Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A condominium owner sued her homeowners’ association alleging five causes of action, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief as to rules governing elections, voting, sales, and leasing. One cause of action fell to a demurrer, another to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike. The parties stipulated that three claims were mooted when the association amended its rules. Both sides moved for attorney fees as the prevailing party under the Davis-Sterling Act (Civ. Code 4000); the homeowner also sought fees as the successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of attorney fees to both sides. Artus has not shown any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that Artus was not a “successful party” and failed to show that her lawsuit resulted in a ‘significant benefit’ to the ‘general public or a large class of persons.’ “Her one real win,” requiring the association to incur greater effort in preparing its notice materials for proposed rules changes, is of questionable significance to most association members and will likely result in higher assessments. The association simply took unilateral action to avoid judicial rulings and ‘kicked the can down the road;’ View "Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Association" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees, concluding that attorney fee awards against a holder are not capped if a separate state law so provides. The court explained that the term "recovery," as used in the Holder Rule provision, is sufficiently broad to include attorney fees. The court also concluded that Civil Code section 1459.5 is not preempted and plaintiffs are entitled to its benefit. In this case, there is no bar to application of section 1459.5 to the matter before the court even though it had not taken effect when the trial court initially ruled on plaintiffs' fee motion. The court further concluded that certain causes of action asserted by plaintiffs fall within the scope of section 1717 whereas others do not. Finally, plaintiffs waived the argument that section 2983.4 entitles them to an award of attorney fees by failing to raise it below in its motion for attorney fees. The court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Beneficial State Bank" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court has discretion to deny attorney fees under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) in some circumstances and held that the minimal or insignificant standard is applicable when the requester obtains only partial relief under the CPRA. In this case, the Association contends the trial court erred in concluding it had no discretion under the CPRA to deny attorney fees. The court reversed and remanded for the trial court to exercise the discretion it believed it lacked. View "Riskin v. Downtown L.A. Property Owners Assn." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment following a jury's verdict finding the Attorney Defendants liable to plaintiffs for malicious prosecution. The trial court determined as a matter of law that the Attorney Defendants had no probable cause to maintain a lawsuit in which they represented defendant, Rosa Banuelos, and then the jury determined the Attorney Defendants acted with malice and awarded compensatory damages and punitive damages.The court concluded that the trial court correctly found that the Attorney Defendants had no probable cause to initiate or maintain the underlying action. In this case, a reasonable attorney would have known there was little to zero chance of prevailing in the litigation after losing on summary judgment, yet the Attorney Defendants pursued the case through an unsuccessful appeal. Furthermore, no reasonable attorney would have continued to prosecute a lawsuit with potential damages of only $4,000 and exposure to an award of attorney fees. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of malice and award of compensatory damages. Finally, the court concluded that the jury's award of punitive damages was not excessive as a matter of law. View "LA Investments, LLC v. Spix" on Justia Law

Mark Shenefield filed a request for order (RFO) seeking joint legal and physical custody of the child he shared with Jennifer Shenefield. In his declaration, Mark quoted from and referenced the contents of a confidential, court-ordered psychological evaluation undertaken during Jennifer’s previous marital dissolution. Mark’s attorney Karolyn Kovtun filed the paperwork. Jennifer opposed Mark’s request and sought sanctions for violations of Family Code sections 3111(d) and 3025.5, for unwarranted disclosure of the confidential custody evaluation. The trial court ordered the sanctions issue be heard at trial. Jennifer’s trial brief detailed her arguments for why the court should impose sanctions on both Mark and Kovtun. Mark did not file a trial brief. Following trial, the court issued sanctions against Mark in the amount of $10,000 and Kovtun in the amount of $15,000. Kovtun challenged the sanctions, filing a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d). A different court heard Kovtun’s request to vacate the sanctions imposed against her and denied the request. On appeal, Kovtun argued the court improperly sanctioned her because: (1) attorneys could not be sanctioned under section 3111; (2) the notice she received did not comply with due process standards; (3) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her; (4) the court failed to enforce the safe harbor provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7; and (5) the court improperly admitted and relied on a transcript of a meeting between Kovtun, Mark, and Jennifer. The Court found Kovtun’s arguments meritless, and affirmed the sanctions. View "Shenefield v. Shenefield" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted for robbery and burglary. In 1996, the trial court sentenced him to 35 years to life in prison, with the bulk of that sentence attributable to the “Three Strikes” law. In 2021, the defendant filed a “Petition for Modification of Sentence (Pursuant to P.C. 1170(d)(1).)” based on “charging and sentencing policies” adopted by Los Angeles County District Attorney Gascón. The defendant quoted Penal Code section 1170(d)(1)1 and argued his 1996 sentence could be modified or recalled because “the district attorney’s office considers that only 15 years of the 25 years [he] already served is more than enough” and the court could consider, under the same statutory provision, his good conduct in prison.The trial court denied relief without appointing counsel for the defendant, “as untimely.” The court of appeal dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that its independent research uncovered published authority—never cited in the opening brief submitted by counsel—holding that a section 1170(d)(1) ruling is a non-appealable order. A defense attorney has an obligation to disclose known authority holding the court has no jurisdiction to decide an appeal when the prosecution does not cite such authority. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

After years of litigation over royalties and rights related to musical compositions, the trial court determined that Currency is entitled to the royalties and the rights to one set of musical compositions, that it has a security interest in the other musical compositions, and that Structured has no rights.Currency appealed from the denial of its motion to recover the attorney fees it incurred litigating consolidated appeals resolved in 2019. Structured appealed from the denial of its motion for sanctions (Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.1) in which it argued that Currency’s motion for attorney fees was frivolous.The court of appeal affirmed. The law of the case doctrine barred Currency’s motion. A party is not entitled to section 128.7 sanctions unless the target of the motion has had 21 days to withdraw the allegedly offending paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial. When calculating the earliest possible day that a motion for sanctions can be filed, the day the motion was served is excluded and the last day is included. The trial court properly denied Structured's motion for sanctions because it resolved the attorney fees motion on the 21st day after service of the motion for sanctions, the last day of the safe harbor period. View "Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Structured Asset Sales LLC" on Justia Law

In a lawsuit against his former clients and their new attorneys, attorney Pech alleged that the new attorneys interfered with his fee agreement by advising the clients not to file a complaint that Pech drafted. The new attorneys moved to strike all of Pech’s claims against them under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation” statute). Pech argued the anti-SLAPP motion should have been denied because the new attorneys failed to identify specific allegations of protected conduct to be stricken and the new attorneys’ interference with the fee agreement was not a protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, or if it was protected, he established a probability of prevailing on the merits.The trial court granted the motion in part, striking the claim for interference with contract. The court of appeal affirmed. The new attorneys identified the conduct supporting the claim for interference with contract that they asserted was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute: advice about proposed litigation against a third party, including the clients’ rights and obligations under a fee agreement with another attorney. Pech did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, because his claim is barred by the litigation privilege contained in Civil Code section 47(b). View "Pech v. Doniger" on Justia Law

Melendez purchased a used 2015 Toyota from Southgate under a retail installment sales contract. Southgate assigned the contract to Westlake. Weeks later, Melendez sent a notice alleging Southgate violated the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and demanded rescission, restitution, and an injunction. Melendez later sued Southgate and Westlake, alleging violations of the CLRA, the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code 1632 (requiring translation of contracts negotiated primarily in Spanish), the unfair competition law, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Westlake assigned the contract back to Southgate. Default was entered against Southgate. Westlake agreed to pay $6,204.68 ($2,500 down payment and $3,704.68 Melendez paid in monthly payments). Melendez would have no further obligations under the contract.The parties agreed Melendez could seek attorney fees, costs, expenses, and prejudgment interest. Westlake was entitled to assert all available defenses, “including the defense that no fees at all should be awarded against it as a Holder” The FTC’s “holder rule” makes the holder of a consumer credit contract subject to all claims the debtor could assert against the seller of the goods or services but caps the debtor’s recovery from the holder to the amount paid by the debtor under the contract. The trial court awarded attorney fees ($115,987.50), prejudgment interest ($2,956.62), and costs ($14,295.63) jointly and severally against Westlake, Southgate, and other defendants. The court of appeal affirmed. The limitation does not preclude the recovery of attorney fees, costs, nonstatutory costs, or prejudgment interest. View "Melendez v. Westlake Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on when a lawyer's settlement demand crosses the line and becomes professional misconduct. Falcon Brands, Inc. and Coastal Harvest II, LLC (collectively Falcon) appealed an order granting respondent’s special motion to strike both causes of action in Falcon’s cross-complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP law). The cross-complaint alleges extortion and intentional interference with a contract against attorney Amy Mousavi and her law firm, Mousavi & Lee, LLP (collectively Mousavi). Falcon argued Mousavi’s e-mail settlement demands, which were the focus of Falcon’s cross-complaint, were not entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP law because they constituted illegal attempts to force Falcon into settling the underlying matter. The trial court rejected this argument and granted Mousavi’s anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal reversed as to the first cause of action for extortion because it concluded Mousavi’s e-mail settlement demands, when considered in context, were not protected speech in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (2006). "Mousavi’s escalating series of threats ultimately transformed what had been legitimate demands into something else: extortion." The Court affirmed as to the second cause of action, intentional interference with a contract. That cause of action arose from Mousavi’s actual revelation of damaging information about Falcon to Falcon’s merger partner. Falcon did not contend the revelations were illegal as a matter of law. The revelations were made in furtherance of Mousavi’s contemplated litigation. The Court found the trial court correctly concluded the revelations were protected by the litigation privilege. Consequently, they were also protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP" on Justia Law