Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, Pacific Bell, claiming that Pacific Bell violated California law (Lab. Code, 226.7, 512) by failing to relinquish control over their activities during meal and rest break periods, and moved for class certification. Plaintiffs asserted that the company’s guidelines converted them into “de facto security guards for their company vehicles during their breaks,” thereby failing to relieve them of all work-related duties. The trial court concluded plaintiffs failed to show Pacific Bell’s allegedly restrictive policies had been consistently applied to the putative class members. The court denied class certification on the ground that common questions do not predominate over individual questions, making the class action procedure an inappropriate method for resolving this dispute. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that it would be impractical to consider each possible combination and interpretation of the six rules at issue, have the trier of fact determine which combinations rise to the level of control so as to amount to a failure to relieve of all duties, and then have each class member show whether he was subject to one of the offending combinations of rules. View "Koval v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co." on Justia Law

Bower was hired by Inter-Con in 2007 and executed an arbitration agreement, covering claims for compensation and wages. In 2008, Bower executed a second arbitration agreement that added clauses prohibiting claims on behalf of a class or in a representative capacity and covering claims for breaks and rest periods. After his 2011 termination, Bower filed a putative class action, claiming failure to: provide meal and rest periods, pay wages, provide accurate itemized wage statements, pay wages upon termination, with claims under the Unfair Competition Act and the Private Attorneys General Act. Instead of moving to compel arbitration, Inter-Con answered, asserting, as an affirmative defense, that Bower’s claims were subject to arbitration. Inter-Con responded to discovery, but objected based on the arbitration agreement, and agreed to provide responses only to Bower in his individual capacity. Inter-Con did respond to an interrogatory concerning the number of class members employed during the class period and propounded its own discovery. Bower moved for leave to file an amended complaint to allege a broader class and additional theories and to compel further discovery responses. Inter-Con then moved to compel arbitration. The court held that “Defendant waived the right to arbitrate by propounding and responding to class discovery.” The court of appeal affirmed. View "Bower v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Before accepting a job with DMC, Satyadi , who holds board certifications in clinical laboratory science, was told the laboratory she would manage had no material deficiencies in staff and equipment performance and accreditation. Within days of starting the position, Satyadi received a list of deficiencies; she was directed to reduce overtime and to “clean up problem personnel.” Her initial performance was praised. Satyadi subsequently informed executives about practices she believed violated state and federal laws. Satyadi refused to engage in those activities. During labor negotiations, an executive made derogatory comments about Satyadi in front of her subordinates. Her complaint was not addressed. An attorney was hired to investigate allegations by other employees, but DMC withheld information. Satyadi was terminated and told that no further administrative appeals process existed. Satyadi sued, claiming retaliation (Labor Code 1102.5.1). The trial court dismissed, holding that Satyadi was required to first to seek relief from the Labor Commissioner. While appeal was pending, the Labor Code was amended to specify that employees need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, unless the specific code provision expressly requires exhaustion. The court of appeal held that the amendments apply and reversed. View "Satyadi v. West Contra Costa Healthcare Dist." on Justia Law

In July 2012, plaintiff-respondent Ernesto Ruiz filed a putative class action complaint alleging defendant-appellant Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. failed to pay Ruiz and other employees overtime and other wages for all hours worked, provide required meal and rest breaks, provide accurate and complete wage statements, reimburse business expenses, and pay final wages in a timely manner. Moss Bros. appealed an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of the employment-related and putative class action, representative, and Ruiz's individual claims. The trial court denied the petition on the ground Moss Bros. did not meet its burden of proving the parties had an agreement to arbitrate the controversy. No statement of decision was requested or issued, but the court implicitly found Moss Bros. did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that an electronic signature on its proffered arbitration agreement was "the act of Ruiz." After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded Moss Bros. did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ruiz electronically signed the 2011 agreement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order denying the petition. View "Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto" on Justia Law

After Tabarrejo left his employment as a PRH caregiver, he filed a claim with the Labor Commissioner for unpaid wages. He was awarded $131,096.77. PRH appealed to the superior court and posted the undertaking required by Labor Code 98.2.1. The trial court granted Tabarrejo’s motion to dismiss on the ground that PRH was a suspended corporation that lacked capacity to sue. PRH failed to pay within 10 days, so Tabarrejo asked the court to release the undertaking to him. PRH disputed Tabarrejo’s entitlement, primarily arguing that since PRH’s corporate powers were suspended, the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter ab initio and should never have accepted the undertaking. The court concluded that PRH did not have standing to appeal and ordered the release of the undertaking to PRH’s owner. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the issue was one of legal capacity, not standing. Although the appeal was invalid when filed because PRH lacked capacity to sue, PRH could have retroactively validated the appeal by reviving its corporate powers. That PRH elected not to do so did not retroactively deprive the court of jurisdiction. The trial court was directed to enter an order releasing the undertaking to Tabarrejo. View "Tabarrejo v. Super. Court" on Justia Law

Danko practiced law with the firm of O’Reilly & Collins, until, in 2009, Danko sued O’Reilly, as an individual, and O’Reilly & Collins, for unpaid wages. Before trial, O’Reilly, as an individual, obtained directed verdict. In 2012, judgment was entered in favor of Danko for more than $2,000,000. Danko filed moved to amend the judgment and the costs and fee order “to include Terry O’Reilly as a judgment debtor for all amounts owed to Michael Danko” on the ground that O’Reilly knew that the firm owed Danko more than $2 million, but drew out all the firm’s available funds without reserving any amounts to satisfy the debt he knew was owed to Danko, telling Danko “you will not be able to execute on any judgment.” The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s amendment of the judgment, citing Code Civ. Proc., 187. The court rejected arguments that the amendment was entered in violation of a stay in the bankruptcy of the firm; the amendment was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata; and the amendment was contrary to the principles governing collateral estoppel. View "Danko v. O'Reilly" on Justia Law

The issues this case presented to the Court of Appeal filed by the petitioners in this matter were two-fold: (1) whether the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board retain jurisdiction over a medical billing dispute pertaining to more than 300 consolidated claims, after the Legislature passed significant workers' compensation reform legislation that created a new administrative independent review process for the resolution of billing disputes; and (2) if the Board did retain jurisdiction over this dispute, was there substantial evidence to support the workers' compensation judge's (WCJ) findings of fact regarding his determination of the "reasonable fee" to be paid for arthroscopic knee procedures, arthroscopic shoulder procedures, and epidural injection procedures performed at three commonly managed ambulatory surgical center (ASC) facilities in San Diego County? After review, the Court concluded that although the text of the relevant legislation and resulting statutes was ambiguous, the most reasonable interpretation of the legislation was that it does not divest the Board of jurisdiction to decide the dispute at issue in this case. Furthermore, the Court held that the WCJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence. View "Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

Duarte joined the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) in 1993. He earned 2.023 years of service. He took unpaid personal leave for Duarte for the 1995-1996 school year and unpaid educational leave for 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. Duarte worked one season as a forest firefighter, attended law school, and worked as a paralegal. In 2003, Duarte returned to teaching in Oakland. On his second day he was assaulted and threatened by students. Duarte has not returned to teaching. In 2004, Duarte filed a worker’s compensation claim. After four evaluations, he entered into a stipulated settlement that indicated a “serious dispute” regarding the scope of Duarte’s disability. In 2006, Duarte sought social security disability benefits; it was determined that he was disabled from the date of the 2003 incident and became eligible for monthly disability benefits in 2005. Duarte’s student loans were forgiven. In 2008, Duarte sought CalSTRS disability retirement benefits. CalSTRS repeatedly asked Duarte to submit medical records and other documents. An ALJ upheld denial of Duarte’s application because he refused to complete the independent medical evaluation ordered under Education Code 24103 (b),. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars CalSTRS from relitigating his disability because several other state agencies have found him to be disabled. View "Duarte v. CA. State Teachers' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

A former Los Angeles County sheriff’s deputy, while on temporary disability leave resulting from knee injuries, was discharged from her employment on grounds later found by the county Civil Service Commission to be unjustified. During the long Commission proceedings, the county’s retirement authority (LACERA) granted her a disability retirement, without benefits, and she withdrew her accumulated retirement contributions. She unsuccessfully sued, seeking restoration of her employment as a deputy sheriff, and LACERA’s reevaluation of her disability status in light of her rehabilitation following knee surgeries. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the Civil Service Commission order requires the Department to restore her employment, whether she is or is not disabled to serve as a deputy sheriff. Upon restoration of her employment she will be restored to LACERA membership, and will be eligible for LACERA’s evaluation and determination of her disability status. Unless LACERA advised her that forfeiture of any right to restoration of her employment and redetermination of her disability would be a consequence of withdrawing her accumulated retirement contributions from LACERA, LACERA breached its fiduciary duties and may be obligated to permit her to redeposit her withdrawn contributions.View "Hudson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Pacific Corporate Group Holdings, LLC (PCGH) sued one of its former employees, Thomas Keck, seeking to collect on a promissory note. Keck defended against the action by claiming that any money that he owed PCGH was offset by monies that PCGH owed him. Keck also filed a cross-complaint against PCGH seeking damages for unpaid bonus and severance payments that he claimed were due to him pursuant to two employment agreements. In a special verdict, the jury found that PCGH owed Keck $270,547.95 under the terms of a 2006 employment agreement. PCGH filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or for new trial on the ground that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the parties entered into the 2006 Agreement. The trial court denied PCGH's motion. Keck filed a motion for additur, or in the alternative, for a new trial on damages, on the ground that the jury had awarded inadequate damages in light of the bonus and severance provisions in the 2006 Agreement. The trial court granted Keck's motion, and issued an additur and conditional order granting a new trial on damages. PCGH refused to consent to the additur, and thus, the trial court's order directing a new trial on damages became effective. Both parties filed motions for attorney fees, which the court denied. PCGH filed two appeals seeking reversal of the judgment: the trial court's order denying its motion for new trial and JNOV; and the trial court's order granting Keck's motion for additur, or, in the alternative, a new trial on damages; and the trial court's order denying its motion for attorney fees. Keck appealed the trial court's order denying his motion for attorney fees. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's order granting a new trial on damages resulted in a vacatur of the underlying judgment, and therefore, the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider PCGH's appeals, the trial court's order denying its motion for new trial, and the trial court's order denying attorney fees. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider Keck's appeal of the trial court's order denying attorney fees. The Court affirmed both the trial court's order denying PCGH's motion for JNOV and the trial court's order granting Keck's motion for additur, or in the alternative, a new trial on damages. The case was remanded back to the trial court with directions to conduct a new trial on damages and any other necessary proceedings.View "Pacific Corporate Group Holdings v. Keck" on Justia Law