Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Respondent Denise Duncan sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) for personal injuries she sustained at one of Wal-Mart’s stores while acting within the course and scope of her employment with Acosta, Inc. (Acosta). The trial court entered judgment finding Wal-Mart liable for Duncan’s injuries. Under Labor Code sections 3852 and 3856, appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company (Hartford) applied for a lien on Duncan’s judgment to obtain reimbursement for the workers’ compensation benefits it paid Duncan, including medical expenses and temporary disability payments for lost wages. Although the judgment included compensation for Duncan’s medical expenses, it did not include compensation for Duncan’s lost wages because she did not seek those damages at trial. The court granted Hartford a lien on Duncan’s judgment, but reduced the lien amount to exclude the indemnity payments for lost wages. Hartford appealed the trial court’s postjudgment order, arguing the court exceeded its authority by reducing the lien amount for any item other than reasonable attorney fees and costs. The Court of Appeal agreed because section 3856’s plain language and the case law applying it granted Hartford a first lien on the judgment in the amount it paid Duncan for worker’s compensation benefits. Duncan’s choice not to seek lost wages at trial did not diminish Hartford’s lien rights under the workers’ compensation statutory scheme. View "Duncan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-respondents Virgil and Glenda Jensen contended they suffered damages caused by a negligently maintained rental truck, rented by his supervisor, Charles Scannell, which blew a tire while Virgil was driving it. Defendant-appellant U-Haul Co. of California (UHCA) appealed the trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. UHCA contended plaintiffs were bound by the arbitration agreement in the rental contract, even though neither plaintiff was a party to that contract. The Court of Appeal’s review of plaintiffs’ complaint showed that plaintiffs did not rely or depend on the terms of the rental in asserting their claims, and none of their allegations were in any way founded in or bound up with the terms or obligations of that agreement. UHCA, citing to general principles and cases that it contended were analogous, argued that plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate their claims, even though they are not signatories to the agreement between Scannell and UHCA, on any of three theories: third-party beneficiary, agency, or estoppel. The Court of Appeal was not persuaded and affirmed the trial court. View "Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's determination that equitable estoppel did not apply to LAUSD's assertions of noncompliance with the Government Claims Act. In this case, plaintiffs filed suit against LASPD when an LASPD vehicle ran a red light and struck them. Upon learning that the vehicle was insured by LAUSD, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add LAUSD as a defendant. LAUSD moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of the Government Claims Act because no government claim was ever filed with LAUSD. The court held that plaintiffs presented evidence sufficient to permit a finding that LAUSD was estopped from asserting noncompliance with the Government Claims Act as a defense. View "Santos v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

A third party can not sue a merchant for negligence in breaching duties when the merchant sells a high-end sports car to its customer and the customer pays for most of the car with two checks the third party made out to the merchant. A customer's payment with a check not in the customer's own name, by itself, is not a red flag. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary adjudication dismissing the third party's negligence and related claims against the merchant. View "QDOS, Inc. v. Signature Financial, LLC" on Justia Law

Oregon State University (Oregon State) petitioned for a peremptory writ of mandate to direct the superior court to vacate an order overruling Oregon State's demurrer to George Sutherland's first amended complaint and to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. Sutherland's complaint asserted causes of action for negligence and negligent misrepresentation against Oregon State. Sutherland was severely injured when a crane he was operating tipped over. At the time, he was using the crane to load a stack container owned by Oregon State onto a vessel owned by his employer, the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, a department of the University of California, San Diego. The stack container's weight was not displayed on its exterior and was not accurately recorded on the bill of lading provided by Oregon State. Oregon State contended the challenged order violated the federal Constitution's full faith and credit clause because the complaint did not and could not allege Sutherland's compliance with the Oregon Tort Claims Act's 180-day claims notice provision. Sutherland maintained the Clause did not require his compliance with the provision because requiring compliance would violate California's public policy by effectively depriving him of a remedy against Oregon State. Alternatively, Sutherland argued if the Clause does require compliance with the provision, he could amend the complaint to plead facts showing compliance. The California Court of Appeal agreed the superior court should have sustained Oregon State's demurrer because the Oregon Tort Claims Act's claims notice provision was entitled to full faith and credit in California. The provision does not conflict with or violate California's public policy and declining to give the provision full faith and credit would evince an impermissible policy of discriminatory hostility to the provision. Sutherland demonstrated he could plead facts showing compliance with the provision, so the Court granted the petition in part and directed the superior court to vacate its order overruling Oregon State's demurrer and enter a new order sustaining the demurrer with leave to amend. View "Oregon State University v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs' vehicle entered into a dark intersection and was struck by another car, they filed a negligence suit against the entity responsible for maintaining the battery backup unit for the traffic signal that was out. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, holding that whether the duty question was analyzed under either Biakanja v. Irving, (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, or Rest.2d Torts, 324A criteria, defendant failed to establish as a matter of law the absence of a duty to plaintiffs. View "Lichtman v. Siemens Industry Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, we deny relief on a petition for review of an award of benefits made by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). In 2006, while working at Pearson Ford, Leopoldo Hernandez accidentally slammed the trunk of a car on his left hand and crushed one of his fingers. Although no bones in his hand were broken, he was unable to continue working at Pearson Ford because of continuing pain in his hand and shoulder. Hernandez applied for and received workers' compensation benefits. Pearson Ford's workers' compensation carrier retained the services of a private investigator, who conducted video surveillance of Hernandez following each of the three visits to his doctor in early 2010. Following each visit, Hernandez was observed taking off his sling, using his left hand to get in and out of his truck or a car, using his left hand to steer his truck or car, and on one occasion stopping at a grocery store and using his left hand to carry a bag of groceries. After the investigator witnessed other instances of Hernandez using his allegedly injured left hand, the carrier notified the district attorney, who in turn, commenced its own investigation. In specified circumstances, a worker who engages in criminal fraud in attempting to recover workers' compensation benefits and is convicted of doing so is thereafter barred from recovering benefits growing out of the fraud. However, in given circumstances where, independent of any fraud, a worker is able to establish his or her entitlement to benefits, benefits may be awarded. Here, the WCAB found evidence, independent of a worker's fraud, that he had suffered a compensable injury and was entitled to benefits. In doing so the WCAB relied on the determination of a medical expert. The Court of Appeal found no error in the WCAB's determination the workers' claim was not barred by the eventual misdemeanor conviction for workers' compensation fraud and in the WCAB's adoption of the expert's finding of a permanent disability. The Court denied the petitioner any relief on its petition asking that it vacate the WCAB's award. View "Pearson Ford v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal addressed whether, for purposes of overcoming the workers' compensation exclusivity doctrine (Lab. Code, section 3600(a) and 3602(a)), an employee’s statements against her hotel employer for violating provisions in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), were sufficient to protect her from nonemployee sexual harassment. The employee alleged facts showing: (1) she was raped while working on the employer's premises by a drunk nonemployee trespasser; (2) the employer knew or should have known the trespasser was on the employer's premises for about an hour before the rape occurred; and (3) the employer knew or should have known that, while on the employer's premises, the trespasser had aggressively propositioned at least one other housekeeping employee for sexual favors. The Court of Appeal concluded these facts were sufficient to state claims under the FEHA for sexual harassment by a nonemployee and for failure to prevent such harassment. Because the superior court determined otherwise and dismissed the employee's operative third amended complaint (complaint) after sustaining the employer's demurrer to it without leave to amend, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "M.F. v. Pacific Pearl Hotel Management LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her ex-fiance for negligence after she suffered a paralyzing spinal injury when she was thrown from her dirt bike during a ride with him. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary adjudication on the basis of primary assumption of risk. The court held that plaintiff's primary assumption of risk barred the negligence claim where the ex-fiance's "guarantee" of a trail did not increase the inherent risk of injury from off-road biking to a coparticipant, and there were not triable factual issues as to whether the ex-fiance engaged in reckless conduct totally outside the range of activity involved in off-road dirt biking. View "Foltz v. Johnson" on Justia Law

While working as a crane operator, plaintiff George Sutherland sustained injuries when his crane tipped over. Sutherland filed his original complaint, which included a negligence cause of action against real party in interest, Curtis Engineering Corporation (Curtis), a provider of engineering services. Sutherland's original complaint did not include a certificate, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 411.35, subdivisions (a) and (b). Sutherland filed and served a first amended complaint which included a certificate. The original and amended complaint were identical, except for two additional paragraphs in the amended complaint stating that: (1) a certificate is attached as an exhibit to the amended complaint and is incorporated by reference, and (2) a claim was sent to defendant Oregon State University. Curtis demurred to the amended complaint arguing, among other things, that Sutherland failed to file the required certificate within the limitations period. The trial court overruled the demurrer. As relevant here, the court concluded that the amended complaint related back to the filing date of the original complaint. In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that a certificate filed after expiration of the statute of limitations and more than 60 days after filing the original pleading did not relate back to the filing of the original pleading. The trial court erred when it overruled a demurrer alleging noncompliance with the certificate requirement of section 411.35. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of mandate. View "Curtis Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law