Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The dependency petition alleged that mother "K.B." had beat X.B., her youngest son, with a belt causing welts and bruises to his chest, shoulder, arms, and legs, and that she pushed X.B.’s head into a pillow to muffle his screams, causing him to feel as if he were suffocating. The petition alleged that mother had a history of using inappropriate discipline techniques on her sons, such as beating them with belts, humiliating K.B. in public, and forcing K.B. to complete strenuous exercise routines as punishment. The petition also alleged that mother allowed her live-in boyfriend to inappropriately punish K.B. and to smoke marijuana in the children’s presence. K.B. appealed the trial court’s order placing X.B. with his nonoffending and noncustodial biological father, K.D. (father), who lived out of state. She argued that the court erred by failing to find under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a), that it would be detrimental to X.B.’s emotional well-being to be separated from his maternal family. Mother requested that X.B. be placed with his older sibling in the home of his maternal grandmother. She also argued that the court failed to give proper notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

Michael C. appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor daughter A.C., and selecting adoption as her permanent plan. Father mainly argued that no sufficient evidence supported the court's underlying findings that: (1) the Agency's adoption assessment report was adequate and up to date on the child's mental and emotional status; and (2) there was no applicable exception to adoption preference. In addition, the Father sought review, by way of designating his appeal to be a writ proceeding, of certain of the juvenile court's earlier orders from the 12-month review and referral hearing, claiming he did not forfeit such claims, even though his previously appointed appellate attorney declined to file such a writ petition after the 12-month orders were made (to that end, Father argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel). Accordingly, Father now asked the Court of Appeal to consider whether the 12-month referral hearing orders were still reviewable because they failed to meet the standards of the Indian Child Welfare Act regarding sufficient evidence: (1) of "ICWA detriment" to return the child to his custody; and (2) whether "active reunification efforts" were made that allowed the juvenile court to rule that his reunification services were adequate and could properly be terminated at the 12-month review and referral hearing. After careful consideration of these arguments in light of the trial court's record, the Court of Appeal determined there was no adequate showing in support of Father's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and further, he has forfeited the substantive arguments he raised about the orders made at the 12-month review hearing. "Even if we were to consider those claims on a writ basis, we would find them meritless." Regarding the judgment that terminated his parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan for the child, the Court found no prejudicial error or abuse of discretion occurred, and that the judgment was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the trial court's order terminating her parental rights with regard to her daughter. At issue on appeal is compliance with notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. The court concluded that there is a duty under the IWCA to send updated notices to the relevant tribes when additional information regarding a child's ancestors is obtained after the original ICWA notices were sent. In this case, because the Department failed to send updated notices after it obtained additional information, the court reversed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re I.B." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Benedict Cosentino appealed an order that dismissed his claims against defendants-respondents Stella Fuller, John R. Magee, Jason P. Maldonado, William R. Ramos, and Robert B. Vargas based on the sovereign immunity afforded to Indian tribes and their officials. Cosentino was a table games dealer at an Indian tribal casino and Defendants were the five members of the tribe’s gaming commission responsible for licensing individuals involved in the tribe’s gaming activities and overseeing those activities. Shortly after he began working at the casino, Cosentino observed ongoing criminal activity on the casino floor. Based on his observations, Cosentino became a informant for the California Department of Justice and the information he provided lead to several criminal convictions. Defendants later sought to learn what information Cosentino provided the Department of Justice, but he followed the Department’s instructions and declined to divulge the information. Defendants thereafter revoked his gaming license and the casino terminated his employment because he could not work at the casino without a valid license. Cosentino filed suit claiming Defendants revoked his gaming license without cause and in retaliation for acting as an informant. Defendants specially appeared to make a motion to quash and dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction because Cosentino based all of his claims on Defendants’ official actions as members of the tribe’s gaming commission. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed: "[a]n official’s actions that exceed the scope of his or her authority are not protected. [. . .]Cosentino, however, presented evidence supporting his claim Defendants exceeded the scope of their authority by revoking his license without cause in retaliation against him. Sovereign immunity prevents us from inquiring into the reliability of information Defendants may have relied upon in revoking Cosentino’s license or any other errors they may have made, but it does not prevent inquiry into whether Defendants exceeded their authority by using their official position to intentionally harm Cosentino." View "Cosentino v. Fuller" on Justia Law

At the start of the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court and Ventura County Human Services Agency believed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, did not apply to Eskimo families. Father and mother appealed from the order terminating parental rights to their two minor children and selecting adoption as the permanent plan, Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26. The court of appeal reversed. Evidence submitted for the first time on appeal established that the children are Indian children under ICWA. The federal definition of "Indian" includes "Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska." The Noorvik Native Community, a federally-recognized Alaskan Indian tribe confirmed that the minors are tribe members. Before terminating parental rights to an Indian child, the juvenile court must satisfy ICWA requirements, including finding that "active efforts" were made to provide services designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that parents' continued custody of minors "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage." Having found ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court did not consider these requirements before terminating parental rights; NNC was not afforded an opportunity to intervene. View "In re H.G." on Justia Law

Appellant Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Association, Inc. appealed the dismissal of their request for a declaratory judgment and other relief. Appellant's complaint was filed in 2012 against defendants-respondents the City of San Diego and the predecessors of Tecolote Investors, LLC. Members of the HOA are sublessees of mobile home park lots subject to a 1979 master lease between the City and Tecolote Investors. Appellant argued that the park site was located on and should have been properly characterized as "Pueblo Lands" within the meaning of the San Diego City Charter (section 219). Section 219 and its predecessors since 1909 have been applied to certain Pueblo lands north of the San Diego River to require approval by City Council ordinance and City voters for any sale or lease of them for more than 15 years. Since no voter approval was sought or obtained for this transaction, Appellant alleged the City was without power to enter into the existing 55-year master lease of the park site with the Landlord Defendants (or their predecessors). As a consequence, Appellant sought decrees to invalidate the master lease and consequently its subleases, specifically attacking the 1983 City-approved provisions allowing periodic rent increases. Appellant also claims entitlement to various other types of relief, such as damages. In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 did not apply, the face of the pleading failed to state its causes of action, and the Landlord Defendants' demurrer was correctly sustained without leave to amend. Based on de novo analysis (akin to judgment on the pleadings),the Court of Appeal concluded the record fully supported the dismissal of all causes of action as to the City too. View "Linda Vista Village San Diego HOA v. Tecolote Investors" on Justia Law

This matter came before the Court of Appeal for a third time; this matter stemmed from the California Valley Miwok Tribe's dispute with the Gambling Control Commission over money collected and held as a "non-compact tribe" under the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF). The Commission began withholding the distribution of RSTF funds to the Tribe when it became aware of a dispute over the tribe's membership and leadership as evidenced by ongoing proceedings and litigation involving the BIA's relationship with the Tribe. In its last opinion, the Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to lift a stay and to allow the parties to file dispositive motions. The parties filed their motions, and the trial court resolved them, entering judgment in favor of the Commission on its motion for summary judgment, which the Tribe then appealed. Finding that the Commission was properly withholding RSTF funds because it could not identify an undisputed tribal representative to receive them, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission's decision.View "CA Valley Miwok Tribe v. CA Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

The Mendocino County Health and Human Services Agency filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 on behalf of Minors, ages 3, 7, and 8, alleging that Mother had a substance abuse problem that inhibited her ability to parent her children and that the parents were not providing adequate food or shelter. Deputies found the children in the care of men at a home with drugs and dangerous objects. There was no refrigerator; the toilet would not flush. There was no running water, and there were dead mice in the house. An open power panel posed a significant fire danger. The children had been wearing the same clothes since Mother had left them four nights earlier. Mother appeared to be “extremely high.” She provided a urine sample, saying it would be “dirty.” The Minors were subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901. For several months, Mother did not engage in services, despite repeated efforts to contact her. The juvenile court found that Mother had partially complied with her case plan, that there was no substantial probability Minors would be returned to her custody within 18 months of their removal, that reasonable services had been offered, and that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. The court terminated reunification services and set a hearing under section 366.26 to determine a permanent plan for the children. The appeals court affirmed. View "C.F. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Stop the Casino 101 Coalition sought to invalidate a compact between the state and the Federated Indians of the Graton Rancheria authorizing the operation of a gaming casino on a 254-acre parcel in and adjacent to the City of Rohnert Park. The coalition claimed that because the state failed to explicitly cede to the Graton Tribe jurisdiction over the property, which was formerly held by private parties, federal law does not authorize the assumption of tribal jurisdiction over the property, so that the state’s entry into the compact violates the California constitutional provision authorizing such gaming compacts. The state countered that the coalition’s claim is essentially an attack on the validity of action taken by the federal government that cannot be challenged in these state court proceedings, and that in all events there has been no violation of either federal or state law. The appeals court affirmed dismissal of the challenge, citing federal approval of the plan under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701) and declining to “pass judgment on the contentious policy issues underlying the creation of Indian reservations for the purpose of constructing gaming casinos.”View "Stop the Casino 101 Coal. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians owned and operated a resort and casino on its rancheria lands in Madera County. In 2005, another tribe, the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians, submitted a request to the United States Department of the Interior asking the department to acquire approximately 305 acres of land in Madera County adjacent to State Route 99 so the North Fork Tribe could develop its own resort and casino there. The land on which the North Fork Tribe wanted to build was approximately 40 miles away from the North Fork Tribe's rancheria lands and approximately 30 miles away from the Picayune Tribe's casino. Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, casino gaming on lands acquired for a tribe by the Secretary of the Interior after October 17, 1988, was generally prohibited, subject to certain exceptions. One of those exceptions was if "the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary's determination." The United States Department of the Interior conducted an environmental review of the project proposed by the North Fork Tribe under federal law and issued a final environmental impact statement in 2009. In September 2011, the Secretary of the Interior's delegate notified the Governor of California that the delegate had made the "'two-part determination'" that a gaming establishment on the newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the North Fork Tribe and its members and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, and asked Governor Brown to concur in that determination. Despite requests by the Picayune Tribe and others that he prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) before acting, Governor Brown issued his concurrence in the two-part determination without preparing or considering the preparation of an EIR. The following day, the Governor executed a tribal-state gaming compact with the North Fork Tribe. The Picayune Tribe filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive relief against the Governor and others, asserting that the Governor's concurrence in the two-part determination constituted an "'approval'" of a "'project'" under state law that "must be the subject of the CEQA environmental review process." All of the defendants and the real party in interest demurred. Among other things, the Governor and the real party in interest argued that as a matter of law the Governor is not a "public agency" for CEQA purposes and therefore his concurrence in the two-part determination was not subject to CEQA. The trial court agreed. Accordingly, the court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court was correct in concluding the Governor was not a public agency for CEQA purposes, and therefore did not err in sustaining the demurrers. View "Picayune Rancheria v. Brown" on Justia Law