Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Chicago Title and others for damages and to rescind the sale of his two-unit residence in San Francisco. After plaintiff resolved the case with other defendants and rescinded the sale, he sought to recover as damages against defendants the attorney fees he spent in securing and quieting his title due to the rescinded sale, attorney fees he incurred defending against his possible eviction from the property, the rent he paid to live in the property before the sale was rescinded, and rental income he lost for the time he was off title.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the trial court erred by deciding that it was legally unforeseeable to defendants that plaintiff would suffer loss of damages following the close of escrow by defendants. The court explained that this is not one of those "occasional" cases where foreseeability may be decided by the trial court as a question of law. Rather, as with most issues related to foreseeability, it is a question of fact for a jury. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion to amend where the evidence did not support a finding that defendants were surprised or would be prejudiced by allowing plaintiff to amend his second amended complaint as requested. Finally, the court noted the continued viability of nonstatutory motions for judgment on the pleadings, like motion in limine No. 10, is unclear. The court merely flagged the issue for future reference and to highlight potential pitfalls these motions often create for trial judges, as happened in this case. View "Tung v. Chicago Title Co." on Justia Law

The arbitration award at issue here involved claims by a former investment fund manager and his former employers, namely, the investment funds. All parties were sophisticated and engaged in a business - not consumer - dispute. Both law firms were frequent users of the services of the ADR provider, JAMS. The motion to vacate was based on the sole ground that the arbitrator did not disclose the extent of JAMS’s “business relationship” with O’Melveny & Myers (one of the law firms) and the arbitrator’s ownership interest in JAMS (not more than .1 percent of total revenue in a given year). Appellant contended the arbitrator failed to make required disclosures. The sole basis for the appeal was the argument the arbitrator did not disclose information that could cause a reasonable person aware of the facts to entertain a doubt that the arbitrator would be able to be impartial. The trial court granted a motion to confirm an arbitration award and denied a motion to vacate that award. Based on the facts and circumstances shown by this record, and applying the analytical framework the Court of Appeal held that the arbitrator’s and JAMS’s disclosures were sufficient, and the arbitrator was not required to disclose more information about the extent of JAMS’s business with O’Melveny & Myers, or the arbitrator’s own ownership interest in JAMS. "There is no issue of a repeat party or lawyer being favored over a non-repeat party or lawyer; the parties in this business dispute are sophisticated; and the law firms were both frequent users of JAMS to the same extent." View "Speier v. The Advantage Fund, LLC" on Justia Law

After an employee brought a wage and hour class action against her employer and prior to certification, the parties settled. The employer paid a sum to the employee and she dismissed the class claims without prejudice, with court approval. Then the employer brought a malicious prosecution action against the employee and her counsel. The employee and her counsel each moved to strike the action under the anti-SLAPP law, which the trial court denied on the basis that the employer established a prima facie showing of prevailing on its malicious prosecution cause of action.The Court of Appeal concluded that, because the prior action resolved by settlement, the employer is unable to establish that the action terminated in its favor as a matter of law. The court explained that the class claims are not severable from the individual claims for the purposes of the favorable termination analysis. Furthermore, the entire action terminated by settlement – a termination which was not favorable to the employer as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for determination of one unadjudicated anti-SLAPP issue, and whether the employee and her counsel are entitled to an award of attorney fees. View "Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Appellants, Jillian Michaels and Empowered Media, filed suit against respondents, a law firm and its shareholder partner, for nine causes of action, including legal malpractice. The legal malpractice claim involved negotiating a branding contract with a diet supplement company called ThinCare. The trial court granted respondents' motions for summary judgment on six of the nine causes of action. Appellants subsequently moved to dismiss the remaining causes of action, which the trial court granted.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding portions of appellants' expert witness's declaration on damages. In reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that appellants have met their burden of establishing a material factual dispute on causation and their burden of establishing materiality on damages. Furthermore, appellants are not barred from recovery under the doctrine of unclean hands. Finally, the court concluded that there is a statute of limitations question involving materially disputed facts that cannot be resolved by a summary adjudication motion. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court court's grant of summary adjudication on the causes of action for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, declaratory relief to rescind and void litigation agreement, and negligent misrepresentation. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Michaels v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP" on Justia Law

Tenants sued for breach of contract and bad faith retention of $4,800 from a security deposit; they subsequently moved to compel responses to requests for admission and interrogatories and requested sanctions ($3,060). Orders granting the sanctions were filed on March 20. On April 15, Tenants sought dismissal without prejudice and Landlord sought reconsideration or to set aside the sanctions, asserting that counsel was representing Tenants “pro bono,” so they incurred no legal fees, contrary to Tenants’ attorney’s representation. The clerk entered the dismissal on April 18. On May 6, Tenants filed “objections” to Landlord's motion, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to reconsider the sanctions because Tenants dismissed their case. On May 28, the trial court granted Landlord’s motion and set aside the sanctions orders. A June 21 order states: “This matter was continued solely for the purpose of addressing the referral of Plaintiff’s counsel to the Bar. The Court determines that ... there was no intentional misrepresentation. The Court will not refer this matter to the Bar.”The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Tenants’ argument that because they filed a voluntary dismissal, the court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider and set aside the sanctions orders. Disallowing reconsideration when sanctions were based on misrepresentations would violate a reasonable sense of justice and fair play View "Manhan v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

The identity of plaintiff's nontestifying expert is not entitled to absolute work product protection because it is not "a writing" that would reveal his "impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories." However, if an attorney can show that disclosure of the identity of a nontestifying expert would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney's industry or efforts or impair the attorney's ability to prepare and investigate a case, the identity may be entitled to protection under the qualified work product privilege. In that case, the identity is only discoverable if the party seeking discovery can establish that "denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that party's claim or defense or will result in an injustice."Plaintiff, an attorney and third-party witness in the underlying action, appeals from an order granting the motion of the California Employment Lawyers Association (CELA) to compel him to provide deposition testimony identifying a nontestifying expert whom plaintiff consulted in prior litigation. In the underlying action, CELA alleges an unknown CELA member (Doe 1) sent plaintiff, a non-member, information received from a members-only email distribution list in violation of a confidentiality agreement.The Court of Appeal concluded that the identity of Doe 1 is entitled to at most qualified attorney work product protection, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding CELA met its burden to demonstrate denial of disclosure would unfairly prejudice CELA in prosecuting the action and only minimally disadvantage plaintiff. The court agreed with CELA that plaintiff has appealed from a nonappealable discovery order, but the court treated plaintiff's appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and denied the petition. View "Curtis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of respondents' request for attorney fees under Probate Code section 2640.1, holding that attorney fees are not available where, as here, the matter is resolved without a conservator's appointment. In this case, respondents filed a conservatorship proceeding on their mother's behalf and the case settled before a conservator was appointed. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting respondents' request. View "Brokken v. Brokken" on Justia Law

When an attorney sues a client for breach of a valid and enforceable fee agreement, the amount of recoverable fees must be determined under the terms of the fee agreement, even if the agreed upon fee exceeds what otherwise would constitute a reasonable fee under the familiar lodestar analysis. To be enforceable, the fee agreement cannot be unconscionable. And, as with every contract, the attorney's performance under the fee agreement must be consistent with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.The Court of Appeal explained that this requires a court adjudicating a fee dispute to determine, among other things, whether the attorney used reasonable care, skill, and diligence in performing his or her contractual obligations. This standard applies in determining the probable validity of an attorney's claim for breach of an enforceable fee agreement under the attachment statutes. In this case, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that the fee agreements here were valid and that plaintiff had established the probable validity of his claims based on his billing statements, correspondence with defendants, and unrebutted evidence showing defendants disputed only a handful of the billing statements. The court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to support the attachment orders under the standard the court articulated. View "Pech v. Morgan" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit against defendant and won a judgment for $133,792.11 plus postjudgment interest, plaintiff sought attorney fees of $271,530, which were later increased to $287,640 in the trial court and now to $292,140 in this court. The trial court awarded $90,000 in attorney fees.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees, concluding that the trial court used sound discretion to limit the attorney fees to $90,000. The trial court began with the conventional lodestar calculation and gave good reasons for concluding that 600 plus hours was reasonable. However, the court reversed the trial court's ruling that plaintiff had no basis to collect the $90,000 award from an insurance company called Wesco that had posted a surety bond for defendant. Rather, the court concluded that the liability of the surety is commensurate with the liability of its principal. In this case, by statute, the court concluded that defendant must pay the attorney fees as a matter of costs and so too must Wesco. Accordingly, the court remanded for the trial court to amend the judgment to make surety Wesco liable for the $90,000 fee award as an item of costs. View "Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Sargent began working for the University in 1991 as an environmental health-and-safety technician. Sargent was the campus’s licensed asbestos consultant. Sargent sued, presenting abundant evidence about retaliation after he raised concerns about environmental hazards. A jury found in his favor on claims alleging unlawful retaliation and on a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (Labor Code 2698, PAGA), which was premised almost entirely on violations of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act (Labor Code 6300, CalOSHA). He was awarded more than $2.9 million in PAGA penalties and more than $7.8 million in attorney fees.The court of appeal affirmed the award of attorney fees but reversed the award of PAGA penalties. Education Code 66606.2 does not bar PAGA claims against the California State University (CSU) system; CSU is not categorically immune from PAGA penalties because it is a public entity. Viable PAGA claims can be asserted against CSU only when the statutes upon which the claims are premised themselves provide for penalties. Here, Sargent brought some viable PAGA claims but ultimately failed to establish CSU’s liability for them because the jury found that he was not personally affected by the underlying statutory violations. View "Sargent v. Board of Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law