Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hennessy manufactured and supplied brake arcing machines used to grind asbestos brakes. Rondon used Hennessy’s machines while working as a mechanic, 1965-1988. Rondon developed mesothelioma as the result of exposure to asbestos while working as a mechanic and brought claims for strict liability and negligence against Hennessy, alleging that its brake arcing machines released asbestos dust that caused him injury when he used them to grind standard brake linings. Hennessy’s grinders themselves did not contain asbestos. Hennessy alleged that the machines were not designed to be used exclusively with asbestos-containing products and were used on non-asbestos brakes. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed, citing the 2015 decision from the Second District Court of Appeal in Sherman v. Hennessy, holding that the proper test is not the “exclusive use” standard argued by Hennessy and relied on by the trial court, but whether the “inevitable use” of Hennessy’s machines would expose a worker like Rondon to asbestos dust absent safety protection or adequate warning. Rondon produced sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the “inevitable use” standard was met. View "Rondon v. Hennessy Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Hennessy manufactured and supplied brake shoe arcing machines, (grinders) used to grind asbestos brakes. Hetzel allegedly used its grinder while working as a mechanic from 1958 to 1962 and alleged Hennessy knew or should have known its grinders would be used in conjunction with asbestos-containing brake linings. All brake shoe linings used with automobiles during the relevant period contained asbestos. He claimed Hennessy had a duty to warn of the risks. Hennessy’s grinders did not contain asbestos and are designed to reshape the friction material of a brake shoe, regardless of the shoe’s composition, by mechanical abrasion. When the grinder comes into contact with an asbestos-containing brake shoe, it releases asbestos into the air. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Hennessy, reasoning that brake shoes without asbestos existed at the time of plaintiff’s exposure and Hennessy’s grinders worked on all brake linings, regardless of whether they contained asbestos. Hetzel, who suffered lung damage, died in 2012. The court of appeal reversed. The combined use of Hennessy’s machines with the asbestos brakes inevitably created a hazardous condition by releasing asbestos fibers into the air. Hennessy was in a position to provide safeguards from this exposure. View "Hetzel v. Hennessy Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2001, BioEnterics obtained FDA approval for the Lap-Band, “designed to induce weight loss in severely obese patients by limiting food consumption" by creation of a small gastric pouch. The FDA indicated that the Lap-Band’s labeling must “specify the requirements that apply to the training of practitioners who may use the device” and required annual progress reports on a postapproval study. BioEnterics's brochure states that surgeons planning laparoscopic placement must have specific experience, participate in a training program authorized by BioEnterics, be observed by “qualified personnel” during their first placements, have the equipment and experience necessary to complete the procedure via laparotomy if required, and report on their personal experiences using the device. In 2003, plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure to implant a Lap-Band, which eventually eroded into her stomach and her liver; Lap-Band tubing became entangled with her small intestine. During surgery to remove the Lap-Band she suffered a massive hemorrhaging from her liver, causing her to experience profound hypotension and systemic shock, resulting in brain damage. More than nine years later, plaintiff filed suit. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal of her claim that the company failed to adequately train physicians in the use of the Lap-Band, as preempted by federal law. View "Glennen v. Allergan, Inc." on Justia Law

Cummins installed asbestos containing products in California and had received hundreds of asbestos bodily injury claims, including many lawsuits, based on exposure to its asbestos containing materials. Cummins purchased 19 U.S. Fidelity insurance policies 1969-1987, and purchased four U.S. Fire policies, 1988-1992, for “primary, umbrella, and or excess insurance policies,” some of which “may be missing or only partially documented.” Cummins and its parent company (Holding, formed in 2014) sought a “declaratory judgment that defendants are obligated to defend and/or indemnify Cummins [Corp.], in full, including, without limitation, payment of the cost of investigation, defense, settlement and judgment . . . , for past, present and future Asbestos Suits under each of the Policies triggered by the Asbestos Suits.” The trial court dismissed without leave to amend, finding that Holding lacked standing. The court of appeal affirmed. Holding, the controlling shareholder of Cummins, does not have a contractual relationship with the insurers and is not otherwise interested in the insurance contracts. View "D. Cummins Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a salesman for Kaiser Refractories, filed suit against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products, including Foster Wheeler, a manufacturer of industrial boilers insulated with refractory, alleging causes of action for, among other things, strict liability and negligence/failure to warn. The jury returned a verdict for Foster Wheeler and plaintiff appealed. The court agreed with plaintiff that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, because substantial evidence fails to prove, as required for the sophisticated user defense, that by virtue of his position, training, experience, knowledge, or skill, he knew or should have known of the health risks posed by working with or near the asbestos-containing products he sold and which were used in Foster Wheeler boilers. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Moran v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a products liability suit against Toyota, alleging that plaintiffs' accident occurred because their Toyota Tundra lacked electronic stability control (ESC), also known as vehicle stability control (VSC), and that the absence of this device or system was a design defect. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s denial of their motion in limine to exclude evidence that the custom of the automotive industry was not to include ESC as standard equipment in pickup trucks. The court held that evidence of industry custom and practice may be admissible in a strict products liability action, depending on the nature of the evidence and the purpose for which the proponent seeks to introduce the evidence. In this case, the trial court properly denied plaintiffs' motion in limine because plaintiffs moved to exclude all such evidence. The court also concluded that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and imposition of a time limit on the duration of rebuttal argument were not an abuse of discretion, and that the trial court properly refused plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions on federal safety standards and industry custom. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a negligence and strict products liability action against E.F. Brady, alleging that asbestos-containing products it distributed caused Joel Hernandezcueva’s mesothelioma. On appeal, Jovana Hernandezcueva challenged the trial court's rulings on the motions for nonsuit and a new trial. In the published portion of the court's opinion, the court concluded that the trial court erred in granting a nonsuit on the strict products liability claim because the Hernandezcuevas’ evidence sufficed to show that E. F. Brady, while acting as a subcontractor in the construction of a commercial building, was in the stream of commerce relating to the asbestos-containing products, for purposes of the imposition of strict liability. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hernandezcueva v. E.F. Brady Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, diagnosed with acute myelogenous leukemia allegedly caused by exposure to Safety-Kleen 105 Solvent during the course of their employment, filed suit against defendants, including Calsol, a distributor of mineral spirits for the ultimate manufacturer, Safety-Kleen. The trial court granted Calsol's motion for summary judgment based on the raw material or component parts doctrine. The court concluded, however, that the component parts doctrine requires a showing that the mineral spirits supplied to Safety-Kleen was not inherently dangerous. Because Calsol failed to make that showing, the court concluded that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether mineral spirits are inherently dangerous. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brady v. Calsol, Inc." on Justia Law

This action under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the False Advertising Law (FAL) arose from Philip Morris USA, Inc.'s use of terms such as "Lights" and "Lowered Tar and Nicotine" in advertising Marlboro Lights, to indicate they were less harmful to one's health than Marlboro Reds and other full-flavored cigarettes. The trial court determined Marlboro Lights were as dangerous than any other cigarettes, Philip Morris knew that, and its advertising was likely to deceive consumers. The court, however, denied plaintiffs' prayer for restitution on the ground they received value from Marlboro Lights apart from the deceptive advertising, and the evidence they submitted in an effort to show the difference between what they paid for Marlboro Lights and the value they actually received was incompetent and inadmissible. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the court erred as a matter of law by determining the only measure of restitution in a UCL products action was the measure set forth in "In re Vioxx Class of Cases," 180 Cal.App.4th 116 (2009)). Plaintiffs asserted value was immaterial, and they were not required to show any loss attributable to the deceptive advertising, because as an alternative measure the court had discretion to order Philip Morris to make a full refund of consumer expenditures, or its profits thereon, exclusively for the purpose of deterrence. Plaintiffs also contended the court abused its discretion by denying injunctive relief on the ground of mootness. A federal court opinion affirmed in relevant part in "United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." (566 F.3d 1095 (2009)), and federal legislation have already enjoined tobacco companies' use of the objectionable descriptors, plaintiffs asserted the matter was not moot because Philip Morris continued to market the cigarettes, called Marlboro Gold, in light-colored packs, which ostensibly signified they were less dangerous than Marlboro Reds or other cigarettes sold in dark-colored packs. Additionally, plaintiffs argued the court erred by denying them declaratory relief, awarding Philip Morris costs as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, and denying them sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 for Philip Morris's failure to make admissions. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that all of plaintiffs' points were meritless and affirmed the judgment. View "In re Tobacco Cases II" on Justia Law

Shiffer developed mesothelioma and sued CBS, whose predecessor, Westinghouse, provided a turbine set and asbestos-containing insulation for a power plant where Shiffer worked for several months in 1969-1970. Shiffer did not repair or maintain any Westinghouse equipment and did not install or remove any insulation material himself; no already-installed insulation was removed or disturbed during Shiffer’s time at the power plant. The trial court granted CBS summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed. Shiffer failed to produce evidence raising a triable issue that Shiffer suffered bystander exposure to Westinghouse asbestos while at the plant. The trial court also properly denied plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration and a new trial, because evidence of potential harm from reentrainment of asbestos was not new and could have been presented in opposition to the original summary judgment motion. View "Shiffer v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law