Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Marvalyn DeCambre, M.D., a physician specializing in pediatric urology, filed an action against Rady Children's Hospital-San Diego (RCHSD), Children's Specialist San Diego (CSSD) and the Regents of the University of California, alleging retaliation, harassment, racial discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination and wrongful termination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). DeCambre also brought claims against all defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), defamation, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the Cartwright Act. DeCambre contended that throughout her tenure at RCHSD, defendants discriminated against her because of her race and gender. Each defendant filed a special motion to strike DeCambre's complaint. The trial court granted the motions in full on the ground that all of DeCambre's causes of action arose from RCHSD's decision not to renew its contract for DeCambre's services, which was the culmination of a peer review process that was protected as an official proceeding. The court also sustained defendants' demurrers to DeCambre's claims for IIED, defamation, unfair competition and violation of the Cartwright Act and denied DeCambre's request for leave to amend. On appeal, DeCambre argued the trial court erred in granting the special motions to strike because the defendants' peer review process was not entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP statute and even it was, her claims did not arise from that process. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' anti-SLAPP motions as to DeCambre's claims for harassment and IIED. These claims did not arise from protected activity, and the Court rejected "defendants' attempt to cloak them in the protections afforded to peer review proceedings under the anti-SLAPP statute." Because the Court reversed this portion of the anti-SLAPP ruling, it also reversed and remanded the attorney fee awards. In addition, the Court remanded with directions that the court determine whether DeCambre should be afforded leave to amend her claim for defamation. View "DeCambre v. Rady Children's Hospital" on Justia Law

The California State Personnel Board upheld Telish’s dismissal from his position with the California Department of Justice based on findings that he intimidated, threatened to release sexually explicit photographs of, and physically assaulted a subordinate employee with whom he had a consensual relationship. The essential issue was the admissibility of recorded telephone conversations between Telish and his former girlfriend and subordinate employee, L.D., which was received at the administrative hearing. The court of appeal affirmed denial of relief. A participant may properly record a telephone conversation at the direction of a law enforcement officer, acting within the course of his or her authority, in the course of a criminal investigation (Pen. Code 633). Section 633 does not limit the use of duly recorded communications to criminal proceedings. Although Telish contends the criminal investigation was a “sham,” the Board determined L.D. duly recorded the telephone conversations pursuant to the direction of DOJ in connection with a criminal investigation, and the Board’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. View "Telish v. Cal. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a massage therapist at a spa, filed an employment action against her employer, alleging that she was subjected to harassing and discriminatory conduct by two customers. She alleged: sex discrimination, sexual harassment, racial harassment, retaliation, failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent harassment and discrimination based on sex, and failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent harassment based on race (California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code 12900). The court of appeal reversed an award in favor of plaintiff. There cannot be a valid claim for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment if, as here, the jury finds that the sexual harassment that occurred was not sufficiently severe or pervasive as to result in liability. A claim for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment cannot prevail when the necessary element of sexual harassment is not established. Similarly, the jury’s finding that defendant was not liable on plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim because there was no adverse employment action precluded defendant’s liability for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sex discrimination. View "Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Universal Protection Service, L.P. petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to challenge the superior court's order granting real party in interest Floridalma Franco's demand to arbitrate her employment-related disputes with Universal and ruling the arbitrator would decide the arbitrability of Franco's class action claims. Universal argued the court legally erred in its ruling because the parties' arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably submit arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, and thus it was for the superior court to decide whether the agreement authorized class and/or representative arbitration. The Court of Appeal concluded the court erred by granting Franco's petition, but nevertheless agreed with Franco that the parties' reference to American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules, which unambiguously stated that the arbitrator was to decide whether the parties' arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration, constituted clear and unmistakable evidence of their intent that the arbitrator decide this issue (which was a threshold question of arbitrability). Because the trial court reached the correct conclusion, the Court of Appeal denied Universal's petition. View "Universal Protection Services v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Eva Mies sought class action certification in order to sue her former employer, Sephora U.S.A., Inc. (Sephora), on behalf of employees who, like her, worked as "Specialists" in Sephora’s California retail stores. Mies claims Sephora misclassified Specialists as exempt from certain provisions of California labor law and, as a result, failed to pay overtime wages and failed to compensate them for missed meal periods. However, after crediting evidence that all Specialists did not engage in the same tasks to the same extent, the trial court denied class certification, concluding individualized issues, not common ones, would predominate the determination of liability. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court used proper legal criteria in assessing class certification and substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings. The Court also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Mies v. Sephora U.S.A." on Justia Law

Franco filed a purported class action as an employee of Athens Services, claiming Labor Code and wage-order violations. He also sued in a representative capacity under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code 2698) and alleged violation of state unfair competition law. (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200). Athens petitioned to compel arbitration based on Franco’s employment agreement, alleging that it was engaged in interstate commerce under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1-16). The trial court agreed. The appeal court concluded that provisions requiring arbitration and waiving class actions were unenforceable. On remand, Athens informed the court that Franco’s actual employer was Arakelian. Franco amended the complaint to add Arakelian, which filed another petition to compel arbitration, arguing that authorities cited by the prior decision had been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2010. The trial court denied the petition, citing the law of the case doctrine and finding that Arakelian waived its right to compel arbitration by failing to earlier identify itself as Franco’s true employer. The court of appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court vacated. The court of appeal reversed denial of the petition to compel arbitration, in light of the rule announced by the California Supreme Court in Iskanian. View "Franco v. Arakelian Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Horne filed an employment discrimination action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of District Council 16, reasoning that Horne was unable to establish that he was qualified for the union organizer position he sought and had failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code 12900). The trial court relied on after-acquired evidence of a prior conviction so that, at the time of the employment decision in 2010, federal law prohibited Horne from serving as a union organizer; the 13-year disability period established by that federal statute had not been shortened. The California Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of its 2014 opinion in Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. The court of appeal then reversed. Other than with respect to certain post-discovery period remedies, FEHA is not preempted by Section 504(a) of the federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act; although the trial court correctly concluded that Horne’s citizenship rights had not been fully restored for purposes of Section 504(a), its grant of summary judgment in reliance on after-acquired evidence was inappropriate during the liability phase of this FEHA litigation. View "Horne v. Dist. Council 16, Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades" on Justia Law

The Unions, representing employees in five Sheriff’s Department bargaining units, entered into collective bargaining agreements with the County of Los Angeles that contained grievance procedures for resolving complaints concerning the interpretation or application of the agreements. The grievance procedures consisted of progressive steps culminating in arbitration. The Unions filed class grievances seeking overtime pay for “donning and doffing” and related activities (putting on, taking off, and maintaining their uniforms and equipment) and “off-the-clock” supervisory activities by certain employees. The county denied the grievances; the Unions filed requests for class arbitration of the grievances, which the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM) granted. The County sought a declaratory judgment that ERCOM’s order granting class or consolidated arbitration violated the parties’ agreements. The trial court refused to compel such arbitrations, ruling that Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 gave it discretion, in the interest of judicial economy, to stay the arbitration while it resolved issues between the parties that were not subject to arbitration, which resolution might make arbitrations unnecessary. The court of appeal reversed, holding that all of the issues between the parties were subject to individual arbitrations. View "Ass'n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Nealy was hired by Santa Monica in 1996 and became a recycling worker. Nealy injured his knee on the job in 2003. A doctor declared him temporarily totally disabled until 2005, when he was released to “light duty” with the restriction that he could not push large trash bins. Nealy requested a clerical or refuse collection vehicle operator position, but began working as a groundskeeper. Nealy met with the accommodations committee again in 2006 because of difficulty climbing or descending stairs. The city did not have any office work available; Nealy never returned to work after a 2006 emergency room visit. After additional accommodation meetings, in 2010, the city indicated that it was unable to provide reasonable accommodation into an alternative position because Nealy was not minimally qualified for the only available position that was not a promotion. The city filed a disability retirement application but, in 2011, CalPERS canceled the application for failure to submit necessary information. Nealy obtained a right-to-sue notice from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. The court entered judgment for the city on disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, and retaliation. Meanwhile, an ALJ awarded Nealy $36,260 on his workers’ compensation claim. The court of appeal affirmed, in favor of the city. View "Nealy v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

Three health care workers sued their hospital employer in this putative class and private attorney general enforcement action for alleged Labor Code violations and related claims. In this appeal, the workers argued that a hospital policy illegally let health care employees waive their second meal periods on shifts longer than 12 hours. A statute requires two meal periods for shifts longer than 12 hours. But an order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) authorized employees in the health care industry to waive one of those two required meal periods on shifts longer than 8. The principal issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the validity of the IWC order. After review, the Court concluded the IWC order was partially invalid to the extent it authorized second meal break waivers on shifts longer than 12 hours. However, with one exception, the retroactive application of the Court's conclusion had to be litigated on remand. The Court also determined the court incorrectly granted summary judgment and denied class certification. View "Gerard v. Orange Coast Mem. Medical Center" on Justia Law