Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue in this appeal is whether respondent Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital (Hospital) can be held liable for the alleged negligence of its staff physician. The physician’s patient, Plaintiff, appealed the judgment entered after the trial court granted Hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff claimed that the physician had negligently injured him during surgery performed at Hospital. Plaintiff settled his malpractice action against the physician for $1 million, the maximum coverage under the physician’s professional liability insurance policy.   Based on actual agency and ostensible agency theories, Plaintiff sought to hold Hospital vicariously liable for the physician’s negligence. The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment in Hospital’s favor. The court explained that for actual agency to exist, the principal must in some manner indicate that the agent is to act for him, and the agent must act or agree to act on his behalf and subject to his control. By producing the “Physician Recruitment Agreement” between Hospital and the physician, Hospital satisfied its initial burden of production as well as its burden of persuasion for summary judgment purposes. In his reply brief Plaintiff alleged, “Because of the extent of [Hospital’s] control over the physician’s practice of medicine, except for how he actually treated patients, the physician was an actual agent of Hospital.” Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted as to Plaintiff’s claim of actual agency. For summary judgment purposes, Hospital satisfied its initial burden of production as well as its burden of persuasion that the physician was not its ostensible agent. View "Franklin v. Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff designated his nephew as his health care agent and attorney-in-fact using an advance health care directive and power of attorney for health care decisions form developed by the California Medical Association (the Advance Directive). After the execution of the Advance Directive, Plaintiff was admitted to a skilled nursing facility. Nineteen days later, his nephew executed an admission agreement and a separate arbitration agreement purportedly on Plaintiff’s behalf as his “Legal Representative/Agent”. The sole issue on appeal is whether the nephew was authorized to sign the arbitration agreement on Plaintiff’s behalf.   In answering the relevant question on appeal, the Second Appellate District held that an agent’s authority to make “health care decisions” on a principal’s behalf does not include the authority to execute optional arbitration agreements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. The court explained that its conclusion that the execution of an arbitration agreement is not a “health care decision” finds support in the regulatory history of the recently enacted federal regulatory scheme prohibiting nursing facilities participating in Medicare or Medicaid programs from requiring a resident (or his representative) to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of admission. Specifically, in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (i.e., the agency’s) responses to public comments published in the Federal Register. These comments and responses demonstrate that practically speaking, arbitration agreements are not executed as part of the health care decision-making process, but rather are entered into only after the agent chooses a nursing facility based on the limited options available and other factors unrelated to arbitration. View "Logan v. Country Oaks Partners" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ son fell to his death from the steep, sloped roof of a residential building where he lived. The building was owned by Young Men’s Christian Association of Glendale, California (YMCA or Defendant). Plaintiffs’ son had been drinking and had eaten a marijuana brownie earlier, was feeling high, and had been acting erratically before the fall. The parties agree there was an “open and obvious risk” from the roof sloped at a steep angle and covered with brittle, broken, slippery and unstable Spanish tiles. They also agree there was no need for Plaintiffs’ son to be on the roof.The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held under the circumstances Defendant owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs’ son, and his parents cannot prevail on their wrongful death claims based on premises liability and negligence. The court explained that Defendant owed no duty to do anything to protect Plaintiffs’ son from his voluntary, unnecessary, and uninvited risk taking. View "Montes v. Young Men's Christian Assn. of Glendale, CA" on Justia Law

Stella Grace Yeh (Yeh) attended the University of San Diego. Following a party where Yeh became highly intoxicated, a friend summoned an Uber to take Yeh back to her dorm at the University. That ride was terminated before completion, and the Uber driver, one of the codefendants, Louvensky Geffrard, exited the Interstate and allegedly ordered Yeh out of the car. Subsequently, Yeh initiated a second ride request from Uber, and petitioner Mark Rycz (Petitioner) arrived. Yeh did not enter that car and instead left the area. Half an hour later, an eyewitness observed Yeh walk onto the freeway, where she was struck by two different cars. Petitioner alleged Yeh was several miles away from where Petitioner saw her when she was killed. Plaintiffs and real parties in interest (Plaintiffs) were Josefina McGarry, Yeh’s mother, in her individual capacity; Josefina McGarry in her capacity as a successor in interest to Yeh; and McKenna McGarry Limentani, Yeh’s sister, in her capacity as a successor in interest to Yeh. In April 2021, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber); Geffrard, an Uber driver; and Petitioner, also an Uber driver. The Superior Court denied Petitioner’s motion for change of venue to San Diego County under Code of Civil Procedure section 397 (c) based on the convenience of witnesses and the interests of justice. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal directing the Superior Court to set aside denial of the motion and to grant the motion. Among other things, the Court of Appeal concluded the Superior Court erred: (1) in reasoning the location of the witnesses was unimportant because they could appear remotely under section 367.75, enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic; and (2) in finding Petitioner failed to show venue in San Diego would be more convenient for most witnesses and promote the interests of justice. The Court granted writ relief to require the Superior Court to grant Petitioner’s motion. View "Rycz v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Luis Munoz and LR Munoz Real Estate Holdings, LLC (together, Munoz) bought a hotel from a company owned and managed by Rajesh Patel and his son, Shivam. Before escrow closed, the parties negotiated a leaseback arrangement requiring Munoz to lease the hotel back to the Patels’ company after the sale. Escrow closed and the parties thereafter executed the previously-negotiated lease. However, Munoz contended the Patels secretly swapped out the agreed-upon lease for a lease substantially more beneficial to the Patels and worse for Munoz, and then tricked him into signing it. Munoz filed suit against the Patels, an alleged alter ego entity of the Patels called Inn Lending, LLC, and other defendants involved in the sale, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory fraud, and elder financial abuse, among other causes of action. Rajesh and Inn Lending demurred to the operative second amended complaint, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. In a prior opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and determined, among other things, that Munoz alleged a viable fraud cause of action based on a theory of fraud in the execution. The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case back to the appellate court, ordering a rehearing of the parties arguments for fraud. After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal concluded operative complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a viable cause of action for fraud in the execution against Rajesh, but not against Inn Lending. Additionally, the Court concluded the complaint plead facts sufficient to state an elder financial abuse cause of action against both Rajesh and Inn Lending. The Court concluded Munoz failed to establish that the trial court erred in dismissing his breach of contract and bad faith causes of action. In light of these determinations, the appeals court reversed the trial court judgment and remand the matter with instructions that the trial court vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to the entire complaint, and enter a new order. View "Munoz v. Patel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell while walking on a public sidewalk in the City of Redondo Beach. More specifically, Plaintiff's back foot hit a raised sidewalk slab causing her to trip and fall forward to the ground. As a result, Plaintiff fractured her kneecap and elbow. Plaintiff sued the City.The City successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing that any alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law. On Plaintiff's appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that under Government Claims Act Sec. 830(a), a public entity is not liable for injuries caused by a condition of the property if the "risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury."After considering the "type and size" of the defect, the court determined it was trivial as a matter of law. Further, the court did not find any additional factors indicating that the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonable person. Thus, the Second Appellate District found no error in the trial court's ruling. View "Nunez v. City of Redondo Beach" on Justia Law

Appellant, then proceeding pro se, brought an action against Respondent, her brother, alleging he had falsely accused her of committing crimes against him and their elderly parents. Respondent emailed the attorney in this matter (“Attorney”), who was Appellant’s husband since June 2015, her former coworker at his law firm, and later her counsel in this action, warning that if Appellant did not settle the action, Respondent would file a cross-complaint the next day.   The court subsequently dismissed Respondent’s cross-complaint. Appellant retained Attorney to represent her pro bono or at a discounted rate, having been advised by Attorney that he would likely need to testify at trial, and having executed informed written consent to Attorney’s representation notwithstanding his expected dual role as advocate and witness   Two months before trial, Respondent moved to disqualify Attorney as Appellant’s counsel under California’s advocate-witness rule, viz., rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 3.7). The trial court disqualified Attorney from all phases of the litigation.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s disqualification order, holding that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standards, and thereby abused its discretion, in disqualifying Attorney from representing Appellant under the advocate witness rule. The court explained that the trial court failed to apply Rule 3.7’s informed-consent exception. Indeed, the trial court failed even to cite Rule 3.7, instead applying the ABA Rule, which is not binding and lacks any informed-consent exception. The trial court further abused its discretion in failing to apply Rule 3.7’s limitation to advocacy “in a trial.” View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

M & L Financial, Inc. (M&L) took 45 vivid yellow diamonds worth $4 million to Sotheby’s for auction on consignment. M&L told Sotheby’s it was the exclusive owner of the diamonds, but Sotheby’s later released them to a stranger without telling M&L. The diamonds vanished. M&L sued Sotheby’s, which escaped on demurrer.   The Second Appellate District reversed the breach of contract ruling and affirmed the tort ruling, and remanded. The court explained that there was no agreement yet that Sotheby’s definitely would auction the diamonds for M&L, but a potential auction was the point of Sotheby’s involvement. Sotheby’s breached this agreement by giving the diamonds to a stranger without M&L’s permission. This breach cost M&L the value of the lost diamonds.   The court further wrote that as for M&L’s negligence claim, however, the trial court’s ruling was right. The court explained that the economic loss rule governs. “In general, there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted ‘purely economic losses,’ meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage.” (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922 (Sheen).) By deferring to the contract between parties, the economic loss rule prevents the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other. M&L offers no good reason for departing from the fundamental economic loss rule, which bars its tort claim. View "M & L Financial v. Sotheby's" on Justia Law

The real parties in interest, two truck drivers, were injured in a single-vehicle truck accident. At the time of the accident, the injured drivers were operating a truck manufactured by Defendant. Defendant is a Delaware company that maintained a hub in Fontana, California but did not manufacture or assemble trucks in the state.The injured truck drivers filed product liability, negligence and loss of consortium claims against Defendant. Defendant moved to quash, claiming that California courts lack personal jurisdiction over Defendant because the truck drivers' causes of action did not arise out of or relate to its forum-related activities. The truck drivers responded that Defendant was subject to specific jurisdiction because it had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California by marketing, selling, and servicing the specific model of truck that was involved in the accident. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to quash and Defendant sought a writ of mandate from the Second Appellate District.The Second Appellate District denied Defendant's petition for writ of mandate, finding 1.) Defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits of operating in California, 2.) the truck drivers' claims "relate to Defendant's forum contacts, and 3.) the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant comports with fair play and substantial justice. View "Daimler Trucks North America LLC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

McNeal was exposed to asbestos from several sources. He was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2017. The jury found his asbestos exposure included the use of Old Spice talcum powder on a daily basis, 1958-1980, except for one year while he was in Vietnam. Talc is a naturally occurring mineral with cosmetic uses. Asbestos, a known carcinogen when inhaled, is also a naturally occurring mineral. When talc is mined, it sometimes contains asbestos.A jury awarded McNeal punitive damages. The defendant, the supplier of the talc in Old Spice that contained asbestos fiber, did not contest the finding it was negligent and otherwise responsible for McNeal's harm but argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish that any officer, director, or managing agent acted with the malice, oppression or fraud necessary for an award of punitive damages. The court of appeal agreed and reversed the award of punitive damages. The evidence does not show that defendant’s executives knew there were “probable dangerous consequences” from trace levels of asbestos in its talc, and deliberately did nothing to avoid them. It was not known until 1994 that the contamination of talc with trace amounts of asbestos could cause mesothelioma or other asbestos-related diseases. View "McNeal v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels" on Justia Law