Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Employer Tilly’s Inc. (and World of Jeans & Tops, Inc.) hired plaintiff-respondent Maria Rebolledo to work in its warehouse from July 6, 2000, to December 28, 2001. She was rehired on January 28, 2002, and terminated October 30, 2012. In December 2012 she filed a lawsuit on behalf of herself and a putative class of "similarly situated" persons (amended February 2013) alleging her Employer: (1) failed to provide meal periods; (2) failed to provide rest periods; (3) failed to pay wages of terminated or resigned employees; (4) knew and intentionally failed to comply with itemized wage statement provisions; and (5) violated the unfair competition law. Furthermore, plaintiff sought enforcement of Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusion the parties' arbitration agreement expressly excluded statutory wage claims from the arbitration obligation. Therefore, the order was affirmed.View "Rebolledo v. Tilly's, Inc." on Justia Law

LeFiell filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging an order denying its summary judgment motion on a Labor Code section 4558 claim. Section 4558 provides an exception to the exclusivity of the workers' compensation system for employees injured as a result of the employer's knowing removal of, or knowing failure to install, a point of operation guard on a power press. The court concluded that, in this case, the door that was removed from the Fenn 5F swaging machine is not a point of operation guard as a matter of law. While the door acted as a barrier from the power press mechanisms, it was not a point of operation guard within the meaning of section 4558. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "LeFiell Mfg. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

After Loren Collin was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he and his wife Verna Lee Collin sued 22 entities for negligence, strict liability, false representation, intentional tort/failure to warn, alter ego, and loss of consortium, alleging Loren was exposed to asbestos from the defendants' products or activities when he worked in various construction trades. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of four defendants: CalPortland Company, Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (J-MM), and Formosa Plastics Corporation USA, named as an alter ego of J-MM. Plaintiff argued those defendants did not show that plaintiff did not possess and could not reasonably obtain evidence of exposure to an asbestos-containing product for which defendants were responsible; but even if the burden shifted to plaintiff, the evidence was sufficient to support an inference of exposure. Plaintiff also claimed J-MM and Formosa did not establish that Loren was a sophisticated user who knew or should have known of the potential risks and dangers of using J-MM’s asbestos cement pipe. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded summary judgment was proper as to CalPortland and Kaiser Gypsum, because they met their initial burdens on summary judgment and the evidence and reasonable inferences would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding that Loren was exposed to one of their asbestos-containing products. With respect to J-MM and Formosa, however, summary judgment was not proper: the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to whether Loren was exposed to asbestos from a J-MM product. In addition, J-MM and Formosa did not establish they were entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law based on the sophisticated user defense. View "Collin v. CalPortland Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Lori Rhea was employed at General Atomics in a salaried position that qualified her as an exempt employee for the purposes of overtime pay under the federal and California wage and hour laws. The issue this case presented to the Court of Appeal centered on plaintiff's employer, General Atomics' employment practice of requiring exempt employees to use their annual leave hours when they are absent from work for portions of a day. Although "Conley v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co." (131 Cal.App.4th 260 (2005)) established that California law does not prohibit an employer "from following the established federal policy permitting employers to deduct from exempt employees' vacation leave, when available, on account of partial-day absences," plaintiff contended that Conley was wrongly decided, or in the alternative, that even under Conley, General Atomics was not permitted to deduct from an exempt employee's leave bank when the employee is absent for less than four hours. The Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff's contentions were without merit, and accordingly it affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of General Atomics. View "Rhea v. General Atomics" on Justia Law

Defendant provides residential real estate brokerage services in Seattle, Washington. Plaintiff lives in California. In 2009 the parties executed a form contract drafted by defendant. Defendant engaged plaintiff as a Contract Field Agent (CFA) as “an independent contractor.” In 2013, plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, alleging defendant improperly classified CFAs as independent contractors when they were actually employees under California’s Labor Code and Unfair Competition Laws and claimed unpaid overtime, missed meal and rest periods, inaccurate and untimely wage statements, waiting time penalties, and unreimbursed business expenses. Defendant sought arbitration under the Agreement, which provides that it is to be governed by the laws of the state of Washington. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clause was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); that the arbitration clause did not apply to plaintiff’s statutory claims because those claims were based on statutes, not the contract; and noted “unrebutted evidence of substantial procedural unconscionability.” The court of appeal reversed, Under California law, there is a strong policy favoring the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions and, even under California law, plaintiff’s unconscionability claim lacks merit. View "Galen v. Redfin Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner and his employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier agreed to a stipulated award after petitioner was injured during the course and scope of his employment as a roofer. After a timely petition to reopen, the appeals board rescinded the disability rating at issue, concluding that there was no good cause to reopen the case. Petitioner sought review of the appeals board's decision. The court concluded that when petitioner brought his petition to reopen, the evidence clearly established that the stipulated award was inequitable. Moreover, substantial evidence did not support the appeals board's decision to deny the petition to reopen. Therefore, the court annulled the decision of the appeals board and remanded with directions to reinstate the award of the workers' compensation judgment entered in April 2013. View "Benavides v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board et al." on Justia Law

Rodriguez, a former Santa Cruz police officer, had served in the Marine Corps during the first Gulf War as a demolition specialist, involved in multiple fire fights and required to collect the bodies of slain comrades. As a police officer, he was injured during a nighttime raid and continued to suffer pain after attempting to return to work. He applied to the city for industrial disability retirement, alleging psychiatric disability due to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Rodriguez testified to nightmares, drinking, and the destruction of his marriage. The city denied the application. The superior court upheld the denial. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the trial court applied the incorrect standard of review. The court likely did not apply the independent judgment standard in making its decision, and particularly in assessing Rodriguez’s credibility. View "Rodriguez v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law

Martin began working for California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in 2000, and Sphar began working for CDCR in 2002. They were dismissed in 2004 and challenged their dismissals. In October 2008, an administrative law judge found that the dismissals had been unjustified and revoked them. The ALJ’s decision provided that a hearing would be set if the parties were “unable to agree as to salary, benefits and interest due under Government Code section 19584.The two were reinstated to employment. CDCR sought a writ of mandate to overturn the decision to include merit salary adjustments and physical fitness incentive pay (PFIP), and claimed that the offset to backpay for money earned from other employers should have included overtime pay. The CDCR also challenged the Board’s decision that Sphar would be compensated at salary range “K,” for which he had not qualified at the time of his dismissal. The superior court ordered that the offset include overtime pay, but denied the remainder of the petition. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that section 19584 authorized the inclusion of merit salary adjustments and PFIP in the award, authorized Sphar to be compensated at salary range “K,” and required the inclusion of overtime pay in the offset. View "Dept. of Corrs. & Rehab. v. State Pers. Bd." on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union, Local 1021, AFL-CIO (SEIU) alleged that the Sonoma County Community Development Commission lacked legal authority to contract with a private corporation to conduct housing inspection services that had formerly been performed by public employees. The Commission argued that Health and Safety Code sections 34144 and 341452 expressly authorized it to enter into a contract with a private entity for necessary services, such as housing inspection. Section 34145 authorizes it to “hire, employ, or contract for staff, contractors, and consultants.” The trial court dismissed SEIU’s lawsuit. The appeals court affirmed, noting that the Commission’s powers, duties and scope of authority are not delegated but are fixed and circumscribed by statute. The statute does not include the limitations argued by SEIU. View "Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Cnty. of Sonoma" on Justia Law