Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Privette doctrine limits a property owner’s potential liability for on-the-job injuries sustained by employees of an independent contractor. An exception to the Privette doctrine’s rule of nonliability in cases where: “(1) [the property owner] knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” Plaintiff-appellant Travis Blaylock argued the trial court erred by failing to recognize there was a triable issue of fact about whether DMP 250 Newport Center, LLC, the owner of the premises on which he was injured, and DMP Management, LLC, the owner’s property manager (collectively DMP) knew or should have known of the allegedly concealed hazardous condition — an access panel in the floor of the crawl space in which he was working—that he fell through. The Court of Appeal found no error: while the evidence submitted by Blaylock might be sufficient to demonstrate DMP should have known the access panel existed, there was no evidence it knew or should have known the panel was either concealed from a person in the crawl space above, or that it was hazardous. View "Blaylock v. DMP 250 Newport Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as an electrical foreman for Braaten Electric, Inc. Braaten Electric, Inc. was hired as a subcontractor by Defendant Potential Design, Inc. and its owner to work on electrical installations for two successive silo construction projects at a nut facility in Firebaugh that was owned and operated by Defendant Wonderful Pistachios and Almonds, LLC. Potential Design, Inc. was the general contractor for both construction projects. The nut facility was plagued by flocks of migrating swallows that roosted, over several years, under the roof of an open, barn-like structure (the pole barn), and created sizable accumulations of bird feces. Sometime after Plaintiff’s work at the nut facility was finished, he was diagnosed with a fungal infection, histoplasmosis, which had spread to his brain, resulting in certain permanent impairments. Histoplasmosis is caused by inhalation of airborne spores of a fungus called histoplasma capsulatum or H. capsulatum. Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging their conduct with respect to the bird infestation and accumulation of bird feces at the nut facility was a substantial factor in causing his histoplasmosis. The trial court excluded the declarations of Plaintiff’s experts and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding the declarations submitted by Plaintiff’s experts and, further, that summary judgment is not warranted here. Moreover, the court concluded that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether there is a reasonable medical probability that Wonderful’s conduct with respect to the birds and bird feces at the Firebaugh Facility was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s illness. View "Beebe v. Wonderful Pistachios etc." on Justia Law

The Sativa Water District was created in 1938 under the County Water District Law to provide potable drinking water to the residents living in a neighborhood in the unincorporated community of Willowbrook and parts of the City of Compton within Los Angeles County. On July 9, 2018, four named individuals— (collectively, Plaintiffs)—filed a putative class action lawsuit against the Sativa Water District. The Sativa Water District moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit. Following a briefing, a hearing, and supplemental briefing, the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erred in (1) granting the Sativa Water District’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, (2) denying Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the order dismissing the County as a defendant, and (3) decertifying their class as to the nuisance claim.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Reorganization Act grants a LAFCO discretion whether to permit a district to wind up its own affairs or whether instead to appoint a successor agency responsible for doing so. Because the LAFCO, in this case, took the latter route, Plaintiffs’ class action lawsuit against the dissolved district must be dismissed. The court further concluded that the trial court’s dismissal of the successor agency was proper because Legislature expressly granted civil immunity to that agency. View "Barajas v. Satvia L.A. County Water Dist." on Justia Law

John MM. Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, C.M. (Doe’s mother), and B.S. (Doe’s father) (collectively real parties in interest), sued petitioner Victor Valley Union High School District (the district) for negligence and other causes of action arising from an alleged sexual assault on Doe while he was a high school student. During discovery, real parties in interest learned video that captured some of the events surrounding the alleged sexual assault had been erased. Real parties in interest moved the superior court for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary and issue sanctions against the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. The trial court concluded the erasure of the video was the result of negligence and not intentional wrongdoing, and it denied the request for terminating sanctions. However, the court granted the request for evidentiary, issue, and monetary sanctions because it concluded that, even before the lawsuit was filed, the district should have reasonably anticipated the alleged sexual assault would result in litigation and, therefore, the district was under a duty to preserve all relevant evidence including the video. On appeal, the district argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled the district was under the duty to preserve the video when it was erased and, therefore, that the district was not shielded from sanctions by the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f). The Court of Appeal concluded the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f) did not shield a party from sanctions for the spoliation of electronic evidence if the evidence was altered or destroyed when the party was under a duty to preserve the evidence. The Court found the record supported the trial court’s ruling that the district was on notice that litigation about Doe’s alleged sexual assault was reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, the safe-harbor provision did not apply. The Court granted the real parties’ petition in part and directed the trial court to reconsider whether the form of sanctions imposed were warranted. View "Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2010, Stephen Clevenger committed suicide in an Orange County jail. Lesley Feliz, guardian ad litem for Clevenger’s daughter, then engaged in years of unsuccessful litigation in federal court against the County of Orange and Orange County Sheriff Sandra Hutchens (the County), in which she asserted both federal claims and a supplemental state law claim for wrongful death. After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of her claims, rather than timely refile her state law claim in state court, Feliz endeavored to vacate the judgment under rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In December 2018, after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of her rule 60(b)(6) motion, Feliz filed this action in state court, asserting wrongful death and related claims against the County. The trial court dismissed Feliz’s claims after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, concluding they were time-barred, among other grounds. On appeal, Feliz invoked section 1367(d) of title 28 of the United States Code (section 1367(d)), which tolled the running of state statutes of limitations while supplemental state law claims remain pending in federal court, and argued its tolling period extended to the rule 60(b)(6) proceedings. Alternatively, she contended her claims were timely under the equitable tolling doctrine. The California Court of Appeal held section 1367(d)’s tolling provision covered only Feliz’s appeal of the district court’s judgment and did not extend to the rule 60(b)(6) proceeding. The Court also concluded Feliz did not establish entitlement to equitable tolling. View "Feliz v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

This lawsuit arises from a motor vehicle accident that Plaintiff alleges occurred when a tractor-trailer rear-ended the school bus she was driving. Plaintiff and a passenger on the school bus (collectively, Plaintiffs), sued the tractor-trailer driver, and his employer, Randy’s Trucking, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging personal injuries and emotional distress from the accident. Defendants filed a motion for an order compelling Plaintiff to undergo a mental examination by their neuropsychologist after. Defendants asked the trial court to prohibit the provision of raw test data, test materials, and other documents containing proprietary information to anyone other than a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. The trial court granted the motion to compel the examination, but it ordered Defendants’ neuropsychologist to transfer raw data and an audio recording of the examination to Plaintiffs’ attorney subject to a protective order (the transmission order).   The Fifth Appellate District found no abuse of discretion and denied the writ. The court explained that Defendants failed to establish that the trial court was required to (1) order the raw data and audio recording be transmitted only to a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist or (2) grant reconsideration and modify the transmission order to so provide. Consequently, “they have not demonstrated in this writ proceeding that the superior court was under a legal duty to order, or that its discretion could be legally exercised only by ordering,” transmission only to a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. Moreover, Defendants have not demonstrated there is no “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law” available to them. View "Randy's Trucking v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a resident at a residential skilled nursing facility when she sustained injuries in a fall. She sued the facility, Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC dba Capistrano Beach Care Center (CBCC), and its operator, Cambridge Healthcare Services, LLC (collectively, Defendants). Defendants petitioned to compel arbitration, claiming Plaintiff was bound by arbitration agreements purportedly signed on her behalf by her adult children. The trial court denied the petition, concluding defendants had failed to prove Plaintiff’s adult children had actual or ostensible authority to execute the arbitration agreements on Plaintiff’s behalf.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that CBCC did not meet its initial burden to make a prima facie showing that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate by submitting arbitration agreements signed by Plaintiff’s adult children. CBCC presented no evidence that the children had actual or ostensible authority to execute the arbitration agreement on Plaintiff’s behalf beyond their own representations in the agreements. The court wrote that a defendant cannot meet its burden to prove the signatory acted as the agent of a plaintiff by relying on representations of the purported agent alone. View "Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured by fellow fans at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (Coliseum) near the end of a Los Angeles Rams football game. Plaintiff, his wife, and two daughters brought an action against Contemporary Services Corporation (CSC), the Los Angeles Rams (Rams) and the University of Southern California (USC), alleging causes of action for negligence, premises liability and related torts. All three Defendants obtained summary judgment in their favor. This appeal involves two of the defendants: CSC and the Rams. CSC is an entity hired to provide crowd management services at the Coliseum during certain events, including Rams football games. In granting CSC’s and the Rams’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court assumed that both Defendants had a duty to protect Plaintiff and his family and had failed to take the ameliorative steps proposed by Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment on the ground that these failures were not the cause of the assault. Plaintiffs appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs do not provide any record citation showing how response time was measured. Plaintiffs seem to assume that response time is measured from when a CSC employee first decides to seek assistance from APEX or LAPD to the time APEX or LAPD personnel arrives. However, the court explained that It is equally, if not more, likely that response time is measured from when APEX or LAPD receive the request for assistance from CSC command. Plaintiffs have not created a triable issue of fact concerning whether improving CSC communications would have prevented the assault View "Romero v. Los Angeles Rams" on Justia Law

Having accidentally locked himself out of his apartment and unable to obtain assistance from the managers of the building, Plaintiff went to the roof of the building and attempted to drop down onto the balcony of his top-floor apartment to enter his unit. He was unsuccessful, instead falling to the ground and suffering injuries. Plaintiff filed this action for negligence and premises liability against 726 Hudson Avenue, LLC, Kohen Investments LLC, the entities and individuals who owned and managed the apartment building (the 726 Hudson defendants). The 726 Hudson defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff could not establish that they owed him a duty of care or that their alleged breaches of that duty caused his injuries. The trial court agreed with them on both issues and granted the motion.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that California law imposes a duty on everyone, including landlords, to exercise reasonable care, and the 726 Hudson defendants have not shown public policy considerations justify departing from that general duty; and causation, as it is in most cases, is a factual issue. The court wrote that Plaintiff created a triable issue by stating in his declaration that, had the 726 Hudson defendants not breached their duty of care to him—by, for example, not having an on-site property manager or an alarm on the roof-access door—he would not have gone onto the roof on the night of his injury. View "Razoumovitch v. 726 Hudson Ave." on Justia Law

In 2020, challenger Joe E. Collins III and incumbent Maxine Waters competed for a seat in Congress. During the campaign, Waters accused Collins of a dishonorable discharge from the Navy. Collins shot back that he had not been dishonorably discharged. He showed Waters a document saying so. Collins sued Waters for defamation during the campaign, but Waters convinced the trial court to grant her special motion to strike his suit.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order. The court explained that the document apparently was official. There was nothing suspicious about its appearance. The document, if genuine, would have established without doubt that Defendant’s charge was false. Waters easily could have checked its authenticity but did not. Her appellate briefing asserts that today, years later, she still does not know the truth about whether Collins’s discharge was dishonorable. The court wrote that this disinterest in a conclusive and easily-available fact could suggest willful blindness. The court explained that the preliminary posture of the case required the court to accept Plaintiff's evidence as true. His evidence created a possible inference of Defendant’s willful blindness, which is probative of actual malice. Thus, the court concluded that it was error to grant Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. View "Collins v. Waters" on Justia Law