Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jesse's father, Crow, a retired physician, was aware that Jesse had a history of fights and arrests, including brandishing a gun on the highway. Crow first met Ryann after she married Jesse and saw her fewer than 10 times. Once, Crow went to their house and found the couple intoxicated. Ryann was in pain and stated that her foot had been run over by a stranger. Crow’s wife arranged for Ryann to see Dr. Williams. Ryann’s injuries were consistent with her explanation. Ryann did not mention abuse. Ryann’s mother, Pipitone, later learned that Jesse had run over Ryann’s foot. Jesse, with help from Crow, paid Ryann $5,000. Ryann signed an agreement, stating that the incident was an accident; Pipitone signed as a witness. Pipitone eventually reported the abuse to the police. Ryann’s sister also reported. Ryann was not cooperative. Ryann admitted that Jesse had deliberately run her over, that she felt threatened, and that he had “guns and a lot of illegal things.” Six months after their marriage Jesse murdered Ryann, and with assistance, dismembered and dumped her body into the San Francisco Bay. Jesse committed suicide in jail. Pipitone brought a wrongful death action against Doctors Crow and Williams for failure to report suspected abuse under Penal Code 11160. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, on grounds of duty and causation. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Pipitone v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2002, Barry Jameson filed a complaint against Dr. Taddesse Desta asserting numerous claims stemming from Desta's allegedly negligent medical treatment of Jameson's hepatitis while Jameson was serving time at the Donovan Correctional Facility. In three separate prior appeals, the Court of Appeal reversed judgments in favor of Desta, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand from Jameson III, Jameson filed a motion for summary judgment and/or adjudication. The trial court denied the motion in its entirety and set the matter for trial. After the parties provided opening statements at an unreported jury trial, Desta orally moved for nonsuit. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Desta. On appeal, Jameson argued the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion for summary judgment; (2) in granting Desta's motion for nonsuit; (3) in failing to have the trial proceedings recorded by a court reporter; (4) by displaying bias and prejudice throughout the proceedings; and (5) that the court's rulings denied him a fair trial. Jameson argued that the sum of all these alleged errors denied him due process. After review, the Court of found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Jameson v. Desta" on Justia Law

Lattimore brought a wrongful death action against two doctors and Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare arising from their care and treatment of Yvonne’s father, who had gone to the hospital for a blood transfusion, experienced gastrointestinal bleeding, and died. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the declaration of Lattimore’s medical expert was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on whether treatment of her father violated the applicable standards of care applicable to physicians and surgeons. However, the medical expert declaration did not raise a triable issue of fact on the standard of care applicable to nurses and hospitals in general. View "Lattimore v. Dickey" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case granted defendant Rideout Memorial Hospital’s motion for summary judgment, finding that, as a matter of law, the emergency room physician who failed to diagnose and treat decedent’s brain hemorrhage was not an agent of the hospital. On appeal, the surviving children argued that, despite the hospital’s boilerplate admissions form and signage stating the emergency room physicians are independent contractors, they presented triable issues of material fact whether their mother entrusted herself to the hospital, whether the hospital selected the physician, whether their mother reasonably believed the doctor was an agent of the hospital, and whether the form and signage could give notice of the employment status of the emergency room physician to a patient suffering acute pain at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner. Based on analogous cases in California and around the country, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Hospital based on a review of the facts entered into the trial court record. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Whitlow v. Rideout Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

After Chan’s mother died from internal hemorrhaging related to Coumadin use following heart surgery, Chan successfully sued Curran for medical malpractice. Chan challenged the trial court’s post-verdict reduction of the $1 million noneconomic damages award to $250,000, as required by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), Civ. Code 3333.2. Chan challenged the MICRA cap as violating equal protection, due process and the right to jury trial, based on her assertion she is entitled to seek noneconomic damages sufficient to cover attorney fees. The court of appeal rejected Chan’s claims, stating that the legitimate debate over the wisdom of MICRA’s noneconomic damages cap remains a matter for the Legislature and state electorate. View "Chan v. Curran" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sharp Memorial Hospital (dba Sharp Rehabilitation Center) appealed the trial court's order granting plaintiff-respondent's Berthe Kabran's motion for new trial following a special verdict on a cause of action for medical malpractice in which the jury found Sharp was negligent in the care and treatment of plaintiff's predecessor, Dr. Eke Wokocha, but that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm. Sharp argued on appeal that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by granting a new trial because the motion was untimely, rendering the order void. It further argued the court abused its discretion because the evidence proffered by plaintiff in support of the new trial motion was cumulative and consistent with defense expert trial testimony, and thus would not change the outcome of the trial. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that no jurisdictional defect appeared in the court's new trial order and, as a result, Sharp could not raise its appellate contentions as to the motion's timeliness for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the new evidence and ruling on the record that plaintiff should have been granted a new trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order. View "Kabran v. Sharp Memorial" on Justia Law

This case centered on a claim for reimbursement made by California's State Department of Health Care Services for funds expended on behalf of an injured party by the state's Medi-Cal program. The injured party, Ashlynn Aguilera, filed a special motion to determine the Department's lien under Welfare & Institutions Code section 14124.76. When Ashlynn was two months old she suffered injuries as a result of the negligence of a physician. She underwent a hemispherectomy (removal of half of the cerebral portion of her brain). Ashlynn suffered from global developmental delay, mental retardation and behavioral disorders. Ashlynn filed an action for medical malpractice and her parents settled the action for $950,000. The settlement was near the defendant's liability policy limits. The trial court approved the settlement, along with the request of Ashlynn's counsel for attorney fees and costs totaling $253,006. Ashlynn's parents received $85,000 of the settlement as a resolution of their prospective wrongful death action against the defendant. The balance of the settlement was placed in a special needs trust. The Department asserted a lien on Ashlynn's recovery, based on the $211,191 that it spent on her behalf. Ashlynn supported her special motion with declarations from her counsel and two physicians, presenting evidence regarding: her life expectancy; the care she will need throughout her life; the cost of future care; lost earning capacity; and the value of her pain and suffering. Among other things, Ashlynn presented evidence that she needs 16 hours per day of licensed vocational nurse (LVN) attendant care until she reaches the age of 21, and 24 hours per day LVN attendant care for the rest of her life. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly employed the methodology used in "Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn,"(547 U.S. 268 (2006)) but erred when it refused to reduce the Department's lien to account for the attorney fees and expenses Ashlynn incurred. The matter was remanded to the trial court to set aside the order and conduct further proceedings: (1) regarding whether the cost of Ashlynn's future at-home attendant care and medical care should be included in its Ahlborn calculation; and (2) apply section 14124.72 (d) to determine the Department's share of Ashlynn's attorney fees and costs. View "Aguilera v. Loma Linda Univ. Med. Center" on Justia Law

In 2008 Knox, the mother of Keys and the sister of Smith underwent surgery on her thyroid. When Knox was transferred from a post-anesthesia care unit to a medical-surgical unit, a nurse noticed Knox’s breathing was “noisy,” and called the hospital’s rapid assessment team to evaluate her. During the medical team’s efforts Knox was without a pulse for a number of minutes and as a result of her blocked airway, she suffered a permanent brain injury. She died after life support was withdrawn. A jury awarded Keys and Smith damages on their claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that plaintiffs meaningfully comprehended the medical negligence that led to the death of their family member at the time the negligence was occurring. View "Keys v. Alta Bates Summit Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

AEG hired Dr. Murray as entertainer Michael Jackson’s personal physician for a concert tour. Michael died of acute propofol intoxication while under Murray’s care. Katherine Jackson, on behalf of herself and as guardian of Michael’s children, Michael Jr., Paris-Michael and Prince Michael, filed suit for negligence hiring, retention, and supervision. The jury found that Murray was not unfit or incompetent to perform the work for which he was hired. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in summarily adjudicating negligence because AEG did not owe Michael a duty to refrain from exerting pressure over Murray; AEG did not undertake to provide protective services to Michael; and AEG owed Michael no duty arising out of the contract with Murray. The court also did not err in summarily adjudicating respondeat superior because the undisputed facts establish that Murray was an independent contractor as a matter of law; AEG is not liable under the peculiar risk doctrine as an independent contractor; and Murray was not an agent of AEG. The trial court did not err in instructing the jurors with a modified jury instruction along with the special verdict form; the special verdict was legally sufficient. View "Jackson v. AEG Live, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, Blevins had knee surgery at a surgical facility. The knee later became infected by bacteria, subsequently found on a sponge manufactured by Ruhof that had been used to clean surgical equipment before the surgery. The bacteria had apparently "survived the sterilization process." The surgical center paid Blevins $4,118.23 for medical expenses he incurred in treating the infection. Blevins did not sign an agreement releasing the center from liability; he was not represented by counsel and the center did not give him written notice of the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action. More than 15 months after receiving the payment, Blevins filed suit. Ruhof settled for $100,000. The trial court, relying on Insurance Code section 11583, ruled that the one-year limitations period was tolled by the payment of medical expenses. The trial court reduced a jury’s award of damages against the surgical facility to $285,114. The court of appeal affirmed. Section 11583, which provides that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled when advance or partial payment is made to an injured and unrepresented person without notifying him of the applicable limitations period, applies to the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. View "Coastal Surgical Inst. v. Blevins" on Justia Law