Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After moving out of their condominium due to mold, Brenda Lee Allen and her family stayed at the Ontario Airport Inn Hotel, owned by Anil Bhula Patel. After more than 30 days, Allen’s funds ran out, and she requested extra time to pay rent, which was refused by the hotel manager, Luis Mejia. On April 19, 2020, while Allen and her family were moving out, an altercation occurred involving Allen, Mejia, and Patel. Allen alleged that Patel forcibly entered her room, threw her belongings into the hallway, struck her, and pushed her against the wall, causing her to suffer posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other serious health issues.Allen filed suit against Patel and his company, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for battery, assault, and related claims. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County bifurcated the trial to separate liability and compensatory damages from punitive damages. The jury awarded Allen over $1 million in compensatory damages for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Before the punitive damages phase, two jurors were unavailable, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial on that issue. Patel subsequently moved for a new trial, arguing attorney misconduct and other trial irregularities.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court conducted an independent review and found substantial evidence of misconduct by Allen’s attorney, including knowingly misleading statements about medical causation, introduction of prejudicial and inflammatory evidence, improper closing arguments violating the golden rule and reptile theory, and attacks on defense counsel’s character. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting a new trial on liability and compensatory damages, finding no abuse of discretion and concluding that the issue of punitive damages was moot. View "Allen v. Patel" on Justia Law

In 2017, the plaintiff was involved in a low-speed collision when the defendant, driving a car, struck the plaintiff riding a motorcycle. The plaintiff did not fall or receive immediate medical attention and reported pain only in his hip, leg, and foot the following day. He later claimed the accident caused severe and lasting neck and groin injuries. The defense contested the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries, noting his continued participation in physical activities after the accident. As trial approached, the plaintiff, who had previously designated numerous expert witnesses, visited a new doctor—Dr. Gravori—just days before trial. Dr. Gravori recommended spine surgery, introducing a new theory of injury not previously disclosed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County allowed Dr. Gravori to testify as an expert, provided he was immediately made available for a deposition at the plaintiff’s expense. The defense objected, arguing the late disclosure of this expert was prejudicial and violated procedural rules. The deposition took place during jury selection, and the court maintained its ruling, permitting Gravori’s testimony. The jury ultimately awarded the plaintiff substantial damages, including future medical expenses and pain and suffering.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the late expert witness. The appellate court found that the plaintiff offered no reasonable justification for the delayed designation of Dr. Gravori and failed to follow statutory requirements for augmenting the expert witness list. The court held that this was an abuse of discretion and that the error was prejudicial, likely affecting the outcome. Accordingly, the judgment and costs order were vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. Costs were awarded to the appellants. View "Fancourt v. Zargaryan" on Justia Law

Ana Faiaipau, an elderly woman recovering from heart surgery, was transferred to a long-term acute care hospital operated by Kindred Healthcare. During her stay, Ana allegedly suffered neglect, including lack of dialysis, malnutrition, inadequate hygiene care, and failure to properly monitor her ventilator. The ventilator became disconnected, leading to a severe anoxic brain injury and Ana’s subsequent death. Ana’s daughters, Jennifer and Faamalieloto, acting both individually and as successors in interest, filed suit against Kindred for negligence, elder neglect, fraud, violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and wrongful death.The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed Kindred’s motion to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by Jennifer as Ana’s legal representative. The court granted arbitration for survivor claims brought on behalf of Ana, including negligence, elder neglect, fraud, and UCL claims, but denied arbitration for Jennifer and Faamalieloto’s individual claims for wrongful death, fraud, and violation of the UCL. The court also stayed litigation of the individual claims pending arbitration.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the appeal. Citing the California Supreme Court’s decision in Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., the appellate court held that the wrongful death claim—premised on failure to monitor and reconnect Ana’s ventilator—constituted professional negligence and must be arbitrated under the arbitration agreement. However, the court affirmed the denial of arbitration for Jennifer and Faamalieloto’s individual fraud and UCL claims, finding Kindred had not shown that the agreement bound them in their individual capacities. The order was modified to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim and affirmed as modified. View "Faiaipau v. THC-Orange County, LLC" on Justia Law

A former student alleged that the director of his school’s childcare program sexually abused him during the 2001-2002 school year, both on campus and at her residence. The childcare program was operated by West End YMCA on the school’s campus, and the director was employed by West End YMCA, not by the school district. The student, as plaintiff, brought suit against several parties, including the school district, asserting multiple causes of action related to negligence and abuse.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the district’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication on four causes of action asserted against it. The court granted summary adjudication in favor of the district on two causes—negligent hiring/retention and failure to perform mandatory duties—but denied it as to the first (negligent supervision of students) and fourth (negligent supervision/failure to warn, with respect to Johnson) causes of action. The school district sought writ relief from the partial denial, specifically contesting the denial as to the fourth cause of action.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court focused solely on the fourth cause of action, which alleged negligent supervision of the program director. Applying the standard from C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., the Court of Appeal held that liability for negligent supervision requires actual or constructive knowledge by the district’s supervisory employees of the individual’s dangerous propensities. The record contained no evidence that any district employee had actual or constructive knowledge of the director’s inappropriate conduct. Accordingly, the appellate court granted the writ of mandate and directed the superior court to enter summary adjudication in favor of the district on the third, fourth, and seventh causes of action, awarding costs to the district. View "Rancho Cucamonga Central School Dist. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

An employee of an independent home inspection company was injured while inspecting a private residence, slipping and falling on outdoor steps made of wooden railroad ties. The inspector was hired by his employer to conduct a safety inspection at the home for the homeowner's insurance company. The homeowner did not direct his work, provide tools, or control how he performed the inspection. The inspector admitted the steps were visible and that he was not watching where he stepped, and he received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. He and his wife sued the homeowner for negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium, alleging the steps were hazardous.The Superior Court of Ventura County granted summary judgment for the homeowner, relying on the Privette doctrine, which generally prevents employees of independent contractors from suing the person who hired the contractor for work-related injuries. The plaintiffs argued that the homeowner was not a “hirer” under Privette and that there was a factual dispute about whether the “concealed hazard” exception from Kinsman v. Unocal Corporation applied. They pointed to evidence that the steps were sometimes slippery and that the homeowner had mentioned this to her gardener years earlier.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the judgment. The court held that the Privette doctrine applied because the homeowner, by allowing the inspection and paying for insurance, was effectively a hirer. The court further found that the concealed hazard exception did not apply, as there was no evidence the condition was concealed or that the inspector could not have discovered it with reasonable care. The court affirmed summary judgment for the homeowner, and the derivative loss of consortium claim failed as well. View "Andrews v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Two young children, ages four and two, were severely injured after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in an apartment building in Lodi, California, where they lived with their mother. The accident occurred shortly after the property owner replaced the apartment’s windows during a renovation that did not include installing fall prevention devices on the upper-floor windows. The children’s guardian ad litem sued the property owner and its manager, alleging negligence based on both general negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the absence of fall prevention devices violated the California Building Standards Code and proximately caused the injuries.The case was heard in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda. Prior to trial, the defendants sought to defeat the negligence per se claim, arguing the building was exempt from current code requirements because it complied with the code at the time of its original construction in 1980. The trial court denied their motion, allowing both negligence theories to proceed to trial. After plaintiffs presented their case, the court granted a nonsuit for the entire complaint, ruling there was no duty owed under general negligence given lack of foreseeability, and that the window replacement qualified for a code exemption, negating negligence per se.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the matter de novo. The appellate court affirmed the nonsuit on the general negligence claim, finding the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty. However, it reversed the nonsuit as to negligence per se, holding that replacing the window did not qualify for the “original materials” exemption in the Building Code, and thus the defendants were required to comply with current safety standards. The case was remanded for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an experienced bus rider, was injured when she fell while standing on a public bus operated by a transit district. She had stood up and moved toward the rear door in anticipation of her stop, holding a bag in one hand and a phone in the other. Security camera footage showed she was not holding onto a railing at the time the bus made a routine turn, lost her balance, and fell. The driver was not alleged to have made any unusual maneuver, nor did other passengers appear affected. The plaintiff claimed the driver operated the bus negligently and failed to warn her to hold on or sit down.After the incident, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Kern County, asserting causes of action for motor vehicle negligence against both the driver and the transit district (the latter on a vicarious liability theory). The defendants moved for summary judgment, relying heavily on the bus’s video recording to argue that the bus’s movement was ordinary and that the plaintiff’s own actions were the proximate cause of her injury. The plaintiff argued that factual disputes remained, that the heightened duty of care for common carriers was not met, and that expert opinion and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur created triable issues for the jury. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding there was no evidence of negligence by the driver and that the plaintiff’s own conduct was the sole proximate cause of her injury.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that, while common carriers owe a heightened duty of care, that duty does not make them insurers of passenger safety for ordinary vehicle movements. The court further held that evidence, including the video, established the driver did not breach the applicable duty, and the plaintiff’s own negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injury. The court also ruled that neither comparative negligence nor res ipsa loquitur doctrines applied under these facts. Judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit Dist." on Justia Law

Mike Dennis developed mycosis fungoides, a subtype of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, after regularly applying Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, for approximately 20 years. Dennis claimed his cancer resulted from exposure to Roundup, which he alleged was sold and marketed without adequate warnings about its carcinogenic risks, despite Monsanto’s knowledge of the potential danger. He brought claims for design defect, failure to warn (under both negligence and strict liability), and negligence. At trial, the jury found that Monsanto was liable for failing to warn about the cancer risk, determining Monsanto knew or should have known of the risk, failed to provide adequate warnings, and acted with malice or oppression. The jury awarded Dennis $7 million in economic damages and $325 million in punitive damages.Following the verdict, Monsanto moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Monsanto’s requests to overturn the liability findings but reduced the punitive damages award from $325 million to $21 million, finding the original award disproportionate to the compensatory damages. Monsanto timely appealed, arguing that Dennis’s failure to warn claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and that the punitive damages were excessive and unconstitutional.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA does not preempt state law failure to warn claims that parallel federal misbranding requirements, in line with United States Supreme Court precedent and California decisions. The court also found that the punitive damages award, as reduced by the trial court, did not violate due process, as it was based on highly reprehensible conduct directly related to Dennis’s harm. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in full. View "Dennis v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a couple and their two minor children, brought suit against their neighbor after a long history of escalating neighborhood disputes. The neighbor’s husband exhibited a pattern of threatening and violent behavior, including verbal threats, physical assault, gun-related incidents, and other menacing acts. The central incident occurred when the husband violently attacked one plaintiff with a baseball bat, after which he barricaded himself and ultimately died by suicide with a firearm. Plaintiffs alleged that the neighbor was negligent in failing to control her husband, failing to warn others, and providing false assurances about the absence of firearms and the husband’s dangerousness.The Contra Costa County Superior Court, treating the defendant’s demurrer as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted it and dismissed the action as to the neighbor. The court found that the complaint failed to establish that she had a special relationship with her husband or the plaintiffs that would give rise to a duty to protect the plaintiffs from his conduct. It also ruled there was no viable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and denied leave to amend, finding no reasonable possibility of amendment. Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court correctly found no duty for the neighbor to protect plaintiffs from her husband under negligence principles, as the plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing her ability to control him or a special relationship that would give rise to such a duty. The court also determined that, although the existing complaint did not adequately allege negligent misrepresentation due to insufficient allegations of reasonable reliance, plaintiffs should have been granted leave to amend their complaint to attempt to state such a claim. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sproul v. Vallee" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, identified as Jane Roe and John Doe, brought a defamation lawsuit against Jenna Smith and her mother, alleging that Jenna had falsely accused John of sexual assault and Jane of being a non-consensual partner while all were students at a Los Angeles County high school. These accusations, made both to other students and school officials, led to an investigation by the school, which ultimately found John not responsible for the alleged misconduct. The plaintiffs claimed significant reputational and emotional harm from the spread of these accusations and sought damages, injunctive relief, and an order preventing future defamatory statements.After the complaint was filed under pseudonyms, the First Amendment Coalition moved to unseal the plaintiffs’ names. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, however, deemed the motion premature and directed the plaintiffs to file a formal motion to maintain anonymity. Both plaintiffs and defendants filed such motions without supporting evidence. The court granted both motions, allowing all parties to proceed pseudonymously. The Coalition then appealed the order granting anonymity to the plaintiffs, while no party appealed the order regarding defendants.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the matter and applied independent judgment on the constitutional issue. It held that, absent statutory authorization, litigating under pseudonyms should only occur in rare circumstances and requires an evidentiary showing of an overriding interest that outweighs the public’s right of access to court records. The court found that the plaintiffs’ generalized fears of reputational harm and potential future impact on employment were insufficient and unsupported by evidence. It reversed the Superior Court’s order granting plaintiffs anonymity, emphasizing that defamation plaintiffs are generally not entitled to proceed pseudonymously without robust factual support. View "Roe v. Smith" on Justia Law