Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a professional basketball team in the NBA, filed an unverified petition for a writ of review against the Appeals Boards and others, challenging what it refers to as the Appeals Board's jurisdiction over a claim for accumulated injuries by Durand Macklin, a former professional basketball player in the NBA, for cumulative injuries. Petitioner contends that, in view of Macklin's contact with California, application of California workers' compensation law in this case would not be reasonable and thus would be a denial of due process. The court held that Labor Code section 5954 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1069 require verification of a petition to review a decision of the Appeals Board. After oral argument, the court granted petitioner's request to file a verified petition. On the merits, the court held that California has a legitimate interest in an industrial injury when the applicant was employed by a California corporation and participated in other games and practices in California for non-California NBA teams, during the period of exposure causing cumulative injury. Therefore, subjecting petitioner to California workers' compensation law is reasonable and not a denial of due process. The court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Board. View "N.Y. Knickerbockers v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant and Dr. Fanaian seeking to recover compensatory damages for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 and wrongful termination in violation of public policy under Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. Plaintiff was terminated after reporting to the Police Department that a coworker may have stolen her wedding ring at her workplace. The jury found in favor of plaintiff on both causes of action and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict against defendant. The court held that the plain and unambiguous language of section 1102.5(b) creates a cause of action for damages against an employer who retaliates against an employee for reporting to law enforcement a theft of her property at the workplace. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Cardenas v. M. Fanaian, D.D.S., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a truck driver, filed a putative class action complaint against his employer, Rich Voss Trucking, Stevens Creek Quarry, and Richard Voss, alleging wage and hour violations. Plaintiff contended that defendants were his joint employers and the employers of all similarly situated non-exempt current and former employees of defendants and asserted failure to provide required meal periods and rest periods, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay minimum wage, failure to pay all wages due to discharged or quitting employees, failure to maintain required records, failure to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures incurred in the discharge of duties, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and unfair and unlawful business practices. Plaintiff alleged a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act for a representative action for civil penalties. He filed a separate complaint, alleging disability and national origin discrimination and retaliation. The court of appeal reversed denial or class certification and remanded for an explanation of the reasoning for the denial. View "Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

During William Danser’s service as a superior court judge, a jury convicted of conspiring to pervert or obstruct justice. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Danser on probation for three years. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and the California Supreme Court denied review. Months later, the trial court reduced the felony charge to a misdemeanor, terminated probation, and granted Danser’s petition to dismiss the criminal charges against him. After the conviction but before sentencing, Danser retired from judicial office. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) subsequently determined that Danser was convicted of a felony offense in the course and scope of his judicial duties and that the conviction became final when the California Supreme Court denied review. CalPERS concluded that under the terms of Danser’s pension plan (the Judges’ Retirement System II (JRS II)) he was subject to benefit forfeiture. CalPERS refunded Danser’s retirement contributions and determined that he was precluded from receiving any retirement benefits from JRS II. Danser challenged the CalPERS forfeiture determination by filing a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, writ of mandate, and other extraordinary relief and damages. The trial court denied the writ petition and entered judgment for CalPERS. On appeal, Danser claimed: (1) the CalPERS forfeiture action was time-barred; (2) CalPERS lacked jurisdiction to determine whether forfeiture occurred in this case; and (3) Danser was not subject to forfeiture of his retirement benefits because there was no final conviction punishable as a felony. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Danser’s contention that the CalPERS action was time-barred was forfeited because he did not support it with legal analysis and it was not raised in the administrative hearing; (2) his contention that CalPERS lacked jurisdiction was without merit because CalPERS acted within its authority to interpret applicable retirement law; and (3) Government Code section 75526 was concerned with whether Danser was found guilty of a felony offense and whether that finding of guilt was final (the finding of guilt was final when the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and the California Supreme Court denied review). The Court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Danser v. CalPERS" on Justia Law

Respondent, employed as a deputy with the Department, pled guilty to a violation of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (b) for driving under the influence, while he was relieved of duty. Respondent was subsequently discharged. Respondent then filed a petition for administrative mandamus challenging the final order of the Commission adopting the hearing officer's findings and recommendation of discharge. The trial court granted the petition for writ of mandate and ordered the Commission’s final order to be set aside on the ground that the Department lacked authority to discipline respondent. At issue was whether the Department can discharge respondent for misconduct committed while he was on unpaid, relieved-of-duty status. The court concluded that the Department had the authority to do so and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Garvin v. Chambers does not compel a different result. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Negron v. Los Angeles Cnty. Civ. Serv. Comm." on Justia Law

Dahl sustained a cumulative industrial injury to her neck and right shoulder while employed by Contra Costa County as a medical records technician. The injuries resulted in surgeries and scarring. She was 49 years old and had worked for the county for over 8 years. Dahl has a bachelor’s degree and a felony conviction for possession and sale of methamphetamine. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board awarded Dahl a permanent disability rating of 79 percent. Dahl’s permanent disability rating on the California Permanent Disability Rating Schedule is 59 percent. Dahl sought to rebut that rating, arguing that she “will have a greater loss of future earnings than reflected in a rating because, due to the industrial injury, the employee is not amenable to rehabilitation.” The court of appeal annulled the award. Dahl’s “rebuttal” included no evidence that the injuries she sustained rendered her incapable of rehabilitation, but consisted solely of a vocational expert’s opinion that his method for determining Dahl’s diminished future earnings capacity produced a higher rating than the Schedule rating produced and that his method more accurately measured Dahl’s diminished future earnings. Dahl’s attempted rebuttal did not comport with any approved method for rebutting the presumptively-correct Schedule rating. View "Contra Costa County v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Lario Melendrez worked for Ameron for 24 years where he was exposed to asbestos and died of asbestos-related mesothelioma. Plaintiffs, Lario's survivors, filed a wrongful death suit against Ameron, alleging that in addition to his workplace exposure to asbestos, Lario was also permitted to take waste or scrap pipe home, where he was exposed to asbestos in using the pipe for home projects. The trial court granted Ameron's motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs' sole and exclusive remedy against Ameron lies in the California Workers’ Compensation Act, Lab. Code, 3600 et seq. The court concluded that the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy rule applies; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Ameron expert witness fees; and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Melendrez v. Ameron Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

In an attempt to curtail attrition within the Los Angeles Police Department, the City required all newly hired police officers who graduated the Los Angeles Police Academy to reimbuse the LAPD a prorated portion of the cost of training at the Academy if s/he voluntarily left after serving less than 60 months following graduation (and going to work for another law enforcement agency within a year of terminating employment with the LAPD). Officers signed an "acknowledgement" of this reimbursement requirement. This case was a coordinated action involving 43 former officers of the LAPD, all but three of whom were successfully sued by the city for breach of the acknowledgment. On appeal in case No. E058460, the officers contended that the acknowledgement failed as a contract for lack of consideration, but that if there was a contract, it was unenforceable as contrary to multiple state and federal laws. The Court of Appeal agreed in part with appellants’ contention that LAAC section 4.1700 violated Labor Code section 2802, and concluded that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the acknowledgment was entirely void pursuant to Labor Code section 2804. Because these conclusions were dispositive, the Court did not address the remaining issues appellants raised. The Court also affirmed the judgment in favor of the city on appellants’ cross-complaint. While the appeal in case No. E058460 was pending, the city filed an appeal of the trial court’s ruling denying its motion for attorney fees. (Case No. E060572.) The Court of Appeal consolidated the two cases. Because the Court reversed judgment on the city’s complaint and order entry of judgment in favor of all defendants, the Court dismissed dismiss the appeal in case No. E060572 as moot. View "In re Acknowledgment Cases" on Justia Law

Karen Nosal-Tabor was a registered nurse who previously worked in the cardiology department at Sharp Chula Vista Medical Center (Sharp). In 2011, Sharp implemented "nurse-led" cardiac stress testing in which a physician is not physically present during the tests. Nosal-Tabor repeatedly refused to perform nurse-led stress tests and made numerous complaints concerning the testing to Sharp's management. Among Nosal-Tabor's complaints was that stress testing constituted the practice of medicine and that Sharp had not adopted legally adequate standardized procedures to permit its nurses to perform such tests. Sharp's management told Nosal-Tabor that Sharp had adopted legally sufficient standardized procedures, and that these procedures permitted nurses such as Nosal-Tabor to conduct nurse-led stress testing. After Nosal-Tabor continued to refuse to perform nurse-led stress testing and to complain about its implementation, Sharp disciplined her and eventually terminated her employment. Nosal-Tabor sued Sharp, alleging wrongful termination and two causes of action premised on claims of improper workplace retaliation. Sharp moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted the motion, ruling that Nosal-Tabor presented "no credible evidence that the Standardized Procedures in place at the time of her termination were insufficient." On appeal, Nosal-Tabor claims that the trial court erred in granting Sharp's motion for summary judgment. Her primary contention is that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find that Sharp had failed to adopt standardized procedures that comply with the Guidelines. Nosal-Tabor contended that this error caused the court to improperly conclude that she would be unable to establish any of her causes of action. The Court of Appeal agreed: the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Sharp. The documents that Sharp held out as its standardized procedures did not contain several elements that are required by the Guidelines. In light of these deficiencies, a reasonable juror could find that Sharp improperly retaliated against, and wrongfully terminated, Nosal-Tabor when she complained about, and refused to perform, nurse-led stress testing pursuant to Sharp's legally deficient procedures. View "Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista Medical Ctr." on Justia Law

Linda Arneson worked for Pacific Mortgage, and received both salary and commission. After she left Pacific in February 2013, she claimed she was owed commissions for, among other things, certain work done by a fellow employee as part of her team. Representing herself, she filed a wage claim with the state Labor Commissioner, and, in October 2013, obtained an award of approximately $29,500. Appealed, and filed a bond guaranteeing Arneson's award. The appeal prompted Arneson to seek legal counsel in mid-December 2013. Her counsel substituted into the case on January 10, and six days later the court scheduled a pretrial conference for early March 2014, and the appeal itself for late March. In early February, Arneson's new counsel served Pacific notice that Arneson was reserving the right to present claims beyond just unpaid commissions at the scheduled hearing on the appeal, such as violations of various Labor Code sections and even fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Pacific withdrew its appeal with prejudice. Pacific then paid the Labor Commission award, plus accrued interest. At issue before the Court of Appeal was the matter of counsel's claim for attorney fees. In early March 2014, Arneson's counsel filed a motion for attorney fees and costs. The trial court denied all fees to Arneson on the theory that there must be a court award under Labor Code section 98.2 before a party can collect its fees. And since Pacific had withdrawn its appeal, no fees could be awarded. "In adding the 'employee-is-successful' sentence in 2003, the Legislature certainly never intended to give employers a chance to whipsaw employees by filing section 98.2 appeals and then withdrawing them. Such a reading of the statute turns the basic purpose of the 2003 amendment on its head. It incentivizes employers to file frivolous appeals and then withdraw them at the last minute so as to inflict gratuitous legal costs on an employee who has been otherwise successful at the Labor Commission level." The order denying fees was reversed, and the matter remanded for the trial court to ascertain the reasonable fees incurred by Arneson to defend employer Pacific's aborted appeal. View "Royal Pacific Funding v. Arneson" on Justia Law