Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Products Liability
by
In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four, the plaintiffs, thousands of individuals who suffered adverse effects from the use of a prescription drug, TDF, made by Gilead Life Sciences, Inc., brought a claim of negligence and fraudulent concealment against Gilead. The plaintiffs alleged that while Gilead was developing TDF, it discovered a similar, but chemically distinct and safer potential drug, TAF. However, Gilead allegedly decided to defer development of TAF because it was concerned that the immediate development of TAF would reduce its financial return from TDF. Gilead sought summary judgment on the ground that in order to recover for harm caused by a manufactured product, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective. The trial court denied Gilead's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.In reviewing this case, the appellate court held that the trial court was correct to deny Gilead's motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim. The court reasoned that a manufacturer's duty of reasonable care can extend beyond the duty not to market a defective product. The court found that the factual basis of the plaintiffs' claim was that Gilead knew TAF was safer than TDF, but decided to defer development of TAF to maximize its profits. The court held that if Gilead's decision to postpone development of TAF indeed breached its duty of reasonable care to users of TDF, then Gilead could potentially be held liable.However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision regarding plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent concealment. The court concluded that Gilead's duty to plaintiffs did not extend to the disclosure of information about TAF, as it was not available as an alternative treatment for HIV/AIDS at the time the alleged concealment occurred. Consequently, the court granted in part and denied in part Gilead's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the superior court to vacate its order denying Gilead's motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order denying summary adjudication of the negligence claim but granting summary adjudication of the fraudulent concealment claim. View "Gilead Tenofovir Cases" on Justia Law

by
In this case, Crista Miller tripped on a vertical misalignment of less than one inch between a metal plate covering an underground utility vault, owned by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), and the surrounding sidewalk adjacent to a property owned by Hip Sen Benevolent Association (Hip Sen), resulting in an injury to her ankle. Miller filed a lawsuit against both PG&E and Hip Sen, alleging general negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the lawsuit was barred by the trivial defect doctrine.Miller appealed, but the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court concluded that the vertical misalignment was a trivial defect as a matter of law. The court stated that to recover damages for negligence or premises liability, Miller had to prove that the defendants breached a legal duty to either repair or warn about the existence of the misalignment. However, it is well-established law that landowners are not liable for damages caused by minor, trivial, or insignificant defects in property. Even considering the steepness of the sidewalk, the weather conditions, the time of the incident, and the crowded nature of the street, the court found that these factors did not render the misalignment a dangerous condition. The court also found that the city's guidelines and repair notices did not impose a legal duty to repair such minor defects.Miller also argued that the city's repair notices to PG&E and Hip Sen for their violations of the city's Guidelines rendered them liable under a theory of negligence per se. However, the appellate court found this argument to be forfeited as Miller did not raise this issue in the trial court and only presented it for the first time in her appellate reply brief.Therefore, the appellate court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find the trivial sidewalk defect posed a substantial risk of injury to a foreseeable pedestrian exercising due care and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Miller v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

by
Appellants’ father died in a multi-car accident caused by a deer crossing State Route 154 (SR-154). Appellants sued respondent California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and others for negligence. They alleged the road constituted a dangerous condition under Government Code section 835. The trial court found that design immunity applied to Caltrans and granted summary judgment. Appellants contend the trial court erred when it found design immunity was a complete defense to Caltrans’ liability. They also contend the court failed to address a separate basis of liability, failed to warn when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment.The Second Appellate District affirmed. Appellants’ theory of the case, in sum, is that Caltrans designed SR-154 without certain specific features they contend would have made the highway safer. The court explained that Caltrans need not produce additional evidence to prove this point. A traffic engineer attested to the applicable design standards and how Caltrans addressed the dangers posed by deer entering traffic and vehicles crossing the median. This constitutes substantial evidence of advance approval. The court wrote that it would not second-guess the decision of Caltrans to include or omit certain design features. The court concluded that substantial evidence showed that a reasonable public employee would have adopted the SR-154 design plans, even without the features and changes Appellants contend Caltrans should have considered and included. View "Stufkosky v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

by
Mark Kielar challenged a superior court’s decision to grant Hyundai Motor America’s (Hyundai) motion to compel arbitration of his causes of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, and fraudulent inducement arising from alleged mechanical defects in the condition of his 2012 Hyundai Tucson. The superior court’s ruling followed Court of Appeal's earlier decision in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC, 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (2020) and concluded Hyundai, a nonsignatory manufacturer, could enforce the arbitration provision in the sales contract between Kielar and his local car dealership under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The Court of Appeal joined recent decisions that have disagreed with Felisilda and concluded the court erred in ordering arbitration. Therefore, it issued a preemptory writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its June 16, 2022 order and enter a new order denying Hyundai’s motion. View "Kielar v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

by
Raul Camacho was installing glass panels when he fell out of a scissor lift manufactured by JLG Industries Inc. (JLG). Camacho failed to latch a chain that was designed to guard the lift’s entrance. Camacho sued JLG for strict products liability, failure to warn, and related claims. At a jury trial, Camacho alleged the scissor lift as designed with the chain invited human error, and the foreseeable risk of harm could have been avoided if JLG had marketed only its alternative design with a self-closing gate. Camacho also alleged there was a defective warning label on the lift. At the close of evidence, JLG moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion. The court ruled in order to show causation Camacho needed to prove if the chain been latched, “the accident would have happened anyway.” To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: "Camacho only needed to make a prima facie showing that the alternative design with the self-closing gate would have prevented his fall. Under a risk-benefit test, it was then JLG’s burden to prove the benefits of the chain outweighed its risks." The Court found Camacho made a prima facie showing of causation, and the jury could have reasonably inferred that had a self-closing gate been in place, Camacho’s fall would have been prevented. The Court also found the jurors could have reasonably inferred JLG’s allegedly defective warning label was also a substantial factor in causing Camacho’s injuries. Thus, the Court reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting JLG’s motion for a directed verdict. View "Camacho v. JLG Industries" on Justia Law

by
This appeal involved the effect of an antiwaiver provision of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act on a release executed as part of a pre-litigation settlement between plaintiff-appellant Derek Rheinhart and defendants-respondents Nissan North America, Inc. and Mossy Nissan, Inc. (collectively Nissan) over issues that had arisen with Rheinhart’s leased Nissan vehicle. After Rheinhart entered into the settlement agreement and release, he filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the Act and seeking repurchase of his vehicle as well as other statutory remedies. Nissan moved for summary judgment on grounds the settlement agreement and release, which Rheinhart admitted he read and had an opportunity to review before signing, extinguished his claims. The trial court granted the motion, finding section 1790.1 of the Act applied to waivers of consumer warranties in connection with a product purchase, not to releases negotiated to end disputes about those warranties, and thus rejected Rheinhart’s argument that the settlement was unenforceable. Rheinhart contends the court erred. He argued the settlement agreement and release violated section 1790.1 and was unenforceable as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the settlement agreement and release contravened Rheinhart’s substantive rights under the Act and was void and unenforceable as against public policy. View "Rheinhart v. Nissan North America" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff Kamiya Perry appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) after a jury found in favor of Kia in her automobile defect trial. On appeal, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury that Kia had concealed evidence (certain engineering documents) during discovery; (2) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Kia’s paralegal who verified discovery requests relevant to the engineering documents; and (3) she was not given a fair trial because the jurors were required to deliberate in a small room, which, in the midst of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, incentivized the jury to complete their deliberations quickly. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Perry v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

by
In 2008, as part of the defendants’ application for approval of Onglyza and Kombiglyze XR, two diabetes drugs with saxagliptin as the active ingredient, the FDA’s Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee required that defendant AstraZeneca perform a cardiovascular outcomes study. “SAVOR” was a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study that consisted of 16,492 patients with type 2 diabetes who were at high risk of cardiovascular disease. The study concluded that saxagliptin did not increase or decrease the risk of these occurrences but noted a higher risk of hospitalization. Following SAVOR, the FDA required warning labels for medications containing saxagliptin, referring to the potential increased risk of heart failure. Researchers conducted additional studies and did not find an association between saxagliptin and an increased risk of hospitalization for heart failure.Patients who took drugs with saxagliptin filed approximately 250 related cases. Most of these cases were filed in federal court and consolidated into federal multidistrict litigation. A Judicial Council coordination proceeding (JCCP) was established for the California state court cases. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court upheld the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ general causation expert, who opined that saxagliptin can cause heart failure. View "Onglyza Product Cases" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs Oscar and Audrey Madrigal sued defendant Hyundai Motor America (Hyundai) under California’s automobile lemon law. Early in the case, Hyundai made two offers to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, both of which were rejected. After a jury was sworn in, plaintiffs settled with Hyundai for a principal amount that was less than Hyundai’s second section 998 offer. The parties elected to leave the issue of costs and attorney fees for the trial court to decide upon motion. Under the settlement agreement, once the issue of costs and attorney fees was resolved and payment was made by Hyundai, plaintiffs would dismiss their complaint with prejudice. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether section 998’s cost-shifting penalty provisions apply when an offer to compromise is rejected and the case ends in settlement. Under the facts of this case, the Court held that it did and therefore reversed the order of the trial court. View "Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs filed claims against the Ford Motor Company (FMC) for alleged defects in vehicles the company manufactured. FMC filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims based on the arbitration provision in the sale contracts. Plaintiffs opposed FMC’s motion, including on the grounds that FMC had waived its right to compel arbitration through its litigation conduct. The trial court denied FMC’s motion on its merits.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with the trial court that FMC could not compel arbitration based on Plaintiffs’ agreements with the dealers that sold them the vehicles. Equitable estoppel does not apply because, contrary to FMC’s arguments, Plaintiffs’ claims against it in no way rely on the agreements. FMC was not a third-party beneficiary of those agreements, as there is no basis to conclude Plaintiffs and their dealers entered into them with the intention of benefitting FMC. And FMC is not entitled to enforce the agreements as an undisclosed principal because there is no nexus between Plaintiffs’ claims, any alleged agency between FMC and the dealers, and the agreements. View "Ford Motor Warranty Cases" on Justia Law