Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Brian Carr appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Newport Beach (the City) an action arising from injuries plaintiff sustained after diving headfirst into shallow harbor waters. The court concluded the City was immune from liability pursuant to Government Code section 831.7, which concerned hazardous recreational activities. It also found no triable issue of fact as to plaintiff’s claim alleging a dangerous condition of public property. Plaintiff contended the decision was error because there are triable issues of fact regarding the City’s claimed immunities and his dangerous condition claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding record evidenced otherwise. "As a matter of law, the hazardous recreational activity immunity insulates the City from the alleged liability, so thus affirm the judgment." View "Carr v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

After an elementary school teacher grabbed and twisted A.S.’s arm, his mother (and guardian ad litem) filed a complaint form with the Palmdale School District (District) on his behalf. They then filed a lawsuit for damages against the District, its superintendent, the assistant superintendent, the elementary school principal, and the teacher. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer to Appellant’s third amended complaint on the ground Appellant failed to file a claim with the District in compliance with Government Code section 910.2 Appellant appealed from the subsequent judgment of dismissal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Appellant specified several administrative actions that he wanted the District to take but did not state he was seeking monetary damages and made no attempt at all to estimate, even roughly, an amount of damages or state whether or not the claim would be a limited civil case. Accordingly, the court held that the complaint form does not substantially comply with section 910. Further, the court explained that even if it assumes that all of the elements of equitable estoppel were initially present, the law recognizes that circumstances may change and render estoppel no longer appropriate. Here, Appellant’s counsel is charged with the knowledge that Appellant needed to file a claim for damages with the District and with the knowledge of what was required for such a claim. Given that counsel possessed the relevant facts about the incident, had the original complaint form, and was actually aware of the statutory requirements for suing a governmental entity, this was ample time. View "A.S. v. Palmdale Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff died after his pick-up truck collided with a tractor-trailer driven by Jose R. Inzunza (Inzunza) for CR GTS, Inc. (CRGTS), an interstate motor carrier. Plaintiff’s surviving spouse and their four adult children and two adult stepchildren (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought this wrongful death action against Defendants Inzunza and CRGTS (collectively, Defendants). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs. CRGTS appealed the judgment.   The Second Appellate District agreed with CRGTS’s first contention and conclude the trial court prejudicially erred by precluding CRGTS from presenting evidence contesting liability and of comparative fault. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment against CRGTS and remanded the action for a new trial against CRGTS. The court set aside the judgment against Inzunza pending the outcome of the new trial. The court concluded that an agent’s deemed admissions do not bind the principal codefendant, even when the basis for the action against the principal codefendant is vicarious liability arising from the acts of the agent. The court wrote that to hold otherwise would directly contradict the plain language of section 2033.410. The trial court, therefore, erred by precluding CRGTS from introducing evidence of non-liability and comparative fault. The court found that this error clearly was prejudicial. View "Inzunza v. Naranjo" on Justia Law

Appellant Tanner Altizer suffered serious injuries when he ran into a suspended cable fence while riding his off-road motorcycle on an unpaved area in an unoccupied area of the desert. The owner of the property, respondent Coachella Valley Conservation Commission (the Commission), placed the cable fence around its property to stop illegal dumping and off-road vehicles in order to protect the sensitive habitat. Altizer sued the Commission, alleging that the cable fence created a dangerous condition on public property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commission, and Altizer appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Commission was entitled to hazardous recreational activity immunity under Government Code section 831.71 and affirmed. View "Altizer v. Coachella Valley Conservation Com." on Justia Law

The principal issue in these cases is whether two corporations, wholly owned by the late entertainer Michael Jackson, had a legal duty to protect plaintiffs from sexual abuse Jackson is alleged to have inflicted on them for many years while they were children. The corporations say they had no duty to protect plaintiffs from Jackson because of their corporate structure, that is, “because they had no ability to control Jackson—their sole owner—or his interactions with [plaintiffs]. Parties cannot be liable for neglecting to exercise powers they simply do not have.” The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend in Safechuck’s case and granted summary judgment to Defendants in Robson’s case. Both Plaintiffs appealed, and Robson also appealed a discovery sanctions order against his counsel   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that following the guidance in Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 (Brown), it concludes that a corporation that facilitates the sexual abuse of children by one of its employees is not excused from an affirmative duty to protect those children merely because it is solely owned by the perpetrator of the abuse. The court explained that while there is no comparable case law to recite it would be perverse to find no duty based on the corporate defendant having only one shareholder. Thus the court reversed the judgments entered for the corporations. One of the plaintiffs also appealed a sanctions order and discovery rulings granting protective orders to nonparty witnesses. The court found no abuse of discretion in those rulings. View "Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

While at his job as a correctional officer at the Lancaster State Prison in August 2002, respondent Michael Ayala was severely injured in a preplanned attack by inmates. He filed a workers’ compensation claim and alleged that the injury was caused by the serious and willful misconduct of his employer, petitioner California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Such an allegation was significant because Labor Code section 4553 provided that “[t]he amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half . . . where the employee is injured by reason of serious and willful misconduct” by the employer. Ayala and CDCR agreed that the injury caused Ayala 85 percent permanent disability, but they could not agree whether CDCR engaged in serious and willful misconduct. Over a dissent, a Board majority found that CDCR “failed to act on a credible threat of inmate violence that was specifically reported to be planned for the day of the attack and took the facility off lockdown despite this threat even though it possessed additional information . . . that this had long been planned.” Ayala contended that, for the period before his permanent disability, his base compensation was his full salary. He was paid his full salary because he was on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave, which were alternatives to temporary disability. CDCR contended the base compensation was only what Ayala would have been entitled to on temporary disability. Assuming that Ayala would have been entitled to temporary total disability, the base compensation would have been two-thirds of his salary, subject to statutory limits. The workers’ compensation judge agreed with CDCR and found that the base compensation was what Ayala would have been paid in temporary disability. But on reconsideration, the Board again rescinded and reversed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision, this time finding that the base compensation was what Ayala was paid on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave. The Court of Appeal held that industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave were not “compensation” as that term was used in section 4553 and annuled the Board’s contrary decision. View "Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioners Infinity Select Insurance Company and Infinity Property and Casualty Corporation (collectively, Infinity) are named Defendants in a pending action (the instant lawsuit). The instant lawsuit stems from an earlier 2013 case (the prior action) in which plaintiffs sued Infinity’s insured for negligence and wrongful death in connection with a three-vehicle collision (the collision). In August 2022, the court issued its ruling. The primary effect of the ruling was to reform the Infinity policy to provide greater bodily injury policy limits of $750,000. Per its terms, the ruling “establishes the policy limits for the jury’s consideration in the upcoming jury trial on the remaining causes of action” including plaintiffs’ cause of action against Infinity for bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing due to Infinity’s rejection of plaintiffs’ Code of Civil Procedure section 998 demand of $750,000. Infinity filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the subject ruling.   The Fifth Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred in reforming the Infinity policy. The court held that the motor carrier of property—not the insurer—bears ultimate responsibility for meeting the requirements necessary to obtain a motor carrier permit. Moreover, even where an insurer intends to issue and certify a policy under section 34631.5, it is not obligated to issue the policy in the full amount of $750,000. Additionally, the court wrote evidence of insurance is not the only means of complying with the MCPPA financial responsibility requirements and infinity was under no duty to determine whether the insured had otherwise complied with MCPPA requirements. View "Infinity Select Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner sued directors and staff of a structured sober living facility, including a real party in interest Peter Schuster, for dependent adult abuse. The trial court found Petitioner failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 because his statement of compliance in response to Schuster’s document requests failed to identify which documents would relate to which specific requests. The court imposed sanctions against Petitioner and his attorney in the amount of $910 for misusing the discovery process. Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of mandate directing the court to reverse the sanctions order. He argued that a statement of compliance in response to a production demand need not identify which document pertains to which request; such identification need only occur when the documents are produced.   The Second Appellate District granted Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that based on the plain language of section 2031.210, a statement of compliance need not identify the specific request to which each document will pertain. Because Petitioner substantially complied with his discovery responsibilities in this regard, the court’s imposition of sanctions was an abuse of discretion. View "Pollock v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After obtaining a judgment against Defendants in a prior case, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants, their attorney, and others for fraudulent transfer, quiet title, and declaratory relief. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the entire complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. At issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling Defendants failed to meet their initial burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity and the claims for relief supported by them. Further, the issue is whether the trial court’s earlier order granting the Defendants’ attorney’s anti-SLAPP motion compels the same outcome here.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order denying Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The court explained that where a defendant moves to strike the entire complaint and fails to identify, with reasoned argument, specific claims for relief that are asserted to arise from protected activity, the defendant does not carry his or her first-step burden so long as the complaint presents at least one claim that does not arise from protected activity. Here, Defendants not only failed to identify specific claims for relief arising from protected activity, they expressly asked the court to perform the type of gravamen analysis disapproved in Bonni. At no point did the Defendants “identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” And there are obviously claims in the complaint that do not arise from anti-SLAPP protected activity. View "Park v. Nazari" on Justia Law

In 2016 Martin Mariano, an employee of plaintiff L & S Framing Inc., was working on a residential house under construction when he fell from the second floor onto the concrete ground floor below, sustaining serious injuries. Following an investigation, real party in interest California Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division) issued a citation, which eventually included a serious accident- related citation for violation of California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 1626(b)(5). Plaintiff appealed the citation. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the Division’s mid-hearing request to amend the citation to allege a violation of section 1632(b)(1), denied the Division’s post-hearing motion to amend to allege violation of section 1626(a)(2), and concluded the Division failed to prove the alleged violation of section 1626(b)(5). The Division filed a petition for reconsideration with the defendant California Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Appeals Board). The Appeals Board concluded the ALJ improperly denied the two requests to amend and upheld the citation based on violation of both section 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2). Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court: (1) erred in permitting the Appeals Board to amend the citation; (2) incorrectly concluded sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) applied; and (3) incorrectly concluded section 1716.2 did not apply and did not supersede the other regulations on the facts of this case. The Court of Appeal surmised that second and third of these contentions depended on the question whether the specific location from which Mariano fell qualified as a floor opening (§ 1632(b)(1)) and/or a stairwell (§ 1626(a)(2)), or instead an “unprotected side[] or edge[]” (§ 1716.2(f)). After review, the Court affirmed, finding the Appeals Board properly allowed the Division to amend the citation, the Appeals Board reasonably deemed the location at issue to fall within the scope of sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) and that determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the Appeals Board properly determined section 1716.2 did not apply. View "L & S Framing Inc. v. Cal. Occupational Saf. & Health Appeals Bd." on Justia Law