Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, Francisco Gutierrez appealed a judgment granting summary judgment to Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, in a personal injury case. Gutierrez was injured when his vehicle was hit by an ambulance driven by Tostado, an emergency medical technician employed by ProTransport-1, during a patient transport. Nearly two years after the accident, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gutierrez's claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act's (MICRA) one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, a decision Gutierrez appealed.In considering Gutierrez's appeal, the appellate court held that because Tostado was providing professional medical services at the time of the incident, MICRA's one-year statute of limitations applied, despite Gutierrez not being the recipient of those services. The court reasoned that the act of driving the ambulance was an integral part of the provision of medical care, and it was foreseeable that third parties could be injured during the provision of such care. The court rejected Gutierrez's argument that MICRA only applied where the defendant owed a professional duty to the plaintiff, holding instead that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services, and their injuries were foreseeable. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law

Doe alleged that his ex-girlfriend and her friends, including Ledor, embarked upon a “vengeful smear campaign” to harass and defame him after his senior year of high school. In 2020, Ledor sent emails to Dartmouth College officials, stating essentially that Doe had committed voter fraud to win an election for student body president at Berkeley High School (BHS) and providing links to what she represented to be articles and a podcast about the incident. After receiving the emails, Dartmouth revoked Doe’s offer of admission. Ledor later sent Instagram messages to two of Doe's acquaintances, advising them to “avoid him” because “men like him grow up thinking it’s okay to disrespect women and be violent.”Doe sued for defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, civil harassment, civil stalking, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, with a claim for vicarious liability against Ledor’s parents. The Ledors filed a special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP, Code Civ. Proc. 425.16). The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. The Ledors did not meet their burden of showing that the statements in the Dartmouth emails involve protected activity under section 425.16(e)(2) or (4), View "Doe v. Ledor" on Justia Law

Firefighters sued Favro, who crashed his car into a firetruck before receiving aid from the firefighters, alleging that Favro was negligent in failing to comply with their directions and thereby caused them to be harmed by another crashing vehicle.The Firefighter’s Rule negates liability "by one whose negligence causes or contributes to the fire which in turn causes the death or injury of the [firefighter].” with exceptions. Civil Code 1714.9(a)(1) provides: “any person is responsible not only for the results of that person’s willful acts causing injury to a" firefighter "also for any injury occasioned to [the firefighter] by the want of ordinary care or skill in the management of the person’s property or person," "Where the conduct causing the injury occurs after the person knows or should have known of the presence of the" firefighter. The court instructed the jury on: “Assumption of Risk/Exception/Occupation Involving Inherent Risk” The Special Verdict Form asked: Did Favro increase the risks to [the firefighers] through conduct occurring after he knew or should have known of the presence of the firefighters?” The presiding juror marked, “No.”The court of appeal ordered a new trial. Favro’s counsel committed misconduct by misrepresenting to the jury the law applicable to these unusual circumstances, stating that Favro could not be held liable unless he had increased the risk to the firefighters “beyond the risk that’s inherent to their job.”. A subsequent admonition failed to cure the error. View "Rattary v. Favro" on Justia Law

Thomas was recruited to play on the women’s soccer team at the University of California, Berkeley (UCB), played on the team during her freshman year and, in the spring of that year, was released from the team. She sued UCB, the team’s head coach (McGuire), and the Director of Athletics (Knowlton), alleging that she turned down a scholarship to another school based on McGuire’s recruitment efforts and that McGuire failed to disclose his “abusive” coaching style and the team’s culture of intimidation and fear. After her federal suit was dismissed, Thomas sued in state court, alleging claims against McGuire and Knowlton for violation of the Unruh Act and negligence; against McGuire for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud; and against UCB under Government Code section 815.2.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, reinstating only a claim of sexual harassment (Civil Code section 51.9) against McGuire and UCB. Thomas failed to state a negligence claim against McGuire, Knowlton, or UCB. Thomas cites no authority imposing on a university a duty to protect students from harm of a non-physical nature. Nor did Thomas establish a breach of fiduciary duty. The court also rejected claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. View "Thomas v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Defendant Que Phung Thi Nguyen allegedly threatened to expose the existence of plaintiff Bruce Tran's child she birthed during his marriage. Between 2010 and 2011, the Trans separated. During their separation, Tran began a romantic relationship with Nguyen; a few weeks into the relationship, Nguyen informed Tran she was pregnant with his child. Shortly thereafter, in June 2011, Tran ended the relationship. According to the complaint filed in this case, Nguyen later “began to blackmail” Tran by demanding that he pay her thousands of dollars, or she would disclose their relationship and the child’s existence to his wife. In this case, the parties disputed whether California had a civil cause of action for extortion. The trial court agreed with defendant Nguyen’s contention plaintiff Bruce Tran’s extortion cause of action could only move forward if it arose out of a threat to initiate a false criminal or civil prosecution—and thus no such cause of action could be based on the facts in this case. The Court of Appeal disagreed: Civil Code sections 1566, 1567, and 1570 established a right to rescission in cases in which a person’s consent to a transaction was obtained by “menace”: threats of confinement, of unlawful violence to the person or his or her property, or of injury to a person’s character. "This is effectively the civil version of extortion." However, because the cause of action which sought rescission sounded in contract, rather than tort, no emotional distress damages were recoverable. Because the civil extortion/rescission cause of action did not give rise to emotional distress damages, the Court found no error in the portion of the court’s order sustaining Nguyen’s demurrer to Tran’s separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court consequently reversed the judgment entered against Tran, and remanded the case with directions to allow him leave to amend his cause of action for recovery of the funds he paid to Nguyen as a result of her threats to reveal their affair—and the existence of their child—to his wife. View "Tran v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

Appellants’ father died in a multi-car accident caused by a deer crossing State Route 154 (SR-154). Appellants sued respondent California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and others for negligence. They alleged the road constituted a dangerous condition under Government Code section 835. The trial court found that design immunity applied to Caltrans and granted summary judgment. Appellants contend the trial court erred when it found design immunity was a complete defense to Caltrans’ liability. They also contend the court failed to address a separate basis of liability, failed to warn when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment.The Second Appellate District affirmed. Appellants’ theory of the case, in sum, is that Caltrans designed SR-154 without certain specific features they contend would have made the highway safer. The court explained that Caltrans need not produce additional evidence to prove this point. A traffic engineer attested to the applicable design standards and how Caltrans addressed the dangers posed by deer entering traffic and vehicles crossing the median. This constitutes substantial evidence of advance approval. The court wrote that it would not second-guess the decision of Caltrans to include or omit certain design features. The court concluded that substantial evidence showed that a reasonable public employee would have adopted the SR-154 design plans, even without the features and changes Appellants contend Caltrans should have considered and included. View "Stufkosky v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Rose Jones, an employee of the Regents of the University of California (the University), was injured while riding her bike on University grounds on her way home from work. She and her husband filed suit against the University. The University moved for summary judgment, arguing inter alia, that Jones was limited to workers’ compensation under that system’s “exclusivity” rule. Although an employee’s commute was generally outside the workers’ compensation scheme, the University argued Jones’s injuries were subject to the “premises line” rule, which extended the course of employment until the employee left the employer’s premises. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment for the University. Appellants challenged the trial court’s ruling, claiming that a triable issue remained as to whether the premises line rule applied to Jones’s accident based on a variety of factors. After review, the Court of appeal determined the factors appellants cited raised no question about the rule’s application. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. View "Jones v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff took her neighbor’s dog for a walk around Dolphin’s apartment complex. Plaintiff observed that it was raining that day with thunderstorms. Before crossing, Plaintiff observed that the concrete on the North Side Gate driveway was wet, and rainwater formed a current that was running down the driveway. Plaintiff proceeded to cross, and the rainwater current knocked her down. Plaintiff sustained injuries to her right shoulder, left knee, and face. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Dolphin, alleging general negligence and premises liability. Dolphin filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because the running rainwater was open and obvious, Dolphin had no duty to warn. The trial court granted Dolphin’s motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims because the rainwater current on the driveway was open and obvious. Further, the court wrote that even assuming Plaintiff did not forfeit the necessity exception to the open and obvious rule, she still cannot prevail on the merits. The court wrote that Plaintiff was in a better position to avoid the obvious danger of walking across a current of water that formed as a result of a rainstorm that began that same day. Plaintiff could have chosen to use a different entrance. The burden imposed on Dolphin to constantly monitor weather conditions and immediately install warning signals is outweighed by Plaintiff’s ability to avoid a condition she should have observed as obviously dangerous. View "Nicoletti v. Kest" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a wrongful death action for the death of the Appellants’ son against the City of Inglewood (the City). Appellants alleged the City was negligent and created a “dangerous condition” in a public park by failing to install security cameras in an area with ongoing criminal activity, which caused an unknown third party to fatally shoot their son. The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to the complaint with leave to amend. Appellants filed a first amended complaint, which the trial court sustained, this time without leave to amend. The trial court then entered a judgment of dismissal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellants’ dangerous and negligence claims failed and the trial court did not err in declining to grant leave to amend. The court explained that here Appellants’ proposed allegations about “additional problematic criminal activity in Darby Park” and “crime in the areas of Inglewood immediately surrounding Darby Park” are vague and not specific. Appellants in no way explain how these proposed amendments would change the legal effect of the allegations in their FAC and merely state in a conclusory fashion that they “could have created a dangerous condition and a duty to warn.” Furthermore, the court wrote that Appellants failed to propose any new facts addressing the main issue of the FAC. View "Summerfield v. City of Inglewood" on Justia Law

After consuming excessive amounts of alcohol, Christina Demirelli left a restaurant in the Fashion Island shopping center (Fashion Island) and walked through a nearby parking structure while engaging in “displays of nonsensical horseplay.” She found herself on an upper story of the parking structure where she seated herself on a 43-inch tall perimeter wall, lost her balance, and fell backward out of the structure to the ground several stories below. Demirelli sued The Irvine Company, which owned the parking structure, for premises liability, alleging the parking structure had a physical defect or dangerous condition. The Irvine Company filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court denied. The Irvine Company filed a petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause. The Court thereafter granted The Irvine Company’s petition. In her opposition, Demirelli conceded the parking structure did not have a physical defect or dangerous condition. In the stead of her original theory, Demirelli asserted a new theory of liability: The Irvine Company assumed a duty to her by hiring a security company charged with detecting and stopping horseplay according to the Fashion Island Code of Conduct. She argued The Irvine Company was liable for the security company’s negligence in enforcing that code. The Court of Appeal found The Irvine Company’s retention of security services did not increase any risk to Demirelli and she did not rely on that undertaking to her detriment. Therefore, The Irvine Company did not owe a duty to Demirelli and summary judgment should have been granted. View "The Irvine Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law