Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Starbucks after she spilled a cup of hot tea she purchased from a Starbucks store and suffered second degree burns, alleging causes of action for products liability and negligence.The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that any alleged defect in the Starbucks cup did not cause plaintiff's injuries. The panel held that Starbucks met its burden of negating an element of plaintiff's products liability cause of action by showing the alleged defects in the cup of tea it served her were not a proximate cause of her injuries. In this case, plaintiff spilled her drink because, after she walked to the table with the two hot drinks in her hands, put her drink down, and removed the lid, she bent over the table, pushed out her chair, lost her balance, grabbed the table to avoid failing, and knocked her drink off the table. The court also held that Starbucks' alleged negligence by serving the allegedly defective cup was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. View "Shih v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

Cornejo died of a methamphetamine overdose at Highland Hospital after being arrested by California Highway Patrol officers during a traffic stop and observed to put in his mouth and swallow something that he insisted was gum, not drugs. Cornejo declined repeated offers of medical attention and no symptoms of drug intoxication were observed until after he was transferred to the custody of deputies at the jail.A jury ruled in favor of Cornejo’s parents in a suit for wrongful death predicated on the negligence of the officers who took Cornejo to jail rather than to the hospital, under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, 52.1). The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the defendants’ arguments that the officers had no duty to obtain a medical examination for Cornejo under the circumstances; that they fulfilled the scope of any duty they may have had by taking him to jail with on-site medical staff; that their failure to take him to the hospital was not a proximate cause of his death; and that the trial court erred in ruling the jury could not consider Cornejo’s intentional act of swallowing the methamphetamine in allocating comparative fault and in denying defendants’ motion to exclude evidence that the officers attempted to coerce an admission to possession of a controlled substance by conditioning medical treatment on Cornejo’s admitting he swallowed a controlled substance. View "Frausto v. Department of the California Highway Patrol" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Angela Bolger bought a replacement laptop computer battery on the online shopping website operated by defendant Amazon.com, LLC. The listing for the battery identified the seller as “E-Life,” a fictitious name used on Amazon by Lenoge Technology (HK) Ltd. (Lenoge). Amazon charged Bolger for the purchase, retrieved the laptop battery from its location in an Amazon warehouse, prepared the battery for shipment in Amazon-branded packaging, and sent it to Bolger. Bolger alleged the battery exploded several months later, and she suffered severe burns as a result. Bolger sued Amazon and several other defendants, including Lenoge, alleging causes of action for strict products liability, negligent products liability, breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty, and “negligence/negligent undertaking.” Lenoge was served but did not appear, so the trial court entered its default. Amazon then moved for summary judgment, arguing primarily that the doctrine of strict products liability, as well as any similar tort theory, did not apply to it because it did not distribute, manufacture, or sell the product in question. It claimed its website was an “online marketplace” and E-Life (Lenoge) was the product seller, not Amazon. The trial court agreed, granted Amazon’s motion, and entered judgment accordingly. Bolger appealed, arguing that Amazon was strictly liable for defective products offered on its website by third-party sellers like Lenoge. In the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed: "Amazon placed itself between Lenoge and Bolger in the chain of distribution of the product at issue here. ... Under established principles of strict liability, Amazon should be held liable if a product sold through its website turns out to be defective. Strict liability here “affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course of their continuing business relationship." View "Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC" on Justia Law

After Jasim Al-Kuraishi was killed in a car accident, Al-Kuraishi's wife filed a wrongful death action against defendant and others. Defendant, while driving on the highway, changed lanes and passed a stopped vehicle in order to avoid crashing into the stopped vehicle. Al-Kuraishi's vehicle, which was behind defendant's vehicle, then crashed into the stopped vehicle.The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the sudden emergency doctrine provides defendant with a complete defense and affirmed. The court held that an emergency or peril under the sudden emergency or imminent peril doctrine is a set of facts presented to the person alleged to have been negligent. Furthermore, it is irrelevant for purposes of the sudden emergency doctrine whether defendant's lane change created a dangerous situation for Al-Kuraishi or anyone else; the only relevant emergency is the one defendant faced. In this case, plaintiff's entire challenge to the trial court's order was that defendant created the emergency that resulted in Al-Kuraishi's death. However, the court explained that plaintiff's argument is focused on the wrong set of circumstances for application of the sudden emergency doctrine. View "Abdulkadhim v. Wu" on Justia Law

Defendants Silverado Senior Living Management, Inc., and Subtenant 350 W. Bay Street, LLC dba Silverado Senior Living – Newport Mesa appealed a trial court's denial of its petition to compel arbitration of the complaint filed by plaintiffs Diane Holley, both individually and as successor in interest to Elizabeth S. Holley, and James Holley. Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, who operated a senior living facility, for elder abuse and neglect, negligence, and wrongful death, based on defendants’ alleged substandard treatment of Elizabeth. More than eight months after the complaint was filed, defendants moved to arbitrate based on an arbitration agreement Diane had signed upon Elizabeth’s admission. At the time, Diane and James were temporary conservators of Elizabeth’s person. The court denied the motion, finding that at the time Diane signed the document, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate she had the authority to bind Elizabeth to the arbitration agreement. Defendants argued the court erred in this ruling as a matter of law, and that pursuant to the Probate Code, the agreement to arbitrate was a “health care decision” to which a conservator had the authority to bind a conservatee. Defendants relied on a case from the Third District Court of Appeal, Hutcheson v. Eskaton FountainWood Lodge, 17 Cal.App.5th 937 (2017). After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that Hutcheson and other cases on which defendants relied are distinguishable on the facts and relevant legal principles. "When the Holleys signed the arbitration agreement, they were temporary conservators of Elizabeth’s person, and therefore, they lacked the power to bind Elizabeth to an agreement giving up substantial rights without her consent or a prior adjudication of her lack of capacity. Further, as merely temporary conservators, the Holleys were constrained, as a general matter, from making long-term decisions without prior court approval." Accordingly, the trial court was correct that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable as to Elizabeth. Furthermore, because there was no substantial evidence that the Holleys intended to sign the arbitration agreement on their own behalf, it could not be enforced against their individual claims. The Courttherefore affirmed the trial court’s order denial to compel arbitration. View "Holley v. Silverado Senior Living Management" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against TIAA, and the companies that managed TIAA's property, after their son died when a hair care product he was handling at work exploded and he was engulfed in the resulting fire. In this case, the employer did not know the product was dangerous and thus did not comply with legal requirements for storing and labeling hazardous materials, or with provisions in the lease of the premises where the fire occurred. The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment.The Court of Appeal affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that there was no evidence defendants had actual or constructive knowledge the employer was storing and handling a hazardous material, and thus defendants owed no duty to the decedent. Therefore, the evidence shows no triable issue of material fact and defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the negligence per se, wrongful death, and survival causes of action. View "Oh v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n of America" on Justia Law

Johnson, a school district’s grounds manager and a heavy user of Roundup herbicides made by Monsanto, sued Monsanto after contracting non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. The jury found that Monsanto failed to adequately warn of its products’ potential dangers and that its products had a design defect. It awarded Johnson around $39.3 million in compensatory damages and $250 million in punitive damages. The court denied Monsanto’s motion for a new trial on the condition that Johnson accept a reduced award of punitive damages.The court of appeal affirmed in part. Monsanto was liable on the failure-to-warn claims because substantial evidence was presented that Roundup’s risks were “known or knowable” to Monsanto. The trial court did not err in allowing Johnson to proceed on a consumer expectations theory of design defect. Johnson presented abundant—and certainly substantial— evidence that the ingredients in Roundup, caused his cancer. Johnson’s causes of action were not preempted under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. 136. Monsanto has not established that the trial court erred in admitting or excluding evidence. The court reversed in part. The evidence does not support the entire award for future noneconomic damages. Johnson was entitled to punitive damages, but they should be reduced commensurate with the reduction of future noneconomic damages. View "Johnson v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

Wolf and her husband were walking with their dog in Tilden Regional Park. Dogs are allowed off-leash in this area, under their owners’ control. Weber and Cenek were walking on the same trail with Luigi, a “large” Argentinian Mastiff-Boxer mix. Both dogs were off-leash. Luigi wandered toward Wolf’s party. Weber and Cenek heard Wolf yell that she was afraid. Weber called for Luigi several times. Luigi began to return to Weber but Wolf turned away from Luigi. Something struck her in the back of her knee; she fell, dislocating her ankle and breaking two leg bones. Weber admitted that Luigi was not under perfect control.Wolf sued Weber, alleging negligence and negligence per se. Wolf alleged Weber breached his duty of care “by failing to leash or otherwise control Luigi.” The negligence per se action contended Weber violated the ordinance by failing to keep his dog under control. The court granted Weber summary judgment, finding that Wolf assumed the inherent risk of “being bumped by a dog.”The court of appeal reversed, finding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply. Given the duties and expectations that the park's ordinance establishes, being knocked over by an unleashed dog with which a person has sought no interaction is not an inherent risk. Controlling one’s dog is part of the “fundamental nature” of hiking on the park's leash-optional trails. View "Wolf v. Weber" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Kaiser in an action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that Kaiser was vicariously liable for a driver who hit and killed plaintiffs' son. The driver drove to an assisted living facility in his own vehicle and provided pet therapy to a Kaiser patient.The court held that the facts do not support a reasonable inference that Kaiser expressly or implied required the driver to use his own vehicle as a condition of his volunteer work. In this case, the evidence shows that Kaiser permitted pet therapy volunteers to select the means of transportation for themselves and their animals, assigned the therapists to provide therapy at a variety of locations, checked the liability insurance of all Kaiser volunteers who either provided a driver's license or used their own vehicles, had at one time offered to reimburse the driver for his mileage, and had an "arrangement" with the driver that he would use his own vehicle. The court also held that the driver's use of his personal vehicle did not provide an incidental benefit to Kaiser; the driver did not use a special mode of transportation; and the coming and going rule applies to the driver's drive. View "Savaikie v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Mentor, alleging causes of action for negligence and negligence per se based on Mentor's negligent failure to warn and negligent manufacturing of breast implants, strict products liability for failure to warn, and strict products liability for manufacturing defects.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and entered an order overruling the demurrer to the third amended complaint. The court held that the tort claims in this case survive preemption because they are premised on conduct that both violates the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and would give rise to a recovery under state law even in the absence of the MDA. The court also held that plaintiffs pleaded the requisite causal connection between their injuries and Mentor's tortious acts to survive a demurrer. Finally, the trial court erroneously sustained Mentor's demurrer to the loss of consortium claim because it was derivative of the other claims. View "Mize v. Mentor Worldwide LLC" on Justia Law