Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kase was exposed to asbestos insulation used on nuclear submarines during the early 1970s. The trial court rejected claims against a broker that arranged for asbestos-containing insulation to be shipped to the Mare Island Naval Shipyard, where workers packed it around the submarine piping it protected. The court held, on summary judgment, that the Navy‘s procurement of asbestos insulation for its nuclear submarines implicated the government contractor defense set forth in the Supreme Court’s 1988 holding, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. The broker procured the insulation pursuant to and in compliance with relatively detailed performance and testing specifications, although those specifications did not expressly call out for asbestos in the insulation. According to undisputed evidence, the specifications could only be met by asbestos-containing insulation, and the only product on the Navy‘s approved list of suitable products was the product at issue, Unibestos. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that the defense does not necessarily exclude the procurement of products also sold commercially. The Navy‘s procurement of the asbestos insulation at issue occurred after years of evaluating and weighing the utility of and the health hazards associated with asbestos products and pursuant to specifications that required an asbestos product. View "Kase v. Metalclad Insulation Corp." on Justia Law

This case arose after Kenneth Evans was diagnosed with asbestosis after a decades-long career working for the Southern California Gas Company. After the jury found that Hood‘s conduct exposed Evans to asbestos, but that Hood was not negligent, a defense judgment was entered. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding two exhibits containing SoCalGas specifications for contractors, allowing the president of Hood to use a contract from an irrelevant time period to refresh his recollection about the content of earlier contracts, and giving the jury two erroneous instructions. The court rejected plaintiffs' evidentiary challenges; found that the jury instruction regarding an employer's duty was not an erroneous statement of the law, and even if it were, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they were prejudiced by any such error; concluded that the use of the special jury instruction regarding the professional standard of care, even if erroneous, did not prejudice plaintiffs in a manner that would warrant reversal; and concluded that the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "LAOSD Asbestos Cases" on Justia Law

Defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound) appealed a trial court’s order granting plaintiff Linda Gee’s motion to set aside dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Gee had been injured while a passenger on a Greyhound bus. She alleged the driver was going too fast, which caused the bus to hit two other vehicles and then crash into a tree. Gee also sued the bus driver’s estate and several others relating to the accident. On appeal, Greyhound argued that the trial court erred in granting relief under section 473, subdivision (b), contending that: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal under section 473, subdivision (b), because Gee failed to comply with the requirements of section 1008; and (2) Gee failed to provide a sufficient showing to justify relief under section 473, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial court’s judgment, and affirmed. View "Gee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant M. Strasner sued out-of-state defendants Brightpoint, Inc., Brightpoint North America, LP, Touchstone Wireless Repair and Logistics, LP, and Touchstone Acquisition, LLC (collectively, Defendants) for injuries she suffered when a Touchstone employee allegedly uploaded a private photograph of Strasner to her Facebook page from a mobile telephone she had returned to T-Mobile. The court granted Defendants' motion to quash service of the summons and amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Strasner appealed, contending she made a sufficient showing of Defendants' contacts with California, both directly and through their California parent corporation, to subject them to personal jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Paul Cameron submitted his application for disability retirement on May 22, 2009, after the second of two injuries he sustained during his tenure as a Sacramento County employee. The SCERS staff referred this matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings where it was heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). In 2013, the ALJ found that the application was untimely and denied the application for service-related retirement. Based on the ALJ’s findings, SCERS denied plaintiff’s application for service-connected retirement. Cameron appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff failed to show he was continuously disabled within the meaning of Government Code sections 31722 and 31641, subdivision (a), between the discontinuance of his service and the time he filed his application for service-connected disability retirement. Consequently, his application was not timely under section 31722. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded that plaintiff did not show that SCERS failed to inform him of his rights regarding disability retirement, misled him concerning those rights, otherwise breached its fiduciary duty to him, or caused plaintiff’s delay in making his application. View "Cameron v. Sacramento Co. Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to L.A. Fitness, contending that the trial court erred in striking the allegations in his complaint as to gross negligence, and it erred in granting summary judgment because a triable issue of fact exists as to whether L.A. Fitness was grossly negligent. Plaintiff, who was in his early 60's, slipped and fell in the shower facilities at an L.A. Fitness gym. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, liberally construing that evidence, and resolving all doubts in plaintiff's favor, no triable issue of material fact exists to preclude summary judgment. In this case, there is no dispute that the Release and Waiver of Liability and Indemnity is valid and is a complete defense to plaintiff's negligence cause of action, insofar as the first amended complaint alleges facts that constitute ordinary negligence; plaintiff bears the burden to produce evidence creating a triable issue of material fact on gross negligence and plaintiff failed to do so; and no triable issue of fact exists to preclude summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Anderson v. Fitness International, LLC" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured while employed by Myers at the University, he filed suit against the general contractor, Staples, for negligence. The trial court granted Staples’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the trial court correctly granted a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff when he failed to present evidence that Staples affirmatively contributed to his injuries. In this case, there were no triable issues of material fact on plaintiff's theory that either the retained control exception or the nondelegable duty exception applied. The court rejected plaintiff's claims of evidentiary errors and affirmed the judgment. View "Khosh v. Staples Construction Co." on Justia Law

This case stems from a traffic accident caused by an oil rig worker driving home after work and providing two other employees with a ride to their employer-paid hotel. Under the going and coming rule, employees traveling to and from work are considered outside the scope of employment and, therefore, employers are not liable for torts committed during the employee’s commute. The court concluded that the undisputed facts establish that the going and coming rule applies in this case where it cannot be reasonably inferred from the undisputed facts that the employer impliedly required or requested the driver to provide transportation to his supervisor between the hotel and the jobsite; the supervisor’s requests for such rides were personal in nature and are not reasonably imputed to the employer; and thus this case is comparable with other cases in which the going and coming rule was applied to employees who made their own carpooling or ridesharing arrangements. In this case, there is no reasonable basis for inferring H&P’s conduct caused or allowed crew members to believe that Ruben Ibarra’s requests for rides were made on behalf of H&P. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and concluded that the employer is not liable for the traffic accident under the doctrine of respondeat superior. View "Pierson v. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co." on Justia Law

After a jury concluded that Joshua B. Nozar was not negligent in connection with a two-car collision in which Sassa Minnegren was injured, Minnegren appealed the judgment. Minnegren contends that the special verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence and the trial court erred when it denied her motion for new trial, as well as appeals from the denial of her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The court concluded that long-standing and consistent precedent teach that negligence is a question of fact where, as here, there is evidence that a driver exercised at least some care and therefore might have acted reasonably even if his or her action ultimately led to a car collision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order. View "Minnegren v. Nozar" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Mercer admitted that he negligently collided with plaintiff Lillie Moore's car. The impact had major consequences for her health and lifestyle, and suffered chronic pain. At issue in this appeal was a question of the reasonable value of medical services provided to Moore, who at the time of her injury, was uninsured. Defendant insisted that plaintiff failed to sustain her burden to prove she actually incurred liability for the full amount of the doctor and hospital charges. "If there was a failure, it was defendant’s failure to challenge plaintiff’s evidence at trial." The Court of Appeals reversed a sanctions order made in this case against the defense, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Moore v. Mercer" on Justia Law