Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Military Law
by
In this case, defendant Charles Yeager-Reiman, a veteran, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor grand theft in connection with fraudulent activities related to veterans' benefits from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Yeager-Reiman appealed his conviction, arguing that his prosecution was preempted by federal law, as his offenses concerned the theft of benefits from the VA.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five disagreed with Yeager-Reiman's contention, and affirmed the lower court's judgement. The court ruled that federal preemption did not apply in this case. While federal law establishes the guidelines and regulations for VA benefits, it does not prohibit state-level criminal prosecutions for fraudulent activities related to these benefits.In terms of field preemption, the court determined that the provisions of the federal law did not indicate an intent by Congress to occupy the field of criminal prosecution of veterans in connection with the theft of VA benefits. As for obstacle preemption, the court found that allowing state-level prosecutions for theft of VA benefits actually promotes Congress's purpose of aiding veterans by preserving funds for veterans' benefits through deterrence.Therefore, the court concluded that neither field preemption nor obstacle preemption deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear Yeager-Reiman's case. View "People v. Yeager-Reiman" on Justia Law

by
Jeremiah Sullivan, III, appeals a stipulated judgment of dissolution of marriage. He challenged a 2018 order that was incorporated into the stipulated judgment, in which the family court found that it lacked jurisdiction to divide his ex-wife Lisa Sullivan’s military pension under the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse’s Protection Act (FUSFSPA). Jeremiah argued the court erred because Lisa “consent[ed] to the jurisdiction of the Court.” The Court of Appeal concluded the stipulated judgment was not appealable because it did not resolve all issues between the parties. At the parties’ joint request, however, the appellate court exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. On the merits, it rejected the trial court’s ruling that a service member had to explicitly and specifically consent to the court’s authority to divide her military retirement under the FUSFSPA. Furthermore, the Court concluded Lisa did consent to the jurisdiction of the court within the meaning of the FUSFSPA by voluntarily filing her dissolution petition in California, seeking a judicial confirmation of “all” her separate property acquired before marriage, asking the court to determine “any” community property assets, and requesting the appointment of an expert under California Evidence Code section 730 to determine a proposed division of the parties’ retirement accounts. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted appropriate writ relief directing the family court to vacate the stipulated judgment and the relevant portion of the 2018 order. View "Marriage of Sullivan" on Justia Law

by
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by summarily denying defendant's petition for recall and resentencing without following the required procedures of Penal Code section 1170.91. Pursuant to section 1170.91, sentencing courts must consider any trauma, substance abuse, and mental health problems caused by a defendant's service in the United States military as mitigating factors weighing in favor of a low-term sentence. In this case, defendant filed a petition after the statute's effective date; stated that he had served in the Marine Corps and ended up suffering from "serious mental health issues and substance abuse addiction" as a result; and attached extensive Marine Corps service records and CDCR mental health records. Therefore, as the People acknowledged, defendant's petition for resentencing met the statutory requirements under section 1170.91, subdivision (b). View "People v. Bonilla-Bray" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff, appearing in propria persona, appealed from the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate directing the California Army National Guard (CAARNG) to vacate an order separating him, a commissioned officer, from CAARNG.The Court of Appeal held that the Feres doctrine did not bar plaintiff's writ petition. The court also held that plaintiff failed to show that the trial court erred in concluding that CAARNG properly separated plaintiff based on federal regulations incorporated into state law, where states may incorporate federal law regarding appointment and termination of National Guard officers and plaintiff failed to show the trial court erred in concluding that the Military and Veterans Code incorporates NGR No. 635–100, subdivisions (5)(a)(8) and (5)(a)(22). Finally, plaintiff failed to show prejudice from any of the trial court's purported procedural errors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "DiRaffael v. California Army National Guard" on Justia Law

Posted in: Military Law
by
Wade, an active duty member of the Army Special Forces Group and affiliated with the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI) with a blood alcohol concentration above 0.15 percent. The court denied his request to enter a pretrial diversion program under the military diversion statute, Penal Code section 1001.80. The court of appeal directed the trial court to reconsider. The trial court departed from the principles behind Penal Code section 1001.80 by focusing on the nature of the offense and applying the felony sentencing guidelines without apparent consideration of the rehabilitative purpose of diversion. The court abused its discretion by denying Wade’s request using criteria which the Legislature implicitly rejected; the Legislature expressly intended to include DUI offenses within the scope of diversion. View "Wade v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

by
Robert and Janice married in 1964; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received nothing. The trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed, contending: (1) under federal law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award to Janice based on Robert’s receipt of either veteran’s disability benefits or CRSC; (2) the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest; (3) the trial court erred by making its award of spousal support nonmodifiable; (4) because the judgment dividing the community property was long-since final, the trial court could not give Janice any remedy for the loss of her community property interest in the retired pay; (5) all of Robert's income was exempt, therefore could not be required to satisfy Janice's claim; and (6) Janice was not entitled to spousal support, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed federal law prohibited the trial court from compensating Janice, in the form of spousal support or otherwise, for the loss of her share of Robert’s retired pay. However, it could properly modify spousal support, provided it did so based on the relevant factors and not as compensation. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to hold a new trial on Janice’s request for a modification of spousal support. View "In re Marriage of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

by
Robert and Janice married in 1964; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received nothing. The trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed, contending: (1) under federal law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award to Janice based on Robert’s receipt of either veteran’s disability benefits or CRSC; (2) the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest; (3) the trial court erred by making its award of spousal support nonmodifiable; (4) because the judgment dividing the community property was long-since final, the trial court could not give Janice any remedy for the loss of her community property interest in the retired pay; (5) all of Robert's income was exempt, therefore could not be required to satisfy Janice's claim; and (6) Janice was not entitled to spousal support, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed federal law prohibited the trial court from compensating Janice, in the form of spousal support or otherwise, for the loss of her share of Robert’s retired pay. However, it could properly modify spousal support, provided it did so based on the relevant factors and not as compensation. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to hold a new trial on Janice’s request for a modification of spousal support. View "In re Marriage of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

by
At issue in this case is the scope of the Governor’s responsibilities upon receiving an allegation brought under the California Military Whistleblower Protection Act, Military and Veterans Code section 56 (Section 56), referred by the inspector general. Major Dwight Stirling, a part-time judge advocate in the California National Guard, brought a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court to compel Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. (the Governor) to act on Stirling’s whistleblower allegation in accordance with Section 56, subdivisions (d) and (f)(1). Stirling argued that Section 56(e) required the Governor to undertake the same preliminary determination, investigation, and reporting that was required of the inspector general under Section 56, subdivisions (d) and (f)(1). The Attorney General, representing the Governor, argued Section 56(e) did not require the Governor to take any particular action on a whistleblower allegation and permitted the Governor to defer to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, who was a federal military officer responsible for heading the federal agency that controlled the United States Army National Guard. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the Attorney General’s demurrer to Stirling’s amended petition for writ of mandate. Because the Court of Appeal was reviewing a judgment following an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, its analysis was necessarily limited to the pleadings and matters of which it could take judicial notice. The Court concluded Section 56 was unambiguous, and its plain language did not require the Governor to undertake the procedures required of the inspector general in response to a whistleblower allegation. The Court of Appeal also concluded, based on the appellate record, that Section 56 did not violate California’s equal protection clause because in all cases a whistleblower allegation is referred to an impartial decision maker who has discretion whether to undertake a full investigation. View "Stirling v. Brown" on Justia Law

by
In 1964, appellant Robert Cassinelli and respondent Janice Cassinelli were married; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received zero. As a result, the trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest. However, it could properly order Robert to reimburse Janice for her lost community property interest; doing so would not have violated either federal law or finality principles. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order awarding Janice the same amount on a different theory. View "Marr. of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

by
The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' review was whether one spouse’s unilateral election (after a settlement agreement and judgment of dissolution) to change from one type of military benefit (retirement that was taxable and community property) to another type of military benefit (combat-related special compensation that was not taxable and separate property) could defeat the community property interest of the other spouse set forth in the marital settlement agreement. The Court determined that one spouse could not, by invoking a condition wholly within his control, defeat the community interest of the other spouse. The trial court here correctly determined that "the post-judgment election" by appellant Philip Chapman did not relieve him of his agreement to pay respondent Judy Chapman $475 per month for her community property share of his military retirement. The Court reversed the trial court’s order, however, because the remedy the court selected was improper. The trial court imposed a constructive trust on the funds received by Philip as combat-related special compensation benefits. But the remedy of a constructive trust was available only for wrongful conduct. View "Marriage of Chapman" on Justia Law