Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An owner of a parking lot, who leases that space out to a mobile food vendor, was not, as a matter of policy, liable for all harm that occurs during the hours of operation of that vendor regardless of intervening acts by third parties. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendant in an action alleging negligence and premises liability after plaintiff was struck and then dragged by a vehicle exiting defendant's parking lot. The court held that defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff where the conduct of the driver was not foreseeable or derivative of defendant's conduct in designing, leasing or operating the parking lot. In this case, neither plaintiff nor his wife anticipated or expected the driver of the vehicle to suddenly reverse his car out of the crowded parking lot and into the street at high speed while still in the midst of dealing with the first accident. View "Sakai v. Massco Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against their landlord for alleged negligence after a fire in an upstairs apartment caused injuries to several tenants. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the landlord, holding that defendant met his initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence that plaintiffs would not be able to establish the element of causation. The court also held that plaintiffs' reference to the discrepancy in the declaration of an expert fire investigator without evidence to establish the significance thereof on the issue of causation, was insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact; plaintiffs never properly alleged a cause of action based on a failure to warn theory; potential inferences that arguably arose under the evidence offered by defendant were not sufficient to create a triable issue of fact; and plaintiffs' 11th-hour spoliation claim was properly disregarded by the trial court under the circumstances. View "Leyva v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, survivors of the decedent who fell to his death while washing windows, filed suit against TCI for negligence and negligence per se, alleging that decedent was fatally injured because TCI failed to install structural roof anchors, as required by statute, to which decedent could attach a descent apparatus. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for TCI. The court explained that Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, and its progeny held that when a property owner hires an independent contractor, the property owner is not liable for injuries sustained by the contractor's employees unless the defendant's affirmative conduct contributed to the injuries. The court held, in this case, that the undisputed evidence was that TCI did not direct how the window washing should be done nor otherwise interfere with the means or methods of accomplishing the work. Therefore, TCI was not vicariously liable to plaintiffs for the negligence of the contractor or its employees. View "Delgadillo v. Television Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnson worked successively as a firefighter for South San Francisco (CSSF) and Pacifica. He developed nasopharyngeal cancer. Labor Code section 3212.11 establishes a presumption that cancer manifesting during and for a specified period following employment in certain public safety positions, including firefighters, arose out of and in the course of that employment. Section 5500.5(a) limits employer liability for a cumulative injury to the employer who employed the applicant during the one year preceding the earliest of the date of injury or the last date of injurious exposure to the hazards that caused the injury, so either CSSF or Pacifica would be potentially responsible for compensation for the entire injury. CSSF settled Johnson's workers’ compensation claim and sought contribution from Pacifica. An arbitrator denied the petition, ruling that evidence of the latency period for Johnson's cancer showed the injurious exposure occurred during Johnson’s earlier employment with CSSF. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board adopted the order. CSSF argued the Board erroneously utilized a more lenient preponderance evidentiary standard in applying section 5500.5(a), rather than the more stringent cancer presumption rebuttal standard of section 3212.1. The court of appeal affirmed; the evidence supports the award. Worker protection policies embodied in section 3212.1 are not implicated in the allocation of liability between employers. View "City of South San Francisco v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Guzman was operating a soil compactor on a hillside with a 45-degree slope when the compactor hit a rock. The compactor rose in the air, causing Guzman to fall backward, and then fell on top of him. The workers’ compensation judge determined that Guzman sustained an injury to his back and psyche and that the psychiatric injury was caused by a “sudden and extraordinary employment condition,” Lab. Code, 3208.3(d). The workers’ compensation carrier for Guzman’s employer unsuccessfully sought reconsideration by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, arguing that Guzman failed to meet his burden of proving that his psychiatric injury was caused by a “sudden and extraordinary employment condition.” The court of appeal annulled the Board’s order denying reconsideration. Guzman did not provide any evidence establishing that it is “uncommon, unusual, and totally unexpected” for a rock to be in soil, for a compactor to rise when striking a rock, or for an operator to become unbalanced and to fall when the compactor rises on a 45-degree hillside. He did not introduce any evidence regarding what regularly or routinely happens if a compactor hits a rock on a slope. Guzman admitted that he had previously worked on flat surfaces only. View "State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, a professional window washer, filed a premises liability action against defendant, after he lost his footing and fell off the roof of defendant's house. Plaintiff alleged that loose rocks, pebbles and sand on the roof of the property constituted a dangerous condition that had caused him to fall. The court held that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff's claims were precluded under the doctrine in Privette v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.4th 689, which prohibits an independent contractor or his employees from suing the hirer of the contractor for workplace injuries. In this case, there were triable issues of fact regarding the hazardous condition exception to the Privette Doctrine. View "Gonzalez v. Mathis" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the trial court's order awarding costs to plaintiffs in a wrongful death case under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the joint offer to settle both wrongful death claims was valid. The court held that the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs costs under section 998. In this case, defendants did not anticipate that either wrongful death claim, standing alone, would exceed the settlement offer. The court explained that this was precisely the situation in which an additional cost award under section 998 was appropriate and in furtherance of the goal of encouraging parties to accept reasonable settlement offers. View "Gonzalez v. Lew" on Justia Law

A woman checked into a hotel room in the early evening. She did not answer her husband’s calls for several hours. He suspected that she may have been injured. The husband called the hotel and a maintenance worker checked the room. The worker reported that no one was there. Hours later, the husband went to the hotel room and found his wife lying on the floor. She had suffered a brain aneurism. The couple sued the hotel and the maintenance worker’s employer (a staffing agency) for negligence. The agency filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no legal duty to the married couple. The trial court granted the motion and the couple appealed. Ordinarily, a person has no legal duty to come to the aid of another; however, if that person does, and does so without exercising reasonable care, the person coming to the aid of the other may be responsible for any damages caused under a “negligent undertaking” theory of liability. The Court of Appeal could not say as a matter of law that the maintenance worker owed no legal duty; there were triable issues of material fact such that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment and reverse. View "O'Malley v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions" on Justia Law

A woman checked into a hotel room in the early evening. She did not answer her husband’s calls for several hours. He suspected that she may have been injured. The husband called the hotel and a maintenance worker checked the room. The worker reported that no one was there. Hours later, the husband went to the hotel room and found his wife lying on the floor. She had suffered a brain aneurism. The couple sued the hotel and the maintenance worker’s employer (a staffing agency) for negligence. The agency filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no legal duty to the married couple. The trial court granted the motion and the couple appealed. Ordinarily, a person has no legal duty to come to the aid of another; however, if that person does, and does so without exercising reasonable care, the person coming to the aid of the other may be responsible for any damages caused under a “negligent undertaking” theory of liability. The Court of Appeal could not say as a matter of law that the maintenance worker owed no legal duty; there were triable issues of material fact such that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment and reverse. View "O'Malley v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions" on Justia Law

Turley sued multiple defendants, alleging that he has an asbestos-related disease caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products, including valve gaskets, during his 36-year employment at PG&E. Interrogatory responses stated that Turley was exposed to asbestos-containing pipe products supplied by Familian, including “asbestos cement transite pipe, pipe collars, gaskets, elbows, pipe-repair products and other asbestos products.” Familian moved for summary judgment. arguing that plaintiffs could not show exposure to asbestos in a Familian-related product. Turley submitted a declaration from a third-party witness, Scott, who had not been deposed. The court allowed Scott to be deposed. Familian used portions of the deposition in its reply. The court concluded that the deposition testimony “conclusively negates” Scott’s declaration testimony as to exposure, refused to consider it, and granted summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed, stating that ambiguity in the evidence should be resolved at trial. Scott’s testimony established that Familian-supplied asbestos-containing gaskets were frequently used at Turley’s worksite and that Turley used them. That Familian was not the only supplier did not warrant the conclusion that Turley did not establish exposure. There was no direct contradiction between Scott’s declaration and his deposition testimony with respect to several areas, so his testimony should not have been disregarded. View "Turley v. Familian Corp." on Justia Law