Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After his son drowned in a swimming pool owned by defendants, plaintiff filed suit for general negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to treat the premature appeal as an appeal from the judgment and addressed the trial court's decision on the merits. The court held, with respect to the negligent supervision claim, that where, as here, the homeowner, having initially assumed responsibility for supervision of the child, turned over such responsibility to an adult close relative who accepted it and did not thereafter relinquish it, the homeowner owed no duty of care to protect the child. In regard to the premises liability claim, the court held that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to causation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Taylor v. Trimble" on Justia Law

Mission Bay Park was the largest man-made aquatic park in the country. While Lorin Toeppe was walking through Mission Bay Park with her boyfriend, a branch fell off a eucalyptus tree and struck her. Toeppe sustained serious injuries. She filed suit against the City of San Diego (City) alleging the existence of a dangerous condition on public property, namely a negligently maintained eucalyptus tree. The City prevailed on summary judgment, arguing that Toeppe was struck by the tree branch while standing on a trail; thus, the City could not be liable under Government Code section 831.4 (trail immunity). Toeppe appealed the subsequent final judgment following the City's successful motion for summary judgment. Toeppe argued: (1) trail immunity did not apply under the facts of this case because her claim of a dangerous condition was based on a negligently maintained eucalyptus tree, not the condition of the trail passing through the park; and (2) even if trail immunity did apply, a disputed issue of material fact existed as to where she was located when the branch struck her. The Court of Appeal agreed with her on both grounds, and thus reversed. View "Toeppe v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Defendants David Hernandez and D&H Trucking appealed from a $3.3 million personal injury judgment entered against them after plaintiff sustained serious injuries from a car accident with Hernandez's truck. The Court of Appeal affirmed and held that a reasonable trier of fact could find by a preponderance of the evidence that it was reasonably certain plaintiff would need four future shoulder surgeries. View "David v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Under Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette), an independent contractor's employee generally may not recover tort damages for work-related injuries from the contractor's hirer. Plaintiff filed suit against Evergreen and two of its contractors for general negligence after he was injured at work when he drove a maintenance van into a shipping container. Plaintiff was employed with PCMC, which had been hired by Evergreen. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants based on the Privette doctrine. The court held that defendants met their burden as the moving parties on summary judgment and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. View "Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC" on Justia Law

In a products liability case, plaintiffs Kawika and Sandra Demara appealed the grant of summary judgment granted in favor of defendants The Raymond Corporation (Raymond) and Raymond Handling Solutions, Inc. (RHSI). As pertinent to the appeal, Plaintiffs asserted claims for strict liability and negligence based on injuries Kawika suffered allegedly as a result of design defects in a forklift designed by Raymond and sold by RHSI. In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled, in part: (1) Plaintiffs did not establish a triable issue of material fact as to causation; (2) the consumer expectation test did not apply as a matter of law; and (3) for purposes of applying the risk-benefit test, even if Plaintiffs had shown a triable issue of material fact as to causation, Defendants established the requisite elements for the application of the risk-benefit test, and Plaintiffs did not establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether the benefits of the design outweighed the risks of the design. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in these rulings: (1) because Plaintiffs' showing as to causation was more than negligible or theoretical, it was sufficient to defeat summary judgment; (2) Defendants did not meet their burden of establishing as a matter of law that the consumer expectation test does not apply to Plaintiffs' claims; and (3) in applying the risk-benefit test, Defendants failed to present sufficient evidence to shift the burden to Plaintiffs to show a triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded with instructions to deny Defendants' motion. View "Demara v. The Raymond Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kathleen Swigart and defendant Carl Bruno participated in an organized endurance horseback riding event with approximately 47 other riders. Swigart was in the lead and had dismounted at a required checkpoint along the course. There was no dispute that Bruno's horse struck Swigart while she was standing on the ground, injuring her. Swigart sued Bruno, alleging causes of action for negligence, reckless or intentional misconduct, and having an animal with a dangerous propensity. The trial court granted Bruno's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals concluded the doctrine of primary assumption of risk barred Swigart's cause of action for negligence, and that Swigart did not meet her burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to Bruno's alleged recklessness or Bruno's horse's alleged propensity for danger. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Swigart v. Bruno" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Marline and Joseph Petitpas filed suit against Exxon, Ford, and others, alleging that exposure to asbestos caused by defendants resulted in Marline's mesothelioma. The Court of Appeal held that summary adjudication for Exxon appropriately was granted because the evidence did not show that Exxon was within the stream of commerce for any asbestos-containing products, and Exxon did not have a duty to Marline regarding secondary exposure because Marline was not a member of Joseph's household at the relevant time; nonsuit as to Rossmoor was appropriate because the causation evidence against Rossmoor presented at trial was insufficient to support a verdict for plaintiffs; jury instructions relating to Ford accurately reflected the law, and Ford was not liable under a design defect theory for products it did not manufacture or supply; because the court affirmed the defense verdict in favor of Ford, plaintiffs' challenge to the summary adjudication of punitive damages claims against Ford was moot; and since plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they were entitled to a verdict in their favor as to Exxon as a matter of law, there was no basis for reversing the defense verdict in favor of Exxon. View "Petitpas v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the Government Claims Act's, Gov. Code, 810 et seq., statute of limitations is the date on which a plaintiff discovers or should reasonably have discovered that she had suffered a compensable injury. The trial court overruled the City's demurrer to a complaint, arguing that the real parties in interest failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement of the Act by not presenting their claim to the City within six months. The Court of Appeal held that the parties in interest presented their claim to the City more than 10 months after the date upon which the cause of action accrued and thus failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement. Accordingly, the court granted the City's petition for writ of mandate. View "City of Pasadena v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A freightliner driven by petitioners' employee struck a vehicle, causing serious injuries to the passengers, real parties in interest Matthew and Michael Lennig. The Lennings filed suit against the employee and petitioners, seeking punitive damages. The Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ of mandate and held that petitioners' admission of vicarious liability did not bar recovery of punitive damages. The court held, however, that there were no triable issues of fact which, if resolved in the Lennings' favor, could subject petitioners to punitive damages. View "CRST, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the trail immunity in Government Code section 831.4 does not immunize a dangerous condition of a commercially operated, revenue generating public golf course that causes injury to pedestrians on an adjacent trail. Plaintiff and his mother filed suit against American Golf for negligence and the City for a dangerous condition of public property after plaintiff was injured by an errant golf ball on a walkway the City contends is a trail. The Court of Appeal explained that a public golf course cannot assert a trail immunity defense when the golf course is adjacent to a trail abutting a public street; the golf course is a commercially operated, revenue-generating enterprise; the golf course has a dangerous condition that exposes people outside it to a risk of harm from third parties hitting errant golf balls; and the dangerous condition of the golf course caused harm to a user of the trail. The Court of Appeal rejected the City's warning sign and assumption of risk defenses, as well as claims of immunity afforded by Government Code sections 830.6, 820.2, and 815.2, subdivision (b). View "Garcia v. American Golf" on Justia Law