Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in two consolidated lawsuits against San Diego Guns, LLC (San Diego Guns) seeking a peremptory writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its ruling that granted summary judgment to San Diego Guns on plaintiffs’ causes of action seeking to recover against San Diego Guns based on the doctrine of negligence per se. Plaintiffs’ theory of negligence per se was that San Diego Guns violated California law in selling the 19-year-old involved with the shooting at the Chabad of Poway synagogue, a rifle. According to plaintiffs, the shooter did not qualify for the then-existing exception that allowed a person under the age of 21 to be sold a rifle if that person possessed a “valid, unexpired hunting license.” The trial court granted summary judgment based on its conclusion that the shooter’s hunting license was valid and unexpired in April 2019 even though, on its face, the license stated that it was “Valid 07/01/2019 to 06/30/2020,” i.e., for a period beginning more than two months after San Diego Guns sold him the rifle. The trial court distinguished between the time period “when the license is ‘valid’ or effective for purposes of hunting,” which began on July 1, 2019, and the time period when “the license is valid for purposes of sale of the weapon,” which, according to the trial court, began when the license was issued in April 2019. The Court of Appeal found that the California Legislature's subsequent enactment of Penal Code section 16685, which clarified that “a valid and unexpired ‘hunting license’ means a hunting license . . . for which the time period authorized for the taking of birds or mammals has commenced but not expired,” the trial court erred in concluding that the shooter’s hunting license was valid for the purpose of purchasing a firearm. The Court accordingly granted plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandate. View "Goldstein v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

After sustaining a knee injury during a mandatory eighth-grade physical education class’s touch football unit, Plaintiff sued, among others, defendants Burbank Unified School District (the District) and his physical education teacher. A jury returned verdicts in Plaintiff’s favor against Defendants, finding that the District breached a mandatory duty under the Education Code, the teacher was negligent, and Plaintiff suffered resulting harm. Defendants appealed from the judgment, contending: there was insufficient evidence that the District’s breach of a mandatory duty proximately caused Plaintiff’s injury; the special verdict form was fatally defective because it failed to specify whether the District’s breach of a mandatory duty or the teacher’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries; the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the primary assumption of risk doctrine; and the court erred by not allowing the jury to apportion fault to the student who ran into Plaintiff (the Student), thus precluding Defendants from reducing liability for noneconomic damages.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the District and to hold a new trial limited to the issue of apportionment of fault between the teacher and student. The court explained that the Student’s act of intentionally running into Plaintiff was a substantial causative factor in Plaintiff’s injury and the teacher, therefore, should have been entitled to seek allocation of fault pursuant to Civil Code section 1431.2.11 Because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on comparative fault principles, the court remanded for retrial on the apportionment of fault. View "Nigel B. v. Burbank Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the City and several members of the Inglewood City Council (the council), alleging that after she reported concerns about financial improprieties, the City and the individual defendants defamed and retaliated against her. She alleged causes of action for (1) defamation; (2) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivisions (b) and (c), which prohibit retaliation against an employee based on the employee reporting or refusing to participate in what the employee reasonably believes to be illegal activity by the employer (the section 1102.5 retaliation claim); and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), based both on the alleged retaliation and the alleged defamation. The City and the individual defendants filed a joint special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or SLAPP, under the antiSLAPP statute. The court granted the motion in part but denied it as to the section 1102.5 retaliation claim and the retaliation-based IIED claim against all Defendants. Defendants appealed, arguing the court incorrectly denied the anti-SLAPP motion as to the retaliation-based claims against the individual defendants.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order on the Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to the extent it denies the motion as to Plaintiff’s Section 1102.5 retaliation claim against the individual Defendants and Plaintiff’s retaliation-based IIED claim against the individual Defendants. In all other respects, the order regarding the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. The court explained that it agrees with Defendants that the section 1102.5 retaliation claim is not legally sufficient because Plaintiff is not an “employee” for the purposes of that statute. View "Brown v. City of Inglewood" on Justia Law

Divine Food and Catering, LLC (Divine) appeals from the dismissal of its malicious prosecution complaint against defendants and respondents the Western Diocese of the Armenian Church of North America (the Diocese), St. John Armenian Church (St. John), Archpriest Manoug Markarian (Archpriest Manoug), and Harout Markarian (collectively, defendants). The trial court dismissed the complaint after granting Defendants’ special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. Divine was a commercial tenant of St. John’s banquet hall. St. John and the Diocese (the church entities) filed an unlawful detainer action seeking to evict Divine based on a purported oral month-to-month lease. Following trial, the unlawful detainer court found the written lease was valid and granted judgment for Divine. Divine then filed its malicious prosecution complaint, alleging Defendants brought the unlawful detainer action in order to extort money from Petros Taglyan, the father of Divine’s owner. Divine alleged Defendants had no probable cause to bring the unlawful detainer action.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that the triggers for the interim adverse judgment rule are limited to actual judgments and rulings on dispositive motions. The trial court, therefore, erred by applying the rule based on the unlawful detainer court’s sua sponte comments during trial. Alternatively, Divine has made an adequate showing for anti-SLAPP purposes that the unlawful detainer court’s comments were the product of fraud or perjury, which precludes application of the interim adverse judgment rule. Defendants have shown no other valid basis to support their anti-SLAPP motion. View "Divine Food and Catering v. Western Diocese of the Armenian etc." on Justia Law

The Privette doctrine limits a property owner’s potential liability for on-the-job injuries sustained by employees of an independent contractor. An exception to the Privette doctrine’s rule of nonliability in cases where: “(1) [the property owner] knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” Plaintiff-appellant Travis Blaylock argued the trial court erred by failing to recognize there was a triable issue of fact about whether DMP 250 Newport Center, LLC, the owner of the premises on which he was injured, and DMP Management, LLC, the owner’s property manager (collectively DMP) knew or should have known of the allegedly concealed hazardous condition — an access panel in the floor of the crawl space in which he was working—that he fell through. The Court of Appeal found no error: while the evidence submitted by Blaylock might be sufficient to demonstrate DMP should have known the access panel existed, there was no evidence it knew or should have known the panel was either concealed from a person in the crawl space above, or that it was hazardous. View "Blaylock v. DMP 250 Newport Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as an electrical foreman for Braaten Electric, Inc. Braaten Electric, Inc. was hired as a subcontractor by Defendant Potential Design, Inc. and its owner to work on electrical installations for two successive silo construction projects at a nut facility in Firebaugh that was owned and operated by Defendant Wonderful Pistachios and Almonds, LLC. Potential Design, Inc. was the general contractor for both construction projects. The nut facility was plagued by flocks of migrating swallows that roosted, over several years, under the roof of an open, barn-like structure (the pole barn), and created sizable accumulations of bird feces. Sometime after Plaintiff’s work at the nut facility was finished, he was diagnosed with a fungal infection, histoplasmosis, which had spread to his brain, resulting in certain permanent impairments. Histoplasmosis is caused by inhalation of airborne spores of a fungus called histoplasma capsulatum or H. capsulatum. Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging their conduct with respect to the bird infestation and accumulation of bird feces at the nut facility was a substantial factor in causing his histoplasmosis. The trial court excluded the declarations of Plaintiff’s experts and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding the declarations submitted by Plaintiff’s experts and, further, that summary judgment is not warranted here. Moreover, the court concluded that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether there is a reasonable medical probability that Wonderful’s conduct with respect to the birds and bird feces at the Firebaugh Facility was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s illness. View "Beebe v. Wonderful Pistachios etc." on Justia Law

The Sativa Water District was created in 1938 under the County Water District Law to provide potable drinking water to the residents living in a neighborhood in the unincorporated community of Willowbrook and parts of the City of Compton within Los Angeles County. On July 9, 2018, four named individuals— (collectively, Plaintiffs)—filed a putative class action lawsuit against the Sativa Water District. The Sativa Water District moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit. Following a briefing, a hearing, and supplemental briefing, the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erred in (1) granting the Sativa Water District’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, (2) denying Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the order dismissing the County as a defendant, and (3) decertifying their class as to the nuisance claim.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Reorganization Act grants a LAFCO discretion whether to permit a district to wind up its own affairs or whether instead to appoint a successor agency responsible for doing so. Because the LAFCO, in this case, took the latter route, Plaintiffs’ class action lawsuit against the dissolved district must be dismissed. The court further concluded that the trial court’s dismissal of the successor agency was proper because Legislature expressly granted civil immunity to that agency. View "Barajas v. Satvia L.A. County Water Dist." on Justia Law

John MM. Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, C.M. (Doe’s mother), and B.S. (Doe’s father) (collectively real parties in interest), sued petitioner Victor Valley Union High School District (the district) for negligence and other causes of action arising from an alleged sexual assault on Doe while he was a high school student. During discovery, real parties in interest learned video that captured some of the events surrounding the alleged sexual assault had been erased. Real parties in interest moved the superior court for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary and issue sanctions against the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. The trial court concluded the erasure of the video was the result of negligence and not intentional wrongdoing, and it denied the request for terminating sanctions. However, the court granted the request for evidentiary, issue, and monetary sanctions because it concluded that, even before the lawsuit was filed, the district should have reasonably anticipated the alleged sexual assault would result in litigation and, therefore, the district was under a duty to preserve all relevant evidence including the video. On appeal, the district argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled the district was under the duty to preserve the video when it was erased and, therefore, that the district was not shielded from sanctions by the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f). The Court of Appeal concluded the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f) did not shield a party from sanctions for the spoliation of electronic evidence if the evidence was altered or destroyed when the party was under a duty to preserve the evidence. The Court found the record supported the trial court’s ruling that the district was on notice that litigation about Doe’s alleged sexual assault was reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, the safe-harbor provision did not apply. The Court granted the real parties’ petition in part and directed the trial court to reconsider whether the form of sanctions imposed were warranted. View "Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2010, Stephen Clevenger committed suicide in an Orange County jail. Lesley Feliz, guardian ad litem for Clevenger’s daughter, then engaged in years of unsuccessful litigation in federal court against the County of Orange and Orange County Sheriff Sandra Hutchens (the County), in which she asserted both federal claims and a supplemental state law claim for wrongful death. After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of her claims, rather than timely refile her state law claim in state court, Feliz endeavored to vacate the judgment under rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In December 2018, after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of her rule 60(b)(6) motion, Feliz filed this action in state court, asserting wrongful death and related claims against the County. The trial court dismissed Feliz’s claims after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, concluding they were time-barred, among other grounds. On appeal, Feliz invoked section 1367(d) of title 28 of the United States Code (section 1367(d)), which tolled the running of state statutes of limitations while supplemental state law claims remain pending in federal court, and argued its tolling period extended to the rule 60(b)(6) proceedings. Alternatively, she contended her claims were timely under the equitable tolling doctrine. The California Court of Appeal held section 1367(d)’s tolling provision covered only Feliz’s appeal of the district court’s judgment and did not extend to the rule 60(b)(6) proceeding. The Court also concluded Feliz did not establish entitlement to equitable tolling. View "Feliz v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

This lawsuit arises from a motor vehicle accident that Plaintiff alleges occurred when a tractor-trailer rear-ended the school bus she was driving. Plaintiff and a passenger on the school bus (collectively, Plaintiffs), sued the tractor-trailer driver, and his employer, Randy’s Trucking, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging personal injuries and emotional distress from the accident. Defendants filed a motion for an order compelling Plaintiff to undergo a mental examination by their neuropsychologist after. Defendants asked the trial court to prohibit the provision of raw test data, test materials, and other documents containing proprietary information to anyone other than a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. The trial court granted the motion to compel the examination, but it ordered Defendants’ neuropsychologist to transfer raw data and an audio recording of the examination to Plaintiffs’ attorney subject to a protective order (the transmission order).   The Fifth Appellate District found no abuse of discretion and denied the writ. The court explained that Defendants failed to establish that the trial court was required to (1) order the raw data and audio recording be transmitted only to a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist or (2) grant reconsideration and modify the transmission order to so provide. Consequently, “they have not demonstrated in this writ proceeding that the superior court was under a legal duty to order, or that its discretion could be legally exercised only by ordering,” transmission only to a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. Moreover, Defendants have not demonstrated there is no “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law” available to them. View "Randy's Trucking v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law