pending litigation. View "USS-POSCO Indus. v. Case" on Justia Law