Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) challenged transfers that did not affect compensation or other specified rights, solely because the transfer may lead to negative employment consequences or because of the officer’s belief to that effect. They claimed that the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) (Gov. Code 3300) and a memorandum of understanding between the city and the Los Angeles Police Protective League entitled them to an administrative appeal of their involuntary transfers. The trial court and court of appeal disagreed, holding that POBRA does not afford officers the right to an administrative appeal of a transfer of assignment, unless the transfer was “for purposes of punishment.”View "L.A. Police Protective League v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Serban worked as a massage therapist at Voda Spa. Serban and Voda Spa disagree as to why he left that work, but the trial court found Serban had good cause to leave and that finding was not challenged. They also disputed whether Serban was an employee or independent contractor. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board found that he was an employee, not an independent contractor, and the trial court agreed with the Board that its decision was not subject to judicial review because both the California Constitution and the Unemployment Insurance Code bar actions whose purpose is to prevent the collection of state taxes. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing that the case does not challenge the imposition of a tax.View "W. Hollywood Cmty. Health & Fitness Ctr. v. CA Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Ferrick, a former employee of Santa Clara University (SCU), a private institution, charged Travis, allegedly SCU’s “Director of Real Estate” and Ferrick’s immediate supervisor, with extensive wrongdoing and inappropriate behavior. Only some of the claimed conduct was allegedly reported by Ferrick to SCU’s management. The complaint’s sole cause of action was for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, also known as a Tameny claim. The trial court dismissed without leave to amend, finding that the complaint failed to allege that her discharge violated any fundamental public policy. The court of appeal reversed. The allegations, liberally construed, indicate that Travis accepted a payment, not in trust for SCU, in return for using his position as an SCU employee to place SCU tenants with a private landlord; the complaint adequately pleads that Ferrick had a reasonable basis to suspect commercial bribery and disclosed her “reasonably based suspicions” to SCU. The complaint states a tort cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.View "Ferrick v. Santa Clara Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Cecilia Diego sued her former employer, the Pilgrim United Church of Christ, alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Diego alleged she was terminated as assistant director of Pilgrim;s preschool as a result of the director's mistaken belief that she lodged a complaint with the Community Care Licensing Division of the state Department of Social Services, which resulted in a surprise inspection of the preschool. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pilgrim United on the basis that, because Diego in fact had not made a complaint to Licensing (or otherwise engaged in activity associated with protected disclosure of alleged wrongdoing), her termination of employment did not violate public policy as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal found that Diego met her summary judgment burden of establishing triable issues of fact as to whether Pilgrim was more likely motivated by a discriminatory reason (retaliation) than by its proffered explanation (insubordination) in its termination decision. As such, the Court reversed the trial court with respect to the public policy issue Diego raised, and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Diego v. Pilgrim United Church of Christ" on Justia Law

Real party in interest Alicia Moreno sued her former employer petitioner Garden Fresh Restaurant Corporation for claims related to a variety of alleged Labor Code violations. Moreno filed the action as a putative class action, and also pursued representative relief under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Garden Fresh moved to compel arbitration of Moreno's claims, on an individual basis only, based on two arbitration agreements that Moreno signed during her tenure as an employee of Garden Fresh. Garden Fresh requested that the court dismiss Moreno's class and representative claims, arguing that the parties' arbitration agreements did not contemplate class- or representative-based arbitration. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, but specifically left to the arbitrator to decide the question whether the arbitration agreements between the parties contemplated classwide and/or representative arbitration, thereby denying Garden Fresh's request that only Moreno's individual claims be sent to arbitration. Garden Fresh filed a petition for a writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, presenting one issue: who decides whether an agreement to arbitrate disputes between the parties to the agreement authorizes class and/or representative arbitration when the contract is silent on the matter - the arbitrator or the court? The Court concluded that the question whether an arbitration agreement permits class and/or representative arbitration was a gateway issue, and thus reserved " 'for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.' " The Court granted the request for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court: (1) to vacate that portion of its order leaving it to the arbitrator to determine whether the parties agreed to class and/or representative arbitration; (2) to conduct further proceedings as necessary to determine whether the parties' arbitration agreement contemplates class and/or representative arbitration, and whether the plaintiff's representative PAGA claims may be arbitrated, or rather, whether that claim should be bifurcated; and (3) to enter a new order setting forth the court's determination as to these issues.View "Garden Fresh Restaurant Corp. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Parole agent Baron Earl was disciplined by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for conducting a purportedly unlawful search of a residence, and after an administrative hearing the discipline was upheld by the State Personnel Board. Earl appealed the trial court’s denial of his administrative mandamus petition, seeking to overturn the Board’s decision. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Earl argued: (1) his motion to dismiss should have been granted due to lack of timely notice; and (2) no substantial evidence showed the search was unlawful, and that the level of discipline by the Department and later upheld by the Board reflected an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeal agreed that notice was untimely. As such, the Court did not reach Earl’s remaining contention. The case was reversed and remanded with directions to issue a writ commanding the Board to grant Earl’s motion to dismiss.View "Earl v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Walgreens, alleging that Walgreens violated employees' rights to meal breaks. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for class certification. The court concluded that the trail court used the right analysis to analyze plaintiff's motion where the trial court correctly applied the Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior court holding. Brinker adopted the "make available" standard and rejected the "ensure" standard where the employer merely must make meal breaks available, rather than ensure employees take breaks. The trial court said that Walgreens must make breaks available for its employees, but the employer need not ensure employees actually take the meal breaks. In this case, plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his motions through an expert opinion, emails, and declarations. The evidence was too weak to convince the trial court and the trial court's evaluations were valid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "In re Walgreen Co. Overtime Cases" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit seeking to represent a class of salaried managerial employees who worked at JCS restaurants in California on claims they had been misclassified as exempt employees and were entitled to overtime pay. The trial court subsequently permitted additional plaintiffs to join the lawsuit. The trial court denied class certification based on the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish that their claims were typical of the class, they could represent the class, common questions predominated the claims, and a class action is the superior means of resolving the litigation. The court concluded, however, that the class is adequately represented by plaintiffs and these claims are typical of the class; the trial court failed to adequately assess the means by which plaintiffs' theory of recovery could be proved through resolution of common questions of fact and law; the trial court must reconsider whether class certification provides a superior method of resolving plaintiffs' claim, and therefore, the court reversed the order denying class certification and remanded for further proceedings.View "Martinez v. Joe's Crab Shack Holdings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lori Edwards appealed a trial court's ruling denying her petition for writ of mandate, challenging Edwards's classification and payment as a substitute teacher for the 2007/2008 school year. Edwards contends that, because she provided teaching services during the entire school year, she was a permanent employee and therefore was unlawfully deprived of backpay for the 2007/2008 school year. Edwards also argued the trial court erred in finding her writ petition barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded Edwards's writ petition was not barred by the statute of limitations because the limitation period was tolled while Edwards was pursuing internal administrative remedies. Nevertheless, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying Edwards's petition on the grounds the Lake Elsinore Unified School District did not misclassify Edwards as a substitute teacher and was not required to pay Edwards backpay.View "Edwards v. Lake Elsinore Unified etc." on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs initiated a class action lawsuit against AB Trucking, claiming that AB did not pay its drivers for all hours worked, misclassified some drivers as non-employee trainees and did not pay them at all, and failed to provide required meal and rest breaks. The trial court certified a class of drivers who performed work for AB out of its Oakland, facility. Plaintiffs prevailed on most of their claims and the court awarded the class a total of $964,557.08. In a post-judgment order, the court awarded attorney fees, litigation expenses, and class representative enhancements to plaintiffs. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that federal law preempts application of California’s meal and rest break requirements to motor carriers; that the order granting class certification was not supported by substantial evidence; that the court should have reserved individual determinations of damages for the claims administration process; that AB’s drivers are expressly excluded from coverage under Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) Order No. 9-2001; and that the award of attorney fees and representative enhancements must be reversed.View "Godfrey v. Oakland Port Servs. Corp." on Justia Law