Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A public entity is not liable for an injury caused by a dangerous condition of public property unless the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition and the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred. After a motorist with a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others, recklessly tried to pass a tour bus on State Route 1, he struck a car driven by plaintiff head-on. Plaintiff was severely injured and his wife was killed. The jury returned a special verdict that a dangerous condition of public property existed but did not "create a reasonably foreseeable risk that this kind of incident would occur."The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in favor of defendants, holding that the special verdicts were not fatally or hopelessly inconsistent. The court explained that the jury could find that there was one and/or two dangerous conditions, but it had nothing to do with the collision or the collision was caused by a reckless driver. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that once the jury finds an unsafe condition of public property, the public entity was at least 1 percent at fault and a reckless driver could not be 100 percent at fault. The court also rejected plaintiff's remaining claims of error. View "Fuller v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the County, alleging that the County negligently caused a bus on which he was a passenger to strike a pillar in 2013. The jury found the County liable and awarded $5000 in damages, but then the trial court denied plaintiff's motion challenging the adequacy of the damages and denied plaintiff's post-trial motion for costs.The Court of Appeal held that the testimony of the County's medical expert went beyond the scope of permissible impeachment by an undesignated expert, and that the effect of admitting his opinion testimony was prejudicial. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment on the verdict and remanded for a new trial on all issues, with instructions to the trial court to vacate its order on the parties' post-trial motions and the judgment entered thereon. Finally, the court addressed additional contentions of error regarding issues likely to arise on retrial. View "Pina v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

After plaintiff broke her ankle on a stairway in the Bootjack Campground within Mt. Tamalpais State Park, she filed suit against State Parks for premises liability. The trial court awarded summary judgment to State Parks.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling that State Parks was entitled to immunity because the stairway is a "trail," or at least an "integral part" of a trail, within the meaning of Government Code section 831.4, subdivision (b). However, the court reversed the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs, holding that the issue of immunity was not so clear cut that plaintiff's lawsuit lacked reasonable cause. View "Lee v. Department of Parks and Recreation" on Justia Law

Donald Wilson entered a plea of no contest on a charge of felony child abuse in connection with events culminating in the death on his infant son. He and his wife (plaintiffs) then sued several individuals and entities who undertook to provide lifesaving services for the infant, asserting causes of action for medical malpractice, professional negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At issue in this appeal was the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to one of those causes of action (Second Cause of Action) against one of those defendants, San Joaquin County (the County). This cause of action sought to hold the County responsible for alleged negligence on the part of two firefighters employed by the City of Stockton (the City), who provided emergency medical services to the infant during his transport to San Joaquin General Hospital (the hospital). The trial court concluded Government Code section 850.6 provided the County with immunity under these circumstances. The Court of Appeal concluded this provision, which applied to “fire protection or firefighting” services, did not apply to the emergency medical services provided by the firefighters in this case. View "Wilson v. County of San Joaquin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Charles Huckey sued defendant and respondent, City of Temecula (the City), for injuries he sustained from tripping and falling on a defective city sidewalk. He alleged the sidewalk defect was a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment on the ground the sidewalk defect was trivial as a matter of law. The sidewalk was vertically uneven between two concrete panels, and the height differential was 9/16 of an inch, three feet and one foot from the sidewalk’s right edge, and one and 7/32 inches (1.21875 inches), at the right edge, as plaintiff was walking when he fell. On appeal, plaintiff argued: (1) the City did not meet its initial burden of making a prima facie evidentiary showing that he could not establish that the sidewalk defect was a dangerous condition, or presented a substantial risk of injury; and (2) the court erroneously concluded that the sidewalk defect was trivial as a matter of law. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the City met its initial burden on its motion, and plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact. All of the papers adduced on the motion show that the sidewalk defect was trivial as a matter of law. View "Huckey v. City of Temecula" on Justia Law

The owners and operators of a skilled nursing facility contended the trial court erred when it denied their petition to compel arbitration. They attempted to enforce arbitration in this action for elder abuse and wrongful death brought by a decedent through her husband as successor in interest, her husband individually, and their children. Appellants claimed the successor had signed the arbitration agreements as the decedent’s authorized agent. The trial court determined that although the successor did not sign the agreements as the decedent’s agent, he expressly bound himself to arbitrate all claims he held individually and as the successor in interest. As a result, the decedent’s claim for elder abuse and the husband’s individual claim for wrongful death were subject to arbitration. However, the court denied the petition because the children’s claims were not subject to arbitration, and allowing the arbitration and the litigation to proceed concurrently could result in inconsistent findings of fact and law. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against AUIC, alleging that the release it procured from the insured was fraudulent conveyance under statutory and common law. In this case, the insured was involved in a car accident that injured plaintiff. AUIC paid the insured to release any bad faith claim he had against the company for AUIC's failure to accept an earlier settlement offer.The Court of Appeal held that California's Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA) filing deadlines did not pose a bar to plaintiff's UVTA cause of action; the operative complaint stated a valid UVTA claim against the insured; and plaintiff waived any challenge to the demurrer ruling on the common law cause of action. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Potter v. Alliance United Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against DCFS and a private foster care agency, alleging claims of negligence and failure to perform statutorily mandated duties which resulted in sexual abuse by her foster mother's two sons. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of nonsuit and postjudgment awards of attorney fees, but reduced costs by $6,988.37.The court held that the trial court properly granted nonsuit, because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find in her favor. In this case, there was no evidence Children's Institute owed plaintiff a duty to protect her from the brothers because their sexual abuse was not foreseeable or imminent. Furthermore, the evidence presented by plaintiff was insufficient to permit a jury to find the county's breach of three mandatory duties was a proximate cause of her injuries. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied leave to file a fifth amended complaint, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney fees for unreasonably denied requests for admission. Finally, the court modified the postjudgment order to reflect trial costs are additionally taxed for disallowed costs for investigative expenses. View "Doe v. Department of Children & Family Services" on Justia Law

Williams, a musician, sued the Fremont Corners Shopping Center for negligence and premises liability after he was assaulted in its parking lot at about 1:30 a.m after performing in the Peacock Lounge in the shopping center. Fremont and Peacock asserted they were not aware of prior similar incidents; the shopping center had lighting and security cameras. Williams responded by offering records of service calls from the Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, showing five calls for service to Fremont in the preceding year, including police reports of a simple assault, a battery with serious bodily injury, and a physical altercation with an unknown suspect, which resulted in the victim suffering a broken jaw. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Fremont. The landowner had no duty to take affirmative measures, beyond those in the record, to discover criminal activity on the premises. Williams could not support his allegations that the assault was reasonably foreseeable. The evidence demonstrated that the owner was generally aware of the possibility of fights erupting at or near Peacock but a general knowledge of the possibility of violent criminal conduct is not in itself enough to create a duty under California law, Williams has not asserted what measures Fremont should have taken to prevent the harm that he endured. View "Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc." on Justia Law

After a flying mattress made plaintiff swerve on a freeway and crash at high speed, she filed suit against the company that failed to secure the mattress.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court misinstructed the jury regarding the excuse instruction, CACI 420. Because it was equally probable the jury found for the company on an erroneous excuse theory as it was that jurors found the company had no mattress, the court could not say that this error was not harmless. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. The court noted that, on retrial, the trial court must give neither CACI 420 nor any other excuse instruction based on these facts. Furthermore, it would also be appropriate to include a question on a special verdict form, if one is used again, to isolate the jury's determination about whether the company did or did not break the secure-the-cargo law. View "Baker-Smith v. Skolnick" on Justia Law