Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this personal injury case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, the plaintiff, Mark Olson, sued the defendant, Patrick Saville, for injuries sustained while both were surfing at Miramar Beach in Montecito. Olson claimed that Saville negligently caused his injuries by "dropping in" on his wave, failing to control his board, and not using a leash on his longboard. Saville moved for summary judgment, arguing that Olson's claim was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, which typically applies to sports and recreational activities involving inherent risks of injury.The court granted Saville's motion, holding that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk barred liability for injuries caused by a negligent surfer to a fellow surfer because those injuries were caused by risks inherent in the sport of surfing. The court found that the inherent risks of surfing included surfers "dropping in" on other surfers, not wearing leashes while riding longboards, and using surfboards with sharp fins.On appeal, Olson argued that there were triable issues of material fact as to whether Saville was protected by the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The appellate court disagreed, finding that no reasonable trier of fact could determine that Saville's conduct fell outside the protection of the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that imposing liability in these circumstances would likely chill vigorous participation in surfing. View "Olson v. Saville" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, John GM Roe, a childhood sexual assault victim, filed an action against three "Doe" defendants, including his former Boy Scout leader. The Superior Court of Fresno County dismissed his complaint with prejudice, citing failure to timely file certificates of merit as required by California's Code of Civil Procedure, section 340.1, subdivisions (f) and (g). The court also claimed that the statute of limitations had expired by the time Roe filed compliant certificates.Roe appealed, arguing that Emergency rule 9, enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, tolled the statute of limitations governing his claims. This rule, he contended, meant that when the court dismissed his complaint, the limitations period had not yet expired. Therefore, he insisted that the dismissal should have been without prejudice so he could refile his complaint and certificates of merit before the limitations period ended.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District agreed with Roe. The court ruled that section 340.1, subdivision (q), which created a three-year revival period for all civil claims arising from childhood sexual assault that were barred as of January 1, 2020, is part of a statute of limitations. Consequently, Emergency rule 9, which tolled statutes of limitations for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days, also tolled section 340.1, subdivision (q)’s three-year revival period. This interpretation extended the deadline to file childhood sexual assault claims to June 27, 2023. As such, the court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing Roe's claims with prejudice, allowing him to refile his complaint and certificates of merit. View "Roe v. Doe 1" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of August 1, 2018, Gwendolyn Adams and Glenn Tyler Bolden were pursued in a high-speed chase by Michael William Becker, a peace officer employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Becker suspected Adams and Bolden of wrongdoing, although his suspicions were unfounded. The pursuit resulted in a catastrophic accident that caused severe injuries and, ultimately, the death of Adams's son, D'son Woods.Adams and Bolden filed a lawsuit against the CDCR, alleging negligence causing wrongful death, assault and battery, and violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. The CDCR sought summary judgment, arguing that Becker was not acting within the scope of his employment during the pursuit. The trial court agreed and entered judgment in favor of CDCR.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that whether Becker was acting within the scope of his employment when he pursued Adams and Bolden was a question of fact that should be decided by a jury. The court noted that Becker’s actions may have been influenced by his role as a peace officer, and it was not clear whether he was acting as a private citizen or a law enforcement officer during the pursuit. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the CDCR. View "Adams v. Dept of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

This case involves a pharmaceutical manufacturer, Gilead Life Sciences, Inc., and its development and sale of a drug, tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (TDF), to treat HIV/AIDS. The approximately 24,000 plaintiffs allege that they suffered adverse effects from TDF, including skeletal and kidney damage. Gilead developed a similar but chemically distinct drug, tenofovir alafenamide fumarate (TAF), which could potentially treat HIV/AIDS with fewer side effects. The plaintiffs claim that Gilead delayed the development of TAF to maximize profits from TDF.The plaintiffs do not claim that TDF is defective. Instead, they assert a claim for ordinary negligence, arguing that Gilead's decision to delay the development of TAF breached its duty of reasonable care to users of TDF. They also assert a claim for fraudulent concealment, arguing that Gilead had a duty to disclose information about TAF to users of TDF.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, partially granted Gilead's petition for a writ of mandate and held that the plaintiffs could proceed with their negligence claim. The court concluded that a manufacturer's legal duty of reasonable care can extend beyond the duty not to market a defective product. However, the court reversed the trial court's decision denying Gilead's motion for summary adjudication of the plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent concealment. The court held that Gilead had no duty to disclose information about TAF to users of TDF, as TAF was not available as an alternative treatment at the time. View "Gilead Tenofovir Cases" on Justia Law

In this California case, Gary Garner, the plaintiff, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against BNSF Railway Company, alleging that his father's exposure to toxic levels of diesel exhaust during his four-decade employment with BNSF caused his father's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and subsequent death. Garner retained several experts to opine on whether diesel exhaust and its constituents are capable of causing cancer, including non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and whether the father's workplace exposure to diesel exhaust was a cause of his cancer. However, the trial court granted BNSF's motions in limine to exclude Garner's three causation experts from trial. The trial court found that the science the experts relied on was inadequate and there was too great an analytical gap between the data and their opinions. As a result, Garner's wrongful death lawsuit was dismissed before trial.Garner appealed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Garner's experts. The court held that the trial court's gatekeeping role is not to choose between competing expert opinions, and it does not involve weighing the persuasiveness of an expert's opinion, substituting its own opinion for the expert’s opinion, or resolving scientific controversies. The court found that Garner's experts used their scientific judgment and expertise to evaluate the available data and determine whether to draw an inference of causation, which is a matter of informed judgment, not scientific methodology. The court reversed the orders and judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter new orders denying BNSF's motions in limine. View "Garner v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

In this case, an accident occurred where Sara Spagnolini, a provider under the In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program, ran a stop sign and crashed into a car driven by Hanah Keren Samson Yalung. Yalung and four of her five children were seriously injured, and one child was killed. Yalung, individually and as an administrator of her deceased daughter's estate and guardian ad litem for her other children, sued the State of California, among others, for Spagnolini's negligence.The plaintiffs argued that the State was liable for Spagnolini's negligence as her employer or as a joint employer with Spagnolini's recipient under the IHSS program. The Superior Court of Tulare County, however, sustained the State's demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend. The trial court did not find the statutory scheme made the State the employer or joint employer of IHSS providers for all purposes, noting that no cases held the State was an employer for purposes of vicarious liability.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the IHSS statutes are incompatible with a finding of joint employment as a matter of law. The court found that while the State administers the IHSS program and has some oversight responsibilities, it does not control or direct the day-to-day tasks or activities of IHSS providers. Accordingly, the State could not be deemed an employer or joint employer for the purposes of vicarious liability. View "Yalung v. State of California" on Justia Law

In this case, Crista Miller tripped on a vertical misalignment of less than one inch between a metal plate covering an underground utility vault, owned by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), and the surrounding sidewalk adjacent to a property owned by Hip Sen Benevolent Association (Hip Sen), resulting in an injury to her ankle. Miller filed a lawsuit against both PG&E and Hip Sen, alleging general negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the lawsuit was barred by the trivial defect doctrine.Miller appealed, but the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court concluded that the vertical misalignment was a trivial defect as a matter of law. The court stated that to recover damages for negligence or premises liability, Miller had to prove that the defendants breached a legal duty to either repair or warn about the existence of the misalignment. However, it is well-established law that landowners are not liable for damages caused by minor, trivial, or insignificant defects in property. Even considering the steepness of the sidewalk, the weather conditions, the time of the incident, and the crowded nature of the street, the court found that these factors did not render the misalignment a dangerous condition. The court also found that the city's guidelines and repair notices did not impose a legal duty to repair such minor defects.Miller also argued that the city's repair notices to PG&E and Hip Sen for their violations of the city's Guidelines rendered them liable under a theory of negligence per se. However, the appellate court found this argument to be forfeited as Miller did not raise this issue in the trial court and only presented it for the first time in her appellate reply brief.Therefore, the appellate court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find the trivial sidewalk defect posed a substantial risk of injury to a foreseeable pedestrian exercising due care and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Miller v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

In 2017, plaintiff Marcelina Barron sued the Santa Clara County Valley Transportation Authority and bus driver Bruce Arnold Gaillard for general negligence after she was injured in a bus accident. After several delays, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that it had not been brought to trial within the five-year deadline defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310. Barron countered that the deadline had been extended by six months due to Emergency rule 10(a), enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic by the Judicial Council of California. The trial court granted the dismissal, interpreting the Ables v. A. Ghazale Brothers, Inc. decision to mean that the emergency rule did not extend the five-year period because it was not a statute. Barron appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the Judicial Council had the authority to enact Emergency rule 10(a), and therefore the time to bring the case to trial was legally extended by six months. The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Barron's complaint prematurely based on an incorrect interpretation of the five-year statute of limitations in section 583.310 and Emergency rule 10(a). The case was reinstated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barron v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

The case concerns a firefighter, Matthew Vann, who was injured when a bus driver, Louis Yu, drove through an active emergency scene and over a fire hose, causing it to break off from a fire engine and strike Vann. Vann sued the City and County of San Francisco and Yu for negligence. The trial court dismissed the case, sustaining the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. The court ruled that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as Vann was receiving workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained in the incident.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court rejected Vann's argument that the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) and the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA), which employed Vann and Yu respectively, were separate legal entities akin to separate businesses within a multi-unit corporate enterprise. The court reasoned that the SFFD and the SFMTA were not independent entities but were merely parts of the same entity, the City and County of San Francisco. Consequently, the City was the employer of both Vann and Yu. Therefore, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, workers' compensation was Vann's exclusive remedy against the City as his employer and against Yu as his coemployee. View "Vann v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

Jose Velasquez, as a condition of probation, had entered a residential rehabilitation program sponsored by The Salvation Army and was injured while working in its warehouse. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (the Board) denied Velasquez's claim for workers’ compensation benefits, determining that Velasquez was not employed by either The Salvation Army or the County of Santa Barbara (the County). The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District held that The Salvation Army is statutorily excluded from being an employer for workers’ compensation purposes under section 3301 of the Labor Code, and affirmed the Board’s decision in that respect. However, the Court found that the record was inadequately developed during the administrative proceedings to determine whether the County was Velasquez’s employer. Therefore, the Court annulled the Board’s decision as to the County and remanded the matter for further consideration. View "Velasquez v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law