Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anten and the Rubins jointly retained Gelfand and Kirios of the Weintraub law firm to advise and represent them on a matter of common interest: incorrect advice given by their prior tax attorneys. Anten filed a malpractice action against those lawyers concerning that representation. In response to discovery propounded by Anten, the lawyers objected that Anten’s discovery sought communications between the lawyers and the Rubins that were protected by the attorney-client privilege, which the Rubins expressly declined to waive. The superior court denied a motion to compel further responses, on the basis of the attorney-client privilege objection. The court of appeal granted Anten writ relief. In a lawsuit between the attorney and one or more of the attorney’s joint clients, based on an alleged breach of a duty arising from the attorney-client relationship, relevant communications between the attorney and any of the joint clients, made in the course of the attorney-joint-client relationship, are not privileged. View "Anten v. Super. Court" on Justia Law

Almanza was charged with nonforcible lewd or lascivious act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, 288(a)), forcible sodomy (286(c)(2)), and forcible lewd or lascivious act on a child under age 14 (288(b)(1)) with respect to his girlfriend’s daughter. At one point the victim stated that she had lied about the molestations because she was angry about having been disciplined. The court was aware, before trial, that the prosecutor threatened to prosecute the defense investigator and insinuated that defense counsel could also be prosecuted, for hiring and revealing the victim’s name to an investigator who was not licensed. After a bench trial, Almanza was found guilty of the lewd-act counts but not guilty of the sodomy counts and was sentenced to 16 years in prison. The court of appeal affirmed, despite finding that the prosecutor precipitated a serious conflict of interest between defendant and defense counsel, that “the trial court did little to try to remedy and that defense counsel could have done more to address.” The court noted the evidence of guilt and cited the California Supreme Court’s statement that prejudice will be presumed only when counsel is representing multiple defendants concurrently and a conflict of interest arises from that circumstance. View "People v. Almanza" on Justia Law

The Fergusons offered to sell their attorney, Yaspan, an interest in a London flat they owned. At Yaspan’s suggestion, the Fergusons hired independent counsel and the parties exchanged five drafts before signing a written agreement in 1995. This agreement enabled the Fergusons to recover nearly all of their original purchase price for the flat and still own half of it. Both the Fergusons and the Yaspans wanted to be partners with each other and not each others’ children, so they agreed that whichever couple outlived the other would have the right to buy out the deceased couple’s interest before that interest could pass to anyone else. The Fergusons were then 70 and 68 years old; the Yaspans were 49 and 47. The trial court concluded that Mrs. Ferguson’s 2011 petition to set aside the agreement as a product of Yaspan’s undue influence was untimely and without merit. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by looking at the fairness of the Agreement as a whole rather than focusing on terms Ferguson identified as unfair, and giving insufficient weight to the statistical likelihood that the buyout provision would favor the Yaspans. View "Ferguson v. Yaspan" on Justia Law

Danko practiced law with the firm of O’Reilly & Collins, until, in 2009, Danko sued O’Reilly, as an individual, and O’Reilly & Collins, for unpaid wages. Before trial, O’Reilly, as an individual, obtained directed verdict. In 2012, judgment was entered in favor of Danko for more than $2,000,000. Danko filed moved to amend the judgment and the costs and fee order “to include Terry O’Reilly as a judgment debtor for all amounts owed to Michael Danko” on the ground that O’Reilly knew that the firm owed Danko more than $2 million, but drew out all the firm’s available funds without reserving any amounts to satisfy the debt he knew was owed to Danko, telling Danko “you will not be able to execute on any judgment.” The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s amendment of the judgment, citing Code Civ. Proc., 187. The court rejected arguments that the amendment was entered in violation of a stay in the bankruptcy of the firm; the amendment was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata; and the amendment was contrary to the principles governing collateral estoppel. View "Danko v. O'Reilly" on Justia Law

Flannery and Murray sued Southern California Gas Company (SCGC) for damages suffered in the 2008 Sesnon wildfire.They were jointly represented by Tepper until attorney Ardi substituted in as Murray’s counsel. Tepper represented Flannery until 2012, when attorney Daneshrad substituted in as Flannery’s counsel. Tepper filed a notice of lien. In 2013, a settlement b was approved by the court, requiring SCGC to pay confidential specific amounts to Flannery and Murray and their attorneys before March 19, 2013. Tepper sent an e-mail advising all that he was “entitled to know the amount” and asserting a 33 1/3% lien. Unable to obtain agreement from Tepper and Daneshrad, SCGC filed the Interpleader Action, identifying Tepper, Daneshrad, and Flannery as defendants, and deposited the settlement funds with the court. Once the deadline for SCGC to pay had expired, Flannery moved to enforce the settlement. SCGC moved for discharge from the interpleader action and attorney fees. Flannery filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP). The court granted the discharge and denied the Anti-SLAPP Motion. The court of appeal affirmed. SCGC met its burden of showing a probability it would prevail on the merits of its interpleader action. View "S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Flannery" on Justia Law

Cobra was a prequalified vendor of information technology goods and services to the city. In 1999-2000, Cobra submitted invoices based on invoices submitted by its subcontractor, Monarch. Monarch had not performed the work, but was a sham corporation run by Armstrong, then-manager of information technology for a city agency. The city paid the invoices. After uncovering another scheme involving Armstrong and a different vendor, the city received complaints that Cobra had not paid subcontractors for work for which the city had paid Cobra. Cobra did not submit to an audit request. The City Attorney had represented Cobra on matters including city contracts while in private practice. Although he had personally been screened from matters related to Cobra, the court ordered the city to retain independent counsel, but stayed proceedings pending appeal. The California Supreme Court affirmed the disqualification. A jury returned verdicts against Cobra and rejected all counterclaims. The court of appeal held that Cobra waived appeal of its motion to preclude the city from using evidence procured with the participation of the City Attorney; reversed as to intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the false claims acts; and remanded for a new trial limited to those claims. View "City & Cnty, of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Cohen and Cohen and Associates Law Corporation represented Slack in a personal injury action on a contingent fee basis. They withdrew from the representation and Drell took over the case. Cohen asserted an attorney fee lien, informing one of the insurers in the personal injury case that any payment of funds to Slack was subject to a lien for their fees incurred during their representation. Drell negotiated settlement of the case, but the insurer made the check payable to Cohen and Drell. Cohen filed a special motion to strike Drell’s complaint seeking declaratory judgment, claiming that it arose from their protected activity of asserting a lien in a demand letter that threatened litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16 (b)(1).)1. The trial court denied the motion, finding the gravamen of the complaint was not protected activity and denied Drell’s request for attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the declaratory relief action targeted protected activity.View "Drell v. Cohen" on Justia Law

The Firm and its former partner seek a writ of mandate in this action for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract against the Firm and the former partner. At issue was whether the attorney-client privilege applies to intrafirm communications between attorneys concerning disputes with a current client, when that client later sues the firm for malpractice. The court concluded that when an attorney representing a current client seeks legal advice from an in-house attorney concerning a dispute with the client, the attorney-client privilege may apply to their confidential communications. Adoption of the so-called "fiduciary" and "current client" exceptions to the attorney-client privilege is contrary to California law because California courts are not at liberty to create implied exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. The court granted in part the petition and remanded for further proceedings.View "Palmer v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Karton filed suit against its former client for unpaid fees and costs and obtained a default judgment, including an award of attorney fees under the parties' retainer agreement. The court reversed the trial court's determination that Karton is the prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney fees and concluded that the client is the party prevailing on the contract within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717; reversed the trial court's determination that Karton is the prevailing party for purposes of an award of costs and concluded that the client is the party prevailing within the meaning of section 1032; and concluded that Sears v. Baccaglio provided no basis to affirm the awards of attorney fees and costs to Karton.View "David S. Karton v. Dougherty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained defendant to represent her in an action against Ralphs Grocery Company for breach of contract where plaintiff subleased property owned by Ralphs. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against defendant, alleging in the third amended complaint that defendant committed legal malpractice by failing to designate and call an expert witness at trial. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend and plaintiff appealed the judgment of dismissal. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege a relevant breach of duty by defendant and has only established that a trial court error, which precluded her from establishing that the sewage discharge into her premises was covered by the sublease with Ralphs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Kasem v. Dion-Kindem" on Justia Law