Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Before it was acquired by DirecTV, 180 Connect entered into an employment arbitration agreement with Marenco, which prohibited filing a class or collective action, or a representative or private attorney general action. After acquiring 180 Connect, DirecTV retained employees, including Marenco. Marenco later filed suit, alleging that DirecTV had issued debit cards in payment of wages to a putative class of employees. Plaintiffs who used their cards to withdraw cash at ATM machines were required to pay an activation fee and a cash withdrawal fee, resulting in DirecTV’s failure to pay plaintiffs’ full wages in violation of the Unfair Competition Law and Labor Code 212. DirecTV moved to compel arbitration of Marenco’s individual claims, and stay the class claims. Marenco argued that DirecTV lacked standing to enforce the agreement and that the agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law. The U.S. Supreme Court then issued its 2011 decision, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the California rule of unconscionability. The trial court ordered arbitration of Marenco’s individual claims, holding that DirecTV had standing; the class action waiver is not unconscionable; and prohibition of representative actions does not violate the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 157). The court of appeal affirmed. View "Marenco v. DirecTV, LLC" on Justia Law

Wright was a correctional officer and lived on the San Quentin premises, in a unit he rented from his employer, the state. Living on the grounds was not mandatory and he paid market rate rent. Wright was injured when he fell in the course of his lengthy walk from his home to his actual place of work and received workers’ compensation. He then sued the state, which moved for summary judgment on the ground that workers’ compensation was Wright’s exclusive remedy, based on the “premises line” rule, which provides that the employment relationship commences once the employee enters the employer’s premises. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that there were triable issues of fact as to whether Wright’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. That the State did not intend its workers’ compensation policy would insure Wright for all injuries suffered on San Quentin grounds, even at or near the home where he lived, is evidenced by the terms of Wright’s lease agreement, which required Wright to obtain a “broad policy of comprehensive coverage of public liability insurance, naming the State as the insured.” View "Wright v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

AEG hired Dr. Murray as entertainer Michael Jackson’s personal physician for a concert tour. Michael died of acute propofol intoxication while under Murray’s care. Katherine Jackson, on behalf of herself and as guardian of Michael’s children, Michael Jr., Paris-Michael and Prince Michael, filed suit for negligence hiring, retention, and supervision. The jury found that Murray was not unfit or incompetent to perform the work for which he was hired. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in summarily adjudicating negligence because AEG did not owe Michael a duty to refrain from exerting pressure over Murray; AEG did not undertake to provide protective services to Michael; and AEG owed Michael no duty arising out of the contract with Murray. The court also did not err in summarily adjudicating respondeat superior because the undisputed facts establish that Murray was an independent contractor as a matter of law; AEG is not liable under the peculiar risk doctrine as an independent contractor; and Murray was not an agent of AEG. The trial court did not err in instructing the jurors with a modified jury instruction along with the special verdict form; the special verdict was legally sufficient. View "Jackson v. AEG Live, LLC" on Justia Law

Former ABM security guards filed a class action, alleging that ABM failed to provide rest periods required by California law in that it failed to relieve security guards of all duties during rest breaks, instead requiring its guards to remain on call during breaks. ABM admitted it requires its security guards to keep their radios and pagers on during rest breaks, to remain vigilant, and to respond when needs arise, such as when a tenant wishes to be escorted to the parking lot, a building manager must be notified of a mechanical problem, or an emergency situation occurs. The trial court certified a class and granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication, concluding an employer must relieve its employees of all duties during rest breaks, including the obligation to remain on call and that ABM was subject to approximately $90 million in statutory damages, interest, penalties, and attorney fees. The court of appeal reversed. Labor Code section 226.7 prescribes only that an employee not be required to work on a rest break, not that the employee be relieved of all duties, such as the duty to remain on call. Remaining on call does not itself constitute performing work. View "Augustus v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the California constitution's prohibition against the impairment of contracts precluded the application of the defined benefit formulas and employee contribution provisions of the California Public Employees' Pension Reform Act of 2013 to County of San Diego safety employees who were hired after the Act's effective date, but who were covered by preexisting collective bargaining agreements containing conflicting terms. After review, the Court concluded the application of the defined benefit formula provisions did not result in a constitutionally prohibited impairment of the agreements. The Court did not reach the constitutional question as to the application of the employee contribution provisions as the Court concluded their application resulted in a statutorily prohibited impairment of the agreements. The Court affirmed the judgment as to the application of the defined benefit formula provisions and remanded the case back to the superior court for further proceedings as to the application of the employee contribution provisions. View "Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Solares filed an unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200) class action on behalf of employees who are or were employed by PSAV, which provides audio-visual services to hotels within the Century Corridor Property Business Improvement District adjoining Los Angeles International Airport. They allege that PSAV collects from customers a separately designated “service charge,” “delivery charge,” facility charge,” “gratuity,” “administrative fee,” or other such charge that “customers might reasonably believe . . . were for the class member/employees’ services.” PSAV allegedly failed to pay the separately-designated charges it collects to its employees in violation of the Hotel Service Charge Reform Ordinance in the Los Angeles Municipal Code. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the audio-visual workers’ suit. The court of appeal reversed. The ordinance applies only to those hotel workers who would have received a gratuity for their services but for the imposition of a service charge that hotel customers believed was in lieu of a gratuity. The complaint did not allege that Solares and the proposed class are within the class of hotel workers who traditionally relied on gratuities. View "Audio Visual Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

When Cruise applied for employment with Kroger in 2007, she completed an employment application, which contained a clause requiring arbitration of employment-related disputes and incorporating by reference Kroger’s Mediation & Binding Arbitration Policy. When Cruise sued, alleging employment discrimination, thel court denied Kroger’s motion to compel arbitration, ruling that Kroger failed to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement. The court was not persuaded the undated four-page arbitration policy attached to Kroger’s moving papers was extant at the time Cruise read and signed the employment application, and that it was the same Arbitration Policy to which the employment application referred. The court of appeal reversed. The arbitration clause in the employment application, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the parties agreed to arbitrate their employment-related disputes, and that Cruise’s claims against Kroger fall within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. The only impact of Kroger’s inability to establish the contents of the 2007 Arbitration Policy is that Kroger failed to establish the parties agreed to govern their arbitration by procedures different from those prescribed in the California Arbitration Act, so the arbitration will be governed by the CAA, rather than by the procedures set forth in the Arbitration Policy. View "Cruise v. Kroger Co." on Justia Law

Montano filed a putative class action against Wet Seal, alleging that it failed to offer all required meal and rest periods to its California non-exempt retail employees; failed to provide all regular and overtime pay when due or when employment terminated; and failed to provide accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements, in violation of the Labor and Business and Professions Codes, Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 7, and Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. She included a representative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act. Montano propounded discovery requests and Wet Seal responded with objections but no substantive information. Montano moved to compel discovery responses. Before the hearing, Wet Seal moved to compel arbitration of Montano’s individual claims and to stay the action pending completion of arbitration, based on a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims." The trial court ultimately denied the motion for arbitration and granted the discovery motion. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Montano v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc." on Justia Law

Rivero was the elected sheriff of Lake County in 2011. He had been involved in an on-duty shooting while serving as a deputy. A year after Rivero became sheriff the district attorney announced that he had reopened the investigation, believing that Rivero had been untruthful, and informed Rivero of the intention to deem him a “Brady officer,” so that the district attorney would be obliged to inform any criminal defendant in a case in which Rivero might testify that he was subject to impeachment because of a finding that Rivero had provided false information in an official investigation. Rivero requested legal assistance from county counsel. County counsel responded that it could not represent either party in a dispute between county public officers, but recommended that Rivero be allowed to retain outside counsel at the county’s expense. The board of supervisors denied Rivero’s request. The trial court directed the county to provide independent legal counsel for Rivero pursuant to Government Code section 31000.6 for negotiations with the district attorney prior to the final decision. The court of appeal modified the decision, finding that Rivero’s right to independent counsel extends to a legal challenge to the designation as a Brady officer. View "Rivero v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Schultz sought workers’ compensation benefits after suffering injuries in a traffic accident while driving his personal vehicle at Edwards Air Force Base where he worked for JT3. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board denied benefits. The court of appeal annulled the denial. Under the “going and coming rule” workers’ compensation benefits are generally not available for injuries suffered by an employee during a local commute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours, because the injury does not occur during the ordinary course of employment. However, the ordinary course of employment is deemed to commence when an employee enters the employer’s premises (the premises line rule); at that point, the going and coming rule does not bar workers’ compensation liability. In this case, the employee was working on a secure base not generally open to the public, entered the base in his personal vehicle after passing a gate using an employer-issued security pass, and had travelled one mile inside the base when the accident occurred. Although Schultz worked at a fixed location, the employer had multiple locations on the base and he travelled sometimes in his own vehicle, as needed, throughout the base to perform assigned work. View "Schultz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law