Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the landlord, filed an unlawful detainer action against Coolwaters, the commercial lessee. On appeal, Coolwaters challenged the trial court's order denying its special motion to strike the complaint and awarding plaintiff attorney fees as sanctions for the expenses of responding to the special motion to strike. The court concluded that a nonpaying tenant should not be permitted to frustrate an unlawful detainer proceeding by initiating litigation against the landlord in order to bring a special motion to strike the landlord’s subsequently filed unlawful detainer complaint, on the asserted ground that the unlawful detainer action arose out of the tenant’s protected activity in filing the initial lawsuit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying the special motion to strike and imposing monetary sanctions against Coolwaters. View "Olive Properties v. Coolwater Enter." on Justia Law

Defendants Charles and Stella Ohaeri leased space for a thrift store in a shopping center owned by plaintiff AP-Colton LLC. The thrift store was not a success, and the Ohaeris stopped paying rent. According to the Ohaeris, AP-Colton had fraudulently induced them to enter into the lease by stating that a church was going to move into the space next to theirs, but a competing store moved in instead. AP-Colton originally filed this case as a limited civil action, in which damages were limited to $25,000. The Ohaeris filed a cross-complaint seeking more than $25,000, but they did not pay the $140 fee required to reclassify the case as an unlimited civil action. Thereafter, AP-Colton filed an amended complaint seeking more than $25,000, because the Ohaeris should already have paid the reclassification fee, so AP-Colton did not pay it. After a bench trial, the trial court rejected the Ohaeris' fraud claims and awarded AP-Colton $126,437.25. The Ohaeris argued on appeal of that judgment that among other things, the case remained a limited civil action, and thus, the trial court erred by awarding damages of more than $25,000. The Court of Appeal agreed that the case should have remained a limited civil action. The Ohaeris, however, took the position below that the case had become an unlimited civil action, and the trial court accepted this position by awarding AP-Colton damages in excess of $25,000. The Court of Appeal held that as a result, the Ohaeris were judicially estopped to deny that the case was an unlimited civil action. Accordingly, on condition that it pays the $140 reclassification fee, AP-Colton can recover the full award. View "AP-Colton v. Ohaeri" on Justia Law

Mak owns a Berkeley rental property with four apartments. In 2012 Mak served on Burns, a tenant for 28 years, a 60-day eviction notice, asserting that Mak intended to occupy the apartment. Two months later, Mak and Burns entered a written agreement under which Burns agreed to vacate the apartment, stating that Burns was not doing so pursuant to the 60-day notice, and that such notice “shall upon occupant vacating, be conclusively deemed withdrawn.” Burns vacated the apartment and months later the Maks rented the unit to new tenants (Ziems), at more than double the rent that Burns had paid. In response to Ziems’s application to the Rent Stabilization Board to lower the permissible rent to that paid by Burns, Mak contended that Burns had voluntarily vacated, so that under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code 1954.50, the Board was prohibited from limiting the rent at the commencement of the new tenancy. The Board and the trial and appeals courts rejected the “landlord’s transparent attempt to circumvent” rent control. The Act creates a rebuttable presumption that a tenant who moves out within one year of service of an owner move-in eviction notice has moved out pursuant to that notice. Mak failed to present evidence overcoming the presumption. View "Mak v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a forest ranger at Yosemite National Park, filed suit against defendant, a public entity, after he was injured by a grease fire from a skillet in his rental unit. Defendant provided plaintiff and other tenants with fire extinguishers, but one was not available for plaintiff at the time of the grease fire. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for damages for the injuries he suffered, alleging that the absence of a fire extinguisher in the residence constituted a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the trial court properly applied the immunity statute by determining that liability was precluded by the immunity accorded to a public entity for failing to provide or maintain fire protection facilities or equipment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Puskar v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Tenant was served with a three-day notice to quit that listed eight separate incidents that involved damaging the premises, disturbing neighbors and other tenants in the building, and running around naked and/or in boxer shorts. Tenant did not vacate, but filed an answer to an unlawful detainer action, asserting affirmative defenses, including breach of the warranty of habitability, payment of all rent that was due, discrimination based on sexual orientation and religion, laches, and retaliation for requesting repairs. Tenant subsequently entered into a settlement agreement, which included a stipulation for judgment, with the property management company and the property owner. Tenant violated the agreement. The trial court entered a stipulated judgment giving the lessors damages, costs, fees, and possession of the property. Subsequently, tenant sued the lessors for their damaged and missing personal property, which had remained in the rental residence after tenant vacated the premises. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata bars all of tenant’s claims and that his daughter, who was not a tenant and did not reside in the rental unit, cannot state a claim against the lessors. View "Needelman v. Dewolf Realty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, purchaser of a nine-unit building in San Francisco, filed a landlord's petition with the Rent Board seeking a determination that the unit was not subject to rent control pursuant to the Rent Board Rules and Regulations and the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code section 1954.50 et seq. At issue was whether Civil Code section 1954.53,1 subdivision (d)(2) authorizes a San Francisco landlord to raise the rent without limit on an apartment otherwise subject to rent control when an occupant, who moved into the apartment as a child when his parents took possession, remained in possession of the unit after his parents vacated it. In Mosser Companies v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board, the panel addressed the identical issue and concluded that “the son, although a minor when the rental agreement was entered and not a signatory to the rental agreement, is nonetheless an ‘original occupant’ entitled to the continued protection of the rent control provision.” Because the current law does not permit vacancy decontrol until all lawful occupants residing in a dwelling at the start of the tenancy vacate the premises, the court affirmed the denial of the petition and the claim for declaratory relief. View "T & A Drolapas & Sons, LP v. SF Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd." on Justia Law

In 2004, Berkeley issued a use permit for construction of a building with 51 residential rental units and ground floor commercial space. Permit condition 10 provides: “Before submission for building permit, the applicant shall submit floor plans and schedules … showing the location of each inclusionary unit and the sales or rental prices…. and that the unit rent or sales price complies with Chapter 23C.12” (Inclusionary Housing Ordinance). The Ordinance was designed to comply with Government Code section 65580, requiring a general plan to contain a housing element stating how the local agency will accommodate its share of regional need for affordable housing. The ordinance requires that 20 percent of all newly constructed residential units be reserved for households with below-median incomes and rented at below-market prices. The development took more than seven years. The city sought a declaration that the condition was valid, conceding that the ordinance has been preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code, 1954.50), but arguing that it may enforce the condition, the validity of which was not previously challenged. The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of the city. View "City of Berkeley v. 1080 Delaware, LLC" on Justia Law

Wade, an apartment tenant living alone, was evicted after the City of Los Angeles determined his unit, a converted recreation room, was an illegal rental. Wade asserted he has an orthopedic disability impairing personal mobility. Under the Rent Stabilization Ordinance, a tenant who has lived in a rental unit for three or more years is entitled to relocation assistance of $9,650, unless the tenant is a “qualified tenant,” entitled to an enhanced payment of $18,300. A “qualified tenant” includes a tenant who is handicapped as defined in Section 50072 of the California Health and Safety Code: a family in which the head of the household is suffering from an orthopedic disability impairing personal mobility or a physical disability affecting his ability to obtain employment or a single person with such a physical disability, where the family or person requires special care or facilities in the home. The trial court held a single person with an orthopedic disability was entitled to the enhanced payment. The court of appeal vacated. Under section 50072, only a head of household with an orthopedic disability is deemed to be handicapped. Because Wade was a single person, not a head of household, he was not a “qualified tenant” for purposes of the enhanced payment. View "City of Los Angeles v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Wright was a correctional officer and lived on the San Quentin premises, in a unit he rented from his employer, the state. Living on the grounds was not mandatory and he paid market rate rent. Wright was injured when he fell in the course of his lengthy walk from his home to his actual place of work and received workers’ compensation. He then sued the state, which moved for summary judgment on the ground that workers’ compensation was Wright’s exclusive remedy, based on the “premises line” rule, which provides that the employment relationship commences once the employee enters the employer’s premises. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that there were triable issues of fact as to whether Wright’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. That the State did not intend its workers’ compensation policy would insure Wright for all injuries suffered on San Quentin grounds, even at or near the home where he lived, is evidenced by the terms of Wright’s lease agreement, which required Wright to obtain a “broad policy of comprehensive coverage of public liability insurance, naming the State as the insured.” View "Wright v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

Mosser’s nine-unit residential apartment building is subject to rent control under the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, which limits rent increases to tenants in occupancy. Under Civil Code section 1954.53, which provides that “an owner of residential real property may establish the initial rental rate for a dwelling or unit,” local jurisdictions are authorized to impose rent control limiting rate increases until “the original occupant or occupants who took possession of the dwelling or unit pursuant to the rental agreement with the owner no longer permanently reside there.” Brian, then age 13, moved into the apartment with his parents in 2003. When his parents and siblings left the apartment in 2013, Brian remained, with the landlord’s consent. The San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board and the trial court concluded that Brian, although a minor when the rental agreement was entered and not a signatory to the rental agreement, was an “original occupant” entitled to the continued protection of the rent control provision. The court of appeal affirmed; the law, as written, does not permit vacancy decontrol until all lawful occupants vacate the premises. View "Mosser Co. v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd." on Justia Law