Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of the superior court in their lawsuit against Southern California Edison Company (SCE) following summary judgment in SCE’s favor. Plaintiffs previously lived on a property on Knob Hill Avenue in Redondo Beach (Plaintiffs’ former home), which is located a few doors away from one of SCE’s electricity substations, the Topaz substation. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleged that electricity from the substation caused them to experience shocks at various places on their property, and sought recovery primarily for the emotional distress they suffered as a result.   On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the court (1) excluded evidence that would have created a triable issue of fact as to causation; (2) applied the wrong legal standard for causation; and (3) erred in concluding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor did not establish causation.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of the superior court. The court held that that, under the applicable substantial factor causation standard, the evidence presented on summary judgment established Plaintiffs could not prove causation in fact. The court further concluded that the court correctly rejected res ipsa loquitor as a means of establishing causation in this case. The court wrote it need not decide whether the court erred in excluding the evidence Plaintiffs identify because even considering that evidence, the record does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether stray voltage from the Topaz substation caused Plaintiffs’ claimed shocks. Specifically, SCE offered evidence that stray voltage shocks require certain conditions and that those conditions did not exist at the Plaintiffs’ former home. View "Barber v. Southern Cal. Edison Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s guardian ad litem filed suit against Defendants for damages resulting from personal injuries suffered by Plaintiff in connection with a bicycle accident that occurred at Defendants’ residence when Plaintiff was six years old. The jury determined, by special verdict, that Defendant was not negligent. Judgment was entered in favor of Defendant.   Plaintiff challenged the trial court’s rulings on three motions in limine. The first motion in limine sought permission for Plaintiff’s counsel to give a brief opening statement prior to voir dire questioning. The remaining two motions sought to exclude testimony from two witnesses. Plaintiff also challenged the court’s denial of his motion for a new trial.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.  Ultimately, the court held that Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was grounded upon the same arguments he made on appeal. The court reasoned that a trial judge is accorded wide discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial and the exercise of this discretion is given great deference on appeal. Here, Defendant acknowledges he did not file an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Plaintiff contends that, as a result, Defendant has now waived all opposition to the legal errors and abuse of judicial discretion Plaintiff raised in his Motion for New Trial, as well as on appeal. However, neither authority Plaintiff cites stands for the proposition that the failure to oppose a motion for a new trial operates to waive any argument on appeal that the judgment should be affirmed. View "D.D. v. Pitcher" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven adults who claimed they were molested by a priest when they were children, brought suit against The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles and related parties ("Defendants"). The Plaintiffs' claims were that the Defendants ratified the assaults and acted negligently in failing to supervise the priest who committed the assaults.In response, Defendants moved to strike the complaint, claiming that some of the acts that allegedly ratified the priest's conduct, as well as those serving as the basis for the allegations of negligence, constituted speech and litigation conduct that was protected under California's anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16). The district court rejected Defendants' anti-SLAPP motion.The Second Appellate District affirmed. As to the ratification claims, the court held that Defendants mischaracterized Plaintifffs' complaint, "cherry-picking allegations of litigation conduct, and, without support, suggesting that they are the only allegations incorporated by reference into the sexual abuse cause of action."As to the negligence claims, Defendants too narrowly construed Plaintiffs' complaint, focusing only on what Defendants claim was protected speech. Any allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint that may have been "conclusory" when taken out of context, were supported by factual allegations earlier in the complaint. View "Ratcliff v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of L.A." on Justia Law

Appellants alleged that Respondents, Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company (Berkshire), Cypress Insurance Company (Cypress), Zenith Insurance Company (Zenith), and others conspired to “hack” a third-party computer system. At the direction of the insurance-company Respondents, allegedly copied thousands of electronic litigation files, which had been uploaded to the system by workers’ compensation and personal injury attorneys and their clients (including Appellants), and transmitted the copies to insurers and insurance defense law firms. Appellants first sued respondents in federal district court on various causes of action, including invasion of privacy.   The Second Appellate District, affirmed and agreed with the trial court that Appellants failed to state a claim. The court concluded that Appellants failed to allege any actionable injury because: (1) they did not allege damage or disruption to the computer system, as required by Intel; and (2) they did not allege injury to the copied files or their asserted property interests therein. The trial court properly sustained Respondents’ demurrers to Appellants’ trespass-to-chattels claim, because Appellants failed to allege any actionable injury to a property interest, whether in the HQSU system or in the files copied from it. In response to Appellants’ unfounded warnings that affirmance will leave future victims of hacking without any effective remedy. Having abandoned a privacy claim during their federal litigation, Appellants effectively attempted, both in the trial court and on appeal, to repackage an alleged invasion of privacy as a trespass to chattels. Because Appellants failed to plead facts satisfying the latter tort’s element of injury to a property interest, the trial court properly sustained respondents’ demurrers. View "Casillas v. Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered as to Defendants State of California, acting by and through the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and CHP Sergeant (together, the CHP defendants), after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the CHP defendants’ demurrers to the Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. Plaintiffs asserted on behalf of their deceased son claims for negligence and wrongful death after CHP Sergeant’s patrol car struck and killed Plaintiffs’ son while Langford was responding to an emergency call concerning an altercation on the freeway. The trial court found the claims against the CHP defendants were barred by investigative immunity conferred under California Government Code section 821.6 (section 821.6).The Second Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s sustaining the Sergeant’s demurrer based on Plaintiffs’ concession at oral argument that the Sergeant is entitled to immunity as an emergency responder under California Vehicle Code section 17004. However, because California Vehicle Code section 17001 provides an independent statutory basis for CHP’s liability based on the Sergeant’s alleged negligence, the court did not reach the scope and application of section 821.6 immunity, and the court reversed the judgment as to CHP and remand for further proceedings. View "Silva v. Langford" on Justia Law

A trial jury disbelieved Plaintiff’s claim that a 2017 rear-end accident caused him $1.5 million in damages. The jury awarded Plaintiff nothing finding the 2017 accident with Defendant caused Plaintiff no injury. Plaintiff appealed and the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment.   The court explained that Plaintiff incorrectly faulted the trial court for refusing to direct a verdict on the issue of causation. Plaintiff told the trial court that causation was undisputed: that everyone agreed the 2017 accident caused Plaintiff at least some injury, so Plaintiff deserved a directed verdict on causation. This argument is inaccurate Plaintiff bases this claim—on the root idea that the defense expert conceded the 2017 accident caused Plaintiff a new neck injury, different from the one Plaintiff claimed from 2016. The defense witness did not concede causation, rather the evidence put causation in play.   Next, Plaintiff argued no substantial evidence supports the defense verdict. Plaintiff’s medical witnesses opined the 2017 accident injured him, but Plaintiff had hidden his 2016 accident from them. Thus, substantial evidence supported the verdict. Third, Plaintiff argued the jury instructions and verdict form led the jury astray, but if there was any error, he invited it. View "Davis v. Harano" on Justia Law

The instant appeal is from a judgment of dismissal following a successful demurrer by respondents Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier-CA, LLC, and Rasier, LLC (collectively, the Uber entities) to a complaint filed against them by appellants, Jane Doe Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (collectively, the Jane Does). The Jane Does were abducted and then sexually assaulted by assailants who lured the Jane Does into their vehicles by posing as authorized drivers of the Uber entities’ ridesharing app. The complaint alleged the Uber business model created the risk that criminals would employ this scheme, then failed to protect potential victims from it. The trial court sustained the demurrer to the operative complaint and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.   The Second Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court reasoned that the Uber entities were not in a special relationship with the Jane Does that would give rise to a duty to protect the Jane Does against third-party assaults, or to warn them about the same. The complaint thus did not allege actionable nonfeasance. Nor does the complaint allege actionable misfeasance. Although it is foreseeable that third parties could abuse the platform in this way, such crime must be a “necessary component” of the Uber app or the Uber entities’ actions in order for the Uber entities to be held liable, absent a special relationship between the parties. The trial court correctly concluded that the Uber entities cannot be held liable for causing or contributing to the Jane Does’ harm. View "Jane Doe No. 1 v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a severely disabled child whose congenital abnormalities were undetected during his mother’s pregnancy, sued various medical providers for wrongful life. The California Department of Health Care Services (“DHCS”) asserted a lien on Appellant’s settlement to recover what DHCS paid for his medical care through the state’s Medi-Cal program, and the trial court awarded DHCS the full amount of the lien.   The Second Appellate District reversed, rejecting Appellant’s contentions that DHCS’s lien is preempted by federal law and that there is no substantial evidence that Appellant’s settlement included payments for past medical expenses. However, the court held that the trial court erred by failing to distinguish between past medical expenses and other damages.   The court concluded that the provisions of the Medi-Cal Act permitting DHCS to impose a lien on Appellant’s tort recovery are not preempted by federal law. Further, the court concluded that the trial court did not err by concluding that Appellant’s settlement included past medical expenses. The court reasoned that the Welfare and Institutions Code provides that DHCS “shall have a right to recover . . . the reasonable value of benefits” provided to a MediCal beneficiary, and it further provides that the court, not the Medi-Cal beneficiary, determines what portion of a settlement is fairly allocated to satisfy DHCS’s lien.  However, it does not appear that the trial court determined which portion of Appellant’s settlement was attributable to past medical expenses, thus the court remanded the trial court to apportion the settlement accordingly. View "Daniel C. v. White Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a product liability lawsuit against the manufacturer of a device used in his hip replacement surgery. After a limited retrial of Plaintiff’s personal injury claims, Defendant asserted that the trial court made two categories of evidentiary error and that the jury awarded Plaintiff excessive damages.   The Second Appellate District reversed for a retrial and agreed that the trial court erred in categorically excluding all of Defendant’s proffered medical opinions expressed to less than a reasonable medical probability as to issues on which Plaintiff bore the burden of proof. The court reasoned the error prevented Defendant from presenting any expert testimony as to an issue where expert testimony was essential. Here, Plaintiff acknowledged that he bore the burden of proving that Defendant caused his injuries to a reasonable medical probability. Defendant was entitled to put on a case that Plaintiff failed to satisfy that burden. To accomplish this, Defendant did not need to show it was more likely than not that a cause identified by Defendant resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. In other words, Defendant did not need to show that a different cause was more likely than not the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Further, the court reasoned that the trial court properly admitted Plaintiff’s expert testimony on the subject but erroneously excluded Defendant’s. As a result, Defendant was unable to offer any expert testimony, notwithstanding that it had proffered admissible and material testimony that the jury was entitled to hear. This resulted in a one-sided presentation of evidence. View "Kline v. Zimmer, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, heirs of a nursing home resident who died after wandering off-site and getting hit by a car, filed a lawsuit against the nursing facility, its director, and its manager, alleging negligence, willful misconduct, elder abuse, and wrongful death. The facility demurred to the complaint on the ground that it is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs argued that the managers and director’s felony convictions revived the statute of limitations under section 340.3. Plaintiffs claimed that because the facility was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the statute of limitations was also revived as to the facility.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling and held that the extended statute of limitations does not apply to the employer of the felon in an action based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Further, the court held that Labor Code section 2802, which allows an employee to be indemnified by his or her employer, does not apply to third parties. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Victims’ Bill of Rights embodied in Article I, Section 28 of the California Constitution is misplaced. Under that section, victims have the right to seek restitution “from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer.”  Further, the court reasoned that Labor Code section 2802 allows an employee to be indemnified by his or her employer. It does “not provide access to the employer’s or its insurer’s pocketbook through a third-party suit against the employee.” View "Cardenas v. Horizon Senior Living" on Justia Law