Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to L.A. Fitness, contending that the trial court erred in striking the allegations in his complaint as to gross negligence, and it erred in granting summary judgment because a triable issue of fact exists as to whether L.A. Fitness was grossly negligent. Plaintiff, who was in his early 60's, slipped and fell in the shower facilities at an L.A. Fitness gym. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, liberally construing that evidence, and resolving all doubts in plaintiff's favor, no triable issue of material fact exists to preclude summary judgment. In this case, there is no dispute that the Release and Waiver of Liability and Indemnity is valid and is a complete defense to plaintiff's negligence cause of action, insofar as the first amended complaint alleges facts that constitute ordinary negligence; plaintiff bears the burden to produce evidence creating a triable issue of material fact on gross negligence and plaintiff failed to do so; and no triable issue of fact exists to preclude summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Anderson v. Fitness International, LLC" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured while employed by Myers at the University, he filed suit against the general contractor, Staples, for negligence. The trial court granted Staples’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the trial court correctly granted a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff when he failed to present evidence that Staples affirmatively contributed to his injuries. In this case, there were no triable issues of material fact on plaintiff's theory that either the retained control exception or the nondelegable duty exception applied. The court rejected plaintiff's claims of evidentiary errors and affirmed the judgment. View "Khosh v. Staples Construction Co." on Justia Law

This case stems from a traffic accident caused by an oil rig worker driving home after work and providing two other employees with a ride to their employer-paid hotel. Under the going and coming rule, employees traveling to and from work are considered outside the scope of employment and, therefore, employers are not liable for torts committed during the employee’s commute. The court concluded that the undisputed facts establish that the going and coming rule applies in this case where it cannot be reasonably inferred from the undisputed facts that the employer impliedly required or requested the driver to provide transportation to his supervisor between the hotel and the jobsite; the supervisor’s requests for such rides were personal in nature and are not reasonably imputed to the employer; and thus this case is comparable with other cases in which the going and coming rule was applied to employees who made their own carpooling or ridesharing arrangements. In this case, there is no reasonable basis for inferring H&P’s conduct caused or allowed crew members to believe that Ruben Ibarra’s requests for rides were made on behalf of H&P. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and concluded that the employer is not liable for the traffic accident under the doctrine of respondeat superior. View "Pierson v. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co." on Justia Law

After a jury concluded that Joshua B. Nozar was not negligent in connection with a two-car collision in which Sassa Minnegren was injured, Minnegren appealed the judgment. Minnegren contends that the special verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence and the trial court erred when it denied her motion for new trial, as well as appeals from the denial of her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The court concluded that long-standing and consistent precedent teach that negligence is a question of fact where, as here, there is evidence that a driver exercised at least some care and therefore might have acted reasonably even if his or her action ultimately led to a car collision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order. View "Minnegren v. Nozar" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Mercer admitted that he negligently collided with plaintiff Lillie Moore's car. The impact had major consequences for her health and lifestyle, and suffered chronic pain. At issue in this appeal was a question of the reasonable value of medical services provided to Moore, who at the time of her injury, was uninsured. Defendant insisted that plaintiff failed to sustain her burden to prove she actually incurred liability for the full amount of the doctor and hospital charges. "If there was a failure, it was defendant’s failure to challenge plaintiff’s evidence at trial." The Court of Appeals reversed a sanctions order made in this case against the defense, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Moore v. Mercer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit for negligence after she was injured boarding a shuttle bus provided by Bicycle Casino. Plaintiff alleged that Bicycle Casino was a common carrier and had a duty and responsibility to ensure the safety and security of its patrons who took the shuttle bus. The trial court entered judgment for Bicycle Casino. The court concluded that the trial court erred in holding Bicycle Casino was not a common carrier as a matter of law, as there is a triable issue of material fact on the point. The court also concluded that, even if the casino were a private carrier owing only a duty of ordinary care, there was no basis for establishing a “no duty” rule in this case. Finally, the court held that Bicycle Casino was not entitled to summary judgment on causation grounds where the trial court did not reach this issue in light of its holding on the lack of duty. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Huang v. The Bicycle Casino" on Justia Law

Manuel Nava was injured while a patient at Saddleback Memorial Medical Center (Saddleback). His injury occurred while he was being transported in the hospital on a gurney. Nava filed suit against Saddleback, and an ambulance service, Herren Enterprises, Inc. (Herren). The complaint was filed more than one year, but less than two years, after his injury. Both Saddleback and Herren filed motions for summary judgment, contending that the complaint was time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340, which imposed a one-year statute of limitations when an injury was caused by the professional negligence of a health care provider. The trial court granted the motions. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court held that section 340.5 applied when negligence occurs in the use or maintenance of medical equipment or premises while medical care is being provided to the plaintiff. Applying the Supreme Court's holding to this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that Nava’s claims were barred by section 340.5’s statute of limitations. "The transfer of Nava in the hospital on a gurney was integrally related to Nava’s medical treatment or diagnosis, and, therefore, the injury occurred in the rendering of professional services." The Court, therefore, affirmed. View "Nava v. Saddleback Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

A horse ran away from a meadow owned by defendants Gregory Nibbelink, Bevlee Nibbelink, Gary D. Nibbelink, Linda A. Nibbelink, Robert G. Goulding, Diane K. Goulding, and Nibbelink Revocable Family Trust (meadow landowners) onto adjacent property known as Strawberry Lodge (Lodge) and trampled plaintiff Yan Wang as she and her husband, plaintiff Tyler Raihala, got out of their car to dine at the Lodge. This appeal involved plaintiffs’ negligence claims against the meadow landowners who invoked Civil Code section 846. In this case of first impression, the Court of Appeals held section 846 paragraph 3(c) shielded landowners from liability where such recreational users of the land cause injury to persons outside the premises who are uninvolved in the recreational use of the land, even where the plaintiffs also allege that the landowners’ neglect of their own property-based duties contributed to the injury. Plaintiffs appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the meadow owners. Plaintiffs had argued: (1) the meadow owners forfeited section 846 by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense in their answer; (2) the statute does not apply to off-premises injury to a person who was not a participant or spectator of the recreational use; (3) even if section 846 applied, triable issues of fact preclude summary judgment; and (4) even if section 846 relieved the landowners from liability for negligence of the recreational users -- Highway 50 Association (HFA) and horse rider Robert Donald Burnley -- in failing to secure the horse, the landowners were liable for their own negligence in failing to ensure adequate secure containment for the event’s horses, failing to build a fence, and failing to warn those nearby who were not participating in the event. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded section 846 applied; no triable issues existed; and plaintiffs failed to show any potential for liability independent of section 846. Accordingly, the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the meadow landowners. View "Wang v. Nibbelink" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as guardian ad litem to her minor daughter, filed suit against the District and others, alleging that defendants negligently allowed male students to sexually abuse her while at school. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants because plaintiff failed to file the required government tort claim with the District. Plaintiff asserts that she was excused from filing a tort claim under Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), which exempts “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.” The court concluded that, because section 340.1 provides the limitations period for the daughter's claims of childhood sexual abuse, she was exempt from filing a tort claim under Government Code section 905, subdivision (m). In this case, the court explained that the trial court erred by concluding the exemption applies only if the alleged childhood sexual abuse was committed by an employee, volunteer, representative or agent of the public entity. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "A.M. v. Ventura Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit against plaintiff's pain management physician, Howard L. Rosner, M.D., and Cedars for professional negligence and loss of consortium. Rosner's treatment rendered plaintiff a quadriplegic. A jury found that both Rosner and Cedars had been negligent, but that only Rosner’s negligence had been a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's severe injuries. The jury nonetheless apportioned 40 percent of fault to Cedars, apparently on the basis of its finding that Rosner was Cedars’s ostensible agent. Both defendants appealed. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, plaintiff knew or should have known that Rosner was not Cedars’s agent where he received actual notice and was treated in a nonemergency context. Therefore, Cedars’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. The court also concluded that the jury's negligence finding was supported by substantial evidence; the special verdict form used in this case properly required the jury to make findings only as to ultimate facts for plaintiffs’ sole cause of action; the trial court was not required to grant a new trial, but instead acted properly to eliminate the ambiguity or inconsistency by striking the jury’s apportionment of fault; and substantial evidence supports the jury’s award of future economic damages and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed with respect to Rosner and reversed with respect to Cedars. View "Markow v. Rosner" on Justia Law