Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A woman with dementia was admitted to a memory care facility, where her family warned staff about her tendency to wander and need for supervision. Three days after admission, she was found unattended in a courtyard on a 102-degree day, suffering from severe burns and heatstroke, ultimately dying days later. Her family, acting as successors in interest and individually, sued the facility for elder neglect, negligence, fraud, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Upon admission, her niece had signed an arbitration agreement on her behalf, which the family argued should not bind their individual claims or override their right to a jury trial.The Superior Court of Sacramento County considered the facility’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. The court found a valid arbitration agreement existed for the decedent’s survivor claims but ruled that the agreement did not bind the family members' individual claims, as they were not parties to the agreement. The court also declined to compel arbitration of the survivor claims under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c), citing the risk of conflicting rulings if the family’s claims proceeded in court while survivor claims were arbitrated. The court further held that the agreement’s reference to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not expressly incorporate the FAA’s procedural provisions to preempt California law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably delegate threshold issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and that the FAA’s procedural provisions were not expressly adopted by the agreement. Therefore, California law applied, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny arbitration to avoid inconsistent rulings. The judgment was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs. View "Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove" on Justia Law

A woman with a Medtronic infusion pump for fentanyl died from an overdose while hospitalized for a hernia repair. Her doctors included her pain management physician, who managed her pump, and a surgeon at a hospital. After surgery, she continued receiving fentanyl from the pump and self-administered additional doses. Hospital staff noticed changes in her mental status, but the actuator allowing self-administration was not removed. The family alleged that the managing pain doctor treated her at the hospital without proper staff privileges and failed to turn off the pump when asked.Her children filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Yuba County, initially against other medical providers, and later amended their complaints several times to add the pain management physician as a defendant, more than four years after their mother’s death. They asserted claims for professional negligence, lack of informed consent, wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse.The Superior Court of Yuba County sustained the pain management physician’s demurrer to the fifth amended complaint without leave to amend. It found that the medical negligence claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the complaint did not sufficiently allege elder abuse. Judgment was entered for the physician, and the plaintiffs appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 applied to the negligence-based claims because the alleged acts constituted “professional negligence” and did not fall within exclusions for acts outside the scope of hospital-imposed restrictions. The court also found no factual basis for tolling the statute for intentional concealment and concluded that the claims did not relate back to the original complaint against fictitiously named defendants. Finally, the court agreed that the elder abuse allegations were deficient and found no abuse of discretion in denying further leave to amend. View "Nichols v. Alghannam" on Justia Law

A woman began using talcum powder products from a cosmetics company as a child in the 1950s, continued through the late 1970s, and resumed use from 1995 to 2010. She was later diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease associated with asbestos exposure. She and her husband sued multiple companies, alleging that asbestos in cosmetic and automotive products caused her illness. By the time of trial, only the cosmetics company and one other defendant remained; the other defendant is not a party to this appeal. After her passing, her husband continued the suit as her successor.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over a lengthy trial. A jury found the cosmetics company liable on multiple grounds: strict liability for inadequate warnings, manufacturing and design defects, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. The jury further found the company had acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, justifying punitive damages. The jury awarded over $40 million in compensatory damages and $10.3 million in punitive damages, apportioning 90 percent of fault to the company. The company appealed, challenging several evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the cosmetics company had waived its challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and most of its evidentiary objections. It found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the plaintiffs' expert testimony or excluding the company’s corporate witness due to lack of disclosure and personal knowledge. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, including all damages awards and findings of liability. View "LAOSD Asbestos Cases" on Justia Law

A dispute arose among four adult brothers regarding the division of their parents’ estate. After their mother’s death, two of the brothers, Brittin and Kent, reported to the San Diego Police Department that their mother was missing, despite knowing she had died of natural causes. Their intention was to cast suspicion on their siblings, Todd and Wade, with whom they had a contentious relationship. The police briefly investigated before learning of the mother’s death and closing the matter. The phone call from the police deeply distressed Wade, a recovering alcoholic who had been sober for 15 years. Within a week, Wade relapsed, drove his motorcycle while intoxicated, and died in a crash. A psychologist testified at trial that the distress caused by the police inquiry precipitated Wade’s relapse.The Superior Court of San Diego County presided over a jury trial in which Todd, both individually and as Wade’s successor in interest, pursued claims for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligence, and conspiracy. The jury found Brittin and Kent liable for negligence and IIED, and determined their conduct was a substantial factor in causing Wade severe emotional distress and his subsequent death. Damages were awarded to both Wade’s estate and Todd, including punitive damages. The defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial were denied.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the defendants conceded the jury’s factual findings but argued that their actions were not, as a matter of law, the legal cause of Wade’s death. The appellate court rejected this argument, holding that under the broader scope of liability for intentional torts, the defendants' intentional infliction of emotional distress was a legal cause of Wade’s death. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and the denial of JNOV, upholding all damages awards. View "Fisher v. Fisher" on Justia Law

After the death of Sandra Robinson from a fentanyl overdose, her adult children brought suit against Muhammad Alghannam, M.D., and others, alleging professional negligence, lack of informed consent, wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse. Sandra had an implanted fentanyl infusion pump managed by Alghannam and underwent surgery at Rideout Health. Post-surgery, she continued to receive fentanyl through the pump and self-administer doses, with clinical staff observing changes in her mental status. Plaintiffs claimed Alghannam treated Sandra without proper hospital staff privileges, failed to turn off the pain pump as requested, and did not obtain valid consent.The Superior Court of Yuba County sustained Alghannam’s demurrer to the fifth amended complaint without leave to amend, finding the medical negligence claims time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 and the elder abuse allegations insufficient. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the medical negligence statute of limitations did not apply, that tolling should occur due to intentional concealment, and that the claims related back to the original complaint under section 474.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. It held that section 340.5 applied because Alghannam’s alleged actions fit within the statutory definition of professional negligence. The plaintiffs failed to plead facts supporting intentional concealment or timely substitution under section 474. The court also determined the elder abuse claim was insufficient, as there was no well-pleaded allegation of a caretaking relationship or physical abuse with the requisite culpability. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show a reasonable possibility of amendment. View "Nichols v. Alghannam" on Justia Law

The case centers on the estate of Charles Frazier, who, after becoming very ill in late 2019, was cared for by Michael and Kelly Pagano. During this period, Frazier executed a new trust with the Paganos’ assistance, granting them a substantial portion of his assets. Shortly before his death in January 2020, Frazier expressed regret over this change to his nephews, Jeff and Theodore Haun, and executed another trust to revert his estate plan. After Frazier’s passing, the Paganos filed a civil complaint alleging Haun and Jeff had exerted undue influence over Frazier for personal benefit. Haun, as trustee of the January 2020 trust, then initiated a probate petition claiming financial elder abuse by the Paganos.The Superior Court of San Diego County consolidated the competing probate petitions for trial. After eight days of trial, the court found the Paganos had exerted undue influence over Frazier in the creation of the December 2019 trust and committed financial elder abuse. Haun and Jeff, however, were not found to have unduly influenced Frazier regarding the January 2020 trust. The court granted Haun’s petition, denied Kelly’s petition, awarded Haun compensatory and statutory damages, and entitled him to attorney’s fees. The court determined all attorney’s fees incurred by Haun were inextricably intertwined with his defense and prosecution of the elder abuse claims, making apportionment impractical.On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, addressed whether Haun could recover attorney’s fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a), a unilateral fee-shifting provision, given the intertwined nature of his prosecution and defense. The court held that the statute does not bar recovery of fees for defense work that overlaps with prosecution of a successful financial elder abuse claim by a prevailing plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed, and costs of appeal were awarded to Haun. View "Haun v. Pagano" on Justia Law

The plaintiff purchased a vehicle in 2017 and later alleged it was defective, suing the manufacturer in 2021. The parties eventually settled, with the plaintiff surrendering the vehicle and dismissing the suit, and the manufacturer agreeing to pay $100,000. The settlement specified the plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, and the manufacturer would pay the amount determined by the trial court upon noticed motion. After the settlement was reported to the Superior Court of San Diego County, the court ordered dismissal within 45 days. When no dismissal was filed, the clerk issued notice that the case would be deemed dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023, unless a party showed good cause otherwise. No such cause was shown, and the plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees.The motion for attorney fees was opposed by the manufacturer, arguing it was untimely under California Rules of Court, as it was not served within 180 days of the dismissal date. The plaintiff countered that the 180-day deadline did not apply, claiming the case had not been formally dismissed and no judgment had been entered. The Superior Court of San Diego County disagreed, finding the case had been dismissed on August 15, 2023, per the clerk’s notice and court rules, and denied the motion as untimely. The plaintiff appealed the denial, and a signed minute order dismissing the complaint was later entered, but the court maintained that the earlier date controlled.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter de novo. It held that a voluntary dismissal, even if not appealable, starts the clock for filing a motion for attorney fees when it concludes the litigation. The court found the case was dismissed on August 15, 2023, and the plaintiff failed to timely serve the fee motion. The order denying attorney fees was affirmed. View "Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

A passenger was seriously injured after the driver of a remotely rented vehicle, accessed via a membership-based car-sharing service, crashed while under the influence of alcohol. The driver, a university student and approved member of the rental service, reserved the vehicle through a mobile app late at night after consuming alcohol at a party. The process for renting and accessing the car involved no face-to-face interaction with company staff, and the company had no prior knowledge of the driver’s intoxication or any history of impaired driving. Following the crash, the driver was convicted of felony DUI causing injury.The injured passenger sued the car-sharing company and its affiliated vehicle owner in the Superior Court of Yolo County, alleging negligent entrustment for providing the car to an unfit driver, negligent maintenance for failing to include technology to detect driver impairment, and vicarious liability based on vehicle ownership. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled for the defendants, holding that the company owed no duty to inquire about a renter’s impairment at the time of a remote rental, had no duty to install alcohol-detection devices, and was shielded from vicarious liability by federal law (the Graves Amendment).On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that remote rental car companies are exempt from statutory requirements to inspect for signs of impairment at the time of rental, per Civil Code section 1939.37, and that courts should not impose additional investigatory duties absent legislative action. The court also held that the Graves Amendment preempts state law claims of vicarious liability based solely on vehicle ownership. Judgment for the defendants was therefore affirmed. View "Tavares v. Zipcar, Inc." on Justia Law

An 11-year-old student, Therese, died by suicide at her father's home during her school’s winter break. Her parents brought claims against the school district, alleging negligent hiring, supervision, and training of staff, failure to protect Therese from bullying, and inadequate response to her expressions of suicidal ideation. They argued the district failed to fulfill its duty to supervise students and to inform them of Therese’s condition. The parents also pursued a survival claim for Therese’s pre-death suffering, alleging harm occurred on campus due to the district’s negligence.The Superior Court of Solano County denied the school district’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact as to whether the district exercised reasonable care and whether Therese suffered injury on campus due to the district’s negligence. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District, determining that statutory immunity under Education Code section 44808 did not apply because there were factual questions about on-campus harm and failure to exercise reasonable care.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that under section 44808, the district is immune from liability for harms resulting from Therese’s off-campus suicide, as she was not under the district’s supervision at the time. However, the court determined that this immunity does not extend to the survival claim, which concerns alleged on-campus harm while Therese was under the district’s supervision. The appellate court ordered the trial court to grant summary adjudication in favor of the district on the wrongful death and related claims but allowed the survival claim to proceed. View "Vallejo City Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

On a rainy night in March 2020, the plaintiff was catastrophically injured while sleeping in a truck driven by his co-worker, both of whom were transporting plasticware from New Jersey to California. The truck, owned and operated by Alliance, a federally licensed motor carrier, crashed on a highway near Oklahoma City. The transportation had been arranged by XPO Logistics, LLC, a federally licensed property broker, which was hired by Sabert Corporation to facilitate shipping but did not own trucks or employ drivers. XPO contracted with Alliance to perform the transport, and Alliance assigned the plaintiff and his co-worker to drive the shipment.After the accident, the plaintiff sued XPO in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, alleging negligence based on claims that XPO exercised control over the transport and owed a nondelegable duty to maintain a safe workplace. XPO moved for summary judgment, arguing it was solely a broker and not responsible for the carrier’s employee safety. The trial court granted summary judgment for XPO, finding the evidence undisputed that XPO acted as a broker, not a carrier, and did not control Alliance’s transport operations. The trial court also excluded plaintiff’s expert declaration, which had applied the wrong legal standard.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the judgment. The court held that under California law, a broker who hires an independent contractor carrier generally owes no duty of care to the carrier’s employees for workplace injuries, unless the broker has a nondelegable duty or retains and exercises control over the work. The court found no triable issues of fact supporting either exception, and further clarified that the federal Essex Insurance Company v. Barrett Moving & Storage, Inc. test for broker liability for cargo damage is irrelevant to personal injury claims under California law. The judgment for XPO was affirmed. View "Hu v. XPO Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law