Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Erika Grotheer was a non-English speaking German citizen who took a hot air balloon ride in the Temecula wine country and suffered a fractured leg when the basket carrying her and seven or eight others crash landed into a fence. Grotheer sued three defendants for her injuries: the balloon tour company, Escape Adventures, Inc. (Escape), the pilot and Escape’s agent, Peter Gallagher (Gallagher), and Wilson Creek Vineyards, Inc. (Wilson Creek). The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Grotheer could not satisfy the elements of a negligence claim and, even if she could, she had waived the right to assert such a claim by signing Escape’s liability waiver before the flight. The trial court agreed Grotheer could not establish the element of duty, finding Grotheer had assumed the risk of her injury under the primary assumption of risk doctrine and, as a result, Escape and Gallagher owed her no duty of care whatsoever. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, and Grotheer appealed. Grotheer argued the trial court erred in concluding her claim was barred by primary assumption of risk and reasserted on appeal that Escape was a common carrier. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, but on a different ground than relied on by the trial court: (1) a balloon tour company like Escape was not a common carrier subject to a heightened duty of care; (2) the primary assumption of risk doctrine bars Grotheer’s claim that Gallagher negligently failed to slow the balloon’s descent to avoid a crash landing; and (3) Escape does have a duty to provide safe landing instructions to its passengers, but the undisputed evidence regarding the crash demonstrates that any failure on Escape’s part to provide such instructions was not the cause of Grotheer’s injury. View "Grotheer v. Escape Adventures" on Justia Law

Congress has expressed no intent to foreclose tort liability against cigarette manufacturers, even if liability may have some negative impact on the sale of cigarettes. But-for causation does not apply in a case of multiple causes, different combinations of which are sufficient to have caused the harm. In this case, after her husband died of lung cancer, plaintiff filed suit against several cigarette manufacturers, including Lorillard, as well as manufacturers of asbestos to which he had been exposed. All defendants settled except Lorillard. The court held that federal law did not preempt plaintiff's claim; Lorillard was not entitled to an instruction that cigarettes were lawful; the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on but-for causation; there was sufficient evidence that the defective cigarette design was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's husband's cancer; the trial court did not prejudicially err in excluding evidence of asbestos exposure and causation; and the trial court did not err in refusing to award prejudgment interest for the time the dismissal agreement was in effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in all respects. View "Major v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit against the City after her grandson died during a police pursuit. Plaintiff claimed that an officer acted negligently and committed battery by performing a Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT) that caused the vehicle in which her grandson was a passenger in, to spin into a street light pole. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the City was immune from liability for the officer's conduct under Vehicle Code section 17004.7. Section 17004.7 provided immunity to a public agency employing peace officers when the agency adopts and promulgates a policy on vehicular pursuits in compliance with the requirements of the statute. View "Ramirez v. City of Gardena" on Justia Law

Defendant Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company (Coldwell) marketed a vacant, bank-owned property in Simi Valley for sale. The property had a backyard with an empty swimming pool and diving board. While plaintiffs Jacques and Xenia Jacobs were viewing the property as potential buyers, Jacques stepped onto the diving board to look over the fence. The diving board base collapsed and Jacques fell into the empty pool. Plaintiffs sued Coldwell for negligence and loss of consortium. The trial court granted Coldwell’s motion for summary judgment, finding Coldwell was entitled to judgment on plaintiffs’ claim regarding the negligent condition of the diving board. Plaintiffs argued that they also were claiming that the empty pool was a dangerous condition. The court rejected this unpled, undisclosed theory of liability, concluding that even if the theory had been pled, Coldwell could not be held liable for failing to remedy the dangerous condition of the empty pool because Jacques’ accident was not reasonably foreseeable. The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co." on Justia Law

Marlene Baker LaBerge, a 73-year-old woman, was a resident and patient of a 24- hour skilled nursing facility owned by Italian Maple Holdings, LLC dba La Paloma Healthcare Center (La Paloma). LaBerge's heirs, Paul LaBerge, Suzanne Marx, and Talmadge Baker (collectively Plaintiffs) sued La Paloma and Plum Healthcare, LLC (together Defendants) for elder abuse, violations of the Patient's Bill of Rights as codified at Health and Safety Code section 1430, negligence, and wrongful death. In response, Defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration based on the two arbitration agreements that LaBerge had executed. The two arbitration agreements included language required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, subdivision (c), requiring such agreements to include a 30-day "cooling off" period, during which the parties to the agreement may rescind it. Ten days after LaBerge signed the agreements (and therefore, prior to the expiration of the statutorily-required 30- day rescission period), LaBerge passed away. The superior court denied the petition to compel arbitration, relying on Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 176 Cal.App.4th 1461 (2009) to conclude that the agreements were not effective until the 30-day rescission period passed without either party rescinding the agreements; because LaBerge died before the expiration of the 30-day rescission period, the agreements could not be given effect. On appeal, Defendants contended the trial court’s interpretation was wrong, and the Court of Appeal should decline to follow Rodriguez because that case was factually distinguishable from this case. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in interpreting section 1295, subdivision (c), and that the arbitration agreements were valid and enforceable. Pursuant to the plain language of section 1295, subdivision (c), the terms of those agreements governed the parties' relationship upon their execution; the fact that one signatory died before the expiration of the statutory 30-day rescission period does not render the terms of the parties' agreements unenforceable in the absence of other grounds for not enforcing them. View "Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings" on Justia Law

After his son drowned in a swimming pool owned by defendants, plaintiff filed suit for general negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to treat the premature appeal as an appeal from the judgment and addressed the trial court's decision on the merits. The court held, with respect to the negligent supervision claim, that where, as here, the homeowner, having initially assumed responsibility for supervision of the child, turned over such responsibility to an adult close relative who accepted it and did not thereafter relinquish it, the homeowner owed no duty of care to protect the child. In regard to the premises liability claim, the court held that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to causation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Taylor v. Trimble" on Justia Law

Mission Bay Park was the largest man-made aquatic park in the country. While Lorin Toeppe was walking through Mission Bay Park with her boyfriend, a branch fell off a eucalyptus tree and struck her. Toeppe sustained serious injuries. She filed suit against the City of San Diego (City) alleging the existence of a dangerous condition on public property, namely a negligently maintained eucalyptus tree. The City prevailed on summary judgment, arguing that Toeppe was struck by the tree branch while standing on a trail; thus, the City could not be liable under Government Code section 831.4 (trail immunity). Toeppe appealed the subsequent final judgment following the City's successful motion for summary judgment. Toeppe argued: (1) trail immunity did not apply under the facts of this case because her claim of a dangerous condition was based on a negligently maintained eucalyptus tree, not the condition of the trail passing through the park; and (2) even if trail immunity did apply, a disputed issue of material fact existed as to where she was located when the branch struck her. The Court of Appeal agreed with her on both grounds, and thus reversed. View "Toeppe v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Defendants David Hernandez and D&H Trucking appealed from a $3.3 million personal injury judgment entered against them after plaintiff sustained serious injuries from a car accident with Hernandez's truck. The Court of Appeal affirmed and held that a reasonable trier of fact could find by a preponderance of the evidence that it was reasonably certain plaintiff would need four future shoulder surgeries. View "David v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Under Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette), an independent contractor's employee generally may not recover tort damages for work-related injuries from the contractor's hirer. Plaintiff filed suit against Evergreen and two of its contractors for general negligence after he was injured at work when he drove a maintenance van into a shipping container. Plaintiff was employed with PCMC, which had been hired by Evergreen. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants based on the Privette doctrine. The court held that defendants met their burden as the moving parties on summary judgment and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. View "Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC" on Justia Law

In a products liability case, plaintiffs Kawika and Sandra Demara appealed the grant of summary judgment granted in favor of defendants The Raymond Corporation (Raymond) and Raymond Handling Solutions, Inc. (RHSI). As pertinent to the appeal, Plaintiffs asserted claims for strict liability and negligence based on injuries Kawika suffered allegedly as a result of design defects in a forklift designed by Raymond and sold by RHSI. In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled, in part: (1) Plaintiffs did not establish a triable issue of material fact as to causation; (2) the consumer expectation test did not apply as a matter of law; and (3) for purposes of applying the risk-benefit test, even if Plaintiffs had shown a triable issue of material fact as to causation, Defendants established the requisite elements for the application of the risk-benefit test, and Plaintiffs did not establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether the benefits of the design outweighed the risks of the design. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in these rulings: (1) because Plaintiffs' showing as to causation was more than negligible or theoretical, it was sufficient to defeat summary judgment; (2) Defendants did not meet their burden of establishing as a matter of law that the consumer expectation test does not apply to Plaintiffs' claims; and (3) in applying the risk-benefit test, Defendants failed to present sufficient evidence to shift the burden to Plaintiffs to show a triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded with instructions to deny Defendants' motion. View "Demara v. The Raymond Corp." on Justia Law