Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Quintero sued Weinkauf asserting the torts of stalking, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and domestic violence, alleging that after Quintero ended their romantic relationship, Weinkauf shot arrows and discharged a firearm through the windows of Quintero’s law office under cover of darkness. Quintero had identified him on surveillance video footage. Weinkauf, also an attorney, pled guilty to stalking with an enhancement for the personal use of a dangerous and deadly weapon and conceded that he had shot a crossbow at Quintero’s window once but denied involvement in the other shootings.The jury found in favor of Quintero on the stalking, IIED, and domestic violence claims and in favor of Weinkauf on the assault claim; awarded Quintero $1.3 million in compensatory damages; and found that Weinkauf had engaged in conduct with malice, oppression, or fraud. The court determined Weinkauf’s net worth to be $1.5 million. The jury then awarded Quintero $6,000 in punitive damages. After denying Weinkauf’s post-trial motions, the court awarded Quintero $869,688.79 in attorney fees and $60,565.25 in costs.The court of appeal affirmed, upholding the admission of audio clips from a pretext telephone call between the parties recorded by police and video clips of the surveillance footage from the shootings. The court also rejected challenges to jury instructions, to modification of a protective order, and to the calculations of the awards. View "Quintero v. Weinkauf" on Justia Law

Allied provided security guard services at UCSF medical facilities, hiring security guards and assigning them to particular locations. UCSF was responsible for supervising the security guards. Villegas worked 11:00 p.m.-7:00 a.m., five nights per week. Allied did not require Villegas to use her car for work and did not dictate how she traveled to and from work. She frequently requested extra shifts and often worked six shifts per week. On August 21, Villegas began her fourth straight day of work. When her shift ended the following morning, Villegas’s mother picked Villegas up in Villegas’s vehicle. Villegas dropped her mother off at work, then began driving home. About an hour after finishing her shift, near her home, Villegas fell asleep and drove into oncoming traffic, hitting and severely injuring Feltham, who was riding a motorcycle.In a negligence action, the court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Allied. Allied was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Villegas was not acting within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident, and the accident was not a foreseeable consequence of Villegas’s employment. View "Feltham v. Universal Protection Service, LP" on Justia Law

The District appealed a judgment entered following a jury's finding that the District's employees were 54 percent responsible for injuries sustained by plaintiff when another student shot him in the stomach with a shotgun. This allocation of fault and the jury's findings as to damages resulted in a judgment holding the District vicariously liable for approximately $2 million.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the specific acts and omissions identified by plaintiff's expert as below the standard of care for conducting a threat assessment are properly characterized as administrative and not as a mental examination. Thus, those negligent acts and omissions fall outside the scope of Government Code section 855.6 immunity. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cleveland v. Taft Union High School District" on Justia Law

An employer has an affirmative duty to provide employees with a safe place to work. This duty does not include ensuring that an off-site meeting place for coworkers and business associates like an employee's private residence is safe from third party criminal harm.The Court of Appeal granted the writ petition challenging the trial court's order denying summary judgment and directed the trial court to enter a new and different order granting summary judgment. In this case, a young man suffering from a mental health condition suddenly fired a handgun at family members and guests inside his family home. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Colonial and Defendant Holaday for personal injury damages, alleging negligence claims stemming from their injuries. The court concluded that Colonial owed no duty to protect plaintiffs because Colonial did not control Holaday's home. Furthermore, Colonial owed Plaintiff Dominguez no duty to protect based on the employer-employee relationship. Finally, the Rowland factors counsel against imposing a duty to protect; plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress against Colonial fails as a matter of law as there are no triable issues (1) Colonial knew or reasonably should have known that the young man posed a danger to plaintiffs—his deadly misconduct was unforeseeable, and (2) Colonial had no ability to control him; and respondeat superior liability is inapplicable here as a matter of law. View "Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by plaintiff after she was assaulted at a residence for the disabled. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that suggested that defendants knew that the perpetrator was a problem. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in ruling that the residence owed no duty to plaintiff and similarly erred in concluding that plaintiff could not establish breach and causation. Rather, there was a material factual dispute about whether keeping the perpetrator at the residence breached this duty and caused plaintiff's injuries. Furthermore, there are disputed material facts about the extent to which the individual defendants knew or reasonably should have known about the hazard the perpetrator posed. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Brightstar Residential Inc." on Justia Law

Claude Rogers, a former resident of a residential care facility for the elderly known as Meadow Oaks of Roseville, died after experiencing heatstroke. His wife and successor-in-interest Kathryn and sons Jeffrey, Phillip and Richard sued Meadow Oaks of Roseville, Roseville SH, LLC, CPR/AR Roseville SH Owner, LLC, DCP Investors Roseville SH, LLC, DCP Management Roseville SH, LLC, Westmont Living, Inc., Tanysha Borromeo, Ana Rojas, and Andrew Badoud for elder abuse, fraud, and wrongful death. Defendants appealed an order denying their petition to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement that was part of the Residency Agreement Richard signed as Claude’s representative. Although defendants filed a notice of appeal, the appellate briefs were filed on behalf of Roseville SH, LLC only. Roseville SH, LLC contended that in denying the petition to compel arbitration: (1) the trial court erroneously believed defendants had to show that Claude lacked mental capacity to consent before they could prove that Richard had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement for Claude; (2) the trial court erred in concluding that Richard did not act as Claude’s actual or ostensible agent when he signed the arbitration agreement on Claude’s behalf; and (3) the trial court’s order violated the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Roseville SH, LLC misconstrued the trial court’s analysis; (2) the trial court did not err in denying the petition to compel arbitration; and (3) the trial court’s order did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Rogers v. Roseville SH, LLC" on Justia Law

The San Francisco Police Department allowed officers to carry secondary firearms when on duty, and to carry loaded handguns when off duty. A Department bulletin stated officers are responsible for ensuring that firearms under their control are secure at all times and provided specific guidelines for securing firearms in an unattended vehicle.Officer Cabuntala regularly carried an approved secondary firearm on duty and regularly transported it in his vehicle. On August 11, 2017, the city assigned Cabuntala to a training session in a different county. He drove his personal vehicle to the site, with his personal firearm in the vehicle. Firearms were not allowed at the training session. When the training was over, Cabuntala drove home but failed to follow his usual practice of securing his personal firearm inside his house. He left it unsecured inside his vehicle. Cabuntala’s vehicle was broken into. The firearm was stolen and was used to kill Plaintiff’s son. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding Cabuntala was not acting within the scope of his employment. The court of appeal reversed. In the context of policing, a jury could reasonably find the officer’s failure to safely secure his weapon is “not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.” View "Perez v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

After slipping and falling in the crosswalk of a Safeway parking lot, which was wet due to rain, Paige sued Safeway for negligence and premises liability. She asserted that Safeway failed to exercise due care in the manner it restriped the crosswalk several weeks before her fall by not adopting measures that would have made the crosswalk more slip-resistant. The jury returned a verdict for Safeway.On appeal, Paige argued the trial court erroneously prohibited her from cross-examining Safeway’s liability expert about standards promulgated by the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) with respect to safe walking surfaces. Paige contends that Evidence Code Section 721(b)(3) makes clear that an adverse expert may be cross-examined about a publication established as reliable authority, such as the ASTM standards, regardless of the expert’s consideration or reliance on the publication in forming his opinions. The court of appeal affirmed. While the trial court erroneously prohibited Paige from using the ASTM standard during her cross-examination of Safeway’s expert based on the expert’s lack of consideration or reliance on it, the error was harmless. View "Paige v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment in an action alleging claims for negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff was jogging on defendant's property when she encountered a homeless encampment that blocked her path. In order to avoid the encampment, she ran onto the street's bicycle lane, where she was struck and injured by a car.The court concluded that jogging to train for a foot race is an activity in which one engages for a recreational purpose under Civil Code section 846 and a property owner generally owes no duty of care to those who enter or use its property for such an activity. Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to her negligence and premises liability claims, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. View "Rucker v. WINCAL, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) required patients or their family members to sign Conditions of Admissions (COAs) when Dameron provided the patients’ medical care. The COAs at issue in this case contained language that assigned to Dameron direct payment of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) benefits and medical payment (MP) benefits that would otherwise be payable to those patients under their automobile insurance policies. Dameron treated five of California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau's ("CSAA") insureds for injuries following automobile accidents. Those patients had UM and/or MP coverage as part of their CSAA coverage, and Dameron sought to collect payment for those services from the patients’ UM and/or MP benefits at Dameron’s full rates. Instead of paying to Dameron the lesser of either all benefits due to the patients under their UM and MP coverage, or Dameron’s full charges, CSAA paid portions of those benefits directly to the patients which left balances owing on some of Dameron’s bills. Dameron sued CSAA to collect UM and MP benefits it contended CSAA owed Dameron under the assignments contained in the COAs. The trial court concluded that Dameron could not enforce any of the assignments contained in the COAs and entered judgment in CSAA’s favor following CSAA’s successful motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal held Dameron could not collect payment for emergency services from the UM or MP benefits due to patients that were covered under health insurance policies. Further, the Court held: (1) the COA forms were contracts of adhesion; (2) it was not within the reasonable possible expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly out of their UM benefits; and (3) a trier of fact might find it was within the reasonable expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly out of their MP benefits. Accordingly, the Court concluded Dameron could not maintain causes of action to collect MP or UM benefits due to four of the five patients directly from CSAA. However, consistent with this opinion, the trial court could consider whether an enforceable assignment of MP benefits was made by one adult patient. View "Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern Cal. etc." on Justia Law