Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005 class counsel initiated a class action against Wells Fargo on behalf of thousands of mortgage consultants who had allegedly been misclassified as exempt employees. In 2006 ILG filed a putative class action alleging similar claims on behalf of a similar class. An ILG class was initially certified, but was decertified in 2010. Eventually, ILG filed multiple lawsuits, each with 30 to 90 plaintiffs, on behalf of 600 clients, including Maxon. ILG, Wells Fargo and class counsel mediated all pending claims. In 2011, class counsel moved for preliminary approval of a proposed class and settlement; Wells Fargo agreed to pay $19 million, including attorney fees to class counsel, to settle all class claims and $6 million for the ILG claims. At the preliminary approval hearing, the court was told that ILG’s clients would opt out of the class action. Contrary to that explanation, ILG assisted its class member clients in securing the benefits of the class action settlement rather than in opting out to seek recompense from the $6 million fund. ILG claimed that that settlement was for its attorney fees, but was willing to pay $1,750 to each plaintiff for a claim arguably not resolved in the class action. Maxon objected. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order requiring ILG to deposit the funds into escrow. The appeals court affirmed. The court presiding over the class action had jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the settlement of class member claims, even for class members represented by ILG and had a duty to ensure that ILG’s fees were reasonable in light of the overall result.View "Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg." on Justia Law

The attorneys filed suit on behalf of Carabello, who was injured in a collision while acting in the course of his employment. Old Republic, the workers’ compensation insurer, intervened to seek reimbursement. Casby, the other driver, raised a defense that limits the ability of an employer, or its insurer, to obtain reimbursement out of an injured worker’s recovery against a third party where the employer’s own negligence contributed to the injuries. The drivers settled for her $100,000 policy limits. The check was deposited in the attorneys’ account, with signatures of both parties required to withdraw any money” Old Republic sought apportionment, claiming the entire settlement, but later withdrew its motion and filed a notice of lien seeking $111,026.33. It is not clear that the attorneys were notified of the dismissal. The attorneys later dismissed the Carabello complaint with prejudice and took the position that by dismissing its pleading, Old Republic had forfeited any right to litigate employer negligence and to recover on its lien. The attorneys later moved, under the anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16), to strike claims that they wrongfully withdrew the settlement. The trial court concluded that dismissal of all affirmative pleadings had deprived it of jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed. In determining whether a claim arises from conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP law, the focus is on the wrongful, injurious acts or omissions identified in the complaint and whether they fit the statute’s description of protected conduct. Because the withdrawal of funds was neither communicative nor related to an issue of public interest, the trial court properly denied the motion.View "Old Republic Constr. Program Grp. v. Boccardo Law Firm" on Justia Law

In 2002, David hired the Attorneys to represent him in petitioning for his appointment as probate conservator of the person and estate of his mother, Donna. In his petition, David represented there were no conservatorship assets and that all of Donna’s assets were held in her Trust, so that no bond was required. Donna actually owned significant assets, including real property and several individual retirement accounts (IRAs), individually and not as assets of her Trust. The probate court appointed David as conservator of both Donna’s person and estate and waived bond. The Attorneys continued to represent David and allegedly “knew that Donna . . . had assets in her name that under California law were assets of the conservatorship,” but never informed the probate court of their existence nor petitioned the court to require or increase a bond. David subsequently misappropriated over one million dollars. Stine, a subsequently-appointed licensed professional fiduciary sued David for financial elder abuse and conversion and the Attorneys for legal malpractice. The trial court dismissed the Attorneys. The court of appeal reversed holding that the successor trustee is not subject to any defense that can be interposed against David and David’s malfeasance.View "Stine v. Dell'Osso" on Justia Law

"[A]ll too often attorney fees become the tail that wags the dog in litigation." Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties LLC challenged an award of $14,553.50 in attorney fees to Ellis Law Group LLP (ELG) as the prevailing party on a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motion). Sugar Loaf argued the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees for work on the anti-SLAPP motion performed by attorney Joseph Major because Major was a member of ELG on whose behalf the motion was filed. Relying on case law holding self-represented law firms may not be awarded attorney fees for an anti-SLAPP motion, Sugar Loaf argued the fee award must be reversed. ELG contended that Major acted as an independent contractor to the firm because he had no billable hour requirements, did not accrue vacation time, received no health care benefits, and was paid by the hour without deduction for taxes. The trial court agreed with ELG that Major's status as an independent contractor to ELG allowed the law firm to receive attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in awarding fees to ELG under the anti-SLAPP statute: Major was listed as a member of ELG in the caption of documents filed in support of ELG's anti-SLAPP motion; Major signed documents for ELG's anti-SLAPP motion as an attorney with ELG; Major did not file a notice of association or substitution to indicate he was acting as outside counsel to ELG; and when Major contacted opposing counsel regarding the filing of a document concerning the anti-SLAPP motion, he used an e-mail address and signature that identified him as a member of ELG. "The possibility that Major was paid in a manner different than a regular 'employee' of ELG may render him an independent contractor for taxation purposes, but does not make him separate counsel for ELG for purposes of attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute."View "Ellis Law Group v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Prop." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the "private attorney general" attorney fee statute and the trial court denied his application. The court concluded that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff enforced an important right affecting the public interest, satisfying the first prong of the statute. The court concluded, however, that the court erred in concluding that the second and third prongs were not satisfied. The trial court erroneously concluded that the benefit plaintiff's lawsuit conferred on others "may not prove to be significant." The trial court also erred when it concluded that because plaintiff sought recovery of a large amount of money paid as tax on investment gains, and therefore had "significant assets," he did not need the incentive of the private attorney general statute to bring his lawsuit. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying attorney fees and remanded for a determination of the fees to be awarded.View "Cutler v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

Alberto Daniel Saucedo Suarez and his attorneys, Allan Davis and the law firm of Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc. appealed a trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to the City of Corona. In 2008, Suarez was injured when the compressed natural gas (CNG) tank in a van in which he was a passenger exploded while being filled at a fueling station owned by the City. In April 2009, Suarez sued the City and a number of other defendants. Suarez proceeded against the City on a theory of dangerous condition of public property. Appellants contended the trial court erred because: (1) section 1038 did not authorize an award of attorney fees and costs against a party's counsel; (2) the commissioner issuing the award did not have jurisdiction; (3) the award was not proper where the action was brought and maintained with reasonable cause; (4) the fees and costs awarded were not reasonably and necessarily incurred; and (5) the award violated due process. The Court of Appeal agreed that section 1038 did not authorize an award of fees and costs against a party's attorney. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the judgment awarding the City its fees and costs against the Attorneys. In all other respects, the Court affirmed. View "Suarez v. City of Corona" on Justia Law

FLIR filed suit against their former employees for, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets (the underlying action). The former employees prevailed in the underlying action and they obtained a ruling that the misappropriation of trade secrets claim had been brought against them in bad faith, which resulted in an order that FLIR pay their attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, the former employees filed suit against the attorneys who represented FLIR in the underlying action, Latham, for malicious prosecution. Latham moved to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the former employees were unable to establish a probability of prevailing on their malicious prosecution action because the action was untimely brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. However, the court agreed with the former employees that section 340.6 is not the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action and that the former employees have presented sufficient evidence that they otherwise have a probability of prevailing. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court.View "Parrish v. Latham & Watkins" on Justia Law

Chubb petitioned for a writ of mandate, contending that the trial court's order to produce documents improperly impinged on the attorney-client privilege and the attorney duty to maintain client confidences. The court held that, for the limited purposes ordered by the trial court, the trial court did not err in permitting the parties to disclose the documents at issue to their respective attorneys in this case. Based on the record, there was no meaningful distinction between an allegation of privilege as to a party's information and an allegation of privilege as to a third party's information. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Chubb & Son v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, appealed the trial court's judgment sustaining the demurrer to his second amended complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, another attorney, on the theory that he was owed a portion of the settlement checks for clients who had originally hired plaintiff and then substituted defendant as counsel. The court affirmed the trial court's sustaining of defendant's demurrer to the second amended complaint because plaintiff failed to establish the existence, amount, and enforceability of his attorney fees lien in an independent action against the clients. View "Mojtahedi v. Vargas" on Justia Law

The trial court ordered plaintiff and her attorney to pay attorney's fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure 1038. The attorney appealed. The court held that section 128.7 provides for attorney fees sanctions against an attorney; the Attorney General here elected not to seek section 128.7 relief; and, unless and until the Legislature amends section 1038 to authorize an award of "sanctions" against counsel, defense costs and fees may not be imposed against counsel pursuant thereto. Therefore, the award against the attorney is reversed and the attorney is awarded costs on appeal. View "Settle v. State of California" on Justia Law