Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Plaintiffs (pipefitter apprentices) claimed that the company violated the Prevailing Wage Law and Shelley-Maloney Apprentice Labor Standards Act of 1939 by hiring construction craft laborer apprentices instead of pipefitter apprentices to work on the construction of water treatment plants, seeking to represent a class of similarly situated individuals who lost wages and training as a result of the alleged violations. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the company on the ground the journeymen on the relevant projects were classified as laborers, and the Prevailing Wage Law merely required employers to hire apprentices who are in the same occupation as the journeymen on their projects. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the statutes require a contractor to select apprentices based not on their job title or union affiliation but the work processes on which they have been expressly approved to train. If, as they argued, a journeyman’s craft or trade is defined exclusively by the work processes that he is carrying out, that journeyman’s craft or trade could vary from moment to moment. View "Henson v. C. Overaa & Co." on Justia Law

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Costco withheld federal and state payroll taxes from plaintiff's award for lost wages. The trial court, under Lisec v. United States, ruled that the withholding was improper and denied Costco's motion for acknowledgment of satisfaction of the judgment. The court noted that in the 23 years since Lisec, the IRS and the vast majority of federal appellate courts have broadly interpreted the applicable Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provisions as requiring an employer to withhold payroll taxes for all "wages" arising from the employer-employee relationship, even after that relationship has terminated. Therefore, the court adopted this prevailing view and concluded that Costco properly withheld the payroll taxes. The court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Cifuentes v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging various wage and hour violations of the Labor Code, as well as other causes of action. On appeal, defendants challenged the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of claims based on the alleged misclassification of plaintiff as an independent contractor rather than an employee. The court found that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., applies to the parties’ arbitration agreement, and all of plaintiff’s claims are arbitrable; defendants did not waive their right to arbitration even though they waited 14 months after the complaint was filed to move to compel arbitration; plaintiff cannot demonstrate prejudice from the delay, which is determinative; and the court reversed the trial court’s order denying the petition to compel arbitration and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order compelling arbitration of all of plaintiff’s claims. View "Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle" on Justia Law

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Petitioner filed suit under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), Labor Code section 2699 et seq., alleging that real party in interest Pinkerton violated various provisions of the Labor Code. Pinkerton moved to enforce petitioner’s waiver of his right to assert a representative PAGA claim, or alternatively, for an order staying the PAGA claim, but sending the “individual claim” that petitioner had been subjected to Labor Code violations to arbitration pursuant to a written agreement. The trial court denied the motion to enforce the waiver, but granted the alternative relief. The court agreed with the trial court that under Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, the waiver of a right to assert a representative PAGA claim in any forum is unenforceable. The court concluded, however, that petitioner’s single cause of action under PAGA cannot be split into an arbitrable “individual claim” and a nonarbitrable representative claim. Therefore, the court granted the petition. View "Williams v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, food and beverage vendors, filed suit against AEG, Levy, and Canvas for failure to pay minimum wage and willfully misclassifying them as independent contractors in violation of Labor Code section 226.8. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs could not pursue a section 226.8 claim against AEG or Levy because neither entity had made the alleged misclassification decision. The court concluded that section 226.8 is not limited to employers who make the misclassification decision, but also extends to any employer who is aware that a co-employer has willfully misclassified their joint employees and fails to remedy the misclassification. The court concluded, however, that section 226.8 cannot be enforced through a direct private action and therefore, denied plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandate. View "Noe v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-appellant Rachel Verdugo appealed an order granting a motion to stay based on a forum selection clause in her employment agreement with defendant-respondent Alliantgroup, L.P. The clause designated Harris County, Texas, as the exclusive forum for any dispute arising out of Verdugo’s employment, and also included a provision designating Texas law as governing all disputes. Verdugo contended the trial court erred because enforcing the forum selection clause and related choice-of-law clause violated California’s public policy on employee compensation. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the trial court’s order. View "Verdugo v. Alliantgroup" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-appellant Benedict Cosentino appealed an order that dismissed his claims against defendants-respondents Stella Fuller, John R. Magee, Jason P. Maldonado, William R. Ramos, and Robert B. Vargas based on the sovereign immunity afforded to Indian tribes and their officials. Cosentino was a table games dealer at an Indian tribal casino and Defendants were the five members of the tribe’s gaming commission responsible for licensing individuals involved in the tribe’s gaming activities and overseeing those activities. Shortly after he began working at the casino, Cosentino observed ongoing criminal activity on the casino floor. Based on his observations, Cosentino became a informant for the California Department of Justice and the information he provided lead to several criminal convictions. Defendants later sought to learn what information Cosentino provided the Department of Justice, but he followed the Department’s instructions and declined to divulge the information. Defendants thereafter revoked his gaming license and the casino terminated his employment because he could not work at the casino without a valid license. Cosentino filed suit claiming Defendants revoked his gaming license without cause and in retaliation for acting as an informant. Defendants specially appeared to make a motion to quash and dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction because Cosentino based all of his claims on Defendants’ official actions as members of the tribe’s gaming commission. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed: "[a]n official’s actions that exceed the scope of his or her authority are not protected. [. . .]Cosentino, however, presented evidence supporting his claim Defendants exceeded the scope of their authority by revoking his license without cause in retaliation against him. Sovereign immunity prevents us from inquiring into the reliability of information Defendants may have relied upon in revoking Cosentino’s license or any other errors they may have made, but it does not prevent inquiry into whether Defendants exceeded their authority by using their official position to intentionally harm Cosentino." View "Cosentino v. Fuller" on Justia Law

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The Department of Industrial Relations determined that plaintiff Vector Resources, Inc. failed to pay the appropriate prevailing wages to its workers on a public works project for the San Diego Unified School District. The Department's director's decision was based on regulatory language in a document entitled "Important Notice To Awarding Bodies And Other Interested Parties Regarding Shift Differential Pay In The Director's General Prevailing Wage Determinations," which was posted on the Department's Web site. The Important Notice addresses shift differential pay for various crafts used on public works projects, and was augmented by additional regulatory language in a "Note" that the Department placed on the cover page of prevailing wage shift provisions ("the Stamp"). Vector filed a declaratory relief action against the Department, seeking a declaration that the Important Notice and Stamp were invalid and unenforceable as "underground regulations" because they were not promulgated in compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Vector and the Department filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Department's motion on the ground that under Government Code section 11340.9, subdivision (g), the Important Notice and the Stamp were exempt from the notice and hearing requirements of the APA because they were part of an overall prevailing wage determination process that constituted "rate setting." Vector argued on appeal that the grant of summary judgment to the Department was made in error because: (1) the Department admitted that the shift premium rule is a regulation; (2) the Department admitted that that regulation was not adopted in compliance with the APA; (3) the Department failed to prove that the shift premium regulation establishes or fixes rates within the meaning of Government Code section 11340.9, subdivision (g); (4) the court erred in failing to specifically cite the evidence it relied on to grant summary judgment; (5) the court's written order ignored the law and the admissible evidence; and (6) the Department's motion relied upon inadmissible evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Vector Resources, Inc. v. Baker" on Justia Law

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In September 2007, defendant Sutter Medical Foundation hired plaintiff Michaelin Higgins-Williams as a clinical assistant in Sutter's Shared Services Department. In June 2010, plaintiff reported to her treating physician, Alexander Chen, M.D., that she was stressed because of interactions at work with human resources and her manager. Dr. Chen diagnosed plaintiff as having adjustment disorder with anxiety. Based on Dr. Chen's diagnosis, Sutter granted plaintiff a stress-related (disability) leave of absence from work under the CFRA and the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. Plaintiff exhausted her available CFRA and FMLA leave entitlements when she took the leave of absence from June 28 through August 2, 2010. When plaintiff returned to work on August 3, 2010, she received a negative performance evaluation from a supervisor, which was also signed by regional manager; this was plaintiff's only negative evaluation while employed at Sutter. According to plaintiff, her supervisor inaccurately accused plaintiff of being irresponsible in the care of her identification badge. And on that same day, the regional manager grabbed plaintiff's arm and yelled at her, after which plaintiff suffered a panic attack, left work, and never returned. In mid-September 2010, plaintiff submitted to Sutter a disability accommodation request form, requesting a transfer to a different department (for "forever"), a schedule of 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and, pursuant to Dr. Chen's recommendation, a leave of absence from September 9 through October 31, 2010. Sutter granted this requested leave of absence, and two additional leave periods based on Dr. Chen's recommendations. On January 24, 2011, Sutter informed plaintiff :(1) that Dr. Chen had stated on January 6, 2011, that plaintiff could not return to work then, but that plaintiff wanted to return on March 1, 2011, on light duty in the Connecting to Work Program; (2) that Dr. Chen did not provide any information as to if or when plaintiff would be able to return to her clinical assistant position; (3) that there was no information to support a conclusion that additional leave as an accommodation would effectuate plaintiff's return as a clinical assistant; and (4) that if plaintiff did not provide such information by January 31, 2011, her employment would be terminated February 1, 2011. On January 28, 2011, Dr. Chen informed Sutter that plaintiff was not medically cleared to return to work at that point, and that plaintiff would continue her regimen of psychotherapy and medications. Sutter terminated plaintiff February 1, 2011. Plaintiff sued for wrongful termination, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sutter. The Court of Appeal affirmed, largely because plaintiff's alleged disability, "disability—an inability to work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress related to the supervisor's standard oversight of job performance," was not a disability recognized in California's Fair Employment and Housing Act. View "Higgins-Williams v. Sutter Medical Found." on Justia Law

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Fanucchi employees elected UFW to be their exclusive bargaining representative, but no bargaining occurred between 1988 and 2012. In 2012, UFW requested the recommencement of bargaining and Fanucchi refused. The Board upheld the determinations of the ALJ that (i) abandonment and similar equitable theories were not available as defenses to the duty to bargain under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act, Lab. Code, section 1140 et seq., and (ii) make whole relief was appropriate under the circumstances. The court affirmed the Board's position that UFW's past conduct indicating abandonment did not create a defense to bargaining or excuse Fanucchi from its obligation as employer to bargain in good faith with UFW. In this case, the appropriate remedy for UFW's past dereliction is in the hands of the agricultural employees themselves. If the employees do not wish to be represented by UFW, their recourse is to replace or decertify UFW by a new election pursuant to sections 1156.3 or 1156.7. Accordingly, the court reversed the portion of the Board's decision which imposed make whole relief, but affirmed the balance of the Board's decision. View "Tri-Fanucchi Farms v. Agricultural Labor Rel. Bd." on Justia Law