Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Smith’s hip resurfacing implant consists of a metal ball that covers the top of the femur and a cup that fits inside the hip socket. When a surgeon puts these ball-and-cup surfaces in the joint, the polished metal surfaces are supposed to allow smoother movement than the damaged bone or cartilage they replace. Gall, who had hip resurfacing surgery for his left hip, recovered and became physically active. Years later, convinced his implant was unsatisfactory, Gall sued Smith.Gall argued that Smith failed to properly warn Gall’s surgeon, Dr. Hernandez, about the risks of using Smith’s product. The trial court granted Smith summary judgment because Hernandez independently knew these risks and whether Smith gave Hernandez redundant warnings did not matter. Gall also argued that Smith’s product was defective. The trial court granted summary judgment because Gall did not show anything was wrong with his implant. Gall did show Smith’s quality control procedures once failed to satisfy regulatory authorities, but the court concluded this fact did not imply the parts Gall received were defective. The court of appeal affirmed. Gall’s claims share the same causation element and Gall did not establish causation. View "Gall v. Smith & Nephew, Inc." on Justia Law

Doe and Damron twice traveled together to California. In Riverside, according to Doe, Damron forcibly groped her on a sidewalk, attempted to force her to perform oral sex on him in the street, and then raped, battered, and strangled her in their hotel room. The hotel staff called the police; she received medical assistance. Damron pled guilty to willfully inflicting corporal injury on his spouse. Doe alleges that, during another trip, Damron grabbed her, shoved her to the floor, strangled her, and bruised her neck, and also assaulted her numerous times in Georgia. Apart from the Riverside incident, Damron denies assaulting Doe. A Georgia court granted the couple a divorce.Doe sued Damron in California, alleging domestic violence, sexual battery, and gender violence based on acts that took place in California. Damron moved to quash service of process, challenging the court's personal jurisdiction over him. He had never lived, owned property, paid taxes, registered to vote, opened a bank account, or held a driver’s license in California. His only contacts arose from his two trips to California with Doe. He identified witnesses and documents located in Georgia. The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of the suit. Absent compelling circumstances that would make the suit unreasonable, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident who commits a tort while present in the state. View "Doe v. Damron" on Justia Law

Doe claims that in 1988, while he (then 10 years old) was attending catechism classes at a Catholic Church, Father Higson sexually molested Doe. Doe did not tell his teacher what happened; the teacher did not ask why Doe was upset. In 1987 or 1988, the Archdiocese had purchased sexual abuse insurance and began developing policies and procedures for preventing clergy sexual abuse.Doe filed suit in 2017, alleging the Archdiocese had a duty to protect him when he was entrusted to its care, including a duty to “educate, train and warn” Doe and other minors involved in youth programs “regarding prevention, detection, and reporting of child abuse” and a duty to educate, train and warn parents and other employees. Doe alleged the Archdiocese knew of the “epidemic” of priests sexually abusing minors and had received multiple complaints that its priests had sexually abused minors beginning in the 1950s. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding no triable issue of material fact as to whether the Archdiocese had reason to know that Higson committed any sexual misconduct before the purported abuse of Doe.The court of appeal reversed, A church has a duty to protect children from sexual abuse by clergy while the children are attending religious school or participating in other church-sponsored programs. The Archdiocese had a special relationship with Doe, who presented considerable evidence the Archdiocese was aware in the late 1980s that numerous priests had been accused of sexually abusing minors in the Archdiocese and around the country. It was reasonably foreseeable that minors attending catechism classes in 1988 might be sexually molested by a priest, even though the Archdiocese did not have knowledge of prior sexual misconduct by Higson specifically. View "Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Mitchell sued Twin Galaxies for defamation and false light after Twin Galaxies issued a statement asserting Mitchell’s world record scores in the Donkey Kong arcade game were not achieved on original unmodified hardware as required under its rules. Twin Galaxies removed all of Mitchell’s world record scores and banned him from participating in its leaderboards. The trial court denied Twin Galaxies’ special motion to strike under the strategic lawsuits against public participation statute (anti-SLAPP motion). (Code Civ. Procedure 425.16.) The court of appeal affirmed. Mitchell showed a probability of prevailing on his claims; the trial court properly denied the anti-SLAPP motion. Mitchell made a prima facie showing of falsity by providing his own declaration and others’ declarations attesting to the equipment used and made a prima facie showing of actual malice. Twin Galaxies failed to take any steps to inquire into the truth of Mitchell’s statements even after he was provided the names of witnesses and having confirmation of the procedures under which the disputed scores were achieved. View "Mitchell v. Twin Galaxies, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Maria Carachure suffered serious injuries when she was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Celia Acosta Scott. Plaintiff filed suit, and a jury found the action was barred because of a “‘binding and enforceable settlement.’” On appeal, plaintiff contended the trial court erred in granting partial nonsuit on the issue of plaintiff’s consent to settle and acted in excess of its power by approving the settlement on her behalf. She further contended the trial court erred in striking the allegations and prayer for punitive damages. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected plaintiff’s contentions and affirmed. View "Carachure v. Scott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a severely disabled child who suffered catastrophic injuries during her birth in 2015, filed suit against various medical providers for professional negligence. In 2019, the actions were settled for $3 million. DHCS, through its director, then asserted a lien on plaintiff's settlement to recover what DHCS paid for plaintiff's medical care through the state's Medi-Cal program. The trial court denied the lien, concluding that it was prohibited by the "anti-lien" provision of the federal Medicaid Act.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in denying DHCS's lien. The court concluded that, while the anti-lien provision of the Medicaid Act generally prohibits liens against the property of Medicaid beneficiaries, other provisions of the Act carve out exceptions for settlements or judgments recovered from third-party tortfeasors, to the extent such settlements or judgments are attributable to payments made by the state for the beneficiaries' medical care. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine what portion of the settlement properly is subject to DHCS's lien. View "L.Q. v. California Hospital Medical Center" on Justia Law

In April 2018, Cavey filed a personal injury action for injuries sustained in a traffic accident involving a vehicle driven by a School District employee. Citing the six-month statute of limitations, Government Code 945.6,(a)(1), the trial court dismissed. The theory of untimeliness was based on the District’s July 19, 2017 notice rejecting a claim presented without Cavey’s authorization by a chiropractic firm that was treating her injuries, which, allegedly, started the statute of limitations.The court of appeal reversed. The claim submitted by the chiropractic firm was not presented “by a person acting on … her behalf” for purposes of section 910. The limitations period did not begin to run until the authorized claim submitted by Cavey’s lawyers was deemed rejected in November 2017. Using a November 2017 start date, the April 2018 complaint was timely under the six-month statute of limitations. In addition, the District’s notice of rejection was mailed to the wrong address, so the two-year statute of limitations in section 945.6(a)(2) applies. View "Cavey v. Tualla" on Justia Law

Strobel, diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in 2019, died at age 68 in 2020. Strobel had sued for product liability, negligence, and fraud, alleging that continuous exposure to asbestos in J&J’s Baby Powder (JBP), a product he used regularly for 60 years, was a substantial contributing cause of his mesothelioma. J&J’s expert swore that JBP was at all relevant times asbestos-free. The Strobels filed declarations from five experts, all contradicting J&J’s experts. The court sustained J&J’s hearsay objections to much of the Strobels’ proffered expert testimony and concluded that, after the exclusion of this testimony, the Strobels could not bear their burden of proof on legal causation because what remained—opinions from Drs. Fitzgerald and Compton—only confirmed the presence of asbestos in the talcum ore J&J used to manufacture JBP, not in JBP offered for sale as a finished product during the years Strobel used it.The court of appeal reversed a judgment in favor of J&J. The Strobels presented sufficient admissible evidence on legal causation to create a triable issue. The court noted the evidence of long-term usage in this case and concluded that Fitzgerald fairly drew the inference that JBP dating from within the exposure period contained asbestos. View "Strobel v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

X.M., a student at Maple Elementary School, sued Hesperia Unified School District (HUSD), claiming he was sexually assaulted on campus by one of their employees. He sought treble damages under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, alleging his assault resulted from HUSD’s cover up of a prior sexual assault by the same employee. The trial court granted the school district’s motion to strike the increased damages request on the ground that treble damages under section 340.1 were primarily punitive and therefore barred by Government Code section 818. X.M. filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to vacate the trial court’s order and conclude section 818’s immunity did not apply to the treble damages provision at issue here. He argued the primary purpose of the provision is to compensate victims of childhood sexual assault for the additional harm caused by discovering their abuse could have been prevented if those entrusted with their care had responded differently to prior sexual assaults on their watch. In the alternative, he argues the provision’s primary purpose is to incentivize victims to come forward and file lawsuits. The Court concluded the primary purpose of section 340.1’s treble damages provision was punitive because it was designed to deter future cover ups by punishing past ones. "[T]he economic and noneconomic damages available under general tort principles are already designed to make childhood sexual assault victims whole ... It is the rare treble damages provision that isn’t primarily designed to punish and deter misconduct, and nothing in section 340.1 or its legislative history convinces us the Legislature intended the increased award to be more compensatory (or incentivizing) than deterrent." Further, the Court held that section 818’s immunity applied when the defendant was a public agency like HUSD. The Court therefore denied the petition. View "X.M. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Chase sexually assaulted aesthetician, plaintiff-respondent Kimberly Finlan during a facial treatment session at a resort spa. Finlan sued Chase, and in the course of litigating her personal injury action, she sent multiple letters offering to settle for $999,000. The letters stated that her offers were made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, but said nothing about how the offers were to be accepted. Chase did not respond to these offers. Finlan prevailed at trial, receiving an award of $3,875,000. The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review in this case centered on whether a simple reference to section 998 satisfied the acceptance provision requirement of the statute. The Court concluded it did not, based on settled caselaw. Further, the Court determined a valid acceptance provision required more than mere reference to a judgment; section 998 offers must provide some kind of instruction or indication as to how they can be accepted, utilizing a written acceptance that includes a signature from the offeree’s counsel or the unrepresented offeree. Accordingly, the section 998 offers in this case were not statutorily valid, and the trial court's postjudgment order was reversed to the extent it allowed plaintiff to recover costs and interest that could only be awarded based on defendant's failure to accept a legitimate section 998 offer. View "Finlan v. Chase" on Justia Law