Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are hourly employees of PG&E, an “electrical corporation” and a “gas corporation” under Labor Code section 512, which generally requires an employer to provide an employee who works more than five hours “a meal period of not less than 30 minutes.” Their employment is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Each has worked “Consecutive Hour” shifts of at least eight hours’ duration, in which all hours are compensable and the employee is not provided an unpaid meal period. The employees, whose duties include responding to emergencies and hazards, eat while on duty, and only if eating does not interfere with the performance of duties. PG&E had a Missed Meal Payment program under which it paid plaintiffs when they were unable to take a duty free, uninterrupted 30-minute meal period during a consecutive hour shift. PG&E discontinued the program in 2011. The plaintiffs alleged PG&E is required to provide off-duty meal breaks. PG&E asserted the claims are barred by Labor Code 512, (e) - (g), and because the contracts provide for a voluntary on-duty meal period pursuant to Industrial Welfare Commission wage order No. 4-2001. The trial court granted PG&E summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed. A contract that provides that employees who work shifts of eight consecutive hours “shall be permitted to eat their meals during work hours and shall not be allowed additional time therefore at Company expense” falls within the exception provided in 512 (e): where a contract “expressly provides for meal periods.”View "Araquistain v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

A contractor entered into a public works contract to modernize a building at a Santa Clara County community college. Will was the subcontractor for the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) work. The subcontract provided that the project was to be built according to the specifications of the prime contract. The subcontract and general contract did not specify whether Will was required to fabricate any material necessary to complete the HVAC work. The subcontract required Will to “pay not less than the [applicable prevailing wage] to all laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by him at the project site.” California’s prevailing wage law generally requires that workers employed on public works be paid the local prevailing wage for work of a similar character. (Lab. Code,1771.) Since 1991, Will has fabricated materials at a permanent, offsite facility it operates in Hayward. An employee of Will complained to the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement alleging he should have been paid prevailing wages for work related to the project, involving the fabrication of sheet metal at the Hayward facility. DLSE issued a civil wage and penalty assessment. The Department of Industrial Relations reversed, in favor of Will. The trial court reversed. The court of appeal held that offsite fabrication is not covered by the prevailing wage law if it takes place at a permanent, offsite manufacturing facility and the location and existence of that facility is determined wholly without regard to the particular public works project. View "Sheet Metal Workers’ Int'l. Ass'n v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Kroger appealed the trial court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's employment discrimination action. The trial court concluded that Kroger failed to meet its burden to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement. The court concluded that the arbitration clause in the employment application, standing alone, was sufficient to establish that the parties agreed to arbitrate their employment-related disputes, and that plaintiff's claims against Kroger fell within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. However, Kroger failed to establish that the parties agreed to govern their arbitration by procedures different from those prescribed in the California Arbitration Act (CAA), Section 1280 et seq., and, therefore, the arbitration is to be governed by the CAA rather than the procedures set forth in the employer's Arbitration Policy. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court.View "Cruise v. Kroger Co." on Justia Law

Eddie Yau filed a complaint against his former employer, Santa Margarita Ford, alleging he was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy. Yau alleged he was terminated after complaining to Santa Margarita Ford's management about fraudulent warranty repair claims being submitted to Ford Motor Company. Yau also alleged an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against individual defendants who were his coworkers and supervisors, and the owner of Santa Margarita Ford. The trial court sustained demurrers without leave to amend and dismissed the action, entering separate judgments for Santa Margarita Ford and the individual defendants. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Yau adequately pleaded his wrongful termination cause of action and therefore the judgment in favor of Santa Margarita Ford was granted in error. The Court concluded that the trial court correctly dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, and the judgment in favor of the individual defendants was affirmed. View "Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford" on Justia Law

Police Chief Beck charged Officer Pedro with misconduct: use of a city police vehicle for personal business on two occasions, making a discourteous statement to a member of the public, and making a misleading statement to a supervisor conducting an official investigation. A Board of Rights found that three counts were time-barred. Beck disagreed; the board found Pedro guilty on all counts and recommended a 22-day suspension without pay. Beck approved the recommendation. The trial court found in favor of Pedro, finding counts one and four barred by the statute of limitations and counts two and three not barred. It concluded that Pedro was not informed that he was being investigated for misconduct prior to his interrogation, as required, and suppressed Pedro’s statements and set aside the guilty finding on count four. Although the court found that counts two and three were not barred by the statute of limitations, it determined that the Board had found that those counts were barred, and that its finding was final and binding because the city failed to challenge the decision. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the Board failed to proceed as required by law by deferring to Beck’s determination on the statute of limitations rather than making a decision consistent with its own findings, and that its findings do not support its decision. Ignorance of the accused officer’s identity does not postpone the commencement of the one-year limitations period under Government Code section 3304. The discovery rule applies; the trial court properly determined that count four is time-barred. View "Pedro v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit against her former employers, alleging violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 and a violation of public policy. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the denial of a jury trial. The court concluded that denial of a jury trial in this case is a proper matter for writ relief. The court also concluded that the statutory language and legislative history of section 1278.5 reflect an intent to permit a jury trial. Even apart from this evidence of legislative intent, the court concluded that a jury trial is appropriate as the gist of plaintiff's cause of action sounds in law rather than equity. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for writ of mandate. View "Shaw v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janis McLean, a retired deputy attorney general, appealed a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendants the State of California and the California State Controller’s Office to her class action seeking waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 2031 for the failure to comply with the prompt payment requirements of section 202. She argued the trial court erred in ruling that the term "quits" in sections 202 and 203 did not apply to employees who quit in order to retire. The Court of Appeal agreed that in the context of sections 202 and 203, requirements applying to employees who quit also apply to employees who quit to retire. The Court therefore reversed the judgment as to the State of California. However, because the Court held that it was unnecessary to name the California State Controller’s Office as a defendant, and affirmed the judgment of dismissal as to the controller’s office. View "McLean v. California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit under Labor Code section 1102.5(b) against the County. The County subsequently appealed from a judgment entered after a substantial jury verdict in plaintiff's favor and plaintiff appealed from the postjudgment order denying his request for attorney fees. The court initially affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of past conduct and there was no substantial evidence to support the economic damages awarded to plaintiff. Both the County and the plaintiff petitioned for rehearing. The court granted the petitions and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of undisclosed reasons for terminating plaintiff where the record contained affirmative indications that the trial court considered and understood that the introduction of undisclosed reasons for the decision to terminate plaintiff was not relevant and was prejudicial. The court also concluded that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's award of economic damages. Accordingly, the court reversed in that respect but affirmed in all other respects. The court also affirmed the order denying plaintiff's motion for attorney fees. View "Hager v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Scott Carlton sued defendants and respondents Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., Mott’s LP, Larry Young, Caesar Vargas, and Graham Bailey alleging: (1) wrongful termination against Dr. Pepper and Mott’s; (2) sex discrimination against all defendants; and (3) breach of contract against Dr. Pepper and Mott’s. The trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrer of Dr. Pepper, Vargas, Bailey, and Mott’s. The trial court also sanctioned Carlton and his trial counsel jointly and severally in the amount of $1,360 due to Carlton’s “wholly unjustified” interrogatory responses. The only respondent on appeal was Dr. Pepper (the other defendants are not respondents in this appeal). Carlton contended the trial court erred by granting the demurrer because the demurrer was untimely. Further, Carlton argued the demurrer improperly included the breach of contract cause of action, and therefore the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer on that cause of action. Finally, Carlton contended the trial court erred by imposing sanctions. Upon review, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of discovery sanctions in this case, "discovery sanctions are not designed to punish; rather, they are designed to fix the problem created by the evasive responses. [. . .] Dr. Pepper’s late motions to compel could not have fixed Carlton’s evasive responses, because the motions to compel were untimely and therefore Dr. Pepper waived its right to seek further responses. Dr. Pepper missed its opportunity to fix the problem. [. . .] Therefore, discovery sanctions were not warranted, because the problem could no longer be fixed." The Court affirmed the trial court's decision in all other respects. View "Carlton v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against Home Service on behalf of customer service managers who were not reimbursed for expenses pertaining to the work-related use of their personal cell phones. The court held that when employees must use their personal cell phones for work-related calls, Labor Code section 2802 requires the employer to reimburse them; whether the employees have cell phone plans with unlimited or limited minutes, the reimbursement owed is a reasonable percentage of their cell phone bills; and, because the trial court relied on erroneous legal assumptions about the application of section 2802, the court reversed the order denying certification to the class. On remand, the trial court shall reconsider the motion for class certification in light of the court's interpretation of section 2802. View "Cochran v. Schwan'Âs Home Service" on Justia Law