Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Claude Rogers, a former resident of a residential care facility for the elderly known as Meadow Oaks of Roseville, died after experiencing heatstroke. His wife and successor-in-interest Kathryn and sons Jeffrey, Phillip and Richard sued Meadow Oaks of Roseville, Roseville SH, LLC, CPR/AR Roseville SH Owner, LLC, DCP Investors Roseville SH, LLC, DCP Management Roseville SH, LLC, Westmont Living, Inc., Tanysha Borromeo, Ana Rojas, and Andrew Badoud for elder abuse, fraud, and wrongful death. Defendants appealed an order denying their petition to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement that was part of the Residency Agreement Richard signed as Claude’s representative. Although defendants filed a notice of appeal, the appellate briefs were filed on behalf of Roseville SH, LLC only. Roseville SH, LLC contended that in denying the petition to compel arbitration: (1) the trial court erroneously believed defendants had to show that Claude lacked mental capacity to consent before they could prove that Richard had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement for Claude; (2) the trial court erred in concluding that Richard did not act as Claude’s actual or ostensible agent when he signed the arbitration agreement on Claude’s behalf; and (3) the trial court’s order violated the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Roseville SH, LLC misconstrued the trial court’s analysis; (2) the trial court did not err in denying the petition to compel arbitration; and (3) the trial court’s order did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Rogers v. Roseville SH, LLC" on Justia Law

The San Francisco Police Department allowed officers to carry secondary firearms when on duty, and to carry loaded handguns when off duty. A Department bulletin stated officers are responsible for ensuring that firearms under their control are secure at all times and provided specific guidelines for securing firearms in an unattended vehicle.Officer Cabuntala regularly carried an approved secondary firearm on duty and regularly transported it in his vehicle. On August 11, 2017, the city assigned Cabuntala to a training session in a different county. He drove his personal vehicle to the site, with his personal firearm in the vehicle. Firearms were not allowed at the training session. When the training was over, Cabuntala drove home but failed to follow his usual practice of securing his personal firearm inside his house. He left it unsecured inside his vehicle. Cabuntala’s vehicle was broken into. The firearm was stolen and was used to kill Plaintiff’s son. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding Cabuntala was not acting within the scope of his employment. The court of appeal reversed. In the context of policing, a jury could reasonably find the officer’s failure to safely secure his weapon is “not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.” View "Perez v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

After slipping and falling in the crosswalk of a Safeway parking lot, which was wet due to rain, Paige sued Safeway for negligence and premises liability. She asserted that Safeway failed to exercise due care in the manner it restriped the crosswalk several weeks before her fall by not adopting measures that would have made the crosswalk more slip-resistant. The jury returned a verdict for Safeway.On appeal, Paige argued the trial court erroneously prohibited her from cross-examining Safeway’s liability expert about standards promulgated by the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) with respect to safe walking surfaces. Paige contends that Evidence Code Section 721(b)(3) makes clear that an adverse expert may be cross-examined about a publication established as reliable authority, such as the ASTM standards, regardless of the expert’s consideration or reliance on the publication in forming his opinions. The court of appeal affirmed. While the trial court erroneously prohibited Paige from using the ASTM standard during her cross-examination of Safeway’s expert based on the expert’s lack of consideration or reliance on it, the error was harmless. View "Paige v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment in an action alleging claims for negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff was jogging on defendant's property when she encountered a homeless encampment that blocked her path. In order to avoid the encampment, she ran onto the street's bicycle lane, where she was struck and injured by a car.The court concluded that jogging to train for a foot race is an activity in which one engages for a recreational purpose under Civil Code section 846 and a property owner generally owes no duty of care to those who enter or use its property for such an activity. Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to her negligence and premises liability claims, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. View "Rucker v. WINCAL, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) required patients or their family members to sign Conditions of Admissions (COAs) when Dameron provided the patients’ medical care. The COAs at issue in this case contained language that assigned to Dameron direct payment of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) benefits and medical payment (MP) benefits that would otherwise be payable to those patients under their automobile insurance policies. Dameron treated five of California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau's ("CSAA") insureds for injuries following automobile accidents. Those patients had UM and/or MP coverage as part of their CSAA coverage, and Dameron sought to collect payment for those services from the patients’ UM and/or MP benefits at Dameron’s full rates. Instead of paying to Dameron the lesser of either all benefits due to the patients under their UM and MP coverage, or Dameron’s full charges, CSAA paid portions of those benefits directly to the patients which left balances owing on some of Dameron’s bills. Dameron sued CSAA to collect UM and MP benefits it contended CSAA owed Dameron under the assignments contained in the COAs. The trial court concluded that Dameron could not enforce any of the assignments contained in the COAs and entered judgment in CSAA’s favor following CSAA’s successful motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal held Dameron could not collect payment for emergency services from the UM or MP benefits due to patients that were covered under health insurance policies. Further, the Court held: (1) the COA forms were contracts of adhesion; (2) it was not within the reasonable possible expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly out of their UM benefits; and (3) a trier of fact might find it was within the reasonable expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly out of their MP benefits. Accordingly, the Court concluded Dameron could not maintain causes of action to collect MP or UM benefits due to four of the five patients directly from CSAA. However, consistent with this opinion, the trial court could consider whether an enforceable assignment of MP benefits was made by one adult patient. View "Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern Cal. etc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of defendant, a neurosurgeon, in a medical malpractice action against defendant and others, alleging claims related to plaintiff's treatment in the emergency room. Plaintiff and his wife alleged that emergency surgery should have taken place sooner than six hours after his arrival at the emergency room because time was of the essence in removing a blood clot. After the surgery, plaintiff ended up partially quadriplegic.The court concluded that the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury with CACI 509 (Abandonment of Patient) as the instruction was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also concluded that CACI 411 (Reliance on the Good Conduct of Others) did not prejudice plaintiffs. Furthermore, the trial court's refusal to give CACI 430 (Causation: Substantial Factor) and CACI 431 (Causation: Multiple Causes) and its decision to give Defense Special Instruction No. 2 are moot in light of the jury's finding of no negligence. Finally, plaintiff's challenge to CACI 506 (Alternative Methods of Care) is waived, and the trial court did not err in refusing to give BAJI 6.15, which defined "emergency." View "Zannini v. Liker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Treasure Andrews sued the Metropolitan Transit System, San Diego Transit Corporation, and Janalee St. Clair (collectively, MTS) after she was injured on an MTS bus driven by St. Clair. MTS moved for summary judgment on the ground that Andrews’s complaint was barred by the statute of limitations because Andrews filed suit more than six months after MTS mailed a notice of rejection of Andrews’s claim for damages. Andrews opposed, arguing among other things that MTS’s notice of rejection was defective because it did not include the full warning required by statute, and the two-year statute of limitations therefore applied. The trial court found that Andrews’s complaint was untimely, granted the motion, and entered judgment against Andrews. On appeal, Andrews again contended the notice of rejection was defective. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed: the notice did not comply with the statute and was therefore insufficient to trigger the six-month statute of limitations in Government Code section 945.6 (a)(1). Instead, Andrews had two years from the accrual of her cause of action to file suit. Thus, the Court determined the trial court erred by finding that the six-month limitations period applied, and reversed judgment on that basis. View "Andrews v. Metropolitan Transit System" on Justia Law

Petitioner California Correctional Peace Officers Association Benefit Trust Fund (CCPOA) paid money pursuant to its disability policy to real party in interest David Martin Jr., a CCPOA member, after he filed a workers’ compensation claim for injuries sustained while working as a correctional officer. CCPOA subsequently filed a lien against the prospective workers’ compensation award for the sum it paid. It was represented in the workers’ compensation proceedings by petitioner Dan Escamilla, a non-attorney appearing pursuant to Labor Code section 5700. After Martin’s attorney petitioned for costs and sanctions against CCPOA and Escamilla for alleged misbehavior during proceedings on Martin’s claim, CCPOA withdrew the lien. Escamilla then failed to appear at four subsequent hearings on the petition for costs and sanctions. While respondent Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) ultimately affirmed the denial of costs and sanctions, it affirmed an award of $3,280 in attorney fees against CCPOA and Escamilla for the failure to appear at the four hearings. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of review, claiming: (1) the failure to notify them that a hearing held subsequent to the COVID-19 pandemic was to be held telephonically was a deprivation of due process; (2) failure to appear following the withdrawal of the lien was not sanctionable bad faith; and (3) attorney fees were not permitted for an attorney expending time litigating on his or her own behalf. The Court of Appeal found there was adequate notice of the one hearing in question, withdrawal of the lien did not deprive WCAB of jurisdiction to determine the petition for costs and sanctions, and the contention regarding attorney fees for work on behalf of the attorney was not properly before the Court, as it was determined by WCAB in a previous proceeding. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Cal. Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Prior to her death, Eyvon Ambrose (decedent) had become entirely dependent upon others for her basic care needs. Defendants Oroville Hospital d/b/a Golden Valley Home Health and Oroville Hospital, agreed to provide decedent in-home nursing services for wound care for a pressure injury to her left ischium or buttock. Defendants provided such in-home wound care on six occasions in July 2015 and four additional occasions in October 2015. According to real parties in interest (plaintiffs), decedent’s wound worsened, she sustained additional wounds, she was hospitalized, and she ultimately died from her wound and complications. Plaintiffs filed the underlying actions against defendants alleging a number of causes of action. Defendant’s writ petition and arguments related solely to plaintiff’s cause of action to recover under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act for defendants’ alleged neglect which, they asserted, was committed with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. Therefore, plaintiffs asserted entitlement to enhanced remedies under the Elder Abuse Act. They sought no other relief in their petition. Defendants moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, asserting they did not have a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship with the decedent, a prerequisite for recovery for neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. They further asserted that a reasonable jury could not find them guilty of forms of abuse or neglect rising to the level of recklessness. The trial court denied defendants’ motion. To the Court of Appeal, Defendants sought a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of their motion for summary adjudication and to grant the motion. The Court concluded that, in opposition to defendants’ prima facie showing of entitlement to summary adjudication on plaintiffs’ Elder Abuse Cause of action based on the absence of a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship, plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. The Court therefore issued the requested writ. View "Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City for the wrongful death of her son after he drowned when, while stand-up paddle boarding, he fell into the waters of the Santa Barbara Harbor. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment based on governmental immunities.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the City is immune from liability under the hazardous recreational activity doctrine. The court explained that exceptions for failure to warn, gross negligence and specific payment of fees does not bar the application of the immunity in the present case. In this case, there is no evidence showing that there was a known dangerous condition of property in the area where the decedent drowned; the record fails to show that the City engaged in the want of scant care or an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct; and the City did not receive a specific fee for permission to participate in paddle boarding or any other hazardous recreational activity. View "Mubanda v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law