Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This matter arose from a propane tank falling on truck driver, Steven King, while an AmeriGas Propane, L.P. employee, David Jones (Jones), was unloading empty propane tanks from King’s flatbed trailer at an AmeriGas facility. Landstar Ranger, Inc., a motor carrier, hired King and his company, King Transportation, LLC, to transport the load of propane tanks. King and his wife, Grace King, brought a personal injury action against shipper, AmeriGas, and carrier, Landstar, for damages for injuries arising from the tank falling on King. AmeriGas settled with the Kings and cross-complained against Landstar for equitable indemnification and contribution. Following a bench trial on AmeriGas’s cross-complaint, the trial court found Landstar not liable for equitable indemnification. The court concluded AmeriGas did not sustain any recoverable loss or damages and Landstar was not liable for violating any Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs).AmeriGas appealed that judgment, arguing the trial court erred in finding Landstar did not owe a legal duty to King and did not suffer a recoverable loss. Furthermore, AmeriGas argued the trial court erred by considering Landstar's affirmative defenses which the trial court had previously stricken from Landstar’s answer to AmeriGas’s cross-complaint, and erred in not issuing a tentative decision before requesting proposed statements of decision and in failing to rule on material issues raised by AmeriGas’s cross-complaint. AmeriGas further argues the trial court’s alternative findings of nonliability are incomplete, ambiguous, and not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court’s judgment in favor of Landstar, on AmeriGas’s indemnity cross-complaint. There was ample evidence supporting the court’s findings that King was a highly experienced truck driver, qualified to transport AmeriGas’s propane tanks. Therefore Landstar was not negligent based on violations of FMCSRs requiring carriers to ensure their drivers are adequately trained and/or experienced in securing their loads, and adhere to proper securement methods and procedures. Even if Landstar violated FMCSRs, any such violations did not proximately cause or contribute to King’s injuries because the load of propane tanks was secure and stable during transit and upon arrival at AmeriGas’s Fontana yard. The Court also rejected AmeriGas’s objections relating to the trial court’s statement of decision. Any procedural errors were harmless, and the statement of decision was sufficiently thorough and clear in addressing the material disputed issues in this case.View "Amerigas Inc. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc." on Justia Law

The County of Riverside and the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department (collectively Department) demoted Deputy Jose Quintanar as a result of an incident in which Quintanar allegedly used excessive force. Pursuant to the applicable Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Quintanar filed an administrative appeal. This triggered an evidentiary hearing before an impartial hearing officer. The hearing officer agreed that Quintanar had used excessive force and upheld the demotion. Quintanar then filed a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court, sua sponte, questioned whether the hearing officer was required to exercise independent judgment with respect to the nature of the discipline to be imposed, and if so, whether he had, in fact, done so. It remanded the matter to the hearing officer with directions to clarify whether he had exercised independent judgment. On receiving his reply, it determined that he had not exercised independent judgment and it issued a writ commanding him to do so. The Department appealed. After its review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that, under the MOU, the hearing officer was required to exercise independent judgment not only with respect to whether there were grounds for discipline, but also with respect to the nature of the discipline. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion, however, that the hearing officer’s failure to use independent judgment was prejudicial. The hearing officer did indicate that, while he did not believe that he was required to exercise his independent judgment, the exercise of his independent judgment would not have changed the outcome. Hence, the Court reversed.View "Quintanar v. Co. of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, seeking to represent approximately 1,800 drivers engaged by Dynamex as independent contractors, filed suit against Dynamex for violation of California law when the courier and delivery services company converted the status of all drivers from employee to independent contractor. After Dynamex's motion to decertify the class was denied, the company petitioned for a writ of mandate. The court issued an order to show cause why respondent superior court should not be compelled to vacate its order denying the motion to decertify the class; granted the petition in part; concluded that the superior court correctly allowed plaintiffs to rely on the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) definition of an employment relationship for purposes of those claims falling within the scope of Wage Order No. 9-2001; with respect to those claims falling outside the scope of the Wage Order, the common law definition of employee will control; and as to those claims, the court granted the petition to allow the superior court to reevaluate whether, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., class certification remains appropriate by focusing its analysis on differences in the defendant's right to exercise control rather than variations in how that right was exercised.View "Dynamex v. Super. Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Network Capital Funding Corporation filed a declaratory relief action alleging its arbitration agreement with defendant-appellant Erik Papke required Papke to arbitrate his wage and hour claims on an individual basis rather than the classwide basis he sought in his pending arbitration proceeding. According to Papke, the broad language in the parties’ arbitration agreement required the arbitrator, not the court, to decide whether the agreement authorized class arbitration. The trial court denied Papke’s petition, concluding it must decide whether the arbitration agreement authorized class arbitration, and in doing so found this particular agreement did not allow class arbitration. Papke appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court: "[d]eciding whether the parties’ arbitration agreement authorizes class arbitration does not simply determine what arbitration procedures the parties agreed to use, but rather whose claims the parties agreed to arbitrate. Supreme Court precedent requires courts to decide whose claims are covered by an arbitration agreement unless the parties clearly and unmistakably agree to have the arbitrator decide that question. Because Papke’s and Network Capital’s arbitration agreement does not clearly and unmistakably designate the arbitrator to determine whether the agreement authorizes class arbitration, we conclude the trial court properly decided that question." Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court properly determined Papke’s and Network Capital’s arbitration agreement did not authorize class arbitration.View "Network Capital Funding Corp. v. Papke" on Justia Law

The City of Indio and its chief of police appealed a judgment which granted a permanent injunction in favor of the Indio Police Command Unit Association (the PCU), and two of its police officer members, prohibiting the City from implementing a planned reorganization of the City’s Police Department’s command staff until it demonstrated full compliance with the "meet and confer" requirements of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA). They also appealed a postjudgment order granting the PCU its attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The appellants argued the injunction was improper because the City sufficiently complied with its meet and confer obligations, and the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the PCU attorney fees. The Court of Appeal rejected their contentions after review of this case, and affirmed the judgment and postjudgment order.View "Indio Police Command Unit Assn. v. City of Indio" on Justia Law

In "Lobo v. Tamco" (182 Cal.App.4th 297 (2010)) (Lobo I), the Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Tamco, and remanded the matter for further proceedings in the trial court. Trial was held solely on the issue of Tamco's vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Luis Del Rosario. The jury found in favor of Tamco. Plaintiffs, the survivors of a deputy sheriff killed in a vehicular collision with Del Rosario's car as he left Tamco's premises, contended that based on the legal principles the Court enunciated in Lobo I, the evidence adduced at trial compeled a finding that Del Rosario was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. They also argued that the trial court erred in refusing a requested jury instruction. The Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the verdict and that the court properly rejected the requested instruction.View "Lobo v. Tamco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit against Ensign on behalf of himself and other certified nursing assistants, seeking damages for nonpayment of minimum and overtime wages. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Ensign. The court reversed, concluding that there are triable issues of fact as to whether Ensign was plaintiff's employer.View "Castaneda v. Ensign Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a mandate petition challenging the board's decision denying his request for unemployment compensation benefits. The trial court subsequently issued a writ of mandate directing that plaintiff receive the requested benefits. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiff's actions in exceeding his break times on four separate occasions and then falsifying his time sheets constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256. Plaintiff may not receive unemployment compensation benefits because he committed misconduct within the meaning of section 1256.View "Irving v. California Uninsurance Appeals Board" on Justia Law

In 2008-2010, then-governor Schwarzenegger issued executive orders requiring the unpaid furloughs of most state employees. In 2010, the Legislature passed the budget for the 2010-2011 fiscal year, authorizing “reductions in employee compensation achieved through the collective bargaining process or through administrative actions for represented employees and a proportionate reduction for nonrepresented employees (utilizing existing authority of the administration to adjust compensation for nonrepresented employees).” The Governor then issued Executive Order No. S-15-10, applicable to most nonunion state employees, including supervisory and other exempt employees represented by PECG and CAPS, reducing their net compensation by imposing a one-day per month personal leave program. Between EO S-15-10 and the three-day-furlough previously in effect, nonunionized employees’ net compensation for 2010-2011 was reduced by 8.5 percent, equivalent to the 8.5 percent total reduction to the net compensation of employees in state bargaining units represented by SEIU. Union employees represented by CAPS and PECG, however were furloughed for three days each month throughout 2010 and into 2011 and incurred an 8.5 percent reduction in net compensation after their first furlough day in March 2011 but were subjected to two more furlough days. The trial court invalidated mandatory furloughs for employees represented by PECG and the CAPS. The appeals court affirmed. View "Prof'l Eng'rs in CA Gov't v. Brown" on Justia Law

Kao earned a Ph.D. in applied mathematics from Princeton, began teaching mathematics at University of San Francisco in 1991, and became a tenured professor in 1997. Kao was concerned about a lack of diversity of the faculty of the math and computer science departments, and submitted a 485-page complaint to the school in 2006 alleging race-based discrimination and harassment. He lodged a 41-page addendum to the complaint in 2007 school’s failure to advertise in professional journals. During meetings concerning the issue, Kao became “very, very upset,” and started “yelling and screaming.” USF directed Kao to have a fitness-for-duty examination after faculty members and school administrators reported that his behavior was frightening them, and the university terminated his employment when he refused to participate in the examination. Kao sued under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, 12900), the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, 51), the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Civ. Code, 56), and the state constitution’s right to privacy. His defamation claim was dismissed and a jury ruled against him on his other claims. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that USF could not lawfully require an examination.View "Kao v. Univ. of San Francisco" on Justia Law