Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gaurano, driving home from a day of working at the convention center in a vehicle rented through Lyft’s “Express Drive program,” struck the plaintiffs’ vehicles and caused significant injuries. The trial court granted Lyft summary judgment.The court of appeal affirmed. Gaurano was not acting within the scope of his employment with Lyft at the time of the accident. The court rejected arguments that Lyft required drivers to drive the rental, that driving the rental was “ ‘incident to [Gaurano’s] duties’ ” because he had to be in the rental to pick up rides, and that Lyft’s encouragement of personal driving in the rental made accidents more likely. As a matter of law, Gaurano had substantially deviated from any duties he performed for Lyft at the time of the accident. Gaurano had not worked for Lyft on that day and had no intention of doing so. The potential for Gaurano to log onto the Lyft platform, alone, is insufficient to bring all of his personal driving within the scope of his Lyft employment. Gaurano’s conduct was not foreseeable and Lyft derived no benefit from it. The court also rejected an argument that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of a person most qualified (PMQ) deposition. View "Marez v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

Sun Pacific appealed the trial court's judgment after a jury awarded damages against it for injuries sustained by an employee of one of its independent contractors.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial on the negligence cause of action. The court held that the trial court prejudicially erred because it did not instruct the jury on the Privette/Hooker doctrine as it applies to either negligence or premises liability; Sun Pacific did not forfeit its challenge to the negligence instructions; and the trial court's error was prejudicial. The court also held that the trial court improperly refused a jury instruction on mitigation of damages based on the employee's delay in seeking medical care, and Sun Pacific was entitled to the instruction. Because a properly instructed jury could have found Sun Pacific liable for negligence, the court remanded so a properly instructed jury may evaluate the evidence. Finally, the court held that judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted on the premises liability cause of action. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Alaniz v. Sun Pacific Shippers, LP" on Justia Law

Teed promoted himself online as a real estate agent with “over 25 years of experience as a building contractor” with “an extensive background in historic restorations.” Moore believed that Teed was a general contractor. Moore toured homes that Teed had renovated and retained Teed as his agent. Moore bought a large San Francisco fixer-upper house for $4.8 million. The home was built in 1912 and was last updated in the 1950s. Moore borrowed significantly. Teed received a commission from the sale. Teed was not a licensed contractor; his team of contractors gutted large parts of the house and excavated the lot but the foundation was defective. After Moore became aware of the defects, he halted all work and engaged consultants, who concluded, despite Teed's strong resistance, that the foundation had to be torn out and replaced. Teed’s structural engineer agreed and privately apologized to Moore. Moore had paid about $265,000 of the $900,000 promised cost for Teed’s renovations. A jury awarded Moore his out-of-pocket expenses for replacing the foundation and benefit-of-the-bargain damages for the additional cost he incurred in obtaining the promised renovations. Conceding liability, Teed challenged the award. The court of appeal affirmed that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are available to fully compensate a plaintiff for all the detriment proximately caused by a fraudulent fiduciary’s actions and the award of statutory attorney fees and costs based on the jury’s special verdict finding that Teed violated the Contractors’ State License Law. View "Moore v. Teed" on Justia Law

While Michael Tilkey and his girlfriend Jacqueline Mann were visiting at her home in Arizona, they got into an argument. Tilkey decided to leave the apartment. When he stepped out onto the enclosed patio to collect his belongings, Mann locked the door behind him. Tilkey banged on the door to regain entry, and Mann called police. Police arrested Tilkey and charged him under Arizona law with criminal damage deface, possession or use of drug paraphernalia, and disorderly conduct, disruptive behavior. Domestic violence charges were attached to the criminal damage and disorderly conduct charges. Tilkey pled guilty to the disorderly conduct charge only; the other two charges were dropped. After Tilkey completed a domestic nonviolence diversion program, the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed. Before the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed, Tilkey's company of 30 years, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), terminated his employment based on his arrest for a domestic violence offense and his participation in the diversion program. Allstate informed Tilkey it was discharging him for threatening behavior and/or acts of physical harm or violence to another person. Following the termination, Allstate reported its reason for the termination to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA); that information was accessible to any firm that hired licensed broker-dealers like Tilkey. Tilkey sued Allstate for wrongful termination in violation of Labor Code section 432.7 and compelled, self-published defamation. At trial, Allstate presented evidence that it would have terminated his employment based on after-acquired evidence that Tilkey had circulated obscene and inappropriate e-mails using company resources. The jury returned a verdict in Tilkey's favor on all causes of action, advising the court that it did not find Allstate's after-acquired evidence defense credible. Allstate appealed, contending: (1) it did not violate section 432.7, so there was no wrongful termination; (2) compelled self-published defamation per se was not a viable tort theory; (3) it did not defame Tilkey because there was not substantial evidence its statement was not substantially true; (4) punitive damages were unavailable in compelled self-publication defamation causes of action; (5) the defamatory statement was not made with malice; and (6) the punitive damages awarded here were unconstitutionally excessive. The Court of Appeal agreed Allstate did not violate section 432.7 when it terminated Tilkey's employment based on his plea and his participation in an Arizona domestic nonviolence program, and reversed that judgment. The Court also agreed that compelled self-published defamation was a viable theory, and affirmed that judgment. The Court determined the pubitive damages awarded here were not proportionate to the compensatory damages for defamation, and remanded for recalculation of those damages. View "Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Schreiber resided in her apartment since the building was built in 1980. She was seriously injured when she fell through a skylight built into the apartment's deck. Lee built and previously owned the three-unit building. At the time of the accident, Lee’s adult children owned the property, which was managed by Golden. Before trial, Schreiber settled with the Lee children for $2.5 million. The trial court denied Lee’s motion for nonsuit on the ground Schreiber’s claims were based on a patent construction defect and barred by the statute of repose.The jury awarded Schreiber damages of over $2.6 million, allocating 12 percent of fault to Schreiber, 54 percent to Lee, 16 percent to Golden, and 18 percent collectively to the Lee children. After reducing the verdict to reflect Schreiber’s percentage of fault, the court offset the entirety of the economic damages by the amount of the settlement attributable to such damages; it denied any credit to Lee and Golden for the noneconomic damages and entered judgment against Lee for $756,000 and against Golden for $224,000. The court of appeal affirmed in all respects except as to the settlement credit, Golden, but not Lee, is entitled to a credit against both economic and noneconomic damages. The court noted the "unusual circumstances," that the Lee children were not only found independently negligent but also bore imputed liability for Golden's negligence. View "Schreiber v. Lee" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was struck by a car while crossing a street on her way to school, she filed suit against the city. Plaintiff alleged that the intersection in which she was hit constituted a dangerous condition of public property within the meaning of Government Code section 835. A jury returned a defense verdict and found that the property was not a dangerous condition at the time of the accident.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not commit evidentiary error in relying on the privilege set forth pursuant to 23 U.S.C. 409 to preclude admission of a document in which defendant acknowledged the subject intersection was hazardous. The court also rejected plaintiff's claim that defense counsel committed misconduct during trial. Furthermore, any potential jury confusion was cured by the trial court's thorough instructions to the jury. View "Ford v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In the absence of any clear legislative statement on the issue, a physician assistant acts within the scope of his or her license for purposes of Civil Code section 3333.2, subdivision (c)(2) if he or she has a legally enforceable agency agreement with a supervising physician, regardless of the quality of actual supervision.After plaintiff prevailed in her negligence claims, the trial court awarded noneconomic damages, but reduced them under section 3333.2, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's reduction of the damages awarded, rejecting plaintiff's claim that the negligence of the physician assistants is included within the scope of the proviso excluding certain conduct from statutory damages because the physician assistants acted without the supervision of a physician in violation of the governing statutes and regulations. View "Lopez v. Ledesma" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their negligence cause of action against Technicolor. The jury found that Technicolor had been negligent and that its negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to plaintiffs, assigning 95 percent responsibility to Technicolor. After the trial court reduced the jury's damages awards, judgment was entered in the amount of $803,838.30 for economic damages and $2,083,920 for noneconomic damages, for a total award of $2,887,758.30.The court held that substantial evidence supported the verdict where there was substantial evidence that Technicolor could have satisfied the labor verification requirement, and that Technicolor's negligence left plaintiffs in a worse position. The court also held that workers' compensation exclusivity was inapplicable and rejected Technicolor's remaining claims. View "Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Services USA" on Justia Law

Father knew his son, C.B., had been addicted to drugs for a number of years, and "had paid on numerous prior occasions" for C.B. to undergo "detox and/or drug rehabilitation and treatment programs to treat his addiction." C.B. was not employed and was "dependent" on Father for financial support. Father provided "regular, consistent, and frequent financial support" to C.B., which included paying for C.B.'s housing and living expenses as well as giving him money for spending and "necessities of life." The question posed by this appeal was whether Father could be held liable for the death of his son's girlfriend by overdose on methamphetamine allegedly purchased or supplied by the adult son. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of a wrongful death complaint filed against Father. The trial court concluded no special relationship existed between Father and his adult son such that Father should be held liable for wrongful death of the girlfriend. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and affirmed dismissal. View "K.G. v. S.B." on Justia Law

After a seaman's hands were injured on a commercial fishing vessel out on the Gulf of Mexico and he ultimately loss some of his fingers due to infection, he filed suit against the vessel's owner and the production company that was filming a reality TV show on the vessel.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the production company, holding that the production company was not liable under the Jones Act because plaintiff was not an "employee" or a "borrowed servant" to the production company. The court declined to construe the borrowed servant doctrine in the maritime context to impose a duty upon passengers and observers on a vessel to undertake acts inconsistent with the orders of the vessel's captain. The court also held that the production company was not liable under maritime tort law because there were not genuine issues of material fact as to whether the production company had a "special relationship" with plaintiff, the production company's rescue attempts were grossly negligent, and the production company acted negligently in taking charge of a "helpless" person. View "McHenry v. Asylum Entertainment Delaware, LLC" on Justia Law