Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wade, an apartment tenant living alone, was evicted after the City of Los Angeles determined his unit, a converted recreation room, was an illegal rental. Wade asserted he has an orthopedic disability impairing personal mobility. Under the Rent Stabilization Ordinance, a tenant who has lived in a rental unit for three or more years is entitled to relocation assistance of $9,650, unless the tenant is a “qualified tenant,” entitled to an enhanced payment of $18,300. A “qualified tenant” includes a tenant who is handicapped as defined in Section 50072 of the California Health and Safety Code: a family in which the head of the household is suffering from an orthopedic disability impairing personal mobility or a physical disability affecting his ability to obtain employment or a single person with such a physical disability, where the family or person requires special care or facilities in the home. The trial court held a single person with an orthopedic disability was entitled to the enhanced payment. The court of appeal vacated. Under section 50072, only a head of household with an orthopedic disability is deemed to be handicapped. Because Wade was a single person, not a head of household, he was not a “qualified tenant” for purposes of the enhanced payment. View "City of Los Angeles v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Wright was a correctional officer and lived on the San Quentin premises, in a unit he rented from his employer, the state. Living on the grounds was not mandatory and he paid market rate rent. Wright was injured when he fell in the course of his lengthy walk from his home to his actual place of work and received workers’ compensation. He then sued the state, which moved for summary judgment on the ground that workers’ compensation was Wright’s exclusive remedy, based on the “premises line” rule, which provides that the employment relationship commences once the employee enters the employer’s premises. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that there were triable issues of fact as to whether Wright’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. That the State did not intend its workers’ compensation policy would insure Wright for all injuries suffered on San Quentin grounds, even at or near the home where he lived, is evidenced by the terms of Wright’s lease agreement, which required Wright to obtain a “broad policy of comprehensive coverage of public liability insurance, naming the State as the insured.” View "Wright v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

Mosser’s nine-unit residential apartment building is subject to rent control under the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, which limits rent increases to tenants in occupancy. Under Civil Code section 1954.53, which provides that “an owner of residential real property may establish the initial rental rate for a dwelling or unit,” local jurisdictions are authorized to impose rent control limiting rate increases until “the original occupant or occupants who took possession of the dwelling or unit pursuant to the rental agreement with the owner no longer permanently reside there.” Brian, then age 13, moved into the apartment with his parents in 2003. When his parents and siblings left the apartment in 2013, Brian remained, with the landlord’s consent. The San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board and the trial court concluded that Brian, although a minor when the rental agreement was entered and not a signatory to the rental agreement, was an “original occupant” entitled to the continued protection of the rent control provision. The court of appeal affirmed; the law, as written, does not permit vacancy decontrol until all lawful occupants vacate the premises. View "Mosser Co. v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd." on Justia Law

A shopping center owner challenged provisions in its commercial lease with Ross, conditioning Ross’s obligation to open a store and pay rent on Mervyn’s operating a store in the shopping center on the lease’s commencement date and allowing Ross terminate the lease if Mervyn’s ceased operations and was not replaced by an acceptable retailer within 12 months. Mervyn’s filed for bankruptcy and closed its store. Ross took possession of the space, never opened for business, never paid rent, and terminated the lease after the 12-month cure period. The trial court found the provisions unenforceable. The jury awarded $672,100 for unpaid rent and $3.1 million in other damages. The court of appeal held that there was no procedural unconscionability. The parties were sophisticated and experienced concerning commercial leases. The rent abatement and termination provisions must be examined separately because they involve separate consequences triggered by different conditions. The determination that rent abatement constituted an unreasonable penalty was supported by findings that Ross did not anticipate it would suffer any damages from Mervyn’s not being open on the lease’s commencement date and the rent forfeited was $39,500 per month. There is no reasonable relationship between $0 of anticipated harm and forfeiture of $39,500 in rent per month. View "Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc." on Justia Law

Marina Pacifica was built on Long Beach waterfront land owned by McGrath and leased to the limited partnership (LP) in the 1970s. The ground lease was subdivided into 570 leases, one for each condominium unit. When LP sold a unit, it assigned the unit lease to the purchaser. The leases required owners to pay monthly rent to McGrath and an “assignment fee” to LP. Both payments were nominal ($15) until 2006, when they would be recalculated so that together, they would equal 10 percent of the value of the underlying land. In 1999, the Homeowners Association purchased the underlying land from McGrath for $17 million. Each owner paid a pro rata share. Owners no longer pay rent. The HOA attempted to buy out the assignment fee before the 2006 adjustment. In 2000, it purchased the interests of two limited partners (56.25 percent) for $5 million. It was unable to reach agreement with Lansdale to buy his 43.75 percent interest. Litigation resulted in a finding that the land’s fair market value was $60,615,500. The HOA instructed owners not to pay and filed suit, alleging that the assignment fee is invalid or overstated, and that the purchase of the underlying land extinguished the lease. The court of appeal reversed a holding that the assignment fee was an invalid transfer fee after December 31, 2008, under Civil Code 1098 and 1098.5 and directed the court to enter judgment for the HOA on contract claims. View "Marina Pac. Homeowners Ass'n v. So. Cal. Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

After defendants purchased the building where plaintiff was living in a rent-controlled apartment, defendants served plaintiff with a 60-day notice to quit. Plaintiff subsequently initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against defendants and then filed a complaint alleging several state claims. Plaintiff sought an order restoring him to his apartment, restitution, damages, and attorney fees. On appeal, defendants challenged the trial court's denial of their Code of Civil Procedure section 426.16 special motion to strike plaintiff's first amended complaint because their conduct was protected litigation activity. Plaintiff cross-appealed the trial court's denial of his request for attorney fees in defending the motion. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to strike where plaintiff's complaint was not directed at protected activity. However, the court reversed the denial of attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether defendants' motion was frivolous, whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and if so, the amount of such fees.View "Ben-Shahar v. Pickart" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed an order requiring her to obtain approval for leave to file under the vexatious litigant statutes, Code Civ. Proc., 391-391.7, before continuing with her two related appeals from the judgment in favor of her landlord in an unlawful detainer action. The appellate division dismissed the appeal after reviewing petitioner's request to file new litigation by a vexatious litigant and found that she failed to demonstrate the appeals had merit and were not filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. Section 391.7's requirement for obtaining leave to file unquestionably applies to an appeal by a self-represented plaintiff who has previously been declared a vexatious litigant and made subject to a prefiling order. At issue was whether it similarly applied to a vexatious litigant defendant's appeal from an adverse judgment. Because it disregards section 391.7's express reference to actions by a plaintiff and would impede a self-represented defendant's right of access to the appellate courts without significantly advancing the underlying purpose of the vexatious litigant statutes, the court rejected this construction of section 391.7. Therefore, the court granted petitioner's petition for a writ of mandate and ordered the appellate division to vacate its order dismissing petitioner's appeal and to decide the appeal on the merits.View "John v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Landlord converted a rent-controlled apartment building to condominiums, obtained a new certificate of occupancy in 2009 based on the change in use, and raised the rent. Tenant objected. Landlord sought a declaration from the trial court that the unit was exempt from local rent control ordinances under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civ. Code, 1954.50 et seq. On appeal, Landlord challenged the trial court's conclusion that the unit was not exempt, and judgment in favor of tenant. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and rejected Landlord's contention that the unit is exempt from rent control under section 1954.52, subdivision (a)(1) where that section refers to certificates of occupancy issued prior to residential use of the unit.View "Burien, LLC v. Wiley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, doing business as iWorld, filed suit against Westfield, a shopping center, alleging that Westfield violated a lease agreement. The trial court stated that Westfield's service of a notice of termination was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that each count was based in part on Westfield's service of the notice. The trial court concluded that the litigation privilege, Civ. Code, 47, subd. (b), "arguably" was a complete defense to the complaint. The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint did not arise from protected activity and was not subject to a special motion to strike. Therefore, plaintiff need not establish a probability of prevailing on her claims and the court need not decide whether she did so. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting the special motion to strike and the order awarding attorney fees to Westfield. View "Ulkarim v. Westfield, LLC" on Justia Law

The Department of Fair Employment and Housing alleged that Ottovich owned or managed a Fremont apartment building. He advertised an apartment available for rent. Coleman called and expressed interest. He asked who would be living in the apartment, and she stated that she, her husband, and their young daughter would live there. Defendant responded that he would not rent the apartment to her. Coleman told him, “That’s discrimination.” He replied that he did not have to show her the apartment or rent it to her, and hung up. The Department alleged a “familial status” discrimination violation of Government Code section 19255, and sought compensatory and treble damages. Ottovich moved to dismiss the complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). The trial court denied the motion as frivolous, and awarded plaintiff $2,500. After several discovery abuses by Ottovich, followed by sanctions and warnings, the court entered a default judgment against him. The court vacated the default, but continued to treat his answer as stricken and treated the complaint’s allegations as judicially admitted. A jury assessed damages at $8,705. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court was required to reinstate his answer when it vacated the default judgment. View "Dept. of Fair Emp't & Hous. v. Ottovich" on Justia Law