Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

California law establishes the general duty of each person to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others. The Court of Appeal declined to recognize an exception to this fundamental principle for employers and supervisors of healthcare aides working in homes where firearms are present. The court explained that it is foreseeable that an accidental shooting might occur in a home containing unsecured, loaded firearms, and policy considerations favor a duty to use reasonable care when one knows firearms are present.In this case, defendant and her family hired two healthcare aides to work in their elderly parents' home. A jury found that defendant was liable for negligence after one of the aides removed an oxygen tank from a closet which caused a loaded rifle to fall and discharge, striking and injuring the other aide. The court concluded that defendant owed the aide a duty of care. The court also held that substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the aide's harm. In this case, despite defendant's knowledge that her father kept firearms in the house and that the aides' job duties required them to work throughout much of the residence, defendant neither secured the firearms nor warned the aids of their presence. Finally, the court concluded that there was no error in the jury instructions. View "Hernandez v. Jensen" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action brought against defendants, the owners and operators of an outdoor swap meet, where plaintiff and her husband rented two vendor spaces. When plaintiff and her husband were setting up their booth, a 28-foot metal pole holding their advertising banner touched an overhead power line. Plaintiff and her husband were electrocuted, and he died. A jury found that defendants were 77.5 percent at fault and plaintiff's damages totaled $12.25 million. Defendants contend that they owe no duty of care to plaintiff because the danger presented by the overhead power line was open and obvious.The court concluded that the evidence presented in this case did not establish as a matter of law that the danger was open and obvious. The court explained that it was not obvious that the line was uninsulated, that it was energized, or that the amount of electricity being transmitted was lethal. Therefore, a warning would not have been superfluous; it would have provided information that was not obvious. The court also concluded that, because no workers' compensation insurance covered the injuries to plaintiff and her husband, the Privette doctrine should not be extended to the landlord-tenant relationship that existed in this case. View "Zuniga v. Cherry Avenue Auction, Inc." on Justia Law

After Norris Morgan was diagnosed with mesothelioma in December 2017, he and his wife filed suit against J-MM and others. The jury concluded that Morgan was exposed to asbestos from products that J-MM sold, and that J-MM was partly responsible for Morgan’s mesothelioma; awarded compensatory damages; and concluded that J-MM had acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, and awarded an additional $15,000,000 as punitive damages. Based on the jury's apportionment of fault, the trial court entered judgment for plaintiff and his wife against J-MM for $22,213,704.39. The trial court subsequently denied J-MM's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial.The Court of Appeal concluded that the record contains evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that Morgan was exposed to asbestos from pipe supplied by J-MM; the trial court was not required to give J-MM's requested jury instruction that J-MM was not liable for the conduct of another company; and the jury's punitive damage award is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed the award of punitive damages and affirmed in all other respects. View "Morgan v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Respondent David Collins suffered serious injuries following his arrest by San Diego County Sheriff's Deputies for public intoxication. After a three-week trial, a jury found in favor of Collins on his negligence claims against the two deputies involved in the arrest and two nurses employed by the County of San Diego (County) who attended to Collins while in jail. On appeal from the subsequent judgment and the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the County raised five claims of error: (1) the jury’s finding that the deputies had a reasonable basis to arrest Collins foreclosed his claim of negligence against the deputies; (2) the court erred by instructing the jury it could find the deputies liable for injuries caused by private physicians who treated Collins after he was released from custody; (3) the court erred by failing to instruct the jury it could not hold defendants liable for an injury Collins sustained while in jail; (4) governmental immunity requires reversal of the judgment against one of the nurse defendants; and (5) the court erred in its calculation of the amount of setoff the defendants were entitled to based on Collins’s prior settlement with the private physicians and their employer. The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Collins v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying defendant's special motion to strike plaintiff's complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for defamation and other torts, alleging causes of action arising from an article about him that defendant had written in Vietnamese.The court concluded that the trial court erroneously determined that defendant had failed to satisfy the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, i.e., defendant had not made a threshold showing that plaintiff's action arose from protected activity in connection with an issue of public interest. In this case, the article concerned a matter of public interest because plaintiff was "in the public eye" in the Vietnamese community. Furthermore, plaintiff is collaterally estopped from claiming that the article did not concern an issue of public interest because this issue was decided against him in the prior BBC proceeding. The court also concluded that the trial court erroneously determined that plaintiff had satisfied the statute's second prong, i.e., plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court explained that plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishing a probability that he can show by clear and convincing evidence that defendant acted with actual malice. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing on his second cause of action for violation of the common law of publicity and his third cause of action for civil conspiracy. View "Kieu Hoang v. Phong Minh Tran" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the city after her son was killed in a collision with a turning truck while riding his bike. Plaintiff alleged a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835. The trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the city had proved entitlement to design immunity as a matter of law under section 830.6.The court concluded that design immunity shields the city from liability for the absence of a bicycle lane. However, following the state Supreme Court's binding precedent Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318, 327, the court held that even where design immunity covers a dangerous condition, it does not categorically preclude liability for failure to warn about that dangerous condition. In this case, the city's entitlement to design immunity for its failure to include a bicycle lane at the site of the accident does not, as a matter of law, necessarily preclude its liability under a theory of failure to warn. The court remanded for the trial court to consider the failure to warn theory in the first instance. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part. View "Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

After a surgeon competently performed a gastric re-sleeving surgery on plaintiff, she filed suit against him for negligence in recommending gastric re-sleeve surgery as a viable course of treatment and in not obtaining her informed consent to the surgery.The Court of Appeal held that a physician may be liable for negligently recommending a course of treatment if (1) that course stems from a misdiagnosis of the patient's underlying medical condition, or (2) all reasonable physicians in the relevant medical community would agree that the probable risks of that treatment outweigh its probable benefits. The court also held that a patient's informed consent to a negligently recommended course of treatment does not negate the physician's liability for his negligence in recommending it. In this case, although the trial court erred by instructing the jury that plaintiff's informed consent negated any liability for the surgeon's recommendation, the court concluded that this error did not prejudice her case because her negligent recommendation theory should never have gone to the jury in the first place. In this case, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, does not support the conclusion that the surgeon was negligent in recommending that plaintiff undergo the gastric re-sleeve surgery where she suffered from morbid obesity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Flores v. Liu" on Justia Law

A construction worker was killed when concrete formwork toppled over at a worksite. Plaintiffs, the worker's surviving family members, brought a wrongful death action against the general contractor, Swinerton Builders, and formwork supplier, Atlas Construction Supply, Inc. Atlas cross-complained against Swinerton for equitable indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Swinerton as to the wrongful death complaint. Swinerton, in lieu of seeking entry of judgment on the summary judgment order, settled with plaintiffs, wherein plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their case against Swinerton, and Swinerton waived its costs. Apparently under a shared belief that the good faith settlement determination barred Atlas' cross-complaint against Swinerton, Atlas and Swinerton stipulated to the dismissal of Atlas' cross-complaint against Swinerton. Atlas appealed the summary judgment order, the good faith settlement determination, and dismissal of its cross-complaint. Atlas argued that the trial court erred in ruling Atlas lacked standing to oppose Swinerton's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, Atlas argued if the trial court had considered its opposition brief, the court could have reasonably denied Swinerton's motion, and Swinerton would have never settled the wrongful death complaint, never made the good faith settlement determination, and Swinerton and Atlas would never have stipulated to the dismissal of Atlas' cross-complaint. After review, the Court of Appeal determined Atlas was not aggrieved by the trial court's exoneration of Swinerton in the wrongful death action. Therefore, Atlas lacked standing to appeal the summary judgment order. With respect to the good faith settlement and dismissal of the cross-complaint, the Court determined Atlas waived its challenge by failing to make substantive legal arguments specific to those orders. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as to the summary judgment motion, and judgment was affirmed as to all other orders. View "Atlas Construction Supply v. Swinerton Builders" on Justia Law

In this highway fatality case, the Court of Appeal held that there has been a miscarriage of justice and thus the court must vacate the $30 million dollar non-economic damage award. The court explained that, in this case, the jury was not permitted to consider the comparative fault of defendants who settled before trial. Therefore, reversal is required for this reason alone. The court also concluded that no substantial evidence appears to support the amount of the damages award, an amount that shocks the conscience and appears to have been influenced by the misconduct and improper argument of respondents' counsel. The court remanded with directions to conduct a new trial limited to determining the amount of the damages award and its apportionment among all defendants, including those who settled before trial. View "Plascencia v. Deese" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was struck by another vehicle while waiting in his disabled car on the shoulder of the freeway for roadside assistance, plaintiff filed suit against Auto Club and Brent-Air for negligence. The trial court assumed, without deciding, that plaintiff could amend his discovery responses to state that Auto Club's delay in responding to his call was a substantial factor in causing his injuries. The trial court nonetheless held, as a matter of law, no special relationship existed between the Auto Club and plaintiff, and thus the Auto Club had no duty under tort law to provide any assistance.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of Auto Club, holding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on an issue not presented in the moving papers. In this case, the trial court improperly decided the issue of duty where the contract had nothing to do with the question of causation identified by Auto Club's motion and its separate statement, nor did the reasonableness of plaintiff's reliance on Auto Club to timely provide roadside assistance. The court affirmed the judgment as to Brent-Air because plaintiff does not address Brent-Air on appeal. View "Luebke v. Automobile Club of Southern California" on Justia Law