Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' review was whether one spouse’s unilateral election (after a settlement agreement and judgment of dissolution) to change from one type of military benefit (retirement that was taxable and community property) to another type of military benefit (combat-related special compensation that was not taxable and separate property) could defeat the community property interest of the other spouse set forth in the marital settlement agreement. The Court determined that one spouse could not, by invoking a condition wholly within his control, defeat the community interest of the other spouse. The trial court here correctly determined that "the post-judgment election" by appellant Philip Chapman did not relieve him of his agreement to pay respondent Judy Chapman $475 per month for her community property share of his military retirement. The Court reversed the trial court’s order, however, because the remedy the court selected was improper. The trial court imposed a constructive trust on the funds received by Philip as combat-related special compensation benefits. But the remedy of a constructive trust was available only for wrongful conduct. View "Marriage of Chapman" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with misdemeanor counts of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), and driving while having 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his blood in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b). He pled not guilty, and moved for military diversion under Penal Code section 1001.80. Section 1001.80 authorizes a trial court to grant pretrial diversion to a defendant charged with a misdemeanor if the defendant was, or currently is, a member of the United States military and suffers from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of his or her military service. Based on the rules of statutory construction, the language of section 1001.80 and Vehicle Code section 23640, and the legislative history of section 1001.80, the court concluded that Vehicle Code section 23640 does not bar pretrial diversion for veterans or active duty members of the military who meet the criteria of section 1001.80 and are charged in a DUI case. The court urged the Legislature to act by amending section 1001.80 to express its intent with regard to military diversion in DUI cases. Therefore, the court discharged the order to show cause and ordered a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Appellate Division to vacate its order denying petitioner's petition for writ of mandate, and to make a new and different order granting the petition. View "Hopkins v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Mother Mari M. appealed a juvenile court order that her son M.M., born June 2013, was a child described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a). The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency received a report of severe domestic violence between mother and Rogers M., minor's father, which had taken place on December 2, 2014 and which had been witnessed by minor. The domestic violence included father choking mother while holding minor; father throwing mother into a piano, a table and onto the floor while minor was "at their feet"; father pinning mother on the floor at least two times; father breaking mother's phone; and mother hitting and kicking father and shredding his shirt among other allegations. The December 2 domestic violence incident came to light two days later when Mother contacted father's naval command and sought a military protective order (MPO). Mother contended the juvenile court erred when it: (1) assumed permanent jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act after officials and a supreme court judge from minor's "home state" of Japan unambiguously and repeatedly stated it was inappropriate under their legal system for a Japanese court to communicate with the juvenile court regarding this case; (2) failed to advise her that she could commence a separate custody action in Japan; and (3) found minor a dependent under subdivision (a) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, rather than under subdivision (b) of that statute. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

Lanquist and Temple served as midshipmen at the Academy for four years before they became commissioned naval officers. Both men later became employees of Ventura County. They are members of VCERA, which permits employees to purchase retirement service credit for time spent in military service. It excludes time spent as a midshipman at the United States Naval Academy. VCERA denied their requests to purchase retirement service credit for midshipmen service at the Academy. At a hearing before the VCERA retirement board, they presented evidence that as midshipmen at the Academy they were compensated as active duty servicemen and experienced hardships and dangers on surface cruises with active naval vessels similar to those experienced by commissioned officers. The trial court upheld the denial, holding that VCERA's policy of denying retirement service credit for service at the Academy is "appropriate" in view of state and federal authorities interpreting the terms "public service," and "active duty." The court of appeal reversed. "Military service" includes service as a midshipman, Gov. Code, 31450. View "Lanquist v. Ventura Cnty. Emps.' Ret. Ass'n" on Justia Law